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ABSTRACT I
The main objectives of this study are to: (1) investigate empirically the extensiveness of
the Cypriot and Greek corporate mandatory disclosure practices; (2) examine the
relationship between each of a number of specific corporate characteristics and the
Cypriot and Greek corporate mandatory disclosure practices; (3) assess whether the
variations in the extensiveness of Cypriot and Greek corporate mandatory disclosure
practices can be explained by the selected corporate characteristics together; and (4),
compare the results found for Cyprus with those found for Greece. The corporate
characteristics examined, which are used as proxies of agency, political and other
costs, are: company size, age, profitability, liquidity, industry type, listing status and
auditor type.
The study begins with the provision of background information about the Cypriot and
Greek accounting environments which reveals that companies in the two countries
operate within substantially different accounting environments. The study continues
with a synthesis of the conceptual framework for corporate financial disclosure that
identifies the variables that are likely to affect the research problem. A review of the
corporate disclosure literature identifies a gap in the literature, which the study aspires
to fill, and establishes the background for choosing the appropriate methodology to be
used in the study. To investigate the extensiveness of the Cypriot and Greek corporate
mandatory disclosure practices, the 1996 corporate annual financial statements
(CAFSs) of 50 Cypriot and 74 Greek companies were collected. Extensiveness was
defined as the quantity and quality of mandatory information disclosed in CAFSs and
was measured by applying a country—specific disclosure measuring instrument against
the CAFSs of the sample companies from each country. The relationship between the
extent of corporate disclosure and the selected corporate characteristics was examined
by using both bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses for each of the two
countries.
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The results of the empirical analyses have led to four main conclusions. First, the
Cypriot and Greek corporate mandatory disclosure practices, on the whole, appear to
be extensive. Second, Cypriot public companies which are more profitable, are
classified as conglomerates or whose shares are listed on the Cyprus Stock Exchange
(CSE), tend to disclose significantly more extensive mandatory information in their
1996 CAFSs. Third, Greek listed companies which are smaller, are classified as
conglomerates or manufacturing, or whose shares are listed on the main market of the
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), tend to disclose significantly more extensive mandatory
information in their 1996 CAFSs. Finally, on the basis of the comparative analyses
undertaken, it can be concluded that although the influence of listing status and
industry type on Cypriot and Greek mandatory disclosure practices is similar, the
influence of company size is different. In contrast to Cyprus and most evidence
reported in previous studies, company size has a negative influence on the extent of
Greek corporate mandatory disclosure practices. This difference can be explained by
theoretical, environmental, empirical and other considerations. For example, it can be
attributed to the distinctive nature of the highly politicised Greek accounting
environment and can be explained by political cost theory. Another possible
explanation may be that Greek large companies disclose fewer details in their CAFSs
but: (1) use other communication media to disclose mandatory information; or (2), use
mandatory and voluntary disclosures as substitutes and replace the disclosure of less
extensive mandatory information with more extensive voluntary disclosure.
There are several possible policy implications that arise out of the above conclusions.
The first implication is that improvements in Cypriot and Greek corporate mandatory
disclosure can be made. Another policy implication is that corporate stakeholders who
rely on CAFSs to get useful information should be wary of Cypriot companies which are
less profitable, are classified as non—conglomerates or are not listed on the CSE; and
Greek companies which are larger, are classified as others or are listed on the parallel
market of the ASE. This is because these companies have been found to disclose less
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extensive mandatory information. The third policy implication arising out of the
conclusions of the study is that it is possible that different predictions about the
disclosure of corporate information may be derived from the political cost theory,
depending on the environment within which the theory is examined. This is because
although it is usually claimed that politically sensitive companies may disclose more
extensively in order to reduce their political costs, the opposite may be true in the case
of countries with specific environmental characteristics (similar to those existing in
Greece in 1996): politically sensitive companies may disclose less extensively.
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PART I
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
"Every science and every inquiry, and similarly every activity and
pursuit, is thought to aim at some good".
(Aristotle, 384 — 322 B.C.; cited in Bartlett and Kaplan, 1992)
1.1	 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
1.1.1	 The Nature and Role of Accounting
What is accounting? Is it a system of rules aiming to facilitate the recording of
commercial transactions and the production of stewardship reports, or a fully
developed social service with practical rules and supporting theories? Indeed, so
many definitions of accounting are encountered, that one may be confused about its
nature and role.
There are those who argue that accounting is an art, stressing that accounting skills
can be taught and suggesting that a legalistic approach to accounting could be
adopted by codifying its practices (Beams, 1965). On the other hand, there are those
who propose that accounting is a science, emphasising that accounting skills can only
be gained by giving more conceptual insight into what accounting is attempting to do
and provoking more critical thought about its dynamics (Sterling, 1975). Mautz (1963)
proposes that since accounting deals with social groups (enterprises), is concerned
with events which have social consequences (economic transactions), and produces
knowledge that is useful to human beings engaged in activities having social
implications (economic information), accounting is primarily mental in nature and
should be seen as a social science. In this respect, Belkaoui (1994) notes that the
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now widely—held view is that accounting is a social service, emphasising that
research as well as practice have taken the discipline to new frontiers, making it a fully
developed social science.
The discussion above suggests that accounting is a service activity which aspires to be
at the core of the working of the economy. Its role is to produce useful economic
information so as to aid users' decision making, whether in the deployment of
resources in profit and non—profit organisations or in the economy in general. For the
purposes of both practice and study, accounting is usually divided into financial
accounting, whose objective is to provide information for use by parties both internal
and external to the enterprise, and management accounting, whose primary concern is
the provision of information for management purposes. While information provided by
the former is essentially a review of past performance and current financial position,
the latter incorporates feedback on current performance as well as forecasts
concerning future activities and events. This thesis concentrates on financial
accounting and its role as a social service, aiming to provide information which is
useful in making economic decisions.
1.1.2	 Accounting Disclosure
The preceding section indicates that accounting is essentially a process of
communicating economic information. Bedford (1973) conceptualises this process as
consisting of four procedural steps: the perception of an organisation's significant
activities, the symbolisation of the perceived activities in order to grasp an
understanding of their interrelationships, the analysis of the activities in order to
summarise, organise and lay bare their interrelationship and, finally, the
communication of the analysis to different interested parties. While the perception and
symbolisation steps constitute the process of accounting measurement, the analysis
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and communication steps constitute the process of accounting disclosure. These two
processes together give financial reporting its substance (Choi and Mueller, 1992).
Companies, which are the form of business organisation of interest in the thesis,
disclose economic information to interested users via a variety of formal and informal
forms (such as interim statements, prospectuses, news releases, ad hoc statements
etc.). However, it is widely accepted that the most appropriate way in which
information can be presented to meet the objective of corporate financial reporting is
the set of corporate annual financial statements (CAFSs) [Accounting Standards Board
(ASB), 1996]. These statements normally include a balance sheet, an income
statement, a statement of changes in financial position and other explanatory notes
and statements [International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), 1996]. They
may also include supplementary schedules and information, but do not include the
directors' and chairman's reports or other management information that are usually
included (in addition to the CAFSs) in a company's annual report (CAR).
Depending on the degree of statutory and other institutional regulation in each country,
the quality of information disclosed in CAFSs is usually left to the judgement of those
who are legally responsible for their preparation, the company directors. It is,
therefore, of vital importance to the efficient and effective functioning of every
company, that information disclosed in CAFSs is evaluated in order to determine
whether it adheres to certain standards and possesses those qualitative characteristics
that render it useful to decision makers. Because, if information disclosed in the main
communication medium is not believed to be useful, then the whole edifice of
corporate financial accounting (if not of the economic system itself) becomes rickety
and unstable.
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1.1.3	 Previous Work in the Field of Corporate Financial Disclosure
Since the 1960's several researchers have investigated the quality of disclosure in
CAFSs and CARs. However, disclosure quality is a broad and abstract concept which
cannot be measured directly because ". . . it does not possess inherent characteristics
by which one can determine its intensity or quality like the capacity of an automobile"
(Wallace, 1987, p.431). Hence, different constructs of disclosure quality have been
examined by different researchers including adequacy (e.g. Buzby, 1974),
informativeness (e.g. Imhoff, 1992), timeliness (e.g. Courtis, 1976), understandability
(e.g. Jones, 1996), comprehensiveness (e.g. Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994) and
extensiveness (e.g. Patton and Zelenka, 1997). One way of classifying these
disclosure studies is to identify the number of countries examined and their stage of
economic development. Thus, they can be classified as either a single—country study,
where the country examined is either developed or developing, or a cross—national
comparative study, where the comparison is either between two or more developed
countries or between a developed and a developing country.
Most of these studies focused on a single, and usually developed, country. Examples
include the US (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Qesai, 1971), the UK (Firth, 1979), Sweden
(Cooke, 1989), Japan (Cooke, 1991), Spain (Wallace et al., 1994), and Switzerland
(Raffournier, 1995). Apart from Singhvi's (1967) study on India, the field of corporate
financial disclosure research was not extended to developing countries until the late
1980s. Examples include South Africa (Firer and Meth, 1986), Nigeria (Wallace,
1987), Mexico (Chow and Wong—Boren, 1987), Jordan (Abu—Nassar and Rutherford,
1994), and Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994).
In contrast, a literature review indicates that relatively few cross—national comparative
disclosure studies have been done. Even within this category, most studies have
focused on developed countries (for example, Barrett, 1976 and Spero, 1979). The
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paucity of cross—national comparative studies in the literature on disclosure was noted
by Gernon and Wallace (1995). They emphasised the need ". . . to move this type of
research into the international domain by undertaking cross—national comparisons of
accounting and disclosure quality and their determinants" (Gernon and Wallace, 1995,
p.67).
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1.2	 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
1.2.1	 Statement of the Problem
Based on the researcher's knowledge of the Cypriot and the Greek accounting
environments, financial disclosure was identified as an important but unexplored
research area in both countries. After a comprehensive review of the relevant
literature and a series of unstructured interviews in each of the two countries, it was
possible to narrow down the specific issue for investigation to that area which the
researcher considered to be in need for research: to evaluate the quality of the
financial disclosure practices of Cypriot and Greek companies. However, the research
area of corporate financial disclosure is so broad as to be capable of generating many
research endeavours. Consequently, the scope of the study has been limited to the
investigation of the extensiveness of financial disclosure in the 1996 CAFSs of Cypriot
and Greek companies. The reasons for focusing on this topic are summarised below.
1.2.2	 Extensiveness
As noted earlier, disclosure quality is a broad and abstract concept and alternative
constructs have been used to represent disclosure quality; these include adequacy,
timeliness, understandability and extensiveness. Imhoff (1992, p101) defined
disclosure quality as an evaluator's ". . . overall subjective assessment of the
relevance, reliability and comparability of the accounting data produced by the
reporting entity — in essence, the relative usefulness of the data, and the analyses
based on the data".
In this study, extensiveness has been selected to be used as a proxy for disclosure
quality mainly because it can easily be linked to disclosure usefulness. This is
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because ". . . on the basis of the preceding (Imhoff's, 1992) definition and excluding
the problem of information overload, the quality of disclosure in CARs would be
expected to increase if more details were given on each information item of
interest . . ." (Wallace and Naser, 1995, p.327). In the context of this study
extensiveness is operationalised as the quantity and quality of information disclosed in
the CAFSs. The quantity of disclosure items is captured by the number of mandatory
information items disclosed, whereas quality of disclosure is captured by the
disaggregation of the mandatory information items into sub—elements of information
that should or could have been disclosed.
1.2.3	 Financial Disclosure
Several categories of information disclosure have been investigated by accounting
researchers including financial (e.g. Choi, 1973b), non—financial (e.g. Jones, 1986),
segmental (e.g. McKinnon and Dalimuthe, 1993), and environmental (e.g. Wiseman,
1982). Within the context of financial disclosure, different types of information have
been examined such as aggregate (e.g. Cerf, 1961), mandatory (e.g. Tai, Au—Yeung,
Kwok and Lau, 1990) and voluntary (e.g. Cooke, 1991). Even for a particular type of
information, different definitions of each type of information have been used. For
example Tai et al., (1990) defined mandatory items as those required by law, stock
exchange or professional pronouncements, whereas Cooke's (1993) definition
included only those stipulated by law.
In the context of this study financial disclosure is defined as the release of quantitative
and non—quantitative information disclosed in the 1996 CAFSs of Cypriot and Greek
companies. The inclusion of both quantitative and non—quantitative information is
based on the assumption that disclosure of the latter normally enhances an
understanding of the former (Belkaoui, 1994). It has been decided to focus on
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mandatory information items for the following reasons. First, the amount of information
required to be disclosed in both Cyprus and Greece is extensive, and by
disaggregating those mandatory items into different sub—elements of information,
very detailed and comprehensive lists can be produced that can capture the quantity
and quality of corporate disclosure. Second, Cypriot and Greek corporate reporting
has not yet started to emulate to a significant extent the practice of providing
information items that are entirely voluntary. Finally, to investigate the disclosure of
information items that are entirely voluntary may swamp the very thing being looked for
— the extensiveness by which the mandatory information elements are disclosed
(Wallace and Naser, 1995).
Nevertheless, although the information items to be investigated are mandatory, the
study also captures an element of voluntary disclosure (as in the case of Wallace et
al., 1994 and Wallace and Naser, 1995). This is because the information items
required to be disclosed (mandatory information) have been disaggregated into sub—
elements of information that should or could have been disclosed; usually the
disclosure of those sub—elements of information is essentially a matter of managerial
choice (Barrett, 1976).
1.2.4	 Corporate Annual Financial Statements
Although some researchers have evaluated the quality of financial reporting by non-
profit—making organisations such as governmental units (e.g. Robbins and Austin,
1986), the most popular type of organisations investigated in disclosure studies, and
the one of interest in this research, is that of limited companies. The main reasons for
selecting these organisations is firstly because they represent the main form of
business in both Cyprus and Greece and, secondly, because of the absence of public
disclosure by other forms of business organisations (such as partnerships and sole
proprietors). It has been decided to exclude financial companies (banks, insurance
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companies and leasing corporations) from the investigation because they are
exempted from certain disclosure requirements or are required to disclose specific
items that are unique to their type of activities. Thus, including them in the samples
would preclude the construction of a common disclosure measuring instrument for all
companies.
There are different mediums via which companies communicate information to users
that have been investigated in the literature; these include interim reports (e.g.
Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman, 1981) and the chairman's narratives (e.g. Jones,
1986). However, the one examined in this study is the set of CAFSs. This is because
the set of CAFSs is generally recognised as the most appropriate way in which
information can be presented in order to meet the objective of financial reporting (ASB,
1996). Additionally, the set of CAFSs is the only general purpose financial reporting
document which is widely available to all user groups and is subject to an independent
examination by the auditors of the company.
1.2.5	 Cyprus and Greece
There are two reasons for selecting Cyprus and Greece. The first is that in spite of
their increasing economic importance, information about the Cypriot and Greek
corporate disclosure practices is virtually non—existent in the literature. Hence, a
related disclosure study can fill a gap in the literature. Second, the researcher is in a
strategic position to undertake a study on these two countries without facing all the
problems that, according to Wallace and Gernon (1991), render International
Comparative Financial Accounting Research (ICFAR) a "gamble with an uncertain pay
off' 1 (Wallace and Gernon, 1991, p.250).
.1 The researcher has qualified as an accountant/auditor having worked in the profession in Cyprus. He
has also been an accounting lecturer in Cypriot colleges and is currently the Associate Dean and the
Director of Professional studies at Intercoliege where he is in charge of professional accountancy courses
in Cyprus and Greece.
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1.3 JUSTIFICATION AND GOALS OF THE STUDY
1.3.1	 Justification
The purpose of this study is to extend the field of corporate financial disclosure
research to two developing 2 eastern Mediterranean countries, Cyprus and Greece.
This is achieved by undertaking an empirical investigation of the financial disclosure
practices of Cypriot and Greek companies. This study can be justified on the following
grounds.
First, this study should be an addition to the corporate disclosure literature. This is
because a literature review has indicated that in spite of the increasing economic
importance of both Cyprus and Greece, little or virtually no information exists about the
corporate disclosure practices in the two countries. The increasing economic
importance of the two countries can be evidenced by the fact that Greece is a member
of the European Union (EU) and an emerging capital market (Sigma Securities, 1996).
Cyprus, on the other hand, is (at the beginning of 2001) a prime candidate for EU
membership. Hence, a study of the Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure practices
can represent a contribution to the corporate disclosure literature and an addition to
knowledge.
Second, the results of this study can be of particular importance to various economic
and academic groups. For example, the empirical evidence provided can help users of
CAFSs in the two countries to determine whether accounting information disclosed
therein is of a sufficiently high quality and whether it can be relied upon as a useful
2	 •Lipsey (1983) states that we cannot have a unique ranking of various countries in terms of the degree of
development because development of the economy can be measured in several ways. A country can be
classified under one measurement as underdeveloped and as developed under another. In this study, the
term "developing" is used for both the Cypriot and Greek economies as it is the term usually used by local
economists to describe both economies.
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basis for decision making. The results of this study can also help Cypriot and Greek
companies determine whether their current disclosure practices are adequate and
decide whether a change in the way they communicate with external parties is needed.
Likewise, the results of the study can help policy makers in Cyprus and Greece
determine whether any corporate disclosure deficiencies exist and point their attention
to areas where improvements are needed. Finally, the empirical evidence provided by
the study can represent useful research material for accounting disclosure
researchers, as it will provide them with information and evidence about the Cypriot
and Greek accounting environments.
1.3.2	 Research Objectives and Research Questions
To facilitate the transformation of the main research problem into specific research
objectives and research questions and select the appropriate strategies to address
them, a hierarchical structure of the research problem was prepared (Figure 1.1). The
main research problem was broken down into four research objectives:
(1) To investigate empirically the extensiveness of the Cypriot and Greek corporate
mandatory disclosure practices.
(2) To examine the relationship between each of a number of specific corporate
characteristics (found to be explanatory of corporate disclosure in other
countries) and the Cypriot and Greek corporate mandatory disclosure practices.
(3) To assess whether the variations in the extensiveness of Cypriot and Greek
corporate mandatory disclosure practices can be explained by the selected
corporate characteristics together.
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(4) To make appropriate comparisons between the ways in which corporate
characteristics influence Cypriot corporate mandatory disclosure practices and
the ways in which they influence Greek corporate mandatory disclosure
practices.
To accomplish these objectives the following specific research questions were
investigated:
(1) What is the extent of mandatory information disclosure in the CAFSs of Cypriot
and Greek companies?
(2) Is there any association between the extent of mandatory disclosure by Cypriot
and Greek companies and each of a number of selected corporate
characteristics?
(3) Can the variations in the extent of corporate mandatory disclosure practices of
Cypriot and Greek companies be explained by the selected corporate
characteristics together?
(4) What are the similarities of, and differences between, the relationships between
corporate characteristics and corporate mandatory disclosure found for Cypriot
companies and those found for Greek companies?
1.3.3	 Addressing the Research Questions
The nature of the research problem, the associated research objectives set, as well as
the research questions generated, call for a hypothesis—testing investigation. Thus,
this study is hypothesis—testing in nature because it aims to offer an enhanced
14
understanding of the relationships that exist among Cypriot and Greek corporate
financial disclosure and various corporate characteristics.
The first research question was empirically addressed by measuring the extent of
disclosure by Cypriot and Greek companies. To measure disclosure, an index for
each country was constructed.
The second question was addressed separately for each country, by measuring the
degree of statistical association between the extent of the corporate disclosure
practices of the selected companies and each of a number of corporate
characteristics. The characteristics examined were: (1) Company size; (2) Company
age; (3) Company profitability; (4) Company liquidity; (5) Industry type; (6) Listing
status; and (7), Auditor type. The relationship of the selected corporate characteristics
with the corporate disclosure practices was explored by statistically testing the
following hypotheses (stated in the alternative form):
Hl:	 There is an association between a company's size and the extent of its
disclosure practice.
H2: There is an association between a company's age and the extent of its
disclosure practice.
H3: There is an association between a company's profitability and the extent
of its disclosure practice.
H4: There is an association between a company's liquidity and the extent of its
disclosure practice.
H5: The extent of a company's disclosure practice varies depending on the
industry to which it belongs (whether it is a manufacturer, conglomerate
or other).
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H6(C): The extent of disclosure of a Cypriot listed company is greater than that of
an unlisted one.
H6(G): The extent of disclosure of a Greek main—market listed company is
greater than that of a parallel—market listed one.
H7(C): The extent of disclosure of a Cypriot Big 5 audited company is greater
than that of a Cypriot non—Big 5 audited one.
H7(G): There is an association between a Greek company's auditor—type and the
extent of its disclosure practice.
The third research question was addressed by specifying one cross—sectional
regression model for each country. This enabled an examination of the multivariate
relationship between the extent of corporate disclosure (dependent variable) and the
identified corporate characteristics (independent variables) for the samples in each
country.
Finally, the fourth research question was addressed by undertaking qualitative and
quantitative comparisons between the results obtained for research questions 1, 2 and
3.
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1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS
The research was conducted using the hypothetico—deductive method. The selection
of this method has mainly been determined by the nature of the problem of interest
and the type of research questions set. These call for the development of a general
theoretical framework for corporate financial disclosure, the formulation of testable
hypotheses, the collection of relevant data from each country, and the analysis of the
data in order to provide an answer to the research problem. An alternative reason for
employing this approach is because its widespread use in the literature indicates that it
is currently the most appropriate method for investigating national corporate disclosure
practices. The alternative, inductive method, is not considered appropriate for this
study, because it proceeds in the opposite direction: the researcher begins with data in
hand and generates hypotheses and a theory from the ground up (Selltiz, Wrightsman
and Cook, 1981).
Sekaran (1992) states that the hypothetico—deductive method of research involves a
step—by—step logical and organised method to identify the research problem, gather
and analyse the data, and draw valid conclusions. The research process starts with
the identification of the broad research area and proceeds to preliminary data
gathering, delineation of the research problem, development of the theoretical
framework, generation of the research hypotheses, construction of the research
design, and data collection and analysis. In an attempt to follow this purposive and
rigorous approach, as well as in order to keep the research within a reasonable time
scale, network analysis was employed. The main components of the research process
were broken down into activities (Table 1.1) and a procedural network was prepared
(Figure 1.2). The network analysis undertaken identified the critical stages of the study
and pinpointed the activities that could be undertaken simultaneously.
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TABLE 1.1:
NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS
N.4 Main Component ofthe Research Process Activity Description
Activity
Code
PI eceding
Activity Code
-
A
1. Observation - Preliminary study & literature review
- Selection of topic
A
B
2. Preliminary Data
Gathering
- Intensive literature re N iew in Cyprus
and the UK
- Preliminary data collection (general
information about Cyprus and Greece)
- Interviews in Cyprus and Greece
C
D
E
B
B
C, D
3. Problem Definition - Delineate the research problem
- Present thesis proposal & registration
F
G
E
F
4. Descriptive Analysis - Detailed data collection (detailed
information about Cypriot and Greek
accounting environments)
- Analyse regulatory framework of
accounting in Cyprus and Greece
- Draft first chapters
H
I
J
F
H
G, I
5. Theoretical
Framework
- Detailed review of relevant literature
- Variables identified
K
L
I
J, K
6. Generation of
Research Hypotheses
- Visualise the theoretical relationships
- Generate the research hypotheses
M
N
L
M
7. Research Design - Write to companies requesting their
CAFSs
- Design disclosure scoring instruments
- Follow up responses from companies
- External validation and modification of
scoring instruments
- Test response validity
0
P
Q
R
S
K
I
o
P
Q
8. Data Analyses,
Interpretation &
Deduction
- Scoring of CAFSs
- Carry out statistical analyses
- Discuss preliminary results
- Carry out any further analyses needed
and submit first draft
- Final amendments, typing and
submission
- Examination
T
U
V
W
X
Y
R, S
N, T
U
T, V
W
X
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Selection of topic
1
• •
Intensive Ii erature review
in Cyprus and the UK
Preliminary
data collection
Interviews in Cyprus and
Greece	•
• 	
	•
FIGURE 1.2:
PROCEDURAL NETWORK OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS
Preliminary study
& literature review
Delineate the research
problem
•
Present thesis proposal
& registration Detailed data collection
4,
Draft first chapters
Analyse regulatory
framework of accounting
in Cyprus and Greece
•
Variables identified Detailed review of
relevant literature
Design disclosure
scoring instruments
4, 4,
Visualise the
theoretical
relationships
Generate the research
hypotheses
Write to companies
requesting their CAFSs
Extemal
and modification
scoring instruments
validation
of
Follow up responses
from companies
Test response validity Scoring of CAFSs
Discuss preliminary
results
• 
Carry out statistical
analyses
Carry out any further
analyses needed and
submit first draft
4,
Final amendments,
typing and submission
Examination
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1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY
The study is divided into four parts.
Part I, consisting of Chapters 1 and 2, introduces the study. Chapter 1 specifies the
purpose of the study and the underlying research problem. It also establishes the
relationship between the present study and previous studies in the research area and
sets the boundaries within which the study was conducted. Chapter 2 identifies those
factors that exert considerable influence on the development of a country's accounting
and disclosure practices, assesses their impact within the Cypriot and Greek
environments and examines each country's regulatory framework of financial
accounting and reporting.
Part II, consisting of Chapters 3 and 4, reviews the relevant literature on corporate
financial disclosure. Chapter 3 synthesises the conceptual framework for corporate
financial disclosure and identifies the variables that are likely to affect the research
problem. Chapter 4 reviews those corporate disclosure studies that, in the opinion of
the researcher, have been the most influential in the area and establishes the
appropriate research methodology to be used in the present study.
Part III, consisting of Chapters 5 to 8, is the empirical part of the study. Chapter 5
develops several hypotheses about the Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure
practices based on the information and prior empirical evidence that were presented in
Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 6 clarifies the nature of the research design, sheds light
on the data collection and sampling techniques, and explains the methodological
techniques used to measure corporate disclosure and the selected corporate
characteristics. Chapters 7 and 8 empirically investigate the corporate disclosure
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practices of Cypriot and Greek companies, and answer the three research questions
posed.
Finally Part IV, consisting of Chapters 9 and 10, is the concluding part of the study.
Chapter 9 compares the Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure practices. Chapter 10
presents the main conclusions of the study and the related policy implications,
considers the limitations of the study, and suggests possible future research
endeavours.
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1.6	 SUMMARY
Chapter 1 specified the purposes of the study and the underlying research problem. It
also presented the research problem and outlined the research objectives and the
associated research questions to be investigated. Finally, Chapter 1 explained briefly
the different methods used to address the research questions and gave a broad
overview of the research procedure followed.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CYPRIOT AND GREEK ACCOUNTING ENVIRONMENTS
2.1	 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to review the most important factors that affect the Cypriot
and Greek accounting environments. A review of the Cypriot and Greek accounting
environments is important to this study for many reasons. First, it presents the main
characteristics of the two financial accounting and disclosure frameworks and gives a
useful insight of the respective accounting environments. Second, it identifies specific
variables that may exert an influence on corporate disclosure in each country. Finally,
it helps in the development of the research hypotheses and assists in the interpretation
of the empirical results. The information presented is based on a review of the
relevant literature on Greek and Cypriot accounting, on a series of unstructured
interviews 3 and on the researcher's personal experience as a practising accountant
and academic in the two countries. Unless otherwise referenced, the conclusions
drawn represent the subjective opinions of the researcher.
3 The individuals interviewed were academics or practitioners with whom the researcher had an academic
or professional relationship. The interviews typically lasted between one to two hours and were
conducted in order to elicit the opinion of the interviewees about the factors that influence Cypriot and
Greek accounting. The questions asked depended on the area of specialisation of each individual. For
example, during the interviews with stockbrokers the main topic of discussion was the development and
operation of the local stock exchange, whilst in the case of auditors the interview focused on issues such
as the local accountancy profession, education etc. The following persons were interviewed in Cyprus in
May/June 1996 and January 1997: Dr. Andreas Charitou and Dr. Nicos Vafeas (academics — University of
Cyprus); Mr. Costas Toumbouris and Mr. Lannbros Panayiotides (analysts/stockbrokers — CLR
Stockbrockers); Mr. Phidias Pilides and Mr. Achilleas Chrysanthou (accountants/auditors — Coopers and
Lybrand); Mr. Michael Nicolaou and Mr. Panayiotis Loizides (Officers of the Cyprus Chamber of
Commerce and Industry); and Mr. Nondas Metaxas (General Manager of the Cyprus Stock Exchange).
The following persons were interviewed in Greece in December 1996 and April 1997: Dr. Apostolos Ballas
(academic — Athens Laboratory of Business Administration) and Dr. Vasilios Filios (freelance academic);
Mr. George Linatsas and Mr. Panos Karastamatis (analysts/stockbrokers — Sigma Securities); Mr. George
Samothrakis, Ms. Despina Andreadou (accountants/auditors — Coopers and Lybrand); Mr. John
Christodoulides (accountant/auditor — Ernst and Young); Mr. Richard Caseley (accountant/auditor —
Pricewaterhouse); Mr. Yiangos Charalambous (accountant/auditor — KPMG); Mr. George Cambanis and
Ms. Dina Karsas (accountants/auditors — Deloitte and Touche); and Ms. I Manolioudaki and Ms. F
Mendrinou (Administrative Officers of the Greek Ministry of Commerce). Their kind assistance is
gratefully acknowledged.
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2.2 ACCOUNTING AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
Accounting is a language of business, and as a language, it evolves to reflect
environmental, technological and socio—cultural changes. This explains why its
objectives are re—defined and its concepts, techniques and priorities changed through
time: to meet the changing demand and influences of the environment within which it
operates, and keep accounting information technically and socially useful. This
relationship, however, is not a one—way process. Accounting is not only a product of
its environment but at the same time a force for changing it (Pelides, 2001). By
feeding back information, accounting enables individuals and societies to undergo
critical self analysis, and to re—evaluate their socio—political objectives and the
alternative means of achieving them.
A relationship between accounting and its environment has long been hypothesised or
empirically demonstrated by many researchers (e.g. Mueller, 1967; Frank, 1979).
Nevertheless, although research has shown that environmental factors exert
considerable influence on the development of accounting and disclosure practices, it is
a matter of some controversy as to which factors are the most influential. For
example, economic variables (e.g. Nair and Frank, 1980), political systems (e.g.
Goodrich, 1986) and culture (e.g. Hofstede, 1985) have, on different cases, been
reported as being the most influential.
The environmental influences on accounting, as illustrated by Cooke and Wallace
(1990), have been selected as the basis for analysing and comparing the Cypriot and
Greek accounting environments (Figure 2.1). The reason for selecting this framework
is twofold. First, it includes all the main factors which are, in the opinion of the present
researcher, the most influential in the context of Cyprus and Greece. Second, most of
the factors included in the model are usually referred to in the literature as "key" or
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"important" environmental influences on accounting and disclosure practices (e.g.
Radebaugh and Gray, 1997).
FIGURE 2.1:
ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON ACCOUNTING
Internal Environment
- Stage of Economic
Development
- Goals of Society
- Legal Rules
- Political Systems
- Economic Systems
- Level of Education
- Financial Press
- Cultural Variables
Nominal
Accounting
Regulation
by State: Company
Laws and Codes
by Accounting
Bodies: Self—
Regulation
by Community:
Accounting
Standards
Board
by Market: GAAP
Effective
Accounting
Regulation
External Environment
•
Enforcement
Mechanism
- Colonial History
- Impact of TNCs
Regional Economic
Communities
International Trade
- International
Accounting Standards
- International
Movements of
Accounting Firms and
Professionals
- SEC
- Stock Exchange
- Accounting
Profession
- Judiciary
Adapted from: Cooke and Wallace (1990).
25
2.3	 THE MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON ACCOUNTING
AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES
2.3.1	 Internal Environment
(a) Legal System: A country's legal system can be a persuasive force in the
development of its corporate accounting and disclosure practices. Common law
countries, such as the U.K. and the U.S., are characterised by a limited amount of
statute law which is interpreted by courts. In these countries, company and accounting
laws do not prescribe rigid rules to cover corporate behaviour. Instead, they specify
general principles which are either applied using professional judgement or extended
by detailed regulations issued by accounting bodies. In contrast, codified law countries
such as Germany and France, have legal systems based on the Roman jus civile,
where rules are linked to ideas of justice and morality and they become doctrine.
Accounting and financial reporting are to a large extent a branch of company or
commercial law, and have detailed and comprehensive regulations covering the
recording and communication of economic information (Nobes and Parker, 1995).
(b) Political System: The extent to which the political environment influences
accounting practice and disclosure practices usually depends on the nature of the
political system and the degree of political stability. In countries where the political
system provides for a centrally planned economy, there is minimum private ownership
of business entities and as a result no need of communication of information to
outsiders. In contrast, in countries with minimum state ownership of business entities
there is a need to communicate information to all capital providers in order to enable
them to assess management's stewardship. Furthermore, in contrast to countries with
stable democratic systems, in those countries where there is political unrest, civil or
national wars or a lack of a strong and stable government, the people (and possibly the
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government itself) will not be too concerned about accounting development
(Radebaugh, 1975).
(c) Economy: The nature of a country's economy as well as the extent of
economic growth and development, can have a shaping impact on national accounting
and disclosure practices. For example, in economies dominated by service industries
the problems of accounting for intangibles (such as goodwill and brands) are usually
significant. It is also generally accepted that as agricultural economies industrialise,
new accounting problems are posed (such as leasing and deferred tax). These
developments usually call for a reliable accounting system with high levels of
disclosure, in order to attract outside sources of finance (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992).
(d) Socio—Cultural Variables: Culture describes a system of societal or
collectively held values. Hofstede (1980, p.25) defined culture as ". . . the collective
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from
another". Hofstede (1984) described four societal value dimensions as the main
elements of a common structure in cultural systems. First, Individualism versus
Collectivism. Individualism is concerned with a preference for a loosely knit social
framework in society whereas Collectivism is concerned with a preference for a tightly
knit social framework. The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the
degree of interdependence a society maintains among individuals. Second, Large
versus Small Power Distance. People in Large Power Distance societies accept a
hierarchical order in which everybody has a place which needs no further justification.
People in Small Power Distance societies strive for power equalisation and demand
justification for power inequalities. The fundamental issue addressed by this
dimension is how society handles inequalities among people when they occur. Third,
Strong versus Weak Uncertainty Avoidance. Strong Uncertainty Avoidance societies
maintain rigid codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant towards deviant persons
and ideas.	 Weak Uncertainty Avoidance societies maintain a more relaxed
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atmosphere in which practice counts more than principles and deviance is more easily
tolerated. The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is how society reacts
on the fact that time only runs one way and that the future is unknown. Finally,
Masculinity versus Femininity. Masculinity stands for a preference in society for
achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success. Femininity, on the other
hand, stands for a preference for relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and the
quality of life. The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the way in which
society allocates social roles to sexes.
Following Hofstede's research, Gray (1988) identified four accounting values at the
subcultural level of the accountant and accounting practice, as significantly related to
Hofstede's societal values. First, Professionalism versus Statutory Control.
Professionalism refers to a preference for the exercise of individual professional
judgement and the maintenance of professional self—regulation, as opposed to
Statutory Control which refers to compliance with prescriptive legal requirements and
statutory control. Second, Uniformity versus Flexibility. Uniformity refers to a
preference for the enforcement of uniform accounting practices between companies
and for the consistent use of such practices over time, as opposed to flexibility in
accordance with the perceived circumstances of individual companies. Third,
Conservatism versus Optimism. Conservatism refers to a preference for a cautious
approach to measurement so as to cope with the uncertainty of future events, whilst
optimist refers to a more optimistic and laissez—faire approach. Finally, Secrecy
versus Transparency. Secrecy describes a preference for confidentiality and the
restriction of disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely
involved with its management and financing, whereas Transparency refers to a more
transparent, open and publicly accountable approach.
Claiming that the cultural dimensions of Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance exert
the strongest influence on accounting, Gray (1988) hypothesised that the higher a
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country ranks in terms of Individualism and the lower in terms of Uncertainty
Avoidance, the more likely is to rank highly in terms of Professionalism, Flexibility,
Optimism and Transparency. For example, it has been argued that in countries such
as the U.K., the preference for independent professional judgement is consistent with
a preference for a loosely knit social framework and weak uncertainty avoidance
(Intercoliege, 1997).
Although without their criticisms, Hofstede's (1980, 1983) 4 and Gray's (1988) 5
 research
have been attractive bases for studying the accounting profiles of different countries.
For example, Salter and Niswander (1995) note that Gray's (1988) model provides a
workable framework to explain cross—national differences in accounting systems and
practice.
(e) Goals of Society: Linked to the socio—economic factors mentioned above, is
the importance of societal goals and the role of accounting in serving them; an issue
that was firstly put into an internationally comparative context by Mueller (1967). In his
pioneering work, Mueller suggested four approaches to accounting development. In
the case of the macroeconomic pattern, corporate goals are narrower than national
goals and accounting develops as an adjunct of national economic policies (e.g.
Sweden). In the microeconomic pattern, accounting derives its concepts and
applications from economics and tries to reflect economic reality in its measurement
and valuation methods (e.g. the Netherlands). In other countries, such as the U.S.
and the U.K., accounting relies on itself and becomes an independent discipline; it
produces its own concepts and methods from experience and constructs for itself a
4 Hofstede's (1980, 1983) work is usually criticised on the ground that his findings cannot be generalised
to all types of companies. For example, Gernon and Wallace (1995) question the ability of his value
survey model, developed from the study of the world—wide employees of IBM, to predict the cultural
values of accountants.
5 For example, Fechner and Kilgore (1994) argue that current research has been inconclusive in
explaining differences in accounting practices across countries in the cluster groupings identified by
Hofstede (1980, 1983) and Gray (1988). They suggest that environmental influences are more likely to be
a moderating rather than an intervening factor.
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meaningful framework from the business needs it serves. Finally, in countries such as
France, there has been a uniform accounting development pattern and accounting is
used as an instrument of government policy. Standardisation of valuation,
measurement and reporting practices is a common feature of such systems through a
uniform chart of accounts and extensive use of public laws and regulatory agencies.
2.3.2	 External Environment
(a) History: A country's history often shapes its accounting practice. For
example, many ex—British colonies have imported the Anglo—Saxon (British—American)
accounting system while French accounting has been exported to several African and
Asian countries (Choi and Mueller, 1992). However, because of the dynamic nature of
a country's environment, this export of accounting systems has not been systematic.
For example, although both Hong Kong and Australia have imported British
accounting, the former has (since then) not significantly altered its regulatory
environment, whereas the latter is moving away from a professionalism orientation to
more governmental influence and control (Kirsch, 1994).
(b) Multinational Corporations: Multinational corporations (MNCs) have played a
major role in the spectacular increase in world trade since World War II. The degree
and form by which they extend their operations, can influence the host country's
accounting system. This influence can either be direct, through the transfer of
accounting technology and know—how, or indirect through the transfer of an accounting
sub—culture via the training of young accountants and the import of accounting
concepts, bases and policies (Coopers and Lybrand, 1994).
(c) International Trade: The nature and extent of a country's international trade,
together with the business and accounting practices of a country's main trading
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partners, can affect the local financial accounting and reporting system. For example,
as businesses become more international, it becomes increasingly necessary for
financial statements to be comparable across national boundaries. It is therefore
expected that the greater the dependence of a country's economy on international
trade, the more likely it is for local accounting regulators to give more emphasis to
external accounting policies and regulations (KPMG, 1995).
(d) Regional Economic Communities: Membership of regional economic
communities can also result in pressure from within those groups to harmonise
accounting standards and practices. One of the most influential economic grouping
has been the EU which has, through its Directives, brought significant changes to the
accounting practices of certain European countries. Accounting techniques such as
consolidation, and accounting concepts such as the true and fair view, have been alien
to the accounting practices of several member states. Kirsch (1994) observes that
even the U.K., because of EU influence, seems to be moving away from its
professionalism mode towards greater governmental influence over reporting and
disclosure. Furthermore, Alexander and Archer (1995) note that the EU Directives
have been influential in non—EU countries as well, such as Turkey and Poland.
(e) International Accounting Standards: A major effort towards the
development of international accounting standards is being made by the IASC. Many
countries already use IASs as a benchmark or as a basis for national regulations. In
addition many stock exchanges require or permit foreign issuers to produce reports
based on these standards. The adoption of IASs has significantly improved the
accounting and reporting practices in many countries, even though international
accounting researchers such as Briston (1978) opine that the IASC is a "second
best" solution for developing countries, as it is preferable to develop accounting
systems which are capable of meeting their needs.
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(f) International Accounting Firms: It is natural for international professional
practice to follow international business practice. This is the main reason why the
accounting profession has been (and is) internationalising itself. Especially in the case
of the so—called "Big 5" firms the global harmonisation of accounting and auditing
practices has been impressive. Elaborate internal control procedures and specialised
technical backup enable such firms to operate as global partnerships of partnerships
(Choi and Mueller, 1992). As a result they have been importers and exporters of
accounting techniques, concepts and practices around the world. They also play an
important role in the development of the accounting profession and education in each
country, via integrated training programmes and the introduction and maintenance of
high standards of quality control and a strict code of ethics.
2.3.3	 Regulatory Influences
(a) Accounting Profession: Although the structure, strength, competence, size
and independence of a country's accountancy profession are influenced by several
environmental factors, the former also feed back into the type of accounting practised
(Nobes and Parker, 1995). For example, the accounting and auditing requirements of
the law, and the rights, duties and qualifications of the auditor, can influence the actual
and perceived quality of financial statements prepared or audited. Finally, of crucial
importance is the structure of the profession, entry qualifications, training period and
practising regulations because they affect the profession's size, competence and
social standing and have a consequential effect on the ability of the professional body
to conceptualise, formulate and enforce accounting regulations and policies.
(b) Capital Market: The structure of a country's capital market and, in particular,
the dispersion of share ownership, the market size and its level of activity can influence
its accounting system. For example, the need for published information is usually less
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in countries where most capital is provided by the state, banks, or a small number of
wealthy families (Intercoliege, 1997). This is because capital providers have access to
internal information and they do not rely on published reports to monitor their
investments. In contrast, there is usually an increased need for accounting disclosure
in countries where share ownership is relatively dispersed. It is also expected that the
greater the size of a capital market and the higher the turnover in relation to its size,
the greater is the likelihood that it will be more developed with more rigorous disclosure
regulations (Adhikari and Tondkar,1992).
(c) Tax System: The extent to which tax rules influence financial accounting and
reporting varies considerably among countries. In many European countries, such as
Germany and France, accounting is used as an instrument of tax policy with taxation
regulations determining, to a large extent, accounting measurements. On the other
hand, in many countries that use the Anglo—Saxon accounting system, such as the
U.K., accounting practices are independent of fiscal policies. For example, in these
countries accounting profits are rarely equal to tax profits and the practice of deferred
taxation is widespread. In contrast, in most countries that use the Franco—German
accounting system tax regulations influence accounting measurements and deferred
tax is normally alien (Nobes and Parker, 1995).
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2.4	 THE CYPRIOT ACCOUNTING ENVIRONMENT
2.4.1	 Internal Environment
2.4.1.1	 Political System
Cyprus is situated in the north—eastern corner of the Mediterranean basin at the cross-
roads of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. It covers an area of 925,159
square kilometres, which makes it the third largest island in the Mediterranean, and
has an estimated population in the region of 650,000 (Coopers & Lybrand, 1994).
Cyprus is an independent sovereign Republic with a presidential system of government
as established under the Constitution of 1960. The main executive body is the Council
of Ministers which initiates legislation and is responsible for nearly all matters within the
domain of the ministries. The legislature comprises the House of Representatives
consisting of 56 elected members representing various political and social groups.
The uprising of 1955 by the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (E0I<A) 6 led to
independence in 1960, putting the Cypriots in charge of their own affairs for the first
time in history. Between 1960 and 1974, the country underwent political turmoil. It
experienced bloody conflicts not only between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots', but
also between different political groups within the Greek Cypriot community. The
6 The main objective of the E0I<A revolution was enosis (union with Greece) and not independence. The
London—Zurich agreements provided for an independent republic and excluded enosis. Furthermore, it
gave to Britain, Greece and Turkey the right, in the event of a breach of the settlement, to intervene
unilaterally should joint action prove impossible. Many Greek Cypriots bitterly resented the fact that the
enosis objective was abandoned. As a result they were divided into those who were staunch supporters
of enosis and those who wished to maintain Cyprus as an independent unitary state.
7 The Greek Cypriots felt that the 1960 constitution gave the Turkish Cypriots advantages disproportionate
to their numbers in the population. In 1963, President Makarios proposed 13 constitutional amendments
which were immediately rejected by Turkey. In late 1963, fighting broke out between the two communities
and the Turkish Cypriots severed all contact with the government and withdrew into their enclaves. In
1964, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces were sent to the island to try and bring the bi-
communal conflict under control.
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conflicts resulted in the Turkish invasion in 1974 which divided the island, as most
Turkish Cypriots fled to the Northern occupied part.8
As a result of the political conflicts during the 1960-74 period, the development of
accounting was not a national priority. The government of President Makarios, who
ruled from 1960 to 1977, did not have the time to replace or amend the legal
framework for accounting inherited from the British. With the 1974 catastrophe,
however, there came political tranquillity and a need for unity among the Greek
Cypriots. The political harmony and economic recovery of the post—war years enabled
businesses to flourish. The growing size, sophistication and complexity of businesses,
and the intensification of competition among them, commanded highly refined
accounting practices. The absence of comparability between financial statements, and
the arbitrary nature of several accounting practices, exposed the rickety edifice of
financial accounting and reporting. Nevertheless, the government hesitated to step in
and regulate accounting matters, as it believed that this was a task for the accountancy
profession and not for the government. In 1981, the Institute of Certified Public
Accountants of Cyprus (ICPAC) decided that it had to act, and as consequence
adopted the IASs along with the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs)
(Intercoliege, 1997). Overall, it can be said that since independence the government
has been reluctant to intervene and, perhaps, prefers to leave the accounting
profession take care of itself.
2.4.1.2 Legal System
The Cypriot legal system is structured according to that of its former British colonial
masters. In general, sources of ideas and authority from British Law are also used
8 Due to the political situation in Cyprus, this study focuses on the accounting environment and corporate
disclosure practices in the part of the island which is under the control of the government recognised by
the United Nations (South).
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extensively in Cyprus Law (Vafeas, Trigiorgis and Georgiou, 1998). Commercial
activities and company legislation are greatly influenced by British accounting values.
The Cypriot Companies Act of 1951 is virtually a replica of the U.K.'s 1948 Companies
Act. This Act, which up to the present (2001) has not been amended, has been the
main source of accounting regulation in Cyprus up to 1981, when the ICPAC
voluntarily adopted the IASs.
Cyprus can be classified as a common law country. Though the Companies Act is the
main source of legal regulation of accounting in Cyprus, its provisions are so general to
allow considerable flexibility. The Act does not prescribe in any extensive detail how
companies should organise their bookkeeping and report their financial results and
position. The Act mandates the application of the true and fair view, a concept which
is prevalent in Cyprus (Vafeas et al., 1998). This concept, which is neither defined nor
explained in the Act, is determined via the exercise of professional judgement and
having regard to the individual circumstances of a case, rather than an implementation
of prescriptive and detailed legal requirements. This leaves enough room for
companies to record and present information in a form and content in which, according
to their opinion, suits their individual circumstances.
2.4.1.3 Economy
The Cypriot economy is based on the free enterprise system, with the private sector
being the backbone of economic activities, and the government being responsible for
planning and safeguarding the system and for providing public utilities (Coopers and
Lybrand, 1994). Before independence, Cyprus had a rural economy based on
agriculture. The post—independence period saw economic development and
uninterrupted growth. During this period, Cyprus has mainly been an exporter of
minerals and agricultural products. Even though economic prosperity was destroyed
along with peace in 1974, the post war era was characterised by a remarkable
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recovery. The solidarity among all socio—economic groups and the support from the
international community, enabled the island to see an unprecedented economic boom
through a return of business confidence and an upturn in investment levels. By the
late 1970s unemployment was eliminated, the refugees were rehoused 9, and a
restructuring of the economy made the manufacturing and service sectors more
important than agriculture (Coopers and Lybrand, 1994). In the 1980s the basic
strategic objective was to accelerate the process of establishing Cyprus as a regional
services, tourist and business centre, an objective which was realised by the early
1990s. By the late 1990s the sectoral structure of the economy exhibited a
continuously growing importance of the service sector, reflecting the comparative
advantages of Cyprus which stem from the high educational level of the population, the
strategic location of the island and the relatively low level of prices (Planning Bureau,
1996b). Sharelink (2000) notes that the main reason for the improvement in the
macroeconomic indicators of the country during the late 1990s was the excellent
performance of the service sector of the Cypriot economy. Zampelas (2000) points out
that (at the time of writing) the service industry generates 70 per cent of the GDP of
Cyprus and employs 55 per cent of the gainfully active population.
The evolution of Cyprus from an agricultural and undeveloped economy in the 1960s
and 1970s, into an open free market and an international tourist and business centre in
the 1990s, has significantly influenced financial accounting and reporting. In the
former period the role of accounting was mainly that of record—keeping, in order to
meet the needs of trading ventures and the provision of historic information to owners
and managers. Within this framework, the need for sophisticated information and
comprehensive financial statements was limited. Pelides (2001) notes that during this
period the role of a qualified accountant was primarily that of a bookkeeper and final
accounts preparer. Consequently, the loose provisions of the Companies Act 1951
9 A result of the 1974 invasion was the dispersion of about 200,000 Greek Cypriots. This figure was
approximately one third of the population at that time.
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provided an acceptable regulatory framework of accounting and were consistent with
the business needs of the time. With the post—war economic development there came
an increase in the number of external users of published financial statements and a
need for improved financial disclosure in order to attract alternative forms of finance. It
was felt that within the bounds of prescription under the law, the quantity and quality of
information disclosed were inadequate to cope with the increasing needs for current,
reliable and sophisticated information for all corporate stakeholders. These economic
pressures underpinned the ICPAC's initiative to adopt voluntarily the IASs and
change the role of accounting from that of a bookkeeping mechanism to a more
sophisticated management information system. Zampelas (2000) stresses that the
decision of ICPAC to adopt the IASs, contributed a lot to the success of the service
industry and, consequently, the success of the Cypriot economy in general.
2.4.1.4 Socio—cultural Variables
Historical and archaeological evidence indicate that the bulk of the islanders are Greek
Cypriots (Coopers and Lybrand, 1994). Since the 1974 invasion the bulk of the
Turkish population live in the northern occupied part of the country. Greek and
Turkish are the official languages of the Republic but English, following the British
rule for over 70 years, inevitably developed as a third common language. It is now
regularly used in government offices, courts, commerce and the accounting
profession. The attitude of Cypriots towards business in general and accounting in
particular, is favourable. The accounting profession is held in high esteem and the
majority of accountants, especially those educated and trained in the U.K., are
successful professionals holding highly paid positions in the public and private sectors
(Hadjiroussos, 1998).
Important structural elements of the Cypriot culture are those of Individualism and
weak Uncertainty Avoidance. On average, there is a preference for a loosely knit
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social framework, where there is more emphasis on independence and a respect for
individual endeavour. Furthermore, there is a relaxed social and business atmosphere
where practice counts more than principles and a variety of professional judgements
tends to be more easily tolerated (Intercoliege, 1997). This has probably been the
result of the huge numbers of tourists arriving every year 10
 and an increase in the
number of people establishing a permanent residence in the island, especially British,
Russians, Serbs and Lebanese. In line with Gray's (1988) propositions", these
cultural characteristics are consistent with the Cypriot accounting values of
Professionalism and Flexibility. A preference for a loosely knit social framework is
consistent with a preference for the exercise of individual judgement within a self—
regulated environment. The broad accounting regulations imply not just compliance
with a set of rules, but also reliance on the individual's expert opinion and choice of the
appropriate course of action in each unique situation (Professionalism). Additionally, a
belief in fair play and a preference for as few rules as possible, are consistent with a
preference for flexibility of accounting practices to suit the circumstances of individual
companies (Flexibility).
2.4.1.5 Goals of Society
As in the U.K., accounting in Cyprus has developed as an independent discipline.
Vafeas et al., (1998) note that the principal providers of capital in Cyprus are private
investors and that the financial reporting system has a clear orientation towards
investors, in line with the Anglo—Saxon reporting model. Accounting is mainly viewed
as a service function. Accounting practitioners believe that its framework reflects
the pressures, needs, priorities and peculiarities of the business environment within
10 In latest years the number of tourist arrivals has grown to more than 2 million per annum; this figure is
approximately 3 times the population of the island.
11 Gray (1988) hypothesises that the higher a country ranks in term of Individualism and the lower in terms
of Uncertainty Avoidance, then the more likely it is to rank highly in terms of Professionalism, Flexibility,
Optimism and Transparency.
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which accounting operates. This is because the Anglo—Saxon accounting system left
behind by the British, could not have been rejected or radically changed given the
political conflicts and economic under—development of the early post independence
years. A macroeconomic or uniform accounting pattern could not flourish given the
lack of a strong and close coordination of business with national economic policies and
a lack of strict administrative control of the business environment. Similarly, a
microeconomic approach could not prosper since Cyprus has never experienced any
significant inflation problems to make capital maintenance a major accounting issue
(Coopers and Lybrand, 1993). These factors can explain why Cypriot accounting
followed a trial and error method of development, and tended to develop its own
conceptual framework, derived on an ad—hoc basis from its own business practices.
2.4.2	 External Environment
2.4.2.1	 History
The country's prehistory goes far back to the ninth millennium BC when a number of
Neolithic settlements were established. At 1300 BC the Ancient—Greeks arrived to
establish city—kingdoms and transform Cyprus into a Greek—speaking and Greek—
culture island. In 1571 it was conquered by the Ottomans who finally ceded the island
to the British in 1878. The latter ruled until 1960 where, after the E0I<A uprising,
Cyprus became an independent and sovereign republic under the London—Zurich
agreements (Coopers and Lybrand, 1994). The freedom was short—lived since in
1974, using the coup d'etat against president Makarios as a pretext, Turkey invaded
the island to capture approximately 40 per cent of the Cyprus territory. Since 1974 the
island has been divided into two areas, the south, inhabited by Greek Cypriots, and the
north, inhabited by Turkish Cypriots as well as by Turkish settlers transferred from
Turkey.
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Although the British introduced important socio—economic reforms during their 80 year
rule, the Greek Cypriot agitation for enosis persisted throughout the period. During the
first half of the twentieth century British policy tried to persuade the Cypriots to accept
a form of limited self—government. To this effect a well structured programme of
economic development was undertaken after World War II, which included a
modernisation of the economic and legal frameworks and the introduction of the U.K.
Companies Act as the Cypriot Company Law. However, the British efforts were in vain
(Americana, 1979a). In 1950 an open plebiscite resulted in a 95 per cent vote in
favour of enosis and after repeated British refusals to discuss the problem, the EOKA
uprising broke out in 1955. The British withdrew in 1960 leaving behind a sound
system of justice and public administration, a liberal business environment, a strict
code of commercial and business behaviour and an Anglo—Saxon accounting system
whose concepts, bases and policies still remain deeply rooted.
2.4.2.2	 Multinational Corporations
In contrast to other small countries where MNCs determine local commercial and
accounting practices (Brown, Kaur, Maugham and Rendall, 1995), their impact on
Cypriot accounting practice has not been significant. Long term foreign direct
investment in the form of factories, warehouses and machinery has been limited,
mainly because Cyprus does not offer the necessary strategic advantages to provoke
the MNC's attention. Labour is relatively overpriced compared to the Far East and
Eastern European markets and, especially after the loss of the main mining areas in
1974, there is a lack of raw materials and other mineral reserves (Coopers and
Lybrand, 1994). Short term foreign direct investment in the form of portfolio
investment in shares, stocks and other financial securities has been virtually non-
existent because of the small size of the economy, the absence of a regulated stock
market (up to 1996) and the existence of strict exchange controls. For example,
Hadjiroussos (1998) points out that the existence of exchange controls effectively
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segregated the Cypriot economy from other developed and competitive Western
economies.
2.4.2.3 International Trade
EU members constitute the most important trading partners of Cyprus; 60 per cent of
exports and 50 per cent of imports are with EU countries (Planning Bureau, 1996a).
Mainly because of the political ties developed by President Makarios in the 1960s and
1970s, the next trading partners in order of importance are the middle eastern Arab
countries with about 15 per cent of domestic exports. In 1994, a five year strategic
plan for the period 1994-98 was implemented, aiming to support the efforts for
restructuring and modernising the economy, tackling the challenges created by the
liberalisation of international trade within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) framework and preparing Cyprus's forthcoming accession as a full EU
member.
In spite of the dependence of the Cyprus economy on the import demand of its major
economic partners, the impact of international trade on accounting practice has not
been significant (Intercoliege, 1997). The main factor of this has been the nature of
the Cypriot business environment. The deeply rooted Anglo—Saxon business
practices and accounting methods, which are widely used around the world, rendered
Cypriot business documents and accounting reports familiar and acceptable to
the main business contacts of local entrepreneurs. Consequently, local accounting
and disclosure practices commanded no drastic changes.
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2.4.2.4 Cyprus and the European Union
Formal relations between Cyprus and the EU date back to 1972 when an agreement of
permanent association was signed. The relations have since then been continuously
strengthening with a customs union agreement being signed in 1987 and a formal
application for full membership made in 1990. Full accession negotiations started in
early 1998 and membership of the EU is considered a primary political and economic
goal (Hadjiroussos, 1998). The 1994-98 Strategic Development Plan has given a
European orientation to the targeted socio—economic development, and the central
axis of all development efforts is economic convergence and harmonisation of
institutions, mechanisms and policies. Klerides (2001) predicts that during 2001
Cyprus will meet all the Maastricht criteria for European Monetary Union.
The harmonisation exercise has not yet resulted in the incorporation of the EU Fourth
and Seventh Directives into the Cypriot law. In view, however, of the full accession
negotiations this harmonisation is to be expected. Financial Mirror (2000) notes that
(as at May 2000) the Cypriot legislators still need to pass more than 4,000 items of
legislation before Cypriot laws catch up with all the relevant EU regulations. As in the
case of U.K., harmonising local law in line with the EU Directives is expected to have
an impact on Cypriot accounting practice, especially in the case of the Fourth Directive
which is based substantially on German law rather than the Seventh Directive which
mainly follows British practice. The result is expected to be a move from
professionalism and flexibility to greater governmental influence over financial
accounting and reporting and the introduction of detailed valuation, measurement and
reporting rules. Nonetheless, the impact of the harmonisation exercise is not expected
to be radical, as in the case of other European countries where it has effectively
shaped accounting and reporting practice (e.g. Luxembourg). This is because the true
and fair principle, which is the basis of the Fourth Directive, has long been the
fundamental cornerstone of Cypriot accounting. In addition, many of the consolidation
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provisions of the Seventh Directive are already practised by Cypriot companies due to
the application of the relevant IASs.
2.4.2.5 International Accounting Standards
Since 1981 the ICPAC requires its members to ensure that accounts audited by them
comply with the IASs and report instances of non—compliance in their audit reports.
Even though a discussion of the suitability of these standards is outside the scope of
this study, it must be admitted that their adoption was an important step. At the time
the IASs were adopted, economic activity in Cyprus was booming, the unofficial capital
market was taking off and there was an increasing need for high standard financial
reports. The Companies Act was too old to cope with the increased complexities of
the rapidly expanding corporate identity. It was felt that failure by the accountancy
profession to provide regulation on its own would invite the intervention of the
government (Zampelas, 2000), with the consequence that accounting standards would
be set and enforced by civil servants instead of professional accountants. Faced with
this possibility, that could have circumscribed the professional's traditional freedom of
action, some form of self—regulation was needed. In view of its small size and weak
financial strength, ICPAC selected the "off the shelf solution" by adopting the IASs
(Intercoliege, 1997).
Although the IASs have been adopted by both the ICPAC and the Cyprus Stock
Exchange (since 1996), they do not have any legal backing. However, in spite of the
fact that the IASs do not have the force of law, it is generally accepted that they need
to be followed if the financial statements are to show a true and fair view as required
by the Companies Law (Coopers and Lybrand, 1993). Cairns (1996) recognised the
efforts made by Cypriot managers and auditors to achieve a high level of compliance
with IASs and concurs with the view that financial statements of Cypriot companies, in
general, do comply with IASs.
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2.4.2.6 International Accounting Firms
The integrated tier of the Big 5 firms have expanded into Cyprus without any barriers to
entry or practice, and have significantly influenced local accounting education and
practice (Intercoliege, 1997). Up to the 1980 the development of these firms in Cyprus
was moderate. They were mainly engaged in traditional accounting services and
statutory audits, with specialised services such as tax advice undertaken on a limited
scale. The economic boom of the 1980s and the arrival of offshore companies
enabled them to flourish. Multinational companies such as Coca Cola, Reuters and
Barclays established an offshore presence in Cyprus looking for sophisticated
accounting and business services. In addition to the boom in the offshore business,
local companies expanded too, given the economic recovery in the 1980s and the
establishment of the Over—The—Counter (OTC) capital market. The 1990s saw a
consolidation of the roles of international firms as regional management consultants
and business advisors (Zampelas, 2000).
Furthermore, during the 1980s, when there was virtually no university or college
providing accounting education in Cyprus, these firms provided technical backup,
internal training programs and in—house seminars to their Cypriot employees. They
also encouraged young persons to study locally for British accounting professional
qualifications such as the Association of Accounting Technicians (AAT) and the
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA). These firms were the driving
force behind the decision by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales (ICAEW) to select Cyprus as the first non—EU country in the world, into which to
extend its training and education scheme. Overall, it can be said that the international
accounting firms have played a key role in the history of accountancy education in
Cyprus.
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2.4.3	 Regulatory Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting
2.4.3.1	 General
The regulatory framework for financial accounting and reporting consists of those rules
and regulations that govern the way in which businesses must account and report for
their activities. It consists of the legislative framework, which usually includes the
company, accounting and tax laws, and the institutional framework, comprising the
rules and requirements of the stock exchange as well as any related professional
pronouncements.
The most common form of commercial enterprise in Cyprus is the company, which can
be either a private or a public company (KPMG, 1995). A private limited company
limits the number of its members to fifty, restricts the transferability of its shares, and
prohibits an invitation to the public to subscribe for its securities. A public limited
company ("eTaipe1a ") 12
 has a minimum of seven members and can extend an invitation
to the public to subscribe for its securities. The financial accounting and reporting
obligations of a Cypriot public limited company depend on whether it is listed on the
CSE or not. If a public company is listed, then its obligations are stipulated by the
company and tax laws, the IASs and the CSE rules and regulations. If on the other
hand, a public company is unlisted, it is then exempted from the CSE regulations.
Because this study examines the disclosure practices of both listed and unlisted public
companies, the three sources of regulations relating to these types of business
organisations are reviewed.
12 In ancient Greek the word "EraipEia" means the friendly relationship between people.
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2.4.3.2 Company Law
Activities of Cypriot public companies are regulated by the Companies Act of 1951 (the
Act). Walton (1986) notes that Cyprus adopted the British 1948 Companies Act
wholesale, with virtually the only amendment being to substitute Governor for Board of
Trade. The Act, which has not been amended since its enactment in 1951, was the
only source of accounting regulation until 1981 when the accounting profession in
Cyprus decided to adopt the IASs.
The Act requires all public companies to prepare financial statements that should be
audited by independent auditors. The financial statements should include a profit and
loss account and a balance sheet. The Act does not prescribe a format for either the
profit and loss account or the balance sheet, but Schedule Eight of the Act details the
items that must be shown either on the face of the Profit and Loss Account and the
Balance Sheet or by way of a note thereon. The Eighth Schedule also grants specific
disclosure exemptions to financial institutions such as banks, discount houses and
insurance companies. The overriding requirement of the Act is that the financial
statements must give a true and fair view of the profit/loss and of the state of affairs of
the company as at the end of the financial period.
2.4.3.3 Tax System
Tax law in general, and corporate taxation in particular, are mainly based on their
British counterparts. Income tax is levied under the Income Tax Law 58 of 1961 as
amended by subsequent laws. The most important of these is the Income Tax Law 40
of 1979, which changed the basis of assessment from the preceding to the current
year basis. Tax is charged on income derived from, received in, or accruing in Cyprus
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by any person in respect of profits from any trade, business, profession or employment
as well as from dividends, interest, rents and royalties.
Generally the preparation of Cypriot published financial statements is not influenced by
tax rules (Intercoliege, 1997). The amounts to be included in a company's financial
statements are determined in accordance with accounting principles and policies, and
there is no need to follow tax regulations in order to obtain a tax advantage. For
example, judgment determines residual values and useful lives of fixed assets in order
to establish the most appropriate depreciation method. Revaluations of tangible and
intangible fixed assets affect the tax computation only when realised, and provisions
for contingencies, losses or decreases in the values of fixed assets are assessed and
provided for on a case—by—case basis in accordance with the prudence concept.
Furthermore, the practice of deferred tax is widespread as there is a recognition that
the effect of timing differences between accounting and taxable profits is to shift tax
liabilities in time without necessarily altering the total amount payable. Overall, the
prevalent accounting practice recognises that financial statements should report useful
information to the different stakeholder groups and not to the tax authorities which are
provided with special—purpose financial statements.
2.4.3.4 Accountancy Profession
The main professional accountancy body of Cyprus is the Institute of Certified Public
Accountants of Cyprus (ICPAC). Vafeas et al. (1998) report that members of ICPAC
control over 90 per cent of audit fee income in Cyprus. ICPAC is a company limited by
guarantee formed in 1961, to promote and safeguard the interests of the accountancy
profession and establish a professional code of conduct and ethics. Although having
no legal backing, it is de facto recognised as the representative body of the
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accountancy profession by both the business community and the government.13
ICPAC does not conduct its own examinations neither does it have any formal training
requirements. In order to qualify for membership one must be a member of a U.K.
body of accountants (such as the ACCA or the ICAEW), or of another body deemed to
be equivalent. Almost in their entirety, ICPAC members are persons who are also
members of the ACCA or the ICAEW. For a country of the size of Cyprus, the growth
in the number of qualified accountants 14
 joining ICPAC has been phenomenal. From
21 members in 1961, membership rose to around 1,200 in 2001 (Pelides, 2001).
Despite the existence of ICPAC, there is effectively no legal regulation of the Cypriot
accountancy profession. The only legal provision relating to the regulation of the
accounting profession is the basic qualification of who can be an auditor of a company.
Section 155(i) of the Act provides that an auditor must be ". . . a member of a body of
accountants established in the United Kingdom (or) having similar qualifications . . . or
having obtained adequate knowledge and experience . . ." (emphasis added). The
provision for a "member of a body of accountants established in the U.K." has proved
to be problematic in practice. It qualifies a person who is a member of a U.K. body but
does not have a practising certificate, to be an auditor of a public company. For
example, ACCA graduates who have been admitted to membership having obtained
their three years experience in the industry (in non—audit functions) have been issued
with audit practising certificates by the Ministry of Finance because they satisfy the
requirements of Section 155(i). 15
 The adequate knowledge and experience provision
has also been controversial because there is no official definition of the term. The
Ministry of Finance attempted to give its own interpretation and prepared its own
13 For example, in his address to the ICPAC members during the 1996 AGM, the Minister of Finance
commented: ". . . the time has come for the law to back your informal, but de facto, recognition that you
have justifiably earned . . . ". (Christodoulou, 1996, p.25).
14 The term "qualified accountant" is used to refer to ICPAC members.
15 This researcher knows many ACCA graduates who had their training experience in industrial settings
such as commercial banks and co—operative societies. Literally, these graduates have never seen an
audit file before; nevertheless, they are eligible to be appointed as auditors of public companies.
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regulations listing the qualifications needed by someone to be issued with a practising
certificate. Certificates were refused to applicants who did not satisfy these conditions.
This provoked a lot of protests and the issue was finally referred to the Supreme Court.
The court dismissed the decision of the Minister of Finance who had no option but to
grant authorisation almost without any conditions at all. Another attempt to clarify the
issue of the practising certificate was made in 1992, when the Ministry of Finance
prepared a relevant bill requesting a detailed proposal to regulate the profession,
which was rejected by Parliament.
An important development in the early 1990s rendered the issue of regulating the
accountancy profession a necessity. Holders of other accounting qualifications formed
two new local institutes and have challenged the right of the ICPAC to represent the
qualified accountants in Cyprus. The first of those local institutes was founded by
Cypriots who qualified with the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) — the Pancyprian Institute of U.S. CPAs (PICPAs). This institute took the
dispute even further: they threatened ICPAC members with legal action if they were to
continue using the CPA title m, arguing that this is the exclusive right of the members of
the US institute AICPA (PICPA, 1997). The second is the Institute of Qualified
Certified Accountants — Auditors of Cyprus (IQCAAC) representing mainly accounting
graduates from Greek universities. This institute adopted a frontal attack on the whole
system, arguing that a structure of qualifying examinations should be set up with the
trainees being examined in the Greek language (IQCAAC, 1997). As a consequence
of these contests ICPAC took the initiative to propose the drafting of a bill to legally
regulate the accountancy profession. After the necessary consultation with all parties
involved, a bill was drafted that seeks to fully harmonise the accounting system in
Cyprus with the relevant EU Directives. The bill, which covers matters such as
professional examinations, practicing requirements, ethical guidelines and quality
16 The official title of ICPAC members is Certified Public Accountant (CPA) of Cyprus.
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control, is expected to be passed by the Parliament during 2001 (Pelides, 2000).
2.4.3.5 Accountancy Education
A compulsory twelve year elementary and secondary education has led to illiteracy in
Cyprus being almost non—existent. Although a state university was established in
1992, there were already thriving private sector colleges which maintain strong links
with U.K. and U.S. educational establishments. The existence of these colleges, along
with the huge numbers of young persons studying in Greece, the U.K. and the U.S.,
resulted in about 23 per cent of the gainfully employed population being college and
university graduates (Planning Bureau, 1996a).
Accountancy education is introduced in the fourth year of secondary education. There
is a compulsory course in accounting for all students following the commercial or
economics fields of study. The influence of the Anglo—Saxon accounting tradition can
be found as early as at this stage. An important (if not the main) objective of
accounting students is success in the accounting papers of the General Certificate of
Education examinations of London University and the London Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (LCCI). Furthermore, given that the exam papers are set under the U.K.
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs) and Financial Reporting
Standards (FRSs), the majority of textbooks are in English and the language of
instruction is predominantly the same language (Intercoliege, 1998). At the tertiary
education level, both academic and professional qualifications are available.
Academic qualifications can be earned by studying either at the private sector colleges
or at the University of Cyprus. The accounting degree of the University is heavily
influenced by the ACCA examination system as it was structured in such a way so as
to make its holders eligible for exemptions from eight out of the fourteen papers of the
ACCA examinations. Professional qualifications can be earned by studying at private
sector colleges, which offer courses leading to the examinations of the U.K.
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accountancy bodies (ACCA, ICAEW and AAT). Although the professional
accounting education market is dominated by the ACCA, its biggest boost was given
in 1993 when the ICAEW extended its training and education scheme to Cyprus.
The fact that Cyprus has been selected among other candidate countries such as
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore indicates the recognition of the high standard of
the accounting education and profession in Cyprus (Zampelas, 2000).
2.4.3.6 Capital Market
A capital market, but in an embryonic form, has existed in Cyprus since the early
1960s. The securities of a limited number of public companies were traded within an
unregulated environment. With the economic prosperity of the late 1970s and the
growth of several public companies, there was an increased need for a regulated
market. In 1979 the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) saw the need
and, in spite of the absence of any legal background, drafted a set of regulations for
holding stock exchange meetings under its auspices (CCCI, 1993). This resulted in
the establishment of an Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. However, in view of the
absence of a proper watchdog to oversee OTC trading, there was a belief that there
existed market manipulation, spread of misinformation, insider dealing and other
fraudulent behaviour (Antoniou, 1996). It was gradually recognised that an official
market was needed.
The law providing for the establishment and operation of the official stock market (the
CSE) was passed in 1995 and the market was opened in March 1996 with 37 listed
companies. By requiring listed companies to prepare financial statements in
accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act 1951 and the IASs, the CSE
effectively backs both sets of regulations. Continuing obligations include the
preparation and publication of a semi—annual and an annual report. The former must
be submitted within four months of the reporting company's period end and need not
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be audited. However, annual reports must be published within six months of the
company's financial year end and be audited by a qualified auditor.
Though the CSE is small in size when compared to other European stock markets, its
capitalisation in 1999 was approximately 200 per cent of GDP (Sharelink, 2000). The
main characteristics of the CSE and their implication for corporate disclosure practices
are:
(a) Supply-related characteristics:
In most Cypriot companies ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals
and their families (Vafeas et al., 1998). These groups of shareholders are usually
reluctant to relinquish control of their businesses and prefer to rely on bank financing
and retention of profits, rather than issue of new shares to the public. This limited
dispersion of share ownership signifies that the main capital providers have greater
access to internal corporate information, and may not have to rely, to a great extent, on
public disclosure to monitor their investments. Hence, this structure of the supply side
of the CSE implies that the pressure for public disclosure and transparency should be
low.
(b) Demand-related characteristics:
Three discernible groups of investors can be identified (Intercoliege, 1997). First, the
institutional investor group, which mainly comprises investment and insurance
companies. These organisations have organised investment and research
departments and take investment decisions after careful assessment of micro-
economic and macro-economic fundamentals. The second group is that of
speculators, who are not interested in a stable dividend income or long term capital
appreciation. Instead, they usually invest using borrowed money in the hope of fast
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and speculative profit. Finally, the group of long term educated and well informed
investors, who have clear long term investment strategies and usually invest based on
fundamentals. This structure of the demand side of the CSE signifies that many
investors possess the ability or means to appropriately evaluate risk and return of
securities. Furthermore, it implies that the pressure for increased disclosure should be
high, because the number of outside shareholders who can successfully press for
more detailed information is high.
(c)	 Market—related characteristics:
The CSE has lower liquidity and is relatively thin when compared to other developed
markets (Vafeas et al., 1998). In 1996 the number of companies listed on the CSE
was only 41, rising to 54 at the end of 1999. During 1999 the CSE General Index rose
by more than 687 per cent which has been the highest worldwide (Sharelink, 2000).
Trading volumes are low and concentrated in the shares of only two banks.17
Furthermore, the number of new rights and debenture issues are low (CLR, 1997).
However, the total market capitalisation has increased from CYP£1,078.5m in 1996 to
CYP£14,039.8m in 1999. Additionally, during 1999 the number of investors has
increased tremendously and more than 25 per cent of the population have invested in
the CSE compared to less than 10 per cent in 1996 (Sharelink, 2000). All of the above
imply that the pressure for increased disclosure should be increasing.
2.4.3.7 Enforcement Mechanism
There are three accounting enforcement mechanisms in Cyprus: the Companies Act
1951, the accountancy profession and the CSE.
17 For example, in 1996 the volumes traded on the floor of the stock exchange were CYP£231m and 47.4
per cent of the volumes traded related to the shares of Bank of Cyprus and Popular Bank. The
corresponding figures in 1999 were CYP£3,858m and 30.86 per cent.
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The Companies Act provides that directors must take all reasonable steps to secure
compliance with the requirements relating to the accounting books and the preparation
and disclosure of the published financial statements. Failure to do so renders them
liable to prosecution which is punishable by a fine or imprisonment. Nevertheless,
such prosecutions have been very rare. This is probably because corporate
management and auditors usually take the necessary steps to ensure compliance
(Cairns, 1996). It should be noted, however, that as the 1951 law is out of date, mere
compliance with the legal stipulations does not necessarily imply compliance with the
true and fair principle.
As noted earlier, the ICPAC requires its members to follow IASs and ISAs. In the case
of non—compliance by a member, he/she can be referred to the Discipline Committee
which investigates departures and can expel a member either for a specific period or
permanently. Since 1981, however, the number of cases referred to the Discipline
Committee has been insignificant. Currently the profession has no watchdog, such as
the Review Panel in the U.K., to be entrusted with the responsibility to monitor and
enforce accounting standards.
The Council of the CSE has the power to delist any company in case of non-
compliance with any of the CSE's requirements. In 1996, the CSE commissioned Mr.
David Cairns, the former Secretary—General of the IASC, to review the 1995 financial
statements of companies admitted to the CSE with the view to ascertain compliance
with IASs. 18
 Although Cairns (1997) concluded that there is ". . . a high level of
compliance with IASs . . ." (Cairns, 1997, p.9), he did report significant instances of
non—compliance with the accounting and/or disclosure requirements of certain IASs.
This was in spite of the fact that all reporting auditors confirmed conformity with IASs.
Following Mr. Cairn's study, the Council of the CSE reached an agreement with the
18 Cairns assessed the 1995 accounts of listed companies i.e. the accounts released under the old (OTC)
regime.
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ICPAC whereby the latter undertook to carry out a similar study on an annual basis.
An ad—hoc committee of the ICPAC in collaboration with CSE and the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), examines the accounts of all listed companies and
reports back to the CSE the degree of compliance with IASs together with appropriate
recommendations (Hadjiroussos, 1998). The results of this examination, however, are
for the exclusive use of the CSE and are not published. In this sense, it can be argued
that although a financial reporting watchdog does exist, its work is covered by secrecy
and users of financial statements are not informed about non—compliance with
accounting or disclosure regulations of the IASs.
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2.5	 THE GREEK ACCOUNTING ENVIRONMENT
2.5.1	 Internal Environment
2.5.1.1	 Political System
Greece lies in the south—eastern part of Europe. It covers an area of approximately
132,000km, and has an estimated population of 10 million. Greece is a presidential
parliamentary democracy. The executive and legislative branches of the state are
interlinked. The legislative authority rests with the 300 members of Parliament who are
elected every four years. The majority party in Parliament forms the government and
its leader becomes the Prime Minister. The President is elected by Parliament and,
although being the Head of State, his role is mainly ceremonial (Coopers and Lybrand,
1995).
As in France, financial accounting and reporting in Greece is mainly controlled by the
government. Throughout the years the government has seen itself as a regulator
of accounting matters. Corporate legislation is mainly a political process, since most
accounting rules and regulations promulgated through such legislation are determined
largely in the political arena (Belles, 1998). There are at least three factors that have
contributed to this. The first is that during the first years of liberation from Ottoman
rule (early 1830s) and after almost 400 years of hardship, there was an urgent need to
lay new foundations for commercial and legal matters. At this time a political decision
was taken to adopt the French legal, commercial and accounting systems. Since then,
Greek commercial law and accounting have almost always followed developments in
France (Belles, 1994). Second, the government has traditionally seen accounting as a
fiscal instrument whose primary role is to help in planning and administering the
economy as well as introducing and collecting taxes (Belles, 1994). Finally, there has
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been a tradition of a strong influence of party politics in all aspects of commercial and
business matters. This is evidenced by the extensive intervention of the government in
all aspects of business activity following pressure from social actors to intervene
whenever they disagree (Ballas, 1998). It is noticeable that most of what is considered
elsewhere in the developed world as managerial prerogatives, in Greece are
continuously debated in long parliamentary discussions which usually end up as
legislation (Bourantas, Anagnostelis, Mantes and Kefalas, 1990).
2.5.1.2 Legal System
The Greek legal system is greatly influenced by Roman and Byzantine law. Custom
and practice play a minor role and the courts are not bound by judicial precedent. The
Commercial Code draws heavily from its French counterpart and prescribes detailed
and all embracing rules to cover commercial transactions. Up to 1920 company law
was not codified, but in view of the increase in size and complexity of business
organisations, law 2190/2019
 introduced detailed regulations to cover corporate
behaviour.
Greece can be classified as a codified law country where codification of accounting
rules and procedures is the rule rather than the exception (Papas, 1993). The desire
for uniformity and the legalised approach to accounting matters has resulted in the
adoption of a national accounting plan and a uniform chart of accounts. Commercial
and company law have been extended to include the accounting rules, concepts and
procedures surrounding the Greek General Accounting Plan (GGAP), to such an
extent that professional judgement is restricted. As a result, the accountancy
regulation bodies have played a secondary role in the development of accounting
rules and regulations; this role has been restricted to issuing circulars explaining some
19 Laws and other legal decrees are referred to by their number (e.g. 2190) followed by the year they were
originally passed (e.g. 20, which refers to 1920).
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of the details of the GAAP and commenting on amendments of the company law which
affect accounting practice (Ballas, 1994). An important impact on the Greek
accounting system has been brought about by the incorporation of the relevant EU
Directives into the law. Especially in the case of the Fourth Directive the effect has
been significant and Greek companies are, since then, required to give increased
disclosure about their financial results and position (Robinson and Venieris, 1996).
2.5.1.3 Economy
Although the economy is based on the free enterprise system, there has been a
tradition by many businesses to seek continuous government support and protection, a
tradition that has rendered most economic entities inefficient, uncompetitive and
unable to face structural changes (Papas, 1993). Inflation rates of 25 per cent, interest
rates of 35 per cent and public deficit above 14 per cent of GDP were common during
the late 1970s and early 1990s, but starting in 1985 the government has introduced
measures to stabilise and improve the economy. Although agriculture has been the
main economic sector, its importance has diminished as it has been hampered by a
large number of uneconomic small land holdings that render the introduction of modern
agricultural techniques impossible (Coopers & Lybrand, 1995). The most dynamic
sector is that of services with tourism and shipping representing the country's principal
sources of foreign exchange earnings. In the 1990s, in an effort to conform with the
European Monetary Union criteria, the government has introduced strict measures to
control inflation, decrease the public deficit, decrease interest rates and make the
Drachma more stable (via the 1994-1999 Revised Convergence Programme). These
measures have been successful and by early 2000, public deficit has decreased to 1.6
per cent of GDP, inflation has stabilised around 2 per cent whilst the rate of GDP
growth was 2.7 per cent (Ependytis, 2000). Kakoulidou (2000) notes that the
spectacular development of the Greek economy during the late 1990s was the result of
a difficult and painful effort of all the Greek people.
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The relative underdevelopment of the economy and the severe micro—economic and
macro—economic problems faced up to the mid-1980s, have influenced the
development of Greek accounting. The heavy reliance on agriculture, which used
cash—based accounting, and the lack of industrialisation implied that there was more
emphasis on bookkeeping and less emphasis on accounting (Robinson and Venieris,
1996). Until the early 1980s, there was neither a standard format of financial
statements nor uniform accounting terminologies or common valuation rules.
Financial information disclosed was considered to be inadequate as there was no
information on sales, cost of sales and expenses, while notes to the accounts were
extremely rare (Papas, 1993). With Greece's entry into the EU and the link of the
Greek economy with those of its European partners, there came a need for significant
improvement in the financial reporting system. The first changes were introduced in
1981 with the introduction of the GGAP, and were followed by the incorporation of the
EU Directives into Greek law in late 1980s. However, complex financial transactions
and related accounting techniques such as leasing, financial derivatives, factoring and
complex financial instruments are still very rare in Greece (Robinson and Venieris,
1996).
2.5.1.4 Socio—cultural Variables
Greece and Cyprus share many socio—cultural variables: the same ethnicity, language
and religion. However, there is some evidence that, in contrast to the Cypriot society,
Greek society ranks highly on Hofstede's cultural dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance.
Hofstede (1983, p.342) reports that Greece has the highest Uncertainty Avoidance
measure of any of the 53 countries and regions reported in his study. Americana
(1979b) explains that in Greece there is a desire to maintain institutions which protect
conformity to traditions and customs, which are believed to help the Greeks retain their
prestigious heritage under adverse conditions. Another socio—cultural characteristic of
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Greek society is that the attitude of people towards business is a mixture of respect,
dissatisfaction and mistrust (Papas, 1993). This can mainly be attributed to the
traditional party politics phenomenon. Both short and long term socio—economic
objectives and policies, have frequently been changed in accordance with the priorities
of the dominating political party and pressures from party supporters (Papas, 1993).
Charalambis (1989) stresses that the persistence of patronage relations is widely
acknowledged to be one of the major problems of the Greek political system.
Mavrogordatos (1988) examined the relation between the state and associations
representing agriculture, labour and employers since 1974. He demonstrated that all
major political parties in Greece are in a position to influence and guide trade unions
through established political patronage networks with union leaders. Additionally,
Mouzelis (1986) described a particular version of corporatism pertinent to Greece.
This is characterised by the state's tendency to inhibit the formation of autonomous
interest groups and the de facto control exercised by the state over trade associations
and unions.
Papas (1993) opines that the strong influence of party politics has had a strong
bearing on the attitudes and behaviour of economic agents in Greece. This has
resulted in the public's attitude towards accounting being rather unfavourable. As
Papas (1993, p.77) notes ". . . people mistrust it (accounting) as a means of generating
misleading information for tax evasion purposes and pricing policies, and not as a tool
of efficient management . . .". The above socio—cultural variables have influenced
Greece's accounting system which is characterised by the values of Statutory Control
and Uniformity. In line with Gray's (1988) propositions, a strong Uncertainty Avoidance
is consistent with Statutory Control (a preference for compliance with prescriptive legal
requirements where the accountant's role has mainly been concerned with the
implementation of legal rules) and Uniformity (the enforcement of uniform accounting
practices via the imposition of the GGAP). Additionally, Robinson and Venieris (1996)
propose that the higher degree of Uncertainty Avoidance in Greece is probably a
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contributing factor to the existence of tax — based accounting standards enacted by
statute (Uniformity and Statutory Control accounting values). Finally, Papas (1993)
argues that the nature of socio—cultural forces in Greece explains, to a large extent,
why a legalistic approach had to be taken, to secure acceptability of accounting
standards and practices.
2.5.1.5 Goals of Society
Greek national economic goals have usually been more important than individual
corporate goals, both for law makers and civil servants. Administrative procedures
have usually been designed having in mind the optimal implementation of established
formal and informal national policies. As a result corporate goals have normally
followed, rather than led, national economic goals and almost all governments have
tried to use accounting as a fiscal tool for the administrative control of the economy
(Ballas, 1994).
In view of the above, accounting in Greece has followed a uniform accounting
development pattern, and has usually been the instrument to measure performance,
collect taxes and allocate funds. Consequently, the accounting system is
characterised by standardisation, and accounting laws emphasise uniformity rather
than flexibility in accounting methods and practice (Papas, 1993). This is evidenced by
the enactment of common valuation and measurement rules, common definitions and
terminologies, standardised accounts names, and the systematised presentation of
financial statements and the notes thereon.
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2.5.2	 External Environment
2.5.2.1	 History
Early samples of Greek civilisation date back to the 11th century BC, which are
referred to as Homeric years after Homer and his works the Iliad and the Odyssey.
This period was followed by the Geometric period (11th — 8th century BC) and the
Archaic era (8th — 5th century BC) which was famous for the development of the Greek
city—states of Athens and Sparta. Greek civilisation reached its peak during the
Classical years (5th and 4th century BC) 2° during which literature and arts flourished.
This was followed by the Hellenistic 21 period (4th — 2nd century BC), during which
Greek civilisation reached new peaks. Greece was later occupied by the Romans, and
when the Roman empire finally split into two parts, the eastern part was gradually
hellenised and developed into the Byzantine Empire until it fell to the Ottoman Turks in
1453. The latter ruled for almost 400 years until, after the 1821 revolution, the modern
Greek state emerged. Since then, political disunity and financial crises have been
endemic, while peace and prosperity have seldom been enjoyed for long. The Balkan
Wars and World War I, were followed by the Metaxas dictatorship and World War II,
during which the Greeks suffered severe hardships under the Axis occupation. After
the end of the World War II, there followed the long and bitter civil war from 1944 to
1949, and the military dictatorship of the Junta from 1967 to 1974 that led to the 1974
Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
The history of Greece can explain why the country has been left out of the mainstream
of world achievements. The Ottoman rule for 400 years and the series of national and
20 The 5th century BC is also known as the "Golden Century of Athens".
21 "
Hellas" and "Hellenes" are the names by which the Greeks use to refer to their country and themselves
from the post—Homeric periods. These names originated from a small district and tribe in Phthiotis. The
names Greece and Greeks, which are used by the rest of the world to refer to the people and the country,
are derived from the Latin term "Graecus".
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civil wars and dictatorships during the 20th century had a negative impact on the
country's economic development and prevented the emergence of a sound, efficient
and pragmatic accounting system. In the chaos that existed with the emergence of
the modern Greek government in 1830, the government tried to intervene and
dominate all aspects of life. This intervention was extended to accounting via the
codification of legal stipulations relating to commerce (1835), company law (1920),
and tax law (1955). As stated above, since 1835, when the French Commercial Code
was adopted as the Greek Code, accounting in Greece followed developments in
France. This tradition finally led in 1981 to the adoption of the French Plan Comptable
as the GGAP. With the implementation of the EU Directives in the late 1980s this
situation has gradually been changing to the extent that there is some movement
towards a harmonisation of Greek accounting regulations with those of other European
countries (Papas, 1993).
2.5.2.2 Multinational Corporations
Almost all Greek governments have, in the last four decades, enacted various laws
designed to attract foreign capital investment. Through a series of incentives in the
form of grants, interest subsidies and tax allowances, many MNCs were encouraged to
set up operations in Greece or enter into joint ventures with local capitalists. The
MNCs are now among the largest and more profitable business organisations and
have significantly influenced, both directly and indirectly, local businesses. The direct
effect stems from the presence of a large number of subsidiaries of multinational
corporations which have contributed significantly to the modernisation and increased
sophistication of management practices in the country (Coopers & Lybrand, 1995).
The indirect effect resulted from the message that only the financially and technically
strong local companies could withstand the increased competition from the MNCs.
The possibility of fierce competition from MNCs had led to a series of strategic
mergers, acquisitions, reorganisations and reconstructions in order to eliminate
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inefficiencies, introduce new technology and be able to face the increased competitive
pressures (KPMG, 1995).
The operations of the MNCs have also had a positive impact on the country's
accountancy profession. In addition to the fact that their financial statements should
be prepared in accordance with Greek accounting and reporting regulations (for
submission to the local tax and other government authorities), there is also a need to
"decodify" and draft them in accordance with the regulations of the country in which the
MNC is domiciled (usually using IASs), for performance evaluation and incorporation
into the group accounts. In this respect the MNCs have been the most important
clients of the local affiliates of international accounting firms, seeking sophisticated
accounting, auditing and other business services (especially during the pre-1990
period, where the local accounting body [Soma Orgoton Logiston — SOL (Society of
Sworn Accountants)] enjoyed monopoly power over Greek statutory audits.
2.5.2.3	 International Trade
A significant proportion of Greece's international trade is with the EU. Greece's
exports to the EU account for approximately 60 per cent, while imports from the EU
form approximately 45 per cent of the country's trading volume with the rest of the
world (KPMG, 1997). Services are the most dynamic sector of the economy through
which Greece can partially offset its large trade deficits. In the services sector, tourism
and shipping are the country's principal sources of foreign currency earnings (Coopers
& Lybrand, 1995).
Apart from the EU influence which is dealt with in Section 2.5.2.4 below, the influence
of international trade on local accounting and reporting practices has not been
significant. The main reason for this is that the extensive barriers to trade with non—EU
countries that existed until the mid-1990s effectively limited the volume of international
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trade (with non—EU countries). This implied that there was neither a strong pressure
nor a necessity for a compatibility of Greek financial statements with those of its non-
EU trading partners. Additionally, it is only very recently that a small number of Greek
companies have gone to external markets seeking funds from international sources of
finance. As a result, there was no pressure for local financial practices and published
financial statements to be in accordance with international standards so as to be
comprehensible by overseas capital providers.
2.5.2.4 Greece and the European Union
Greece became an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in
1962 and was admitted as its tenth full member in 1981. It was one of the first
countries to ratify the Maastricht Treaty with an overwhelming majority in a vote at
parliament. Greece is one of the least developed EU members and is a large net
recipient of EU support funds (Coopers & Lybrand, 1995). As noted earlier, the 1994 —
1999 Revised Convergence Programme was introduced in 1994 aiming to enable the
Greek economy to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. By early 2000 Greece has managed
to fully satisfy the criteria for joining the eurozone and in May 2000 won the backing of
the European Union's Executive Body to join the eurozone on January 1, 2001
(Financial Weekly, 2000).
Perhaps the most important external environment factor on the development of
accounting and financial reporting in Greece has been the EU. The incorporation of
the EU Directives in Greek Law in the late 1980 have radically changed the mode of
accounting regulation in Greece (Robinson and Venieris, 1996). For example, prior to
the implementation of the Seventh Directive, group accounting was alien as there was
no legal on—going obligation to prepare consolidated accounts. The Seventh Directive
introduced detailed requirements concerning consolidated financial statements and
Greek law now requires the publication of group accounts for financial years
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commencing after 30 June 1990. In addition, the Fourth Directive introduced several
concepts, rules and principles and enabled company law to regain (to a certain extent)
influence on accounting matters from the tax law. However, there are still important
differences with other European accounting systems, mainly because of the
government's decision to adopt as few options (allowed under the Directives) as
possible (Papas, 1993). This implies that although Greece has made a bold move
towards harmonisation, there is still a way to go before its accounting system fully
converges with those of other European countries.
2.5.2.5 International Accounting Standards
IASs do not enjoy any statutory recognition in Greece. Lawrence (1996, p.94) notes
that IASs have had little or no influence in Greek accounting and opines that "Greece
is another country that is likely to present problems to the IASC in its harmonisation
project". However, with the amendment of laws 2190/20 and 3190/55 to incorporate
the relevant EU Directives, and the introduction of specific valuation and reporting rules
under the GGAP, certain requirements of some IASs have been incorporated into
Greek law.
Nevertheless, it is expected that IASs will become more influential on Greek
accounting as the Greek politico—economic environment becomes more
internationalised. This stems from the increasing number of Greek companies which
seek finance in the overseas markets, such as the listing of National Bank in the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) during 2000 and the acquisition of several Greek
companies by foreigners. As a result overseas finance providers usually demand
restatement of Greek financial statements in accordance with the IASs in order to
invest in Greek companies. The growing importance of IASs is evidenced by the fact
that in August 2000 the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed the mandatory
adoption of IASs by all Greek listed companies (Fileleftheros, 2000).
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2.5.2.6 International Accounting Firms
Most international accounting firms have set up operations in Greece since the early
1970s, but because of SQL's monopolistic power over statutory audits (up to the early
1990s) they have mainly been engaged in non—statutory audits and other related
services. In 1979 the international accounting firms established their own association,
the Association of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Greece (SELE), which was
modelled on the U.K.'s chartered accountancy bodies. 22 MacErlean (1992) notes that
members of SELE concentrated on tax and management consultancy and also did
some non—mandatory audits on behalf of foreign enterprises which had invested in
Greek subsidiaries. Nevertheless, SELE members were not authorised to conduct
statutory audits. The Greek audit profession was liberalised in 1992, following a long
and intense intra—professional struggle (Caramanis, 1997). While the international
accounting firms were pressing for liberalisation, this was met with severe resistance
from SQL. The main argument advanced against the reform was that statutory audits
would become lenient (Caramanis, 1999). However, SQL was abolished in 1992 and a
new institute was established, Soma Orgoton Elegton (SOE — translated as the Body
of Sworn—in Auditors). In addition, auditor members of SELE (mainly partners in the
international accounting firms) became members of SOE and, since then, SELE's
activities have diminished. It can be claimed that the liberalisation of the profession
and the spectacular development of the Greek economy during the late 1990s, have
opened up new horizons for the international accounting firms, and enabled them to
achieve remarkable growth rates (Global Training, 2000).
22 It is widely accepted in Greece that the object of liberalising the profession was the raison d'être for the
establishment of SELE (Caramanis, 1997).
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2.5.3	 Regulatory Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting
2.5.3.1	 General
As in the case of Cyprus, the nature of a Greek enterprise determines the type and
extent of its financial accounting and reporting obligations. The most common form of
commercial enterprise in Greece is the company, which can either be an Eteria
Periorismenis Efthynis (EPE) or an Anonymos Eteria (AE) (KPMG, 1997). An EPE
(limited liability company) is a legal entity distinct from its owners but decision making
resembles that of a partnership. It is equivalent to the French Sari and the German
GmbH. An AE (public company) is a separate legal entity in which the liability of
shareholders is limited to the amount they have contributed as capital. It is governed
by Law 2190/20 and is equivalent to the French Societe Anonyme and the German
AG. If an AE is listed on the ASE it is referred to as a listed AE. The financial
accounting and reporting obligations of listed AEs, which are the business enterprises
of interest in this thesis (from now on referred to as companies), are mainly regulated
by commercial, company and tax laws, the Greek General Accounting Plan (GGAP),
detailed regulations issued by the National Council of Accounting, and the regulations
of the ASE. These pronouncements are reviewed in the remaining part of Section
2.5.3.
2.5.3.2 Commercial and Company Law
Ballas (1994) reports that during the 1821 revolution, the National Assemblies at
Salona, Epidaurus, Argos and Trizina decided to adopt the French Commercial Code
of 1807 as the basis for the organisation of Greek commercial life. In 1835 the French
Code was adopted as the Greek Commercial Code and until today represents the
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cornerstone of Greek commercial law in that it laid the foundations of modern
accounting in Greece (Ballas, 1994).
In 1920 the Greek Company Law introduced additional principles to supplement those
of the Code. Law 2190/20, which governs AEs, introduced detailed regulations
governing corporate affairs and, together with the Commercial Code, provided the
conceptual framework of accounting. The Law and its subsequent amendments were
reshaped in 1986 and 1987 with the incorporation of the provisions of the EU
Directives (Caseley, 1996). They provide for the main accounting principles and
valuation methods to be followed, define the main elements of financial statements
(such as assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses), call for the appointment of statutory
auditors and specify the financial reporting and disclosure obligations of all companies.
The books and records to be kept by an AE are specified by tax rules. Bookkeeping
requirements are specified by presidential decree 186/92 which is known as the Code
of Books and Records. This specifies the accounting records and relevant documents
that must be maintained, as well as the bookkeeping procedures and practices to be
followed. Caseley (1996) emphasises that in certain instances there are conflicts
between the requirements of the tax legislation and those of company law (for example
there is a trend not to record provisions until they materialise since they are not
deductible for tax purposes). Papas (1993) observes that one of the main reasons that
contributed to the strong tax orientation of corporate accounting practices is the fact
that in cases where the company law and tax regulations are in conflict, accountants
tend to follow the latter. The annual financial statements must comprise the balance
sheet, the income statement, the profit distribution table and the notes (Prosartima).
According to law 2190/20 the publication of annual financial statements is effected as
follows: (1) The financial statements, together with the directors' and the auditors'
reports, should be filed with the Mitroo of AEs (Register) at the Ministry of Commerce;
(2) All of the above with the exception of the notes and the directors' report must be
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published in the Government Gazette and two national newspapers. The corporate
disclosure practices of Greek listed companies are characterised by the fact that
some companies do not prepare a corporate annual report (CAR) incorporating the
financial statements, the chairman's and directors' reports, the auditors' report and
sundry commentary (as is the practice in UK and Cyprus). When a letter was
despatched to all Greek listed companies requesting a copy of their CARs, some of
them simply despatched a single sheet of paper Incorporating the balance sheet, the
income statement, the profit distribution table and the auditors' report. Prior to the
incorporation of the EU Directives into Greek Law, notes to the accounts were rarely
given and Greek financial statements provided only fiscal and legal information
(Papas, 1993).
Law 1819/88 created the National Council of Accounting [Ethniko Symvoulio Logistikis
(ESYL)] which oversees the application of accounting legislation. ESYL acts as an
adviser to the Ministers of National Economy, Trade, Education and the Treasury on
accounting related matters. It also issues opinions, recommendations and
explanations on accounting principles and details of the GGAP and comments on
proposed amendments on company legislation which affect accounting practice.
Ballas (1994) notes that, in practice, the ESYL has been responsible for issuing
circulars explaining some of the details of the GGAP; the content of those circulars is
characterised by an obsessive attention to seemingly trivial details.
2.5.3.3 The Greek General Accounting Plan (GGAP)
Filios (1995) argues that for the most part of the twentieth century the accounting
systems of many Greek companies have been ineffective and inefficient, mainly
because of out of date accounting legislation and the lack of a competent accounting
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profession. Accounting terms and valuation rules were not uniform and management
was generally unwilling to provide information to outsiders.
The first important step to change this state of affairs has been the implementation of
the GGAP. Although a time consuming process commenced in 1954 the plan was not
introduced until 1981. The EU Fourth and Seventh Directives were incorporated into
the Plan in 1987 and were made compulsory for the majority of companies in 1991. As
a natural consequence of the adoption of the French Commercial Code, the GGAP is
based on the French Plan Comptable as far as structure, chart of accounts and
conceptual framework are concerned. Overall, it emphasises uniformity with disclosure
being much more extensive than that required by the Tax Code. 23
 When the GGAP
was introduced there were many instances where its requirements were in conflict with
those of company and tax law. Furthermore, the Greek business community was not
used to one set of rules for financial reporting and a different one for tax purposes, and
there was confusion as to which set of rules prevailed (Ballas, 1994). Most of the
conflicts were removed in 1994 when a new Code of Books and Records, outlining
how companies should organise their bookkeeping records for tax purposes,
was introduced. However, conflicts still exist, mainly in the case of depreciation and
provision for bad debts, and in such cases there is a tendency to follow the tax rules
for both tax and financial reporting purposes (Papas, 1993). The Plan gives guidelines
for the organisation of accounting records, recording of transactions and
preparation of financial statements. Its stated objective is to upgrade the quality of
accounting information by offering a clear and concise view of the operating
performance and financial results of the business. The GGAP is very rigid in that it
specifies in detail the form and content of financial statements and even the sequence
in which items are to be disclosed; both on the face of the financial statements and the
23 A comparison of the main Cypriot and Greek accounting practices is attached as Appendix A of the
study.
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notes. Grigorakos (1996, p.561) argues that the notes to the accounts are very
informative in that:
There are so many analyses, clarifications and information
disclosed in the notes, that a third party can, by studying the
balance sheet and the income statement in association with the
notes, be informed almost about everything which is known to the
preparers of the accounts. Everything is disclosed.
2.5.3.4 Tax System
Modern income tax in Greece was introduced by Law 1640/19. This law, which was
based on the corresponding French law, was repealed by Laws 3323/55 and 3843/58
relating to personal and corporate taxation respectively. These laws have been
subject to many amendments until they were finally codified in 1989. As noted
previously, a characteristic of the Greek tax system is the existence of the Code of
Books and Records which governs the accounting aspects of income tax. It specifies
the accounting records and documents that are to be maintained and the relevant
accounting principles and rules for updating them (KPMG, 1997). In spite of attempts
to simplify the Greek tax system, it still remains a confused and confusing system of
complicated legislation and conflicting laws, ministerial decisions, court decisions and
presidential decrees (Ballas, 1994). Due to these complications a breakdown of
income tax by source of income is impossible. Tax orientation of accounting practice
continues to some extent to be a tradition (Papas, 1993). Tax orientation is most
evident in the cases of provisions, depreciation and deferred tax.
Companies do not normally account for provisions which, although necessary, are not
deductible for tax purposes. For example, provisions for doubtful debts are allowed
against tax at predetermined rates. This may lead to overprovisioning, if the provision
is not, in fact, required but the company provides for it in order to get the tax benefit
(Caseley, 1996). It can also result in underprovisioning, in cases where a higher
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provision is required but the company is reluctant to do so because it is not allowable
against tax. Depreciation is calculated using the straight line method based on
estimated economic life. Depreciation rates can be subjectively determined by the
company's management but maximum depreciation rates are prescribed by the tax
law. In spite of their tax orientation, financial statements usually report a profit figure
which is different from taxable profit. This can be due to tax deferred reserves
provided for under various incentive laws, non—taxable income, non—allowable
expenses and tax losses carried forward. Nevertheless deferred tax is not required by
the local accounting regulations and is not normally reflected in the financial
statements (Robinson and Venieris, 1996).
It should be noted that non—compliance with tax regulations may result in fines and
criminal sanctions, whereas the penalty for failure to comply with accounting
regulations is usually a harmless qualification in the audit report. This partly explains
why in case of conflict between accounting and tax law regulations, accountants
usually follow the latter (Papas, 1993).
2.5.3.5 Accountancy Profession
The first attempt to introduce external auditing in Greece was made in 1920, when Law
2190/20 required companies to have their accounts audited by at least two auditors.
Nevertheless, the overall regulatory framework for auditing was ineffective and led to a
number of corporate scandals in the 1920s (Theodoropoulos, 1923; cited in
Caramanis, 1997). A new, unsuccessful, attempt was made in 1931 through law
5076/31, which established on paper an Institute of Certified Accountants. Filios
(1995) notes that up to the mid-1950s there were effectively no regulations relating to
the auditors' qualifications, something which led to the conduct of audits being taken
up by almost anybody. In 1948 the Greek government invited two British chartered
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accountants to advise on the establishment of a Greek accountancy body and their
comments formed the basis of Law 3329/55 which introduced the SQL.
SQL enjoyed a legally sanctioned monopoly in the market for audit services. It
effectively operated like a non—profit organisation. Audit fees were non—negotiable
and the individual auditors' remuneration was always determined by the SQL
Supervisory Council (Caramanis, 1998). In order to qualify for membership, one had
to have a university degree, eleven years junior membership, and be successful in
national examinations which were convened in accordance with the demand for
practitioners. SQL was heavily criticised for its quasi—governmental and monopolistic
status, while its international standing was very poor (International Accounting Bulletin,
1984; cited in Filios, 1995). This monopolistic state of affairs provoked protests from
international accounting firms and professional accountants outside the SOL.
Although in 1979 SELE was formed to counter SQL's monopoly, its members were not
authorised to conduct statutory audits and had no legal recognition. Nevertheless,
there was an increasing pressure on the government to liberalise the accountancy
profession and introduce competition in the market for audit services.
The creation and development of the auditing profession in Greece is characterised by
a distinctive profession—state relationship. Ballas (1998) explained how the auditing
profession in Greece was used by the State to further its strategic interests during the
late 1940s and early 1950s period. Ballas (1998) also presented evidence to show
that auditing in Greece was perceived as an instrument for both economic and political
control. In spite of severe resistance from the SQL, the political opposition and the
majority of the press, the move for the liberalisation of the profession was finally made
with the legislative reform in 1992. Caramanis (1998) points out that the audit reform
took place against the backdrop of advancing neoliberal economic and political
discourses which favoured a dramatic shift in state policy towards deregulation,
privatisation and less state involvement in the management of the economy. In May
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1993 SOE was established to replace SOL. It is made up of all the previous SOL
members, SELE members and other practising accountants who satisfy the requisite
criteria to become members of SOE.
Following the liberalisation the profession was split into three parts: (1) the SOL SA
group comprising the majority of ex—SOL members who joined together and formed
SOL SA — a private audit company; (2) the splinter ex—SOL group, comprising a
number of ex—SOL members who did not join SOL SA but established a number of
small audit practices; and (3), the SELE group comprising all the local branches of
international accounting firms — mainly the Big 5. Caramanis (1997) empirically
demonstrated that the two groups of the "indigenous" auditors combined (SOL SA and
ex—SOL) managed to retain the vast majority of audit assignments. This was mainly
because most typical Greek family companies tended to appoint auditors from these
two groups. In contrast, companies which are subsidiaries of foreign enterprises or
had received significant borrowing from abroad, tended to appoint members of the
SELE group as their auditors (Caramanis, 1997). By the late 1998 SOE had around
600 members. Admission to membership is achieved through a combination of
examinations and eight years practical experience. The quality control of auditors'
work is one of SOE's priorities and is expected to issue relevant guidelines and control
procedures in the foreseeable future. loannou (1995) expressed optimistic views
about the future of the accountancy profession in Greece and proposed that things
appear to be moving in the right direction. Additionally, loannou (1995) noted that the
Greek accountancy profession is making a very positive move to bring itself into line
with its European counterparts.
2.5.3.6 Accountancy Education
Accountancy education is offered by many vocational high schools, private colleges
and universities. Until the liberalisation of the profession in 1993, accounting was
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considered a second—rate course at Greek universities and there was no degree— level
course in accounting at any of the state universities (Belles, 1994). As far as
professional education was concerned this was limited to the SQL trainees. The
number of SQL auditors, assistants and juniors was fixed and it was compulsory for all
assistants and cadets to be junior SQL members. Furthermore, a Greek accountant
could only be a member of SQL, if he was in public practice, in contrast to other
countries where a great proportion of qualified accountants work in industry or the
government.
The liberalisation of the profession had a positive impact on accounting education.
Degree level courses in accounting are now widely offered and research in accounting
is being encouraged (Global Training, 2000). SOE established a student training
programme leading to a qualification as a certified auditor. University graduates are
employed as trainees for 2 years before they can take the first set of SOE
examinations. Successful trainees at this examination proceed to the "cadet" level,
which requires a minimum period of 3 years practical training before they can take the
second level of examinations. Successful cadets are transferred to the "assistant"
level and have to practice for another 3 years before they can take the final set of
examinations to qualify as full SOE members. The long period of training and the
requirement to be in public practice, limit the number of persons who attain full
membership of SOE. In view of the shortage of qualified accountants, most
international accounting firms operating in Greece have to recruit expatriates (mainly
U.K. Chartered and Chartered Certified accountants). The recruitment of expatriates
is very costly for the international accounting firms and this was the main reason for
their decision to introduce the ACCA examination and training scheme in 199624
(Global Training, 2000).
24 The scheme has been set up by Intercoliege (Cyprus) and Coopers and Lybrand (Greece) in 1996.
Other international firms have joined in 1997/8 (e.g. Ernst and Young, Delathe & Touche).
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2.5.3.7 Capital Market
The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) was established in 1876 and is currently one of the
emerging Southern European markets. The first stock exchange law was based on
the French Commercial Code. The stock market consists of the main market and the
parallel market. All listed companies must prepare and make available to their
investors and the public at large the latest financial statements together with the
directors' report. Listed companies must also prepare and publish, within 4 months of
the relevant period, semi—annual financial statements. These should be published in
at least one national newspaper. The main characteristics of the ASE and their
implications for corporate disclosure practices are:
(a)	 Supply—related characteristics:
Pre 1990 most companies were controlled by a small number of shareholders, who
were usually reluctant to give up effective control. Extensive use of bank credit
facilities was made in raising new capital, while equity funds were usually being
obtained through the retention of earnings (Filios, 1995). Filios (1995) additionally
notes that the unreliability of Greek financial statements explains why many Greek
banks were lending on the adequacy of collateral rather than on the assessment of
corporate performance and financial position as reflected in published financial
statements. However, during the 1990s the Greek capital market has experienced
remarkable growth rates, a significant number of companies have entered the ASE
and there have been sizeable new share issues and a series of mergers and takeovers
that increased the dispersion of share ownership in listed companies (Sigma, 2000).
These supply—related characteristics imply that the pressure for more extensive
disclosure should be higher than that existed in the pre 1990s.
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(b) Demand-related characteristics:
Papas (1993) points out that most investors invest in the ASE in the hope to make
quick profit through speculation, and only few study corporate fundamentals and make
investment decisions based on available information. This can partly be explained by
the tax orientation of Greek financial statements and the management's reluctance to
provide information beyond that required by the tax authorities. This tax orientation of
Greek financial statements can be demonstrated by the fact that whenever the
government tried to sell state companies on the world markets, international firms were
asked to prepare financial statements in accordance with IASs and audit them.
Examples include those of the OTE (state telephone company) and the Olympic
Airways (national carrier). This structure of the demand side of the ASE implies that
the pressure for detailed and adequate disclosure should be low.
(c) Market-related characteristics:
As at the end of 1996 there were 218 companies listed on the ASE with a total market
capitalisation of GRD 5,945. The corresponding figures as at the end of 1999 were
278 companies with a market capitalisation of GRD 67,093 billion. Sigma (2000)
observes that the ASE has, during the 1990s, been experiencing remarkable growth,
modernisation and internationalisation. The factors that contributed to the
strengthening of the ASE's role as an avenue for investment and source of funds
include a number of new enactments, an increase in trading volumes, the good
performance of certain listed companies and the fact that capital gains from trading
activity are completely tax exempt. These developments imply that the pressure for
more detailed financial disclosure should be increasing.
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2.5.3.8 Enforcement Mechanism
As in the case of Cyprus, there are three accounting enforcement mechanisms in
Greece: Law 2190/20, the accountancy profession and the ASE.
Law 2190/20 provides that failure to prepare and publish a balance sheet in
accordance with the provisions of the law renders a director of a company liable to
prosecution which is punishable by fine or imprisonment. Furthermore, the annual
financial statements together with the directors' and auditors' reports should be
submitted to the Ministry of Finance within 20 days of their approval at the company's
AGM. They are then reviewed by an officer of the department of Register of AEs and
deposited in the company's file (Grigorakos, 1996). This review process, however, is
not a detailed investigation designed to reveal any failures to comply with any
accounting or disclosure requirements. It is rather an administrative formality, which
seeks is to ensure that the proper documents and statements have been submitted on
the due dates (Global Training, 2000).
The presidential decree 226/92, which represents the main piece of legislation
regulating the organisation and operations of the SOE, provides that the SOE Council
(Epoptiko Symvoulio) can refer any member or trainee to its Discipline Committee in
case of improper behaviour or contravention of any law or regulation of the Institute.
The Discipline Committee investigates referred cases in accordance with prescribed
procedures and can impose sanctions. Nevertheless, the cases of disciplinary action
for failure to comply with the accounting or reporting regulations have been rare
(Eliokaftos, 1995). This is probably because of the lack of a systematic review of
CAFSs of listed companies. SOE does not have a watchdog, such as the Review
Panel in the U.K., entrusted with the responsibility to monitor and enforce corporate
accounting and reporting requirements.
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According to the regulations of the ASE, the Capital Market Committee can, at the
approval of the ASE Council, delist a company in case of failure to comply with any of
the CSE's regulation (ASE, 1997). The ASE does not itself assess compliance with
regulations. It merely depends on the auditors' examination and investigates cases of
non—compliance mentioned in the audit report.
In spite of the extremely detailed regulations relating to the reporting and publication of
accounting information, the enforcement mechanism appears not to be stringent
enough, as there is no effective and systematic assessment of compliance with
accounting and disclosure regulations. This is probably the reason why ". . . since
1920 there has not been a penalty imposed on any accountant for failing to comply
with the regulations" (Filios, 1995, p.94).
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2.6	 SUMMARY
This chapter provided background information about the Cypriot and Greek accounting
environments. The information provided reveals that due to historical, political,
economic and other reasons, Cyprus follows the Anglo—Saxon accounting model while
Greece follows the Franco—German accounting traditions. The background
information provided in this chapter, together with the development of the theoretical
framework for corporate financial disclosure and the review of the relevant literature
(undertaken in the next two chapters), will be used to develop the research hypotheses
in Chapter 5. Additionally, the background information presented in this chapter will be
used in discussing the results of the statistical analyses in Chapter 9.
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PART H
LITERATURE REVIEW
CHAPTER 3
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
3.1	 INTRODUCTION
The selection of the possible explanatory variables for Cypriot and Greek corporate
disclosure is mainly theory driven. Thus, in order to encapsulate, develop and test the
related hypotheses, it is firstly necessary to provide a general frame of reference by
which corporate disclosure can be predicted and explained. This is the purpose of
Chapter 3: to set the theoretical framework for corporate financial disclosure and to
provide the basis on which research hypotheses can be developed and tested. The
intention is not to develop a detailed theory of disclosure, since the literature assessing
the validity of the theories underpinning corporate disclosure is voluminous and
complex (Owusu—Ansah, 1998). The attempt is, rather, to synthesise a network of
associations among the variables that are deemed to be integral to the dynamics of a
company's disclosure decision.
Marston and Shrives (1995) point out that there is no general theory of disclosure and
that different researchers use different theoretical approaches, probably because
different disclosure situations are being investigated. This chapter focuses on agency
theory, signalling theory, political cost theory and other economic cost—benefit analysis
approaches. The reason for focusing on these theories is twofold. First, these
theories are amongst those that predominate the disclosure literature (Marston and
Shrives, 1995). Second, based on the researcher's experience, these theories are
likely to be among the most influential on Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure
practices. A deliberate effort is made to keep the synthesis simple without obscuring
the underlying theoretical rationale of each theory of corporate financial disclosure.
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3.2	 THE MARKET FOR ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
The ASB states that the objective of financial statements is ". . . to provide information
about the financial position, performance and financial adaptability of an enterprise that
is useful to a wide range of users for assessing the stewardship of management and
for making economic decisions" (ASB, 1996, p.845-6). In spite of the fact that the
assessment of stewardship has traditionally been recognised as the primary objective
of financial statements (e.g. ASB, 1996), it is gradually being dominated by the
decision making objective. One can argue, however, that the former is effectively a
subset of the latter, since one of the decisions to be made by the shareholders is the
assessment of stewardship and their reward or replacement. Thus, the IASC (1996,
p.44) states that the objective of financial statements is to provide information ". . . that
is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions".
Many researchers have suggested that accounting be viewed as a commodity that
results from an economic activity (e.g. Belkaoui, 1994). There is a market for
accounting information, where demand is derived from the information needs of the
various interested stakeholders groups, and supply comes from the managers of those
entities who are capable of producing the desired information. Although it is
appreciated that a company's disclosure decision may be affected by different
economic, political, legal, psychological, sociological and other factors, the approach
adopted in this investigation follows that taken in most other financial disclosure
studies; that is, by focusing primarily on the economic incentives behind the disclosure
of corporate information. The development of the theoretical framework for corporate
financial disclosure is undertaken by viewing the disclosure of accounting information
in CAFSs as an economic good and examining the factors that influence its demand
and supply.
85
3.3	 THE DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
There seems to be a consensus that apart from investors there are, at least, another
six corporate stakeholder groups that are entitled to information because the
company's activities have an impact on their interests: employees, lenders, creditors,
customers, government and the public. 25
 Naser (1993) states that the identification of
the accounting information required by each user group can be achieved by either
asking them what they want, or identifying the types of decisions they might make and
determining the information needed. In view, however, of the fact that the former
approach is difficult to achieve, the latter approach is usually followed.
ASB (1996) states that investors need information both for investment and stewardship
purposes. Investment decisions involve an assessment of the risk inherent in an
investment and a determination of the adequacy of the return provided, while
stewardship decisions concentrate on monitoring the management's performance.
Employees are mainly interested about an entity's stability and profitability in order to
assess the security of their jobs and determine their bargaining procedures. Lenders
are interested in liquidity and stability in order to judge principal and interest
repayments. Suppliers and other trade creditors are normally interested in an
enterprise over a shorter term than lenders, in order to decide whether to sell or not.
Customers are mainly concerned in an entity's market power in order to know
whether a monopoly situation (and the possibility of being exploited) exists, as well as
about its survival in order to assess continuity of supply. The government and its
agencies are primary interested in an entity's profitability for tax assessment purposes;
they also require general information for regulation, planning and statistics purposes.
Finally, the general public is usually sensitive about an entity's social activities such as
employment opportunities offered and the impact of its activities on the environment.
25 All of these groups are identified by both the ASB and the IASC as potential users of financial
statements.
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The discussion above reveals that although many user needs are common, each
group focuses on a particular aspect of financial performance or position. The demand
for accounting information comes from many potentially conflicting sources where each
party is primarily interested in information that will help its own decision making.
Hence, a question arises as to whether a special purpose report (directed to satisfy as
much as possible the specific needs of each user group), or a multipurpose
comprehensive report (directed to satisfy the needs of all user groups), should be
prepared. Although empirical studies have discovered a need for a high level of
education in order to read and comprehend a company's annual report (Soper and
Dolphin, 1964), this is the only general—purpose financial reporting document which is
widely available to all user groups. The main part of a company's annual report — the
set of CAFSs — is, as noted earlier, the focus of interest in this study.
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3.4	 THE SUPPLY OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
3.4.1	 Different Disclosure Epochs
It is proposed that the factors affecting the supply of accounting information (at least in
the developed Western capital markets such as the US and the U.K.) can be examined
in the context of three different epochs. The first is the nineteenth century epoch,
which was marked by the owner—manager principle and the absence of any disclosure
(or measurement) regulations. Fitzpatrick (1939, cited in Naser, 1993) notes that
accounting behaviour during this period was a response to the objectives of individual
owners—managers, leading to inconsistency and diversity in the disclosed information.
The second is the early twentieth century epoch, which was characterised by the
divorce of ownership from control and a corresponding need for monitoring
management's behaviour and performance. This period was marked by the existence
of minimum disclosure regulation based on the proposition that there were enough
incentives to disclose voluntarily. The third is the mid—late twentieth century epoch,
which is characterised by a wide dispersion of share ownership, the development of
sophisticated stock markets and the increasing demand for corporate information by a
wide range of users whose interests are affected by the company's activities. These
phenomena led to the enactment of specific disclosure regulations based on the belief
that in the absence of disclosure minima, a less than optimum amount of information
will be disclosed to satisfy those needs. The existence of such disclosure minima
raises two important questions. First, what are the factors that influence the
management's decision to comply with, or even exceed, the disclosure regulations (the
supply of corporate information), and second, whether information disclosure should
be regulated or not. The former question is discussed in the remainder of this section,
leaving Section 3.5 to tackle the regulation issue.
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3.4.2	 The Supply of Corporate Information
3.4.2.1	 General
As noted in the previous section, the supply of corporate information is up to the
company's management. For example, the disclosure of voluntary information will be
made provided the management believes that the marginal cost for its disclosure does
not exceed the marginal benefit. The same economic rationale (disclosure up to the
point where marginal cost equals the marginal benefit) can apply to the extent of detail
by which companies will disclose mandatory information. This is because even for
mandatory information companies have substantial discretion in the informativeness
of the disclosure and the amount of detail provided (Barrett, 1976; Wallace and Naser,
1995; Lang and Lundholm, 1996).
The discussion above implies that in order to assess the management's disclosure
decision, it is necessary to analyse briefly the different costs of, and benefits from,
corporate financial disclosure and to assess which of them are likely to have a
significant influence on the disclosure decision. However, before this analysis is
undertaken, it should be emphasised that although several costs and benefits have
frequently been suggested, most of them cannot be easily measured in monetary
terms and, consequently, their empirical testing is difficult. That is why the approach
taken in the discussion that follows is to identify the nature of the most frequently cited
costs and benefits and explore their relationships, rather than attempt to quantify them
in monetary terms. The identification of the relevant costs and benefits is made by
reference to specific theories of corporate disclosure. The different costs and benefits
have been grouped into internal (those affecting corporate insiders such as the
owners, employees and the management), and external (those affecting all corporate
outsiders such as lenders, creditors and customers).
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3.4.2.2	 Internal Benefits
(a) Reduction in the company's cost of capital:
The capital need theory suggests that disclosure reduces investor uncertainty and risk,
and hence required rates of return. Spero (1979) argues that disclosure improves the
estimates of an asset's (individual company's share) mean return and the covariance
of the return with the market return, and lowers the systematic risk of the asset. This,
in turn, results in a lower cost of capital which is beneficial to both individual investors
and the company itself, it is beneficial to investors because they understand the
economic risk of the investment and demand a return consistent with that risk. It is
also beneficial for the company, because a lower information risk premium leads to a
lower cost of capital for the company; this increases shareholders' wealth and makes
marginal projects worthwhile. Spero (1979) additionally notes that the disclosure of
financial information is analogous to advertising which aims to increase the demand for
a company's securities and reduce the company's cost of capital.
(b) Reduction in agency costs:
The divorce of ownership from control, noted in Section 3.4.1 earlier, produced the
agency theory to explain relationships within corporations. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) proposed that companies be viewed as a nexus of contracts between managers
and finance providers (shareholders and creditors) with managers as agents and
finance providers as principals. The theory assumes that there is a conflict of interest
between the agents and the principals because decisions made by the former to
maximise their utility may not maximise the latter's wealth. This is referred to as the
agency problem that leads to agency costs, which are the costs of measuring and
monitoring the agent's behaviour, establishing compensation policies, etc. (Watts,
1977). They comprise bonding expenditures by the agent (such as the cost of
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preparing financial reports), monitoring expenditures by the principals (such as the cost
of employing auditors), and a residual loss represented by the reduction in firm value
because of the divergence of interest between the contracting parties. Monitoring
devices used by management include auditing, other formal control systems and the
establishment of budget restrictions, in order to assure shareholders that they are not
exploiting their fiduciary position. In this respect, the disclosure of corporate
information can be used to monitor and enforce these contracts and reduce agency
costs (Watts, 1977).
(c)	 Reduction in political costs:
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) propose that the political sector has the power to effect
wealth transfers between various groups and that the corporate sector is especially
vulnerable to such redistributions. Politically visible firms, such as large and very
profitable companies, may draw the public's attention and certain groups of voters may
lobby for political actions such as nationalisation, expropriation or regulation. This can
lead to the potential for political costs, such as legal costs incurred in opposing political
actions and costs of increased demands imposed by labour unions. The political cost
theory suggests the use of accounting information in an effort to avoid these risks and
counter potential government intrusions. In this context, Zimmerman (1983),
formulated the political cost hypothesis, used effective corporate tax rates as a proxy
for a company's political costs, and contended that large U.S. companies are less likely
to circumvent their tax responsibilities, and so pay more taxes. He called this the
political cost of being a large company and suggested that this cost is reflected in a
company's effective tax rate.
Zimmerman (1983), however, clarified that a company's effective tax rate is only a
partial measure of a company's political costs. Within this context, some disclosure
researchers argue that another measure for a company's political costs is increased
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corporate disclosure (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). They propose that politically
sensitive companies can disclose more extensive information in order to reduce the
likelihood of political action either of the government or of a particular pressure group
(e.g. Inchausti, 1997).
(d)	 Other benefits:
Other benefits from financial disclosure suggested in the literature include its use to
enhance corporate reputation and public image (Firth, 1979); allay the fears of
investors and lenders about the company's ability to meet its interest and loan
repayment obligations as they fall due (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978); and provide public
relations benefits, such as giving the impression of openness and forthrightness to the
investment community and decreasing the probability of meritless suits and litigation
costs (Elliott and Jacobson, 1994). There is also evidence that stability in share prices
is considered to be a valuable benefit from increased disclosure (Abu—Nassar and
Rutherford, 1995).
3.4.2.3 Internal Costs
(a)	 Direct costs:
The most straightforward and easily quantifiable costs are the direct costs incurred in
gathering, developing, processing, auditing, packaging and disseminating accounting
information. It should, however, be emphasised that certain costs should not be
included in those mentioned above in the sense that they are committed costs (i.e.
those relating to the cost of developing and presenting information for management
purposes). Although in developed countries the indirect costs of disclosure (discussed
next) can assume greater significance that direct costs (Gray and Roberts, 1989),
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there is evidence that the latter can be considered to be more important in less
developed countries (Abu—Nassar and Rutherford, 1995).
(b)	 Indirect costs:
Apart from the direct costs discussed above, there are also indirect costs associated
with increased disclosure; the most frequently cited of which are derived from the
proprietary cost and the political cost theories. First, Verrecchia (1983) argues that the
costs of disclosure include not only the direct costs mentioned above, but also those
relating to the disclosure of proprietary information. The disclosure of such information
can be damaging and can lead to proprietary costs, if external parties, such as
competitors or employees, use it in a way that is harmful to the company. Second,
some researchers claim that an important indirect cost associated with increased
disclosure is that of greater public attention (Wallace and Naser, 1995). This can lead
to a scrutiny of financial results and position and an exposition to political attacks in the
form of pressure for greater regulation, such as price controls and higher corporate
taxes.
3.4.2.4 External Benefits
(a)	 Increase in business investment
The first external benefit associated with increased corporate disclosure is in line with
the internal benefit stemming from the capital need theory. If disclosure reduces a
company's cost of capital, then it can also enhance the public interest if a lower cost of
capital results in an increase in the value of corporate investment. This has a multiplier
effect in the economy, contributes to economic growth, creates additional employment
opportunities and results in an improved standard of living (Singhvi and Desai, 1971).
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In this respect, increased disclosure can have a beneficial impact on the economy
through its influence on business investment.
(b) Efficiency in capital markets:
Improved financial disclosure can also result in more efficient capital markets because
it facilitates the optimal allocation of resources among firms (Beaver, 1981). Alexander
and Archer (1995) argue that the crucial role of financial reporting lies in the reduction
of information asymmetries in capital markets and that the better the information
provided in published financial reports, the more effective it can be in removing these
asymmetries and promoting market efficiency. Furthermore, Elliot and Jacobson
(1994) propose that rich disclosure contributes to the effective allocation of capital by
enabling capital providers to identify the most productive enterprises. Thus, disclosure
ensures that capable companies have adequate supplies of capital.
(c) Enhanced liquidity of capital markets:
Elliott and Jacobson (1994) also suggest that increased disclosure contributes to the
liquidity of capital markets (which varies according to the bid—ask spread). The two
principal determinants of the bid—ask spread are the degree of information asymmetry
and the degree of uncertainty between the buyer and the seller. They argue that broad
public disclosure can result in lower information asymmetry and less uncertainty
between the buyer and the seller, thereby increasing capital market liquidity and
assisting in the effective allocation of capital.
3.4.2.5 External Costs
External costs suffered because of financial disclosure are difficult to find. One
example is the national cost when sensitive financial information about local
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businesses becomes known to foreign competitors. In this way, information about
technological and managerial innovations, planned product development and market
targeting can aid foreign competitors. Although such disadvantages could be cured by
several forms of trade restriction in the local market, the latter are not usually an option
in international markets.
3.4.3	 Benefits, Costs and the Regulation Debate
Although the discussion above reveals that there are several costs and benefits
associated with corporate disclosure, the problem is that it is difficult for some of them
to be precisely quantified in monetary terms (e.g. proprietary costs). Elliott and
Jacobson (1994) opine that a company's disclosure decision is a complex issue and
that there are no agreed—upon measures of the monetary value of the costs and
benefits from disclosure. This leads to one of the most controversial issues among
accounting researchers: whether corporate disclosure should be regulated or not.
Some writers argue that there is a clear commercial reason for disclosing voluntarily
because of the benefits from increased disclosure and the substantial costs of secrecy.
They argue that free market forces will provide an ideal mechanism where an optimal
amount of information will be provided at an optimal price (Free Market Theory). Other
researchers, however, propose that the costs of increased disclosure outweight any
associated benefits, and that companies are unlikely to voluntarily release extensive
information. As a result, a free market cannot guarantee the provision of an optimum
amount of information at an optimal price and some form of regulation is needed;
whether by public sector institutions, private sector bodies or a combination of both
(Regulatory Theory). The next section briefly presents the main arguments of each
theory.
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3.5	 THE MARKET FOR ACCOUNTING INFORMATION: REGULATORY
VERSUS FREE MARKET THEORIES
3.5.1	 Regulatory Theory
3.5.1.1	 General
There are two major theories of regulation: the public interest and the interest—group
(or capture) theories. The public interest theory postulates that regulation is supplied
in response to the demand of the public for the correction of the inefficient (or
inequitable) free market system, and it is instituted primarily for the protection and
benefit of the general public (Belkaoui, 1994). For example, if accounting information is
viewed as a public good, it is likely that it will be under—produced in a free market
system. Therefore, some form of regulation is needed to correct this market failure for
the benefit of the general public and the economy in general. The interest group
theory, however, challenges the above proposition and maintains that regulation is
supplied in response to the demand of special—interest groups (such as the regulator
or the regulated industry), in order to maximise their own welfare (Belkaoui, 1994). For
example, the regulated parties may try to intervene in, or even regulate, the activities
of the regulatory body to ensure that their own interest is satisfied.
The remainder of this section concentrates on the public interest theory of regulation,
which has been the most frequently cited theory in the literature. The essence of this
theory is that if left to the free market system a sub—optimal level of information will be
disclosed. Hence, regulation is needed in order to correct the imperfections of the free
market system and improve social welfare. Several arguments have been advanced in
the literature to support this theory; the most important have been grouped into two
categories and are briefly discussed below.
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3.5.1.2	 Explicit Market Failures
The fundamental economic rationale behind the public interest theory of regulation is
that there are explicit market failures in the free market system. The term market
failures is usually used to refer to the case where the market performance is judged to
be faulty, in the sense that the best attainable outcome has not been achieved, rather
than the fact that nothing good has happened (Lipsey, 1983). Belkaoui (1994) further
clarifies that explicit market failure is assumed to happen when either the quantity or
the quality of a good produced in an unregulated market differs from the social costs of
and benefits from that good, and the market solution results in a non—Pareto resource
allocation. In the context of corporate disclosure the explicit market failures stem from
the possibilities that: (1) accounting information exhibits public good characteristics;
(2) accounting information gives rise to externalities; and (3), there is a presumed
asymmetry in the distribution of financial information among capital market agents.
(a)	 Public good characteristics:
It is usually proposed that corporate information possesses the characteristics of a
public good (Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974). A public good is one which provides
benefits to a large group of people, but for which the free market cannot compel a
payment because there is no way to prevent a person from getting the benefit of the
good if he or she refuses to pay for it.
Some theorists argue that information disclosed in CAFSs displays the two principal
characteristics of public goods: indivisibility, in that its use or consumption by one user
does not diminish it for others; and non—excludability, because users who have not
paid can get a free ride on others' payments and obtain benefits from its use (e.g.
Coffee, 1984). Such characteristics can bring a market failure because individuals
tend to hide their actual preferences and try to become free riders at the expense of
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others; as a result, demand is likely to be understated. In addition, the producers of
information cannot obtain all of its value and without this incentive information will be
underproduced. The above signifies that the price system may not function properly
leading to the classic public goods problem: an underprovision of information needed
for informed investment decisions and a sub—optimal allocation of resources. Thus,
non—market allocation methods are needed in order to maintain the proper supply of
information (Taylor and Turley, 1986).
The public good argument has been challenged in the literature. For example, Watts
and Zimmerman (1986) argue that accounting information has features of a private as
well as of a public good, because its use by one investor reduces the chances of
others to derive the same benefit from its further use. This is because market prices
would have already been adjusted by the first use of the disclosed information and its
later usage is unlikely to yield the same benefits to the investors concerned.
(b)	 The externality problem:
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) explain that an externality exists when the quantity or
quality of a good produced in a free market economy differs from the supposed
socially optimum level. The socially optimum level of production is attained when the
price of a good equals the marginal social costs of its production (the value of the best
alternative use of the resources consumed for the society as a whole). At the
individual producer's level, however, the private optimum level of production is when
the price of the good equals the marginal private costs of its production (the value of
the best alternative use of the resources consumed for the individual producer). An
externality problem is created when the marginal social costs of production do not
equal the marginal private costs of production and the individual producer (who is to
decide the actual quantity and quality of the good to be produced) produces the good
up to the quantity or quality that he or she maximises his/her utility. In such a case, an
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externality is said to exist because it is privately, but not socially, optimum (Foster,
1980).
Within this context, it is usually argued that the disclosure of accounting information
generates an externality problem because while the disclosure will benefit both owners
(shareholders) and non—owners (competitors, lenders etc.), the costs of the disclosure
will ultimately be paid for only by the former (Beaver, 1989). In such a case, there will
be a divergence of the private and the societal costs of producing that information.
This creates an important externality problem: in the absence of regulation the
disclosing company will tend to engage in too little information disclosure because it
will not be compensated (through the free market system) for all the private costs
incurred. Hence, regulation is needed in order to ensure that there is an adequate
supply of information which is socially optimum and facilitates all well—informed
investment decisions to be taken.
Nonetheless, the externality argument has also been challenged in the literature. For
example Leftwich (1980, p.208) argues that:
The output identified by those theories as optimal is optimal in
name only — it is defined independently of any institutional
arrangements that can produce the output. None of these
theories identifies a level of output which is optimal given the
existing technology of markets, regulation, or any other regimes.
Thus, unless market failure theories incorporate attainable
institutional arrangements, they can yield no policy implications. It
is illogical to condemn the actual output of an existing market (or
government agency) merely because the quantity or quality of that
output differs from an unattainable norm that is falsely described
as optimal.
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(c)	 Information asymmetry:
A third reason for a failure in the free market for accounting information is the
information asymmetry that may exist between suppliers and users of that information.
Corporate managers can withhold valuable (or release fraudulent) information giving
rise to the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that can increase uncertainty
in, and lead to a deterioration (or even breakdown) of, the financial information
markets (Coffee, 1984). Moral hazard arises whenever someone's superior knowledge
leads him or her to behave differently from the way he or she would behave if that
knowledge was perfect (Lipsey, 1983).
In the disclosure literature moral hazard is used to refer to the pursuit by management
of activities which are not in the best interest of the shareholders. This is caused by
their access to superior information (e.g. trading on non—public corporate information).
Adverse selection, on the other hand, refers to the case where the asymmetry of
information between buyers and seller leads to the prices of certain goods being sub-
optimal. In the case of financial information markets, the absence of publicly known
information may imply that some users are more informed than others. This can lead
to investments with different characteristics selling for the same price, or investments
with the same characteristics selling for different prices.
Supporters of this view usually refer to Akerlof's (1970) classic paper on "lemons" 26 , to
suggest that the uncertainty caused by the moral hazard and adverse selection
problems, can lead to a deterioration of the financial information markets. For
example, there is a possibility that managers, having monopoly control of corporate
information, may use this information to manipulate stock prices to their own interest
26 This is American jargon for inferior products whose actual quality characteristics are less than the
perceived quality characteristics at the time of purchase. Akerlof (1970) uses the example of "lemons" to
explain how they can bring about a reduction not only in the average quality of goods but also in the size
of the market. In these markets governmental intervention can sometimes increase the welfare of all
parties.
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(Naser, 1993). Additionally, suspicious investors will only be prepared to buy corporate
securities at prices low enough to offset the increased probability that they are
"lemons". In extreme cases investors, fearing that they are exploited by management
or better informed traders, may withdraw their capital to the detriment of the markets
and the economy. Hence, there is a need for disclosure regulation because investors
and the stock market would not otherwise be able to distinguish between efficient and
less efficient firms (Taylor and Turley, 1986).
The information asymmetry proposition has not been left unchallenged. For example
Cooper and Keim (1983) propose that even if adverse selection problems exist, market
mechanisms can emerge which can serve satisfactorily to cope with them and
intervention in the form of disclosure laws is not a necessity. Examples include the
licensing of auditors and the establishment of accounting standards that limit
management's ability to convey ambiguous signals. Similarly, Easterbrook and Fischel
(1984) argue that there is no scientifically acceptable evidence that any benefits from
increased public confidence in information markets exceed the administrative costs of
mandatory disclosure.
3.5.1.3	 Implicit Market Failures
Advocates of the public interest theory of regulation maintain that the free market
system has implicit failures as well. Some of the most important implicit market
failures focus on one of the following claimed defects of the free market for corporate
information:
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(a)	 Exploitation of unsophisticated investors:
The first defect of the free market stems from the fact that it cannot protect investors
who are not well versed in some of the complex accounting terms or techniques. This
is because those unsophistical investors may be fooled by the use of alternative
accounting techniques by comparable firms, and not be able to adjust their decision
making processes to take the diversity of accounting procedures into account. Hence,
increased disclosure is needed to ensure that unsophisticated investors are not fooled
(Belkaoui, 1994). Coffee (1984) also notes that financial disclosure rules can also be
beneficial because they can reduce fraudulent practices in connection with the
issuance of new securities.
(b)	 Functional fixation:
Additionally, it can be claimed that under certain conditions investors may be unable to
change their decision—making processes in response to a change in the underlying
accounting process that provided them with the data, due to functional fixation. This is
the psychological phenomenon where an individual attaches a meaning to a title or an
object and is unable to see alternative meanings or uses. It was applied to accounting
by Ijiri, Jaedicke and Knight (1966), when they argued that if the output from different
accounting methods are called by the same name (e.g. profit), non—experts tend to
neglect the fact that alternative methods may have been used to prepare the output.
Thus, rules which provide for the disclosure of all information (and, preferably, in a
simplified form), will ensure the avoidance of the functional fixation problem.
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(c)	 Reduction in public confidence:
Another commonly offered justification for mandatory disclosure rules is that they
enhance the public's knowledge of and confidence in, the corporate sector and the
economy as a whole. In the absence of disclosure regulation management becomes
an unregulated monopolist of information. In this case the general public may believe
that the market is not fair and either put less into equities or spend more on
investigating before investing. In extreme cases when there is the fear of
misinformation by firms, the public may withdraw their capital (Owusu—Ansah, 1998). In
contrast, disclosure rules can have two potential beneficial effects: first, they can
ensure the dissemination of financial information that may not be otherwise available;
and, second, they can guarantee that companies disclose and are seen to be
disclosing all information. A better informed public would, therefore, be less suspicious
of the corporate sector and more public confidence will be placed in the markets.
Coffee (1984, p.235) claims that "it is clear that financial disclosure regulation
promotes the efficiency of not perfectly efficient capital markets because it supplies
them with new information".
However, the implicit market failure propositions have not been left unchallenged. For
example, the semi—strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) maintains
that market prices reflect fully and speedily all available information and that market
prices will always equal the intrinsic value of a share (Fama, 1970). If the EMH is
valid, then uninformed or naive investors can take a free ride on the information
provided by the market and need not worry about being fooled by alternative
accounting techniques of comparable firms (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Additionally, the existence of portfolio managers and other professionals, mean that
unsophisticated investors can put their money in the hands of such sophisticated
investors and get for themselves whatever advantages accrue to the better informed
traders.
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3.5.2	 Free Market Theory
3.5.2.1	 General
Proponents of this theory suggest that a freely operating market for accounting
information can work efficiently and provide the desired level of information (e.g.
Stigler, 1964). They argue that although mandated disclosure provides some
accounting information, it involves considerable costs. The main argument of this
theory is based on the rationale that the societal costs of regulation exceed the
benefits derived. It is, therefore, better to leave accounting information to be
determined by information seekers and information providers. The level of information
so determined will be the optimum, since it will equate marginal costs of that
information with its marginal benefits.
The theory is non—normative in the sense that it does not prescribe what the optimum
disclosure levels should be. As in the case of regulation, the advocates of the free
market theory have marshalled a substantial amount of conceptual arguments and
empirical evidence to support their arguments. This section concentrates on the
empirical studies of Stigler and Benston as well as the conceptual arguments derived
from agency, signalling and positive accounting theories, the main arguments of which
are presented below, again in broad form.
3.5.2.2 Empirical Studies: The Stigler — Benston Hypothesis
Stigler (1964) and subsequently Benston (1967, 1969, 1973, 1976, 1980, 1982)
provided the intellectual spur for dismantling the apparatus regulating capital markets.
While Stigler tried to show empirically that the US 1933 Securities Act's new issue
registration requirements had no important effect on the quality of new securities sold
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to the public, Benston has questioned the efficacy of the disclosure requirements of
the US 1934 Securities Exchange Acts. Benston (1969) contends that there was little
evidence of fraud in corporate financial statements before 1933 and opines that the
introduction of compulsory disclosure rules was unnecessary. He, additionally, argues
that financial reporting in the decade preceding the 1934 Acts was adequate, and that
these statutes did not significantly improve the quality of information provided to
investors. By studying the voluntary disclosure practices of the NYSE listed
companies in June 1935 (the month before filing was required under the 1934 Act), he
found that a very high percentage of companies were already disclosing the required
information. Benston's main conclusion is that the securities laws produced few
benefits and considerable costs. In a later article Benston (1980) emphasised that the
question at issue is not whether disclosure as such is a good thing, but whether the
benefits of mandatory disclosure exceed its costs, and which stakeholder groups
obtain those benefits and bear these costs. He proposed that the societal costs of
required disclosure exceed the benefits, and explains that the support for regulation
comes from those stakeholders who do not have to pay the very high costs of
producing this information (such as government agencies and analysts).
Nonetheless the Stigler—Benston hypothesis has been heavily criticised. Professor
Seligman, the leading historian on the SEC, has contested Benston's account of
market conditions in the pre-1934 period. For example, Seligman (1983) suggested
that Benston's sample might have been biased because companies not intending to
comply with the 1934 Act's requirement have left the NYSE to avoid the Act's
coverage. Similarly, later researchers argued that there was a great disparity between
the primitive financial disclosure that Benston observed (such as sales and
depreciation data) and the kind of disclosure that would now have been required to
disclose in order to reduce the incidence of fraud. They claimed that Benston's study
is silent on whether management would have had voluntarily disclosed any information
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material to investors other than the few primitive accounting categories listed (Ockabol
and Tinker, 1993).
3.5.2.3 Conceptual Arguments
Stigler and Benston's criticisms of mandatory disclosure systems have been paralleled
by conceptual arguments reported in the agency, signalling and positive accounting
literature. These studies have provided additional academic arguments against
mandatory disclosure systems suggesting that managers have strong incentives to
disclose voluntarily all information that is material to investors.
(a)	 Agency theory:
The basic assumption of agency theory is that individuals wish to maximise their utility
and are sufficiently skillful to do so. As stated in Section 3.4.2.2, agency theory
assumes a conflict of interest between corporate managers (as agents) and providers
of capital (as principals). The conflict arises because, although managers are trying to
maximise their own utility and capital providers their own wealth, decisions taken by the
former may not maximise the latter's wealth. Thus, outside shareholders would
assume that managers might resort to excessive remuneration packages and other
fringe benefits, and the company's share price would be lower as a result. There is
therefore a need to establish mechanisms to measure and monitor the agents'
behaviour. This leads to agency costs which decrease the value of the company to the
detriment of both managers and shareholders. It is, therefore, in the interest of both
managers and shareholders to reduce agency costs using a range of devices such as
external auditing and budget restrictions. Another way to reduce agency costs is to
disclose all material information, in order to assure the market (and outside
shareholders) that managers are unable to exploit their fiduciary position. It follows
that since both managers and shareholders will benefit from such a course of action
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that will reduce agency costs, they will voluntarily disclose all material information.
Hence, any mandatory disclosure system is redundant (and costly) since all relevant
disclosures will be made voluntarily.
Agency theory has not, however, gone uncontested. Ockabol and Tinker (1993), for
example, argued that although agency theory goes some way towards explaining
management's motivation to disclose all material information, it fails to account for
non—financial motivations for suppressing disclosure, such as the reluctance by some
companies to disclose for fear that it will aid their competitors. Additionally, agency
theory ignores the fact that very often managers have significant motives to conceal
adverse information or artificially enlarge the company's short term profits, in an
attempt to boost their direct compensation (salary and bonuses) which are usually
linked to corporate short term profitability. Similarly, Coffee (1984) concluded that
agency theory ignores the fact that some managers have strong incentives to withhold
positive information and try to undertake pre—emptive buyouts of their own firm.
(b)	 Signalling theory:
Ross's (1979) signalling theory provides an additional explanation why market
pressures and managers' self—interest motivate them to disclose all material
information to investors. He stressed that since management's rewards depend on
those of the company, whether tied directly via performance—based formulas or
otherwise, it would be beneficial to disclose "good news" because it would raise the
value of the firm and, concomitantly, management's rewards. In an attempt to signal
the good news to the market in such a way that it will not be confused with all the
misleading and false information being supplied, managers will have an incentive to
validate the information with personal guarantees in the form of self—imposed penalties
in the managerial compensation packages. These guarantees will be high enough to
eliminate the incentive for managers who do not have good news to cheat by false
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signalling. Ross, additionally claimed that managers with "no news" will also have an
incentive to signal this to the market as well, in order to avoid being confused with
firms with "bad news". Furthermore, firms with "good" and "no news" will be
discouraged from publishing false reports because they have guarantees (such as
hiring outside auditors and entering into publicly known performance related contracts)
that they are not falsely disseminating the good or no news. This incentive—signalling
mechanism additionally ensures that the worst news is also effectively signalled, since
those firms with "bad news" are left with no recourse: they cannot match the
guarantees offered by the "good news" and the "no news" firms; ". . . at the bottom of
the hierarchy are those with the worst news, who would like to suppress it, but since it
is not in their interest to offer the kinds of guarantees provided by those with better
news, the worst news will also be effectively signalled" (Ross, 1979, p.187).
Nevertheless, Seligman (1983) claimed that signalling theory does not explain certain
management disclosure practices such as the historical evidence of securities fraud
and the prevalence of window dressing to obscure bad news. In addition, it is
questionable whether non—disclosure means "bad news", since the firm may be
protecting valuable secrets from competitors rather than hiding poor performance
(Ockabol and Tinker, 1993).
(c)	 Positive accounting theory:
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) also argued that information can best be supplied by
market forces. Their proposition stems from the essence of positive accounting
methodology which seeks to explain and predict, rather than prescribe, accounting
practice. The positive approach to accounting is based on the proposition that
managers, shareholders, regulators and politicians act in their own self—interest and
attempt to maximise their utility. In choosing among alternative accounting policies
they compare the relative costs and benefits and select the one which maximises their
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utility, In this respect, management considers the effects of disclosed information on
their compensation (as well as on taxes, political costs, regulations etc.). If
management's compensation is linked to the firm's market value, managers have
incentives to disclose information voluntarily in order to convince the market that they
are not engaged in insider trading, thereby increasing the firm's market value and their
own wealth as well. The managers will continue to disclose voluntarily as long as the
cost of disclosure does not outweight the beneficial effects on the firm's market value.
Additionally, based mainly on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), Watts and
Zimmerman (1986) proposed that there is no need for regulating financial disclosure
because in a semi—strong market security prices will reflect all available information
and even naive investors are price protected because they can buy at a fair price.
The Watts and Zimmermans' (1986) arguments, however, have been subject to strong
criticism. For example, Whittington (1987) argued that Watts and Zimmerman's use of
EMH—based arguments is tendentious because it ignores a considerable body of
evidence that the EMH may not hold true. In addition, he criticised their assumption
that the information market is in a state of competitive equilibrium in all respects (so
that naive investors are price protected), claiming that this is a strong assumption
which has not been backed by any empirical evidence.
3.5.3	 Visible or Invisible Hand?
The question of whether financial information should be left to be determined by free
market forces or the regulator's "visible hand" is a difficult one; each theory is backed
by theoretically sound arguments and equally appealing attacks on each others'
propositions. However it seems that, on balance, the case for regulation is stronger for
two main reasons. First, opponents of regulation have failed to develop a convincing
case, supported with empirical evidence, which is free from significant exceptions or
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restrictive assumptions. Second, the existence of some forms of regulation in all
capital markets and the absence of complete deregulation adds a real life validity and
practical attractiveness to the regulatory theory. The degree of regulation in each
market depends, most probably, on the form of its efficiency as well as an array of
other social, political and other environmental factors.
The examination of the regulation debate in this section, together with the discussion
of the various factors affecting the demand and supply of accounting information
presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, have synthesised a theoretical framework for
corporate disclosure (Figure 3.1). This framework will be used in Chapter 5 as the
logical base on which to speculate about the corporate characteristics that influence
Cypriot and Greek corporate financial disclosure.
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3.6	 SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the underlying theoretical rationale of corporate financial
disclosure. It has shown that corporate disclosure is a compromise between several
conflicting forces. The demand for accounting information is derived from the decision
making needs of several user groups, while supply has been entrusted to the
company's managers who act as agents of the different classes of capital providers. It
has been shown that while corporate disclosure is beneficial (e.g. it can minimise the
company's cost of capital and reduce agency costs) there are incremental direct and
(more importantly) indirect disclosure costs. Although many factors affect the
management's disclosure decision, it is difficult for some of them to be precisely
quantified and determine their exact impact on the corporate disclosure decision. This
is the main reason for the classical controversy among accounting researchers:
whether corporate disclosure should be mandated or left to be freely determined by
demand and supply forces. The main theories concerning the disclosure debate were
then presented and it was concluded that, although each theory is backed by sound
theoretical arguments, the regulatory theory is more appealing as it explains the status
quo. The discussion of disclosure dynamics has also revealed that a company's
disclosure decision is related to a wide variety of variables which can have either a
positive (i.e. result in an increase of corporate disclosure) or a negative (i.e. result in a
decrease of corporate disclosure) influence. This discussion will be used in Chapter 5
as the logical base on which to speculate as to the corporate characteristics that
influence financial disclosure in Cyprus and Greece.
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CHAPTER 4
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
STUDIES
4.1
	
INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the significant findings from earlier relevant research on
corporate financial disclosure. The purpose of this review is twofold. The first is to
identify the gap in the literature which this study aspires to fill and the second is, by
undertaking a critical review of the analytical techniques and research designs used, to
establish the appropriate research methodology to be used in the present study. The
discussion concentrates on those studies which, according to the researcher's opinion,
have been the most influential in the area, and have either presented new empirical
facts or have added to the sophistication and innovativeness of the analytical
techniques used. A summary of the disclosure studies reviewed in this chapter, as
well as a number of other selected disclosure studies is provided in Appendix D of the
study. The review is split into two parts: single country and cross—national comparative
disclosure studies.
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4.2	 SINGLE COUNTRY DISCLOSURE STUDIES
4.2.1	 Developed Countries
In his pioneering work, Cerf (1961) was the first researcher to apply a scientific
approach to measure the quality of corporate disclosure. He introduced the index
methodology as a means of capturing the extent of corporate disclosure in a random
sample of 527 U.S. CARs. These annual reports were scored based on a list of 31
information items which were weighted to reflect their relative importance to a group of
financial analysts. The statistical tests carried out using the mean disclosure scores,
showed that companies listed on the NYSE were disclosing significantly more
information than companies not listed on the NYSE. A least—squares regression
analysis revealed a positive association between the disclosure scores and asset size,
ownership distribution and rate of return. Asset size was found to be the main
explanatory variable of corporate disclosure as it had the largest contribution to
adjusted R2 when all variables were included in the regression model. However, Cerf's
(1961) statistical analyses were later criticised by many researchers. For example,
Singhvi and Desai (1971) pointed out that in view of the fact that Cerf (1961)
established the existence of associations between the disclosure scores and the
selected corporate characteristics by analysing the mean of classes (by using tests of
difference), his analysis was not sufficient. They argued that since each class of
companies did not have an equal number of observations, the average for a class is
more likely to be influenced by extreme values.
Adopting Cerf's (1961) data and adding two more explanatory variables (auditor type
and earnings margin), Singhvi and Desai (1971) preferred to use the chi—squared test
to examine the relationship between corporate disclosure and a number of corporate
characteristics. In contrast to Cerf (1961) (who found that asset size was the main
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explanatory variable), a multivariate analysis showed that only listing status was a
significant explanatory variable. However, Singhvi and Desai's (1971) research design
and statistical analyses were criticised by Moore and Buzby (1972). For example, they
questioned the use of an absolute rather than a relative scoring system (whereby the
score for each company is not the actual disclosure score but the proportion of the
actual disclosure score to the total possible score) and the lack of any formal tests for
multicollinearity among the independent variables. Additionally, Moore and Buzby
(1972) argued that instead of the chi—squared test, a more direct measure of
correlation (such as the Kendall's tau) should have been used to measure the
associations between the disclosure scores and the corporate characteristics. In an
attempt to improve Singhvi and Desai's (1971) methodology, Buzby (1972) matched
44 U.S. listed companies with 44 unlisted (OTC) counterparts and calculated the
disclosure index for each company on a relative basis. The Wilcoxon matched—pairs
signed—ranks test and Kendall's tau provided evidence contrary to those of Singhvi and
Desai (1971) but consistent with those of Cerf (1961): the extent of disclosure was
positively associated with the size of a company's assets but not affected by listing
status. However, Buzby's (1972) methodology has not been left unchallenged.
Cooke (1989) criticised Buzby's matching procedure on the basis of asset size and
questioned the representativeness of unlisted companies by those listed on the OTC
since ". . . presumably a corporation goes on to the OTC market with a view to
obtaining a full listing on an exchange in the future" (Cooke 1989, p.54).
Industry type was a characteristic first examined by Stagna (1976) and proved to be
very popular in subsequent research (see Appendix D). Replicating Buzby's (1972)
methodology, Stagna (1976) examined the association between the disclosure
practices and the industry type and net sales of 80 U.S. listed companies. The scoring
was based on a list of 79 information items, which were weighted to reflect their
importance to a group of financial analysts surveyed. The results, however, added to
the inconsistencies in the literature, in that only industry type was a significant
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explanatory variable. Similar results to those of Stagna (1976) for the US were
reported by Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) for Canada. Their study found that the extent of
disclosure by 200 Canadian non—financial companies varied between industries.
Furthermore, their results were in line with those of Cell (1961), in that they have also
reported a positive association between disclosure adequacy and size. In examining
Canadian corporate disclosure Amernic and Maiocco (1981) adopted a different
approach from that of Belkaoui and Kahl (1978). They carried out a longitudinal study
by investigating the disclosure levels of 60 companies for the years 1967 to 1977.
They reported a ". . . dramatic increase in disclosure by Canadian public
corporations over the past decade" (Amernic and Maiocco, 1981, p.20). Using the
Mann—Whitney test companies cross—listed on U.S. exchanges had significantly higher
levels of disclosure than non cross—listed companies.
Interesting evidence about the impact of raising finance on a company's disclosure
was provided by Firth (1980). Hypothesising that corporate disclosure practices are
influenced by a company's need for new capital, Firth (1980) investigated the changes
in the extent and quality of voluntary financial disclosure when raising finance in the
stock market. Six samples of U.K. manufacturing companies were selected on the
basis of the frequency with which they issued new shares. Their analyses revealed
that . . . "smaller sized companies increased their voluntary disclosure levels
significantly when raising new stock market finance . . ." (Firth, 1980, p.111-2). The
field of corporate disclosure research was extended to Sweden by Cooke (1989).
Using a company's listing status as a criterion, Cooke (1989) classified 90 Swedish
companies into 3 categories (unlisted, single—listed and multiple—listed), and explored
their aggregate, voluntary and social responsibility disclosure levels. One Way
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed that unlisted, single—listed and multiple—listed
firms were significantly different from each other for all types of disclosure. A multiple
regression analysis demonstrated that the most important explanatory variable was
quotation status followed by firm size. Using the same classification principle as in the
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case of Swedish companies, Cooke (1991) examined the voluntary disclosure
practices of 48 Japanese companies. Multiple linear regression showed that company
size was the main explanatory variable, followed by listing status. In contrast to Cooke
(1989), who found that Swedish trading companies disclosed less information than
other industry types, Japanese manufacturing companies disclosed more information
than others.
In the case of Spain, Wallace et al. (1994) used a list of 16 mandatory items and
assessed the comprehensiveness of disclosure by 50 Spanish companies by giving
credit to the fullness of information disclosed. A rank transformation of the dependent
and the continuous independent variables enabled the researchers to use OLS
regression on the ranked variables (ranked OLS regression) to cope with data sets
with non—linear and monotonic relations between the disclosure scores and the
selected corporate characteristics. It was found that comprehensiveness of disclosure
increased with firm size and listing status. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to prior
research (e.g. Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978), liquidity had a significant negative coefficient.
In a voluntary disclosure study Raffournier (1995) defined voluntary disclosure in
Switzerland as the items required to be disclosed by the EU Fourth and Seventh
Directives (which were not mandatory in Switzerland). Multiple linear regression
indicated that size and internationality level were significant explanatory variables for
Swiss voluntary corporate disclosure. Interesting comments on Raffournier's (1995)
work were made by Owusu—Ansah (1997). He criticised Raffournier's (1995) method
of selecting the voluntary items for inclusion in his index, thereby casting doubt on the
reliability and validity of his measuring instrument. Owusu—Ansah (1997) challenged
Raffournier's (1995) definition of Swiss voluntary disclose and suggested an alternative
approach. He highlighted a problem faced by researchers of voluntary disclosure:
how to select the voluntary information items to be included in a voluntary disclosure
index and, more importantly, how to the support the index's reliability and validity. He
also questioned Raffournier's (1995) argument that large firms are politically sensitive
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and as a consequence will disclose more to allay public criticism or government
intervention in their affairs. Instead, Owusu—Ansah (1997) proposed that it is quite
reasonable to expect politically—sensitive firms to disclose less voluntarily. This line of
thought was consistent with that of Wallace et al. (1994), who argued that in some
cases politically sensitive firms may disclose less information in an attempt to avoid the
increased attention that comprehensive disclosure may draw to them. Finally, in the
first voluntary disclosure study conducted for French companies, Depoers (2000) was
the first to examine the impact of labour pressure on the extent of voluntary corporate
disclosure. Deriving her hypotheses from agency theory and limitations imposed by
information costs, she found that French corporate disclosure was significantly related
to company size, foreign activity and a proxy for proprietary costs.
Before moving on to review disclosure studies on developing countries it should be
noted that, although corporate financial disclosure is a topic that has received a great
deal of attention in developed countries during the last 40 years, most studies focused
on countries following the Anglo—Saxon accounting tradition (e.g. the U.S., the U.K.
and Canada).
4.2.2	 Developing Countries
A longitudinal research approach was adopted by Firer and Meth (1986) who
investigated the voluntary disclosure practices of South African companies over the
1979-84 period. The researchers developed two weighting systems, reflecting the
importance of the selected information items to a group of investment analysts and a
group of financial directors. Despite the fact that the relative disclosure scores showed
a general improvement in the overall level of disclosure over the period examined, the
level of voluntary disclosure was considered to be relatively low. Using the disclosure
index developed by Firth (1979) as a surrogate for the voluntary information
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requirements in the U.K., the researchers compared the investors' requirements in the
two countries. This was made by comparing the rankings (assigned to the information
items by the analysts) of the items common to the Firth index and their index. The
Spearman rank correlation coefficient did not reveal a significant correlation, a result
which was mainly attributed to the differences in the social, political and economic
environments of the two countries. However, the results of this study should be viewed
with caution as the comparison was based on two disclosure indexes obtained at
different times.
In Mexico, Chow and Wong—Boren (1987) explored the voluntary disclosure practices
of 52 Mexican companies using a list of 24 information items. Although the
researchers generated a weighted disclosure score for each firm they preferred an
unweighted scoring procedure. The main reason for their preference was that ". . .
since these ratings were obtained through a survey and without real economic
consequences to the respondents, they may not fully reflect loan officers' actual use of
each item" (Chow and Wong—Boren, 1987, p.536). It is interesting that the results of
two cross—sectional regression models, where the weighted and the unweighted
disclosure scores were used alternatively as the dependent variable, were equivalent.
This provided evidence to support Spero's (1979) conclusion that unweighted and
weighted scores can give similar results. Adopting a wide—ranging approach, Wallace
(1987) examined the extent and scope of information disclosed in Nigerian CARs using
a comprehensive list of 185 information items. Wallace (1987) was the first to propose
a particular approach to overcome subjectivity in applying the relative scoring
procedure. In order to decide whether an information item was relevant to a company,
Wallace (1987) first examined all available records about the companies and read
their CARs thoroughly. This procedure has subsequently been used by many other
researchers (e.g. Cooke, 1989). Using a multiple regression procedure, Wallace found
that many Nigerian companies publish CARs that do not adequately comply with
mandatory disclosure minima. Furthermore, he confirmed Singhvi's (1967) results, in
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that a positive association between type of management influence and the statutory
disclosure was found.
An interesting result was reported by Tai et al. (1990), who examined the association
between non—compliance with disclosure minima in Hong Kong and three corporate
characteristics. They found that smaller and larger companies had significantly less
non—compliance than medium—sized companies. No significant difference was found
among the six business sectors examined or between companies audited by the
international Big 8 firms and those audited by smaller local firms. Unfortunately, the
researchers had little to say about the calculation of the disclosure non—compliance
rates, as the results are summarised and reported in terms of eleven broad disclosure
areas. 27 Furthermore, there was a lack of information as to how the researchers
overcame the possibility of penalising a company for the non—disclosure of an
irrelevant item. 28
 The disclosure practices of Hong Kong companies were also
investigated by Wallace and Naser (1995). As in Wallace et al. (1994), the degree of
disclosure detail was rewarded by giving credit to the fullness of information disclosed.
The regression analysis indicated that disclosure varied positively with asset size and
scope of business operations. In contrast to previous studies (e.g. Singhvi, 1967),
the disclosure scores varied negatively with profitability. The researchers explained
that this could have been due to the unique characteristics of the capital market in
Hong Kong and the distinguished nature of the Chinese managers' mindset (face).
Furthermore, in contrast to Tai et al. (1990) and Wallace et al. (1994), the size of a
company's audit firm was negatively related with disclosure.
27 For example one category is "disclosure required by Companies Ordinance". No information is given
how a very low compliance rate of 5 per cent (4 companies) was calculated. It is not clear whether those
4 companies failed to comply with all Companies Ordinance requirements or failure to comply with any
requirement was reported as non—disclosure.
28 For example, 19 companies were reported as non—complying with the disclosure requirements for "post
balance sheet events and contingencies" but no information is given on how the researchers ensured the
existence of such items that should have been reported by each company.
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In investigating the corporate disclosure levels in a developing country Ahmed and
Nicholls (1994) employed a different methodological approach. They used data for 63
Bangladeshi companies to develop a model to predict the probability of a company
complying with mandatory disclosure requirements (using company characteristics as
explanatory variables). The results indicated that subsidiaries of multinational
companies and large audit firms had the most significant positive impact on the level of
statutory disclosure compliance. Using the estimated model, a probability of
compliance of 88.5 per cent could be predicted for a Bangladeshi company which was
a subsidiary of a multinational, audited by a large audit firm, and had a qualified
accountant as the principal accounting officer.
Researchers have constantly been innovative in investigating the impact of unexplored
corporate characteristics on corporate disclosure and employing new statistical
methods to examine this relationship. Abu—Nassar and Rutherford (1994) were the
first to examine the relationship between Jordanian corporate disclosure and thirteen
corporate characteristics. Apart from net income and company size (that have been
found by previous researchers to influence corporate disclosure levels), the
researchers found dividends and proportion of shares held by individuals to have,
respectively, a positive and a negative influence on the disclosure levels of Jordanian
companies. Adding to the innovations of statistical techniques used, Owusu—Ansah
(1998) used robust regression analysis to investigate the mandatory disclosure
practices of 49 companies listed in Zimbabwe. The results of the robust regression
analysis indicated that company size, ownership structure, company age, multinational
corporation affiliation and profitability had statistically significant positive effects on
corporate disclosure practices. In the case of Egypt Abd—Elsalam (1999) investigated
the accounting disclosure practices in a developing country which has adopted the
IASs and has changed towards an economic policy of privatisation after many years of
a socialist rule. Interestingly, she found that companies audited by one of the Big-6
international accounting firms offered the highest disclosure on items required by the
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IASs, whilst large public sector companies which were actively traded in the national
stock exchange provided the highest disclosure on items required by the Egyptian new
disclosure regulations.
In summarising the results of the single country disclosure studies reviewed (Appendix
D), it can be stated that subsequent to Cerf's (1961) path—breaking research, the
majority of single country studies focused on developed countries. It was not until the
1980s, that this field of research was extended to a number of developing countries.
Most researchers have used a dichotomous, unweighted and relative scoring
procedure whereby the disclosure score is composed of dichotomous items which are
not weighted when combined, and the sum is then expressed as a proportion. The
main analytical tool used has been multiple regression (e.g. Chow and Wong—Boren,
1987). However, the sophistication and innovativeness of the analytical techniques
used are improving continuously. For example, Cooke (1989) used different dummy
variable manipulation procedures within a stepwise OLS procedure while Wallace and
Naser (1995) used both ranked and unranked OLS regression to cope with data sets
with non—linear and monotonic relationships between the dependent and the
independent variables.
The literature review has also shown that the results of single country disclosure
studies have been mixed and inconsistent. The inconsistencies in the results can be
attributed to the lack of uniformity in the statistical approaches normally employed and
the differing nature of the explanatory variables examined in these studies (Wallace
and Naser, 1995). Additionally, the inconsistencies can also be due to the different
stages of economic development of the countries examined, the stringency of the
countries' disclosure requirements, the type of disclosure investigated and the period
of the study. Although disclosure quality has usually been found to be related to a
company's size and listing status, the results are usually contradictory or, at least,
inconclusive, both within and between countries. For example, in Hong Kong the
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quality of disclosure has been found to be influenced by a company's industry type by
Wallace and Naser (1995) but not by Tai et al. (1990). Furthermore, profitability has
been found to be positively related to disclosure quality in the U.S. (Singhvi and Desai,
1971) but negatively in Hong Kong (Wallace and Naser, 1995). It can, however, be
concluded that the findings from previous studies tend to support the proposition that
the quality of corporate disclosure in developed countries has usually been found to be
better than in developing countries. Furthermore, as revealed by Appendix D, most
studies indicate that company size and listing status are positively associated with
disclosure. This was confirmed by Ahmed and Coatis (1999) who, in a meta—analysis
of 29 disclosure studies, they have found a significant and positive relationship
between disclosure levels and corporate size, listing status and leverage. Additionally,
Ahmed and Coatis (1999) pointed out that in addition to sampling error, the results of
the studies reviewed have been moderated by differences in disclosure index
construction, differences in definition of the explanatory variables and differences in
research settings.
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4.3	 CROSS—NATIONAL COMPARATIVE DISCLOSURE STUDIES
To the knowledge of the present researcher the first empirical cross—national
comparative disclosure study was conducted by Singhvi (1967), who evaluated the
quality of disclosure by U.S. and Indian companies. By studying the mean, range and
standard deviation of the disclosure scores in each country, Singhvi (1967) concluded
that the quality of disclosure in the U.S. was, on average, higher than in India.
Singhvi's study, however, suffers from the "single—index syndrome". He tried to
capture the quality of disclosure in both countries using a single index comprising only
34 common information items. It can be claimed that using such an approach to
compare the aggregate disclosure levels in two countries which are at different stages
of economic development and have different disclosure minima can be misleading.
This is because the results can be biased in favour of the country with the stricter
disclosure minima.
Barrett (1976) compared the extent and comprehensiveness of disclosure in the CARs
of 103 companies from the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Sweden, Germany, France and the
Netherlands for the 1963 — 1972 period. The corporate financial statements in the
U.S. and the U.K. were found to be superior in terms of their extent and
comprehensiveness of disclosure, with French companies ranked last. Without
carrying out any formal statistical tests, Barrett concluded that. . . "these results were
certainly consistent with the general belief that there is a link between the quality of
financial reporting practice and the degree of efficiency of national equity markets"
(Barrett 1976, p.24). The main limitation of Barrett's study is that the 17 categories of
information used to assess disclosure, were selected without taking into account the
disclosure requirements in each country. As a consequence, his results may be
biased in favour of the U.S. and the U.K., whose mandatory disclosure requirements
are considered to be stricter. Based on the data used in Barrett (1976), Barrett (1977)
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examined whether the extent of financial disclosure by U.S. companies is different
from that of companies from the other 6 countries. He found that, while on average
U.S. companies disclose more information (except the British), they were not uniformly
better in terms of specific information such as segmental reporting and capital
expenditure. However, as in Barrett (1976), the researcher was not comparing like
with like. For example, France was in the lower grouping in terms of disclosure, but
this may reflect the fact that French users are assumed to be familiar with the Plan
Comptable General, and no additional disclosure notes are usually provided.
In a different vein, Spero (1979) analysed the corporate voluntary disclosure practices
in France, Sweden and the U.K. during the 1964 — 1972 time period. He proposed that
financial disclosure is analogous to advertising, which seeks to increase the demand
for a company's shares and reduce its cost of capital ("capital need hypothesis").
Seven disclosure indexes were constructed. Four were replicas of indexes used by
Cerf (1961), Singhvi and Desai (1971), Chandra (1974) and Buzby (1975), and three
were new indexes, namely the equal weights, the market weights and the split—equal
methods. By carrying out different statistical tests, Spero was the first to provide
evidence that ". . . different weighting schemes are not as important as item selection
because companies that view disclosure positively disclosed many items and have
high scores regardless of item weights" (p.64). Unlike Singhvi (1967) and Barrett
(1976 and 1977), Spero focused on voluntary disclosure which avoids the potential
problem of bias in favour of countries with the stricter mandatory disclosure
requirements. Using OLS regression, the capital need hypothesis was partially
supported by the empirical data in all three countries.
Using a scoring system based on the IASs, Cairns, Lafferty and Mantle (1984)
attempted to evaluate the quality of disclosure by 250 of the world's largest companies
from 17 different countries. A significant improvement in corporate reporting during the
1978-1983 period was found, which was attributed to improvements in national
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disclosure regulatory frameworks and the influence of the IASs. Although the results
of Barrett (1977) were confirmed (in that U.S. companies were found to be superior in
disclosure), a methodological deficiency of multi—country comparison studies was
brought into focus. The results revealed that no Swedish company ranked in either the
top 25 or the bottom 25 companies, contradicting the results of Stilling, Norton and
Hopkins (1984), who assessed the CARs of 175 companies from 19 countries against
the requirements of IASs 1 to 13, and found that Volvo ranked first. This contradiction
led Cooke and Wallace (1989) to comment that the results of the two studies (Cairns
et al., 1984 and Stilling et al., 1984) ". . . just do not look right . . ." (Cooke and
Wallace, 1989, p.54). Stilling et al. (1984) also found that only a few out of the 175
companies complied with the IAS's requirements. It is interesting to note that in terms
of average rating per company, South Africa was ranked first, while the fifth and the
ninth positions were taken by the U.S. and the U.K. respectively, a finding which also
contradicts the results of Cairns et al. (1984).
Based on the information disclosed in financial and non—financial statements and the
timeliness in the release of the CAR, Tonkin (1989) appraised the reporting practices
of 200 of the world's leading companies. An index of disclosure, which was developed
using an unspecified weighted scoring procedure and a descriptive international
survey, revealed a superiority of U.K. companies. Cooke and Wallace (1989),
however, criticised Tonkin's use of small samples and questioned the
representativeness of national disclosure levels by transnational corporations, and
stressed that the conclusions of Tonkin's study should be treated with caution.
In order to support the argument that harmonisation has not been successful because
financial reporting and regulation may have multiple purposes reflecting each country's
socio—cultural and political environment, Hussein (1996) compared financial disclosure
and measurement practices in the U.S. and the Netherlands. A matched—pair analysis
found no significant difference between the measurement methods used in the two
126
countries. In the case of financial disclosure, however, the analysis showed that large
Dutch companies provided significantly more disclosure than their U.S. counterparts.
An interesting result was reported by Craig and Diga (1998), who analysed the
mandatory disclosure practices in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and
Thailand. Although corporate disclosure levels were found to be positively correlated
with size, leverage and foreign operation, banks and utilities (which have been
assumed to have a high political cost exposure in these countries) were the industry
groups with the lowest levels of disclosure. This result contradicts the common
prediction, derived from political cost theory, that politically sensitive companies are
likely to disclose more extensively in order to decrease their political costs.
Additionally, this result lends some support to those researchers who claim that
politically sensitive companies may disclose less extensively to avoid the increased
attacks that comprehensive disclosure may draw to them (e.g. Wallace and Naser,
1995).
It can be concluded that the literature survey of cross—national comparative disclosure
studies presented in this section reveals a paucity of disclosure studies for developing
countries. This was long noted by Cooke and Wallace (1989, p.51) who commented
that:
Cross—national studies are fraught with problems because of the
underlying diversities in the economic, social and political systems
of the world . . . . Any cross—national study of the quality of
disclosure in corporate annual reports and accounts can only be
meaningful if there is an internationally agreed perception of the
order of importance of disclosure items, and if the companies and/or
countries under study are, in broad items, similar (i.e. comparable).
In most cross—national comparative disclosure studies, two main methodological
approaches have been used. The first was to compare the disclosure practices of a
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representative sample of companies from a limited number of countries (e.g. Singhvi,
1967), in order to derive conclusions about the quality of corporate disclosure and
identify the factors influencing national disclosure practices. The second was to adopt
a multi—country approach, where a small number of companies from a large number of
countries were compared, in order to rank companies and countries in terms of a
disclosure score (e.g. Tonkin, 1989). Although the former approach enables a
generalisation of the conclusions to national corporate disclosure practices, the latter
approach can be potentially misleading. This is because the number of companies to
be examined from each country is usually small, casting doubt on the external validity
of the study. Nevertheless, the multi—country approach does enable the researcher to
derive some conclusions about the extent of disclosure in different countries.
Additionally, the findings from the cross—national comparative studies reviewed tend to
confirm the propositions that developed countries are usually superior in disclosure to
developing countries (e.g. Singhvi, 1967), with Anglo—Saxon countries usually being in
the lead (e.g. Barrett, 1977 and Tonkin, 1989). Nevertheless, the results of those
studies have sometimes been contradictory too. For example, while the U.S. was
found by Cairns et al. (1984) to be superior in disclosure, it was ranked fifth and sixth
by Stilling et al. (1989) and Tonkin (1989) respectively.
The literature review also revealed a potential problem of cross—national comparative
disclosure studies using a single index: the "single index syndrome", that is, using a
common index to compare corporate disclosure practices in different countries which,
in view of their environmental differences, are incomparable. Following Cooke and
Wallace (1989), it can be argued that if a common index is to be used to compare the
disclosure practices of companies from different countries then certain criteria must be
satisfied. First, the countries included in the study must be comparable in terms of
their socio—economic development. A researcher may not be comparing like with like,
if he or she uses the same index to compare the disclosure practices in a developed
country with a sophisticated capital market, with those in an underdeveloped country
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which lacks a capital market. Second, the perceptions as to the objectives of financial
statements and the order of importance of disclosure items must, in broad terms, be
similar. Again, it can be misleading if one uses the same index to compare the
corporate disclosure practices in a country where there is extensive state control of
businesses and the objective of financial statements is to report conformity with
political decisions, with those in a country with a free enterprise system where the
objective of financial statements is to render useful information for economic decision
making by a wide range of stakeholder groups. Finally, another criterion for using a
common index to undertake cross—national comparisons of corporate disclosure
practices is that the countries compared must have approximately the same disclosure
minima, otherwise the index will be biased in favour of the country with the stricter
disclosure requirements. It can be misleading to compare, for example, the adequacy
of cash flow information disclosure between Cypriot and Greek companies on the
basis of a common index, given that the related information is mandated in Cyprus but
voluntary in Greece.
It is proposed that if the above criteria are not satisfied, then there are at least two
methods to undertake a cross—national comparison of corporate disclosure practices.
The first, is to use a separate index for each country. In this case the comparison will
be indirect, in that the investigator will be assessing the quality of disclosure in each
country, the factors influencing disclosure quality, the importance of each factor etc.
This approach is often used by researchers when they compare their results with those
found in other studies (e.g. Owusu—Ansah, 1998). A second, direct approach, via the
use of a common index, can be followed only if the first two criteria mentioned earlier
(relating to socio—economic development and users' perceptions) are satisfied, and the
investigation is restricted to those types of information whose regulation is, in both
countries, either entirely voluntary or entirely mandatory. For example, if there are,
say, no disclosure requirements relating to segmental information in either country, a
common index can be used to compare the voluntary disclosure of segmental
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information. Alternatively, if there are, say, the same disclosure requirements relating
to contingencies and post balance sheet events, a common index can be used to
compare the disclosure of contingencies and post balance sheet events. In such
cases, it must be made clear that it is not the totality of corporate disclosure practices
that is being compared but a particular type of information (e.g. Craig and Diga, 1998).
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4.4	 THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE
The literature review revealed a gap in the literature, in that neither Cyprus nor Greece
have been the subject of a single country disclosure study published in an English—
language international accounting journal. Furthermore, a relative paucity of cross—
national comparative disclosure studies on developing countries had been revealed.
The lack of such studies in the literature on disclosure, and the appropriate context
offered by Cyprus and Greece, inspired a desire and an enthusiasm to undertake this
research endeavour. Additionally, having identified the gap in the literature and
examined the various methodologies employed by previous disclosure researchers, the
literature review has also established the background for choosing the appropriate
methodology to be used in the study. This is considered in detail in Chapter 6.
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4.5 SUMMARY
Chapter 4 reviewed the significant findings from earlier relevant research on corporate
financial disclosure and identified the gap in the literature which this study aspires to
fill. It has also established the background for choosing the appropriate methodology
to be used in the study.
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PART HI
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
CHAPTER 5
DEVELOPMENT AND FORMULATION OF RESEARCH
HYPOTHESES
5.1	 INTRODUCTION
The theoretical framework set out in Chapter 3 has shown that there are two different
forces that influence the amount of corporate information disclosed. On the one hand
are the users of financial statements who require extensive information to assist them
in their decision making processes; and on the other is the corporate management
who is responsible for the supply of corporate information but may be reluctant to
disclose it for competitive, cost or other reasons. Furthermore, the discussion in
Chapter 3 revealed that a company's disclosure decision can be influenced by many
other factors, such as the need to reduce agency costs or the use of accounting
information as a signalling device. The existence of those theoretical motivations
behind corporate disclosure has inspired many researchers to try to relate corporate
disclosure practices to a number of corporate characteristics such as company size,
company profitability, company liquidity, industry—type, ethnicity of management,
security price fluctuation and listing status. Given that a company's disclosure decision
is influenced by a wide variety of considerations, the current study is based on a
survey of the theoretical and empirical literatures (as in the case of Lang and
Lundholm, 1993), rather than relying on a particular model [as in the case of Chow and
Wong—Boren (1987) who relied only on agency theory].
Based on the background information about the Cypriot and Greek accounting
environments presented in Chapter 2 and the theoretical framework for corporate
financial disclosure formulated in Chapter 3, seven hypotheses have been developed
to: (1) examine whether a relationship exists between the disclosure practices of
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Cypriot and Greek companies and a number of corporate characteristics; and (2), in
case a relationship exists, to derive its direction and strength. The selection of the
specific corporate characteristics investigated in this study was made on the
following basis: (1) the existence of strong theoretical justification or prior
empirical evidence that a characteristic is related to corporate mandatory, voluntary
or aggregate disclosure; 29 (2) the characteristic is relevant to the particularities of
Cyprus and Greece and is believed to be influential in a company's disclosure by the
researcher and the practising accountants/auditors or financial analysts interviewed in
each country; 39 and (3), the characteristic is capable of being measured based on
information disclosed in CARs or other easily accessible information.
The selection procedure referred to above identified seven corporate characteristics
that can be related to the Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure practices, namely:
company size, company age, company profitability, company liquidity, industry type,
listing status and auditor type. The theoretical reasoning behind the development of
the hypotheses is the same for both Cypriot and Greek companies, with the exception
of listing status and auditor type, where the particularities of each country require the
development of different hypotheses.
29 This is because although the information items to be investigated are mandatory, this study (as in the
case of Wallace et al., 1994 and Wallace and Naser, 1995) also captures an element of voluntary
disclosure. This is justified as follows: (1) Even for mandatory disclosure companies have substantial
discretion in the informativeness of the disclosures and the amount of detail provided (Barrett, 1976;
Wallace and Naser, 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). As an example, companies have discretion on the
extent of detail disclosed about contingencies and post balance sheet events; e.g. one company may just
disclose the existence of a contingency, whereas another can explain the nature of the uncertainties
involved and attempt to estimate their financial effect; (2) Mandatory and voluntary disclosures are
sometimes substitutes, so that the "amount" of information produced by "more detailed" mandatory reports
may be offset by a reduction in voluntary disclosures (Dye, 1985; Wallace and Naser, 1995). For example
a company may give a very detailed segmental information note and avoid the presentation of general
information about the growth, performance, market conditions and prospects of significant geographical or
business segments.
30 In view of the fact that the number of sample companies is small (50 for Cyprus and 74 for Greece) the
opinion of the professionals interviewed (their names appear on page 23) was sought in order to limit the
number of corporate characteristics to be examined as potential explanatory variables in the multivariate
analyses. This was deemed necessary given that "in multivariate research the sample size should be
several times (preferably 10 times or more) as large as the number of variables in the study" (Sekaran,
1992, p.254). This process eliminated the need to examine characteristics such as a company's gearing
ratio and divided policy.
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5.2	 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
5.2.1	 Company Size
Wallace and Naser (1995) suggest that the direction of the relationship between the
size of a firm and the comprehensiveness or extent of its disclosure is unclear. The
general proposition, however, is that a company's disclosure practice is positively
related to its size. Several reasons can be advanced in support of the positive
influence of company size on corporate disclosure. The first relates to the disclosure
costs proposition that was outlined in Section 3.4.2.3 of Chapter 3. The argument is
that large companies can best afford both the directs costs of collecting and
disseminating information (Buzby, 1975), as well as the indirect (proprietary) costs
associated with increased disclosure. The indirect disclosure costs relate to the
potential damage to a small company's competitive position that may result from the
disclosure of detailed information to its competitors. In this respect, Craswell and
Taylor (1992) opine that the managers of small companies are less likely to disclose
full information in order to avoid a competitively disadvantageous position compared
with larger companies in their industry. Hence, one may expect larger companies to
disclose more extensively because they can best afford the direct and indirect costs
associated with increased disclosure.
The second argument is derived from the agency cost theory presented in Section
3.5.2.3 of Chapter 3. Jensen and Meckling (1976) have demonstrated that agency
costs are likely to increase with the proportion of outside capital. Given that the
proportion of outside capital tends to be higher for large companies (Leftwich et al.,
1981), it is reasonable to speculate that large companies are more likely to provide
more information in an attempt to reduce their agency costs (e.g. Owusu—Ansah,
1998).
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Another argument in favour of a positive relationship between corporate disclosure and
size can be derived from the political cost theory discussed in Section 3.4.2.2 of
Chapter 3. Since the pioneering work of Watts and Zimmerman (1978), it has been
accepted in the literature that large companies are more sensitive to public scrutiny or
government intervention than small companies, and that size can be considered as a
proxy for political costs (Raffournier, 1995). This has been used by many researchers
to argue that since large companies are more sensitive to political costs, they will
disclose more extensively in order to enhance their chances to muster public support in
order to overturn political actions (e.g. Craswell and Taylor, 1992). Similarly, Schipper
(1981) proposes that large companies tend to have largest analyst following and that
their reports are more likely to be scrutinised than those of small companies. It can,
therefore, be argued that since large companies are more sensitive to public scrutiny
or government intervention, they are more likely to comply with disclosure
requirements in order to avoid political attacks and criticism for non—compliance that
will most probably be revealed by the detailed scrutinisation process (e.g. Raffournier,
1995).
Nevertheless some researchers have the opposite view and, based on the political
cost theory, contend that politically sensitive companies may disclose less information
(Wallace, 1987; Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995). For example,
Wallace (1987) proposes that large companies, being more politically sensitive, may
reduce the likelihood of political action by disclosing less information in an attempt to
avoid the increased attention that comprehensive disclosure may draw to them. It is,
therefore, possible that large companies disclose less information in order to limit
public attacks.31
31 The discussion above brings to the surface the problem pointed out by Ball and Foster (1982); that size
has been used as proxy for many influences (e.g. disclosure, agency and political costs) and that results
confirming a size hypothesis may have alternative explanations. Hence, the results of the empirical
analyses need to be interpreted with the necessary caution.
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Although company size has regularly been found to associate positively with corporate
disclosure (e.g. Cerf, 1961 and Cooke, 1991), economic theory is inconclusive as to
the direction of the relationship. Hence, the following non—directional hypothesis is
examined:
Hl:	 There is an association between a company's size and the extent of its
disclosure practice.
5.2.2	 Company Age
There are several theoretical grounds to assume that older companies are more likely
to disclose more information than younger ones. For example, the competition
argument proposes that young companies are not likely to disclose full information
about their financial results and position, because this may prove to be detrimental if
sensitive information is disclosed to the established competitors (Owusu—Ansah,
1998). Furthermore, it is likely that newcomers into the market will possess particular
competitive advantages and, if detailed information is released, this may harm their
competitive position. In contrast, old companies are less likely to be motivated to
withhold such information since their competitive advantages cannot be easily
challenged with increased disclosure (Owusu—Ansah, 1998). This is because they are
long established and it is likely that the market is already aware of these advantages.
Additionally, younger companies can (on average) be expected to disclose less
extensively than older companies for practical purposes. This is because they are less
likely to have a long operating history and the scope for extensive disclosure may be
limited (Abu—Nassar and Rutherford, 1994).
138
Another argument supporting the proposition that older companies are more likely to
disclose more information that younger ones can be based on the assumption that the
disclosure levels of old companies in a particular industry are usually treated as
disclosure yardsticks for younger ones. Consequently, a newcomer will probably see
the information disclosed by old and established competitors as the maximum
disclosure level in the industry. Hence, it is possible that newcomers may not match
the disclosure levels of old and established companies. Instead, as they grow and
more fully comprehend the disclosure requirements, they are more likely to release
extensive information.
The literature review in Chapter 4 has indicated that company age has not been a
commonly used variable investigated in previous empirical research. Thus, given the
absence of strong prior empirical evidence to support the theorised positive
relationship, the following non—directional hypothesis is examined:
H2:	 There is an association between a company's age and the extent of its
disclosure practice
5.2.3	 Company Profitability
There is a general proposition that a company's willingness to disclose information is
positively related to its profitability. One motive for this can be derived from agency
theory. It is suggested that managers of profitable companies disclose extensive
information in order to show and explain to shareholders that they are acting in their
best interests and justify their compensation packages. This is supported by Singhvi
and Desai's (1971) argument that managers are motivated to disclose detailed
information when the company's rate of return is high, and less information when it is
low. This is in order to support the continuance of their positions and compensation
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packages when the company is profitable, and to cover up the reasons for bad
performance when profits are falling.
Another motive can be derived from signalling theory outlined in Section 3.5.2.4 of
Chapter 3. Signalling theory predicts that profitable companies are encouraged to
disclose more adequate information to the market because failure to signal the good
news may be interpreted as bad news (Inchausti, 1997). Thus, profitable companies
will be more interested in giving detailed information to the market in order to avoid
adverse selection problems and the undervaluation of their shares.
Finally, the political cost theory suggests that profitable companies draw public
attention to themselves, and as a consequence some voters may lobby for political
actions. Thus, profitable firms are more likely to be interested in disclosing more
information to justify the levels of their profits (lnchausti, 1997) and counteract any
potential government intrusion.
In contrast to the arguments presented above, some researchers propose that a
company's disclosure practice is negatively related to its profitability. For example,
Wagenhofer (1990) suggests that signalling theory can be used to support this
hypothesis; namely, that information disclosure can be used as a mechanism for
explaining bad news and that corporate disclosure is likely to be negatively related to
profitability. This is complemented by Wallace and Nasers' (1995) proposition that
companies with lower profit margins may view their results as bad news and provide
more detailed information as part of their accountability.
A second argument in favour of a negative relationship between corporate disclosure
and profitability is derived from political cost theory. Some researchers propose that
companies with large declared profits may be more politically sensitive and fear greater
government or public intervention (Owusu—Ansah, 1997). Disclosure draws the
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attention of the government and the public and leads to greater pressures for
regulation and intervention. Hence, if disclosure leads to greater government or public
intervention, then, firms with huge reported profits may be reluctant to disclose more
information in order to avoid such political attacks (Owusu—Ansah, 1997).
Empirical evidence has been mixed. Singhvi (1967) reported a positive association
between profitability and aggregate disclosure and Abu—Nassar and Rutherford (1994)
found a positive association between profitability and voluntary disclosure. In contrast,
Wallace and Naser (1995) found a negative association between profitability and
mandatory disclosure. Consequently, it is not possible to provide a priori specification
of the direction of the relationship between profitability and the extent of corporate
disclosure in Cyprus and Greece. Consequently, it is hypothesised, that:
H3:	 There is an association between a company's profitability and the extent
of its disclosure practice.
5.2.4	 Company Liquidity
It is usually theorised that the extent of a company's disclosure is negatively related
with its liquidity. This proposition is mainly sustained by theoretical justifications
stemming from signalling theory. Wallace et. al (1994, p.46) propose that ". . . if
liquidity is perceived in the market as a measure of performance, a firm with a low
liquidity ratio may need to give more details to explain its 'weak' performance than a
firm with a high liquidity ratio". Thus, a company in financial difficulties is likely to use
accounting information to signal the fact that it is a going concern and allay the fears of
capital providers.
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A similar relationship between liquidity and the extent of corporate disclosure can be
predicted based on the presumption that when a company is in financial difficulties it
faces increased pressures from shareholders and lenders for more detailed
information so as to confirm its ability to continue in existence. It is therefore likely that
a company in financial difficulty will disclose more information in response to the
pressures from shareholders and lenders. Moreover, the accounts of companies with
liquidity problems are more likely to be scrutinised by analysts and other professionals
in order to assess the likelihood of failure or otherwise. In view of the fact that such a
detailed scrutinisation process is more likely to reveal non—compliance with disclosure
rules, it can be expected that such companies will be particularly careful to observe
disclosure minima; hence the possibility of disclosing more extensively is increased.
Nevertheless, if liquidity is viewed as a measure of a company's soundness, the capita/
need theory (presented in Section 3.4.2.2 of Chapter 3) can be used to hypothesise for
a positive relationship with corporate disclosure. Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) propose
that the liquidity of a company is an accounting measure of its business risk. Liquidity
affects investors' uncertainty in the capital market and the company's cost of capital.
As a result, a financially strong company would be more interested to communicate its
soundness to the market than a financially weak one, in an attempt to reduce
investors' uncertainty and decrease their required rate of return.
Although Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) did not find a significant relationship between
liquidity and the extent of disclosure by Canadian companies, a negative relationship
has been reported by Wallace et al. (1994) in the case of Spanish companies. Given,
however, that economic theory is inconclusive as to the direction of the relationship
between a company's liquidity and the extent of its disclosure practice, the following
non—directional hypothesis is examined:
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H4:	 There is an association between a company's liquidity and the extent of its
disclosure practice.
5.2.5	 Industry Type
The perception that the extent of information disclosure in CAFSs is likely to differ
across different industries is widespread. One reason is the existence of industry—
specific factors, such as the complexity and nature of operations in certain industries
(e.g. conglomerates). For example, a company with diversified interests seems likely
to have a greater volume of financial information to report than an undiversified one
(Craig and Diga, 1998). Additionally, it can be argued that a multiproduct company
operating in a number of geographical or business segments, is more likely to have an
efficient management information system for managerial control than a single product
company operating in a particular market segment. It is, therefore, possible that some
of the available information is also disclosed in the company's CAFSs in order to meet
the needs of financiers, suppliers, customers, analysts and the public in general.
Second, the dominant firm argument can be used to explain why a company may lead
to a bandwagon effect on the disclosure policies of other companies in the same
industry (Wallace, 1987). For example, a nationally dominant company with a high
level of disclosure within a particular industry may lead to a bandwagon effect on the
levels of disclosure adopted by other companies in that industry (Cooke, 1991).
Similarly, the dominant company might have set a precedent of low disclosure which
may be followed by other companies entering that industry.
The industry effect has been supported in aggregate, mandatory and voluntary
disclosure studies. For example, Cooke (1989) found that Swedish trading companies
disclosed less aggregate and voluntary information than other industry types. Cooke
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(1991) demonstrated that Japanese manufacturing companies disclosed more
voluntary information than others, while Wallace and Naser (1995) reported that
conglomerate Hong Kong companies tended to provide more details in their annual
reports. Consequently, the following hypothesis is tested:
H5:	 The extent of a company's disclosure practice varies depending on the
industry to which it belongs (whether it is a manufacturer, conglomerate
or other).
5.2.6	 Listing Status
5.2.6.1 Hypothesis for Cypriot Companies
There are several conceptually valid arguments supporting the proposition that
companies that are domestically listed are more likely to disclose more adequately in
their annual reports than their unlisted counterparts. First, agency problems may vary
with quotation status because an unlisted company with a small number of
shareholders may be more successful in maintaining the agents than a listed company
with a multitude of shareholders (Cooke, 1989). Given that disclosure in annual
reports is one way of reducing monitoring costs (Schipper, 1981), it can be claimed
that listed companies are more likely to disclose detailed information as a way of
reducing those costs.
Second, in an effort to minimise its cost of capital, a listed company is more likely to
have more extensive disclosure than an unlisted company. Given that a prime motive
for disclosure is the need to raise capital at the lower cost (capital—need theory), it is
expected that companies whose securities are traded in capital markets will disclose
extensive information in order to improve the estimates of their share's mean return
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and the covariance of the return with the market return. This lower their systematic
risk and decrease their cost of capital (Spero, 1979). In contrast, it can be argued that
unlisted companies will be less motivated to release detailed information because they
do not depend on the market for their capital needs, and the impact of increased
information on their share's mean return and the covariance of the return with the
market return is less obvious. In this context, Cooke (1993, p.523) argues that "in
order to raise capital on the markets, companies may increase their voluntary
disclosure and increase compliance with mandated disclosures, particularly because
they are subject to more rigorous public scrutiny".
Third, the existence of disclosure costs can also be used to predict increased
disclosure by listed companies. This is because when a company initially applies to be
listed it provides extensive amount of information pertaining to its past, present and
future affairs, some of which needs to be up—dated periodically. It can, therefore, be
argued that since the marginal cost of publicising some of this information is likely to
be minimal, a listed company is more likely to disclose more extensively than an
unlisted company.
Even though, Buzby (1972) found a company's listing status insignificant in the
variation of aggregate disclosure practices of US companies, prior empirical evidence
usually supports the domestic listing status proposition (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971
and Firth, 1979). Based on the arguments above, it can be hypothesised that listing
status has a positive effect on the disclosure practices of Cypriot listed
companies. Therefore, the hypothesis examined is that:
H6(C): The extent of disclosure of a Cypriot listed company is greater than that of
an unlisted one.
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5.2.6.2 Hypothesis for Greek Companies
Although the Greek sample includes only listed companies, a distinction can be made
between those companies listed on the main market and those listed on the parallel
market of the ASE. Both types of companies have the same disclosure responsibilities
but it is possible to hypothesise for a directional relationship between their listing status
and the extent of their financial disclosure. This is because there are reasons to
suspect that the extent of disclosure is higher by companies listed on the main market.
This is based on the assumption that agency problems may vary with the type of a
company's listing status because main market listed companies are more likely to have
a greater number of shareholders. 32
 In such a case agency theory can be used to
speculate that there will be more potential conflicts between managers (as agents) and
capital providers (as principals), and corporate management can use extensive
information disclosure to decrease agency costs and reduce information asymmetries
between agents and principals (Watts, 1977).
Appendix D reveals that the type of a company's domestic listing status has not been a
very popular variable investigated in prior empirical research. Most previous studies
focused on either the listing/no listing dichotomy (e.g. Wallace et al., 1994) or tested
the multiple listing effect (e.g. Cooke, 1989). In addition, most studies that examined
the effect of the type of a company's domestic listing status, investigated information
disclosed by companies listed on different national stock exchanges with significant
differences in disclosure requirements (e.g. Buzby, 1972). This is not the case in
Greece, where the main market of the ASE does not have any additional disclosure
requirements compared to the parallel market. Nevertheless, in view of the strong
theoretical support for a priori expectation it can hypothesised that:
32 The number of shareholders was available only for 44 companies listed on the main market of the ASE.
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H6(G): The extent of disclose of a Greek main—market listed company is greater
than that of a parallel—market listed one.
5.2.7	 Auditor Type
5.2.7.1 Hypothesis for Cypriot Companies
In spite of the fact that the primary responsibility for the preparation of the CAFSs rests
with corporate managers, the literature suggests that auditors may have an influence
on the disclosure policies of their client companies. Specifically, it has been proposed
that large and well—known audit firms may incite companies to disclose more
information (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979). There are different
explanations for this influence. First, Beaty (1989) argues that large audit firms invest
more to maintain their reputation as providers of quality audit than small firms, and
have a greater incentive to discover and report a breach of accounting rules. De
Angelo (1981) found that auditor size and quality are strongly correlated. She calls this
phenomenon a collateral aspect and notes that companies whose annual reports
contain errors and irregularities would diminish the reputation (brand name) of large
audit firms if the latter are associated with them. Hence, large audit firms encourage
their clients to disclose greater amount of information in their CAFSs.
A second argument in support of a relationship between type of auditor and quality of
disclosure has been suggested by Malone, Fries and Jones (1993). They note that
small audit firms are often more sensitive to client demands because they stand to
suffer more in case a client is lost. This implies an economic dependency and a
hesitation to report a lack of compliance with statutory disclosure requirements. In
contrast, large audit firms have a lower economic dependency on a particular client
and are more likely to report non—compliance with disclosure regulations.
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Another argument in favour of the proposition that there is a relationship between type
of auditor and quality of disclosure has been put forward by Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986). They suggested that auditors play a major
role in limiting opportunistic behaviour by agents, thereby reducing the agency costs
borne by principals and agents. It has been argued that companies engaging large
audit firms are those which have substantial agency costs and try to reduce them by
contracting with these audit firms (Inchausti, 1997). Hence, it is expected that when
agency costs are greater there is an increased demand for the audit services of large
firms, with a consequential effect on disclosure quality.
Appendix D shows that the positive influence of large audit firms on the corporate
disclosure practices of their clients has been supported in several studies (e.g. Ahmed
and Nicholls, 1994 and Singhvi 1967). Based on the theoretical and empirical
evidence outlined above and given that in Cyprus the distinction between the Big
5/non—Big 5 is a well established dichotomy for audit size and quality 33 , it is reasonable
to hypothesise that:
H7(C): The extent of disclosure of a Cypriot Big 5 audited company is greater
than that of a non—Big 5 audited one.
33 Although there is no objective data about the market share of each firm, an analysis of the audit reports
of Cypriot public companies shows that the local affiliates of the Big 5 have the majority of the audit
assignments from such companies (42 out of the 50 Cypriot CAFSs examined in this study were audited
by Big 5 audit firms). Furthermore, the unstructured interviews with Cypriot academics and practitioners
confirmed that the Big 5/non—Big 5 distinction is regularly used by Cypriot academics and practitioners as
a dichotomy for audit size and quality.
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5.2.7.2 Hypothesis for Greek Companies
The conjectured relationship between Big 5/non—Big 5 firms and the disclosure quality
of their clients is not clear in the case of Greek companies. Given the distinctive
nature of the Greek market for audit services, the Big 5/non—Big 5 dichotomy for audit
size is not applicable. After the 1992 liberalisation of the audit profession, firms have
split into three groups. There is the SELE group, comprising the local branches of
international audit firms; the SOL SA group, which is the private audit company set up
by the majority of the ex—SOL members; and the splinter ex—SOL group, which is the
group of small audit practices set up by the minority of ex—SOL members (the last two
groups are usually referred to as the "indigenous auditors"). Second, it is not clear
whether the representatives of the Big 5 are in fact the group of the "large audit firms".
Although there is no data on the market share of each firm in total audit revenue or
trend over time, there is some evidence that the two groups of indigenous auditors
managed to retain the vast majority of audit assignments (Caramanis, 1997).
Nevertheless, it is still possible to hypothesise for a relationship between auditor type
and quality of disclosure. It can be argued that companies audited by the SELE group
are more likely to provide more detailed disclosure than companies audited by the
indigenous auditors. This is because the SELE member audit firms, which are
internationally—affiliated, are backed more by the expertise of the international firms to
which they are affiliated compared to local Greek audit firms without such affiliation
("theory of association" — Wallace et al., 1994). It may therefore be expected that the
clients of such firms are more likely to accede to advice regarding the quality of their
CAFSs than the clients of the other firms.
Likewise, internationally affiliated firms can be assumed to be more sensitive to quality
and reputation issues because they are associated with a worldwide brandname which
guarantees a standard quality of service. They are, therefore, more likely to report
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non—compliance with disclosure regulations because the detection of a failure to do so
may harm the international brand name and jeopardise their relationship with the
international firms. Hence, being a client of a SELE member audit firm may incl'ease
the likelihood of a company disclosing more detailed mandatory information.
Given that, to the knowledge of the present researcher, there are no previous
disclosure studies on Greek corporate disclosure the hypothesised relationship cannot
be complemented by any prior empirical evidence. Hence, the following non—
directional hypothesis is examined:
H7(G): There is an association between a Greek company's auditor type and the
extent of its disclosure practice.
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5.3	 SUMMARY
Based on the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 3 and the literature review
presented in Chapter 4, this chapter formulated some relationships between the
disclosure practices of Cypriot and Greek companies and seven corporate
characteristics. These relationships were expressed in the form of research
hypotheses to facilitate their statistical analysis. The testing of those hypotheses will
give some reliable information about the kind of relationships that exist between each
of the variables and the extent of Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure. It must be
emphasised that there may be other potential hypotheses that can be derived from the
theoretical framework (such as the existence of share compensation plans for
directors) that would have been very interesting to examine, but the lack of relevant
information makes these impossible to consider.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
6.1	 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the most important elements of the research design that were
broadly outlined in Chapter 1. It determines the method and type of investigation
carried out and clarifies the unit of analysis and time horizon of the study. Additionally,
it sheds light on the data collection and sampling design and explains and justifies the
methodological techniques used to measure the corporate disclosure practices and the
selected corporate characteristics.
The research design involves a series of decision making choices made in order to
gather and interpret the data in accordance with the research objectives (Sekaran,
1992). As shown in Figure 6.1, the components of the empirical part of the study have
been divided into four groups. While this section describes briefly the details of the
study (that is, the method and type of investigation undertaken, the approach for
comparison, the unit of analysis and the time horizon of the study), the rest of the
chapter discusses the data collection and the measurement and analysis techniques
used. Chapters 7 — 8 analyse and interpret the data and Chapter 9 compares the
empirical findings for Cyprus and Greece.
As stated in Chapter 1, the research was conducted using the hypothetico—deductive
research process. In this process one starts with a theory from which he or she
generates hypotheses (deduction), proceeds to observation or data collection
(operationalisation), analyses the data (data processing), evaluates the findings
(interpretation) and, in case there is evidence against the theory, goes back to modify
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the theory. The hypothetico—deductive research process was used in this study for two
reasons. First, the nature of the research problem and the type of research questions
set call for a process of: (1) testing hypotheses in accordance with the established
standards in the literature; and (2), providing answers to the research questions via
an analysis and explanation of causal relationships. This is the procedure followed by
the hypothetico—deductive method. The alternative inductive method, is not
considered appropriate for this study because it proceeds in the opposite direction:
by trying to generate a theory from the ground up. This is not the objective of this
study as the main aim is not to generate a new theory of corporate disclosure but to
test existing theories using new data. The second reason for using the hypothetico-
deductive method is because its widespread use in the corporate disclosure literature
indicates that it is currently the most appropriate method for investigating national
corporate disclosure practices.
As clarified in Chapter 4, there are at least two approaches that can be used to
undertake a cross—national comparison between Cypriot and Greek corporate
disclosure practices. The first is to develop a common index for both countries and
make a direct comparison. The second is to develop a separate index for each
country and make an indirect comparison (that is, effectively carrying out two single
country disclosure investigations and making an indirect comparison of the results).
As concluded in Chapter 4, if the direct approach is to be used all of the following
conditions must be satisfied: (1) the countries concerned must be comparable in terms
of their socio—economic development; (2) the perceptions as to the objectives of
financial statements and the order of importance of disclosure items must, in broad
terms, be the same in both countries; and (3), the countries compared must have the
same disclosure minima. The background information for Cyprus and Greece
provided in Chapter 2 showed that these conditions are not satisfied as far as the two
countries are concerned. Hence, in this study the cross—national comparison of
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corporate disclosure practices was made with the construction of a separate disclosure
measuring instrument for each country (indirect approach).
As noted earlier, the hypothetico—deductive method of research involves an analysis of
causal relationships and their explanation by existing theories. Hence, a causal type of
investigation was needed and the objective was to identify the important corporate
characteristics that influence Cypriot and Greek mandatory corporate disclosure. It
should be cautioned that the term causality has been the subject of very extensive
philosophical discussions in the statistical literature and different definitions can be
offered for the term (Cox, 1993). In the context of this study the definition of causality
used is that offered by Cox (1993). That is, a corporate characteristic (X) is assumed
to be a cause of corporate disclosure (Y) if: (1) regression analysis reveals that all
possible regression equations for Y include a substantively important contribution from
X; and (2), there is a reasonably well—established economic theory underlying and
explaining the dependence of corporate disclosure on the specific corporate
characteristic. The use of well—established economic theories to explain the
dependence of corporate disclosure on specific corporate characteristics, is expected
to strengthen the internal validity of the study (that is, the degree to which we can draw
valid conclusions about the causal effects of the variables).
The units of analysis selected for this study are the individual Cypriot public and Greek
listed companies. Despite the fact that information can be communicated to users
through different media (such as interim reports, press releases and profit
announcements), the CAFSs of the sample companies were used as the main source
of data because they are widely accepted as the most appropriate way in which
information can be presented in order to meet the objective of financial reporting (ASB,
1996). Additionally, the set of CAFSs is the only general—purpose financial reporting
document which is widely available to all user groups and is subject to an independent
examination by the auditors of the company.
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A disclosure study can be either longitudinal or cross—sectional. A limitation of cross—
sectional studies is that although one can formulate hypotheses in terms of effects
and test them by looking for associations (as it is the case with the second research
question in this study), he or she cannot conclude that the association definitely means
a causal relationship. Longitudinal studies, on the other hand, could help identify
cause—effect relationships more clearly because data are gathered at two different
points in time (before and after manipulation). However, a longitudinal study, which
could have drawn causal relationships more clearly, was not practical in the case of
this study because at the commencement of the research effort (late 1996) the
regulatory framework of accounting in Cyprus was changed with the opening up of the
official CSE (29 March 1996). Thus, only a cross—sectional analysis of corporate
disclosure practices was possible. The causal relationship between corporate
disclosure and the selected corporate characteristics was evaluated through the use of
regression analysis and well—established economic theories to explain any
dependencies. The year 1996 was selected because it was the latest full year at the
commencement of the research effort.
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6.2	 DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE DESIGN
6.2.1
	 Data Collection and Sample Design for Cyprus
As at the end of 1996, there were 135 registered public companies in Cyprus, 41 of
which were listed on the CSE. Six registered companies that were owned and
managed by Turks were not requested to participate in the study because of the
political situation in Cyprus. Additionally, 17 financial companies (banks, insurance
and investment companies) were eliminated because they are subject to special
disclosure requirements (under Schedule 8 of the 1951 Companies Act) which may
affect their overall disclosure practices. The exclusion of the above companies
resulted in an initial target population of 112 companies (27 listed and 85 unlisted),
which was considered to be relatively small. In view of this, all elements of the target
population were contacted for a copy of their audited CAFSs for the financial year
ended in 1996.
The addresses of the listed companies were obtained from the CSE, whereas those of
unlisted companies from the Registrar of Companies. A letter was despatched to all
the elements of the target population in May 1997. The letter explained the objectives
and the importance of the study and guaranteed respondent anonymity. The initial
response rate was 30 per cent. Two reminder letters were sent to non—respondent
companies in September and December 1997, which raised the total response rate to
45 per cent. The response rate from listed companies was 100 per cent whereas that
from unlisted companies was 27 per cent (Table 6.1). Although some responding
companies despatched an English version of their accounts, all have supplied their
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accounts in Greek. As such, the Greek version of their accounts was used in the
investigation."
As the response rate from unlisted companies (27 per cent) was considered to be
relatively low, a random sample of 10 non—respondents were contacted by telephone
to clarify the reasons for not responding. The telephone inquiries revealed that: (1) two
companies have not started actual operations since incorporation; (2) two companies
were unwilling to participate in the study; (3) three companies had not finalised their
accounts as at January 1998; (4) two companies have ceased operations; and (5), one
company was in the process of liquidation. Although the response rate from unlisted
companies was only 27 per cent, the results of the telephone inquiries suggest that the
accounts of many non—responding unlisted companies would not provide meaningful
elements of the target population. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the
Cypriot sample is representative of the final target population, that is those Cypriot
public companies which prepare and publish CAFSs that can be used as a meaningful
basis for informed decision making.
TABLE 6.1:
SUMMARY OF SAMPLE SIZE FOR CYPRIOT COMPANIES
COMPANIES
TARGET
POPULATION (N5) SAMPLE (V)
PROPORTION OF
SAMPLE TO
POPULATION (%)
Listed 27 27 100
Unlisted 85 23 27
TOTAL
,
112 50 45
34 A cross check between the Greek and English versions of the accounts for 10 randomly selected
companies confirmed that there were no differences between the two sets of accounts.
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6.2.2	 Data Collection and Sample Design for Greece
The addresses of the 218 listed companies (181 main market listed and 37 paral'el
market listed) as at the end of 1996 were obtained from the ASE. As was the case of
Cypriot companies, financial companies were eliminated resulting in a target
population of 175 companies (141 main market and 34 parallel market listed). In view
of the relatively small size of the target population a letter was despatched to all
companies in May 1997 requesting a copy of their CAFSs for the financial year ended
in 1996. The letter explained the objectives and the importance of the study and
guaranteed respondent anonymity. The initial response rate was 32 per cent.
An analysis of the initial responses revealed that some responding companies had not
despatched their notes to the accounts. For those companies, the Ministry of
Commerce in Athens was visited in order to obtain a copy of their notes to the
accounts. 35 After the despatch of two reminders to non—respondents and a second
visit to the Ministry of Commerce, the CAFSs of 74 companies were obtained, bringing
the response rate to 42 per cent. The response rate from main market listed
companies was 44 per cent whereas that from parallel market listed companies was 35
per cent (Table 6.2). As in the case of Cyprus, all companies supplied a Greek version
of their accounts, which was the version used in the investigation.
Although the response rate from Greek companies was high when compared to other
disclosure studies (e.g. Cooke, 1992), the representantiveness of the sample was
checked by seeing if it comprised a representative number of companies from the
main and the parallel market of the ASE and the different ASE industrial classifications.
35 According to Law 2190/20 all companies registered in Greece are required to file their annual accounts
together with supplemental notes with the Ministry of Commerce. The kind assistance (in retrieving
these notes to the accounts) of Mr. A. Daoudakis, Mr. A. Demetrakas, Ms. D. Sfyroera, Ms. I.
Manolioudaki, Ms. M. Kalaintzaki and Ms. F. Mendrinou at the Ministry of Commerce in Athens is
gratefully acknowledged.
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TABLE 6.2:
SUMMARY OF SAMPLE SIZE FOR GREEK COMPANIES
-,	
Additionally, it was confirmed that companies of all sizes (in terms of market value)
were included in the sample. 36 It, therefore, seems reasonable to conclude that the
sample is representative of Greek companies in terms of listing status, industry type
and company size (as measured by market value) and can be used as a valid and
reliable sample from which to draw inferences.
COMPANIES
TARGET
POPULATION (N) SAMPLE (N2)
PROPORTION OF
SAMPLE TO
POPULATION (%)
Main market listed 141 62 44
Parallel market
listed
34 12 35
TOTAL 175 74 42
36 The sample comprised 44 per cent of the main market and 35 per cent of the parallel market listed
companies. In terms of the ASE industrial classifications the sample comprised: 43 per cent of holding
companies, 67 per cent of shipping, 23 per cent of textiles, 80 per cent of chemicals, 50 per cent of
pharmaceuticals, 60 per cent of building materials, 29 per cent of construction/technicals, 40 per cent of
metallurgicals, 50 per cent of food/spirits, 50 per cent of flour mills, 67 per cent of containers, 100 per cent
of wood, 58 per cent of others, 50 per cent of informatics and 35 per cent of parallel market companies.
Additionally, the sample included the company in the cold storages class, the two companies in the
tobacco class, the company in the printed information class and excluded the company in the
telecommunications class, the company in the mines class, the company in the mass media class and the
2 companies in the hotels class. Finally, in order to ensure that companies of all sizes were represented
in the sample, the 175 companies of the targeted population were ranked in terms of their market value (in
descending order) and divided into four quartiles. The 74 sample companies were distributed as follows:
21 in the first quartile, 20 in the second quartile, 19 in the third quartile and 14 in the fourth quartile. It
can, therefore, be assumed that a reasonable number of companies from the two ASE markets, the
different ASE industrial classifications and the four company size quartiles were included in the sample.
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6.3	 MEASUREMENT OF DISCLOSURE QUALITY
6.3.1	 The Nature of Disclosure Quality
6.3.1.1	 Financial Disclosure
The concept of disclosure is very important in financial accounting and reporting. Choi
and Mueller (1992) stress that the process of accounting measurement together with
that of accounting disclosure give corporate financial reporting its substance.
Nevertheless, the concept of disclosure is broad enough to encompass almost the
entire area of financial reporting (Hendriksen, 1982). It is, therefore, essential that the
concept is contextually and operationally defined, in order to clarify the focus of interest
under investigation and develop a reliable measurement technique. For the purposes
of this study, financial disclosure is defined as the communication of economic
information to users of financial statements so as to aid their decision making. This
information is restricted to those quantitative (numerical) and qualitative (narrative)
items required to be disclosed in the 1996 CAFSs of Cypriot public and Greek listed
companies. The reason for including in the definition both quantitative and qualitative
information items is twofold. First, disclosure of qualitative information usually
enhances the understanding of quantitative information and, second, the accounting
discipline is now expanding into areas previously viewed as qualitative in nature
(Belkaoui, 1994).
6.3.1.2 Disclosure Quality
Wallace (1987) emphasises that financial disclosure is an abstract concept which
cannot be measured directly because it does not possess those characteristics by
which one can determine its intensity or quality like the capacity of an automobile.
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The ASB states that the qualitative characteristics of accounting information are those
that render it useful for decision making, and that they can be divided into those that
relate to the content of information contained in financial statements and those relating
to how that information is presented. The primary characteristics relating to content
are relevance and reliability. Relevance is ". . . the ability of that information to
influence the decisions of users . . ." whereas reliability implies that the information is
". . • free from material error and bias . . ." (ASB, 1996, p.851-2). On the other hand,
the primary characteristics relating to presentation are those of comparability and
understandability. Comparability requires similar events and transactions to be
represented in a similar way, while understandability refers to the aggregation and
classification of items in a manner that will be comprehensible to an average user of
CAFSs. Moreover, the ASB proposes that financial information should have additional
characteristics if it is to be relevant and reliable, such as having predictive and
confirmatory value, reflect the substance of transactions and being neutral, prudent,
complete and consistent.
The discussion above illustrates that disclosure quality is not only a broad and abstract
concept, but a highly subjective and complex issue as well. Furthermore, the ASB
accepts that there are several constraints on the qualitative characteristics noted
above; such as a trade off between some of them and the need to achieve a balance
between benefit and cost in the production of information. Consequently, ". . . it is
seldom possible to prepare information that is completely reliable, relevant,
comparable and understandable" (ASB, 1996, p.855). Instead, the aim is usually to
achieve an appropriate balance among them in order to meet the objective of
usefulness. Within this context Imhoff (1992, p.101) defined disclosure quality as an
evaluator's ". . . overall subjective assessment of the relevance, reliability and
comparability of the accounting data produced by the reporting entity — in essence, the
relative usefulness of the data, and the analyses based on the data".
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6.3.1.3 Conceptual Definition of Disclosure Quality
Recognising the problems outlined above, several researchers have tried to assess
different aspects of disclosure quality in different studies, rather than try to examine all
(or most) of them at once. Constructs used to represent disclosure quality in the
literature include adequacy (adequate for a defined purpose, e.g. Buzby, 1974);
informativeness (whether reporting earnings suggest the direction of share prices, e.g.
Alford, Jordan, Leftwich and Zmijewski, 1993); timeliness (whether the time of release
of the CAR is affected by good or bad news, e.g. Courtis, 1976); understandability
(whether the CAR communicates effectively with its readers, e.g. Jones, 1986); and
extensiveness (whether more detailed information is provided, e.g. Patton and
Zelenka, 1997). The construct of interest in this study is extensiveness. The main
reason for selecting this proxy is that it can easily be linked to disclosure quality and
usefulness. This is because ". . . on the basis of the preceding (Imhoff's, 1992)
definition and excluding the problem of information overload, the quality of disclosure
in CARs would be expected to increase if more details were given on each information
item of interest . . ." (Wallace and Naser, 1995, p.327). Although it is possible for a
company to provide extensive information which may be incorrect or immaterial, it has
been decided to ignore this problem based on the assumption that audited CAFSs are
free from this potential problem. Furthermore, Wallace and Naser (1995, p.327) argue
that ". . . the possibility of misinformation in annual reports is a problem that it is not
logically feasible to investigate".
6.3.1.4 Operational Definition of Disclosure Quality
Patton and Zelenka (1997) propose that there are four possible approaches to
operationalise the extent of disclosure. The first is to evaluate the extent or quality of
information disclosed based on the usefulness of information items as determined by a
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normative decision model. The second is to evaluate a company's quality of disclosure
based on a group of knowledgeable analysts' evaluation of the annual report. The
third is to assess the extent of market reaction to the disclosure of information. The
final approach to operationalise disclosure extensiveness is to assess the extent of
compliance with a set of legal or GAAP requirements.
In this study the fourth approach was employed and disclosure extensiveness was
operationalised by assessing the extent of compliance with the relevant mandatory
disclosure requirements. This is because the first three approaches are problematic in
the settings of Cyprus and Greece. Operationalising extensive disclosure on the basis
of a normative decision model is problematic because there is no generally accepted
or defensible valuation model specifying the links between accounting information and
appropriate security value (Patton and Zelenka, 1997). Additionally, the
operationalisation of extensive disclosure on the basis of a group of analysts'
evaluation of the annual report suffers from the disadvantage that analysts' ratings are
based on "analysts' perceptions of disclosure" (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Finally,
unresolvable issues in selecting an event window for the analysis renders the
operationalisation of extensive disclosure on the basis of market reaction to the
disclosure of information problematic (Patton and Zelenka, 1997). In sum, the method
selected to operationalise extensive disclosure enables an objective and easy
operationalisation method to be used, which can facilitate the application of valid and
reliable measurement techniques. This is of fundamental importance in an empirical
study because it can facilitate meaningful statistical analyses on the corporate
disclosure scores.
For measurement purposes, the extent of disclosure is operationally defined as the
quantity and quality of information items disclosed in the CAFSs. The quantity of
disclosure items was captured by the number of information items that are disclosed
(out of those required), whereas the quality of disclosure was captured by the
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disaggregation of the mandatory information items into sub—elements of information
that should or could have been disclosed. The disaggregation was done in order to
capture the relative intensity of mandatory disclosure in the CAFSs of Cypriot and
Greek companies. This approach was also used by Owusu—Ansah (1998).
6.3.1.5 Definition of Mandatory Information
Mandatory information items are defined as those information items explicitly required
to be disclosed by the relevant institutional pronouncements applicable to Cypriot
public and Greek listed companies in 1996. In the case of Cyprus, mandatory items
are those required to be disclosed by the Companies Act 1951 and the IASs. The
additional disclosure requirements of the CSE were excluded because the focus of
interest was on public (either listed or unlisted) companies. In the case of Greece,
mandatory items were those required to be disclosed by Law 2190/20, the GGAP and
the ASE. The definition of mandatory information for Greek companies included the
ASE requirements because the focus of interest was on Greek public listed
companies.
The type of information items examined in this study are mandatory. However, the
study captures an element of voluntary disclosure as well because the mandatory
information items that must be disclosed are broken down into sub—elements of
information that could have been disclosed; hence, the disclosure of those sub—.
elements is effectively up to the discretion of management. Therefore, in this study
adequate disclosure is measured by the extent of detail to which the sample
companies disclosed mandatory information items. The decision to focus on the
extent of detail in which companies disclose mandatory information can be justified on
the following grounds. First, the amount of information required to be disclosed in both
Cyprus and Greece is extensive and by disaggregating those mandated items into
sub—elements of information, very detailed and comprehensive disclosure measuring
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instruments will be produced, that will adequately capture the quantity and quality of
corporate disclosure. Second, Cypriot and Greek financial reporting have not yet
started to emulate to a significant extent, the practice of providing information items
that are entirely voluntary. Finally, to include the investigation items that are entirely
voluntary may obscure the very thing being looked for — the extensiveness by which
the mandated information elements are disclosed (Wallace and Naser, 1995).
6.3.2	 Methods of Measurement
There are two main methods that have been used to measure corporate disclosure.
The first is the content approach, which was introduced in disclosure studies by
Copeland and Fredericks (1968). It involves the counting of all information items
appearing in the CAFSs on the basis of the number of words and numbers used to
describe them. Although this approach has been described as a systematic method of
converting text to numerical variables for quantitative data analysis (Hussey and
Hussey, 1997), it is not considered to be a satisfactory measurement method to be
used in this study. This is because in CAFSs there are repetitions of certain numbers
and words which can lead to double counting. In addition, companies differ in their
nature and complexity of operations and more complex companies would have more to
disclose than simple ones. It would be wrong to rank such companies higher merely
because more words have been used and more numbers have been included in their
CAFSs.
The alternative method is the index approach, which involves the checking of
information disclosed against a list of information items; a score is awarded depending
on whether an item is disclosed or not, and a total score is derived for each company.
Hence, the index method is a model that combines several disclosure items into a
single measure.	 Owusu—Ansah (1998) notes that this approach has several
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advantages. For example, it is capable of tapping differences between the financial
reporting practices of different companies and it rank—orders companies in terms of
their disclosure scores. Additionally, Wallace and Cooke (1990) suggest that because
scores on an index can be treated as a variable to which both parametric and non—
parametric methods can be applied, the index approach affords researchers the
possibility to carry out suitable statistical and econometric analyses.
Nevertheless, the index approach is beset by several potential problems which, if not
properly dealt with, can lead to the generation of unreliable scores. First, there are
dangers of including irrelevant, or excluding relevant, information items in the index.
Second, there are potential dangers in deciding the importance (or weight) of every
item in the instrument: shall all items be treated of equal importance or shall they be
weighted? Finally, there is a potential problem of some of the information items in the
index not being applicable to some of the sample companies.
In spite of the above potential drawbacks, the index methodology was preferred and
used in this study because it is currently the most appropriate measurement tool
available (Marston and Shrives, 1991) and has widely been used in the literature (e.g.
Cerf, 1961 and Wallace and Naser, 1995). Additionally, the operational procedures of
the index methodology have been carefully followed in order to avoid the potential
problems referred to above. These procedures are discussed in Section 6.3.3 below.
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6.3.3	 The Index Methodology
6.3.3.1	 Selection of the Information Items
There are many potential dangers associated with the selection of the items to be
included in the scoring instrument. The first relates to the decision of which and how
many items to be included in the instrument. Wallace (1988) pointed out that there is
no theory governing the selection of information items to be included in an index.
Generally, the selection of items is determined by the focus of the study concerned.
Usual methods of selection include a survey of the relevant user groups (e.g. Firth,
1980), a review of the relevant literature (e.g. Chow and Wong—Boren, 1987) and the
use of an existing index (e.g. Marston, 1986). In this study, the focus of interest is the
extent of detail by which the sample companies disclose mandatory information. Thus,
the information items included in the indexes were those explicitly mandated by the
relevant legal and institutional pronouncement in each country. Nevertheless, there
exists an element of subjectivity, in that the information items have been broken down
into sub—elements of information that could have been disclosed for each item. In
order to limit subjectivity in the construction of the index, the break down has been
done based on a review of the voluntary disclosures of the IASs and the U.K.
SSAPs/FRSs. 37
 It is believed that this approach has enabled the researcher to
construct the disclosure indexes for this study as objectively as possible.
In disclosure studies there is usually a potential danger that in constructing the indexes
one excludes items which are relevant to users' decision making, and/or includes items
which are irrelevant. However, this problem is more relevant to voluntary disclosure
37 For example, Greek law requires the disclosure of an analysis and explanation of research and
development expenditure. Based on the disclosure requirements of the SSAP 13, this information item
was sub—analysed into 3 elements that could have been disclosed i.e. (1) the total amount of research
and development expenditure charged to the income statement; (2) an analysis of the amounts involved;
(3) a commentary about the intangible asset or the accounting policy explanation.
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studies. As this study focuses on mandatory disclosure and the indexes include the
information items required to be disclosed in each country, it is reasonable to assume
that in the case of both Cyprus and Greece the disclosure minima represent what the
average user requires in order to take informed decisions. This is based on the fact
that these disclosure minima mainly comprise the requirements of the IASs (in the
case of Cyprus) and of the EU Fourth and Seventh Directives (in the case of Greece).
Additionally, the voluntary sub—elements of information items that could have been
disclosed have been derived from the voluntary disclosures of the IASs and the UK
SSAPs/FRSs. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that these pronouncements
incorporate the most important information items required by the average user of the
CAFSs. It should be pointed out that the issue of whether what is required to be
disclosed (and its sub—elements of information) is what is actually needed by users, is
an issue outside the scope of this study.
Finally, there is the problem of duplication. That is, the possibility of including (in the
disclosure index) an item more than once, in case it is required by more than one
regulatory source. In this study, the problem of duplication was avoided by selecting
the most comprehensive requirement for inclusion in the measuring instruments.
The selection procedure described above produced a list of 332 items for Cyprus and
514 for Greece (the disclosure measuring instruments are attached as Appendices B
and C). Although there is no agreed theory on the number and the selection of the
items to include is a disclosure index (Wallace et al., 1994), the disclosure measuring
instruments used in this study appear to be amongst the most comprehensive used in
a disclosure study. This is evidenced by the fact that the number of items examined in
both Cyprus and Greece is very high when compared to indices used by previous
disclosure researchers. Previous studies which examined such a high number of items
include Spero (1979), Cooke (1989) and Owusu—Ansah (1998) with 275, 224 and 214
items respectively.
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6.3.3.2 Weighting the Index
The selected information items can be weighted to reflect their relative importance to
the researcher or a particular user group. The weights to be used can be assigned
after a review of the relevant literature and the exercise of subjective judgement on the
part of the researcher (as to the importance of each item), or through the use of mean
ratings from a survey of a particular user group (e.g. Buzby, 1975). The alternative
approach is to use an unweighted procedure where an item is scored one if disclosed
and zero if not (that is, on a dichotomous basis).
An unweighted scoring procedure was preferred and used in this study because it is
assumed that each item is equally important to the average user of the CAFSs. This
assumption is not unrealistic since this study does not focus on the information needs
of any particular user group of the financial statements. Additionally, there is evidence
to suggest that there is no significant difference between unweighted and weighted
indexes (Spero, 1979; Robbins and Austin, 1986; Chow and Wong—Boren, 1987). For
example, Spero (1979) reported that attaching weights to information items was
irrelevant because his sample firms were consistent in their disclosure policies (that is,
those enterprises that are better at disclosing important items are also better at
disclosing less important items38). Finally, there is evidence that the relative
importance of an information item is not stable over time but depends upon the
prevalent economic conditions (Collins, 1975; cited in Dhaliwal, 1980).
38 Wallace and Naser (1995) have cautioned against the assumption of equivalence between weighted
and unweighted indexes because this may not be true in all cases. They argued that the equivalence
depends on how refined is the compound index and suggest that compound and simple index numbers
cannot be guaranteed to agree closely in all circumstances.
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6.3.3.3 Scoring the CAFSs
As stated earlier, the scoring procedure was based on a dichotomous basis by which
an item is scored one if it is disclosed and zero if otherwise. This procedure has two
potential problems. The first is how to capture the degree of specificity of each of the
information items disclosed and the second is how to ensure that a company is not
penalised for the non—disclosure of an inapplicable information item.
In this study, the first problem was overcome by developing sub—elements of
information which were appropriately validated and scored on a dichotomous basis.
On the other hand, the problem of penalising a company for the non—disclosure of an
inapplicable item is a difficult one. Wallace and Naser (1995) note that the best way to
overcome this problem is by going directly into the accounting books and records of
each company and assessing whether a particular item that was not disclosed, was in
fact, inapplicable. Since this is difficult to do, the problem of items inapplicability was
reduced by reading thoroughly the CAFSs in order to make a judgement as to whether
an item which was not disclosed was in fact relevant to a company (following Wallace,
1987). In such a case a zero was awarded. If, however, the item was not applicable
then the company was not penalised.
6.3.3.4 Development of the Indices
Since the actual disclosure score for each company is additive, the possibility of some
information items being inapplicable to some companies in the sample renders the
comparison between the total disclosure scores suspect. This problem can be
overcome by ensuring that all information items in the measuring instrument are, in
fact, relevant to all companies in the sample. This, however, was not feasible in this
study because the use of very detailed scoring instruments meant that some items
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(6.2)But,	 AS =
would, inevitably, be inapplicable to some companies. As a result, it was decided to
follow a relative scoring procedure where disclosure scores are calculated by dividing
the actual score of a company by its total maximum possible score. This approach
was preferred because ". . . it is conceptually better than an absolute scoring
system, especially if a researcher desires to study the quality of disclosure in various
industries" (Singhvi and Desai, 1972).
The relative index score (RIS) for each company is the ratio of the actual score (AS),
which is awarded on the basis of the items actually disclosed, to the total maximum
score (TMS), which could have been awarded had that company disclosed all
applicable items. Thus:
RIS = AS ÷ TMS	 (6.1)
and,	 TMS = ai	 (6.3)
1=1
E d
Therefore,	 RIS - 	 	 (6.4)
E ai
where:
di = I if item i is applicable and disclosed by a sample company
= 0 if item i is not disclosed by a sample company
172
ai =1 ?[item i is applicable to a sample company
= 0 if item i is not applicable to a sample company
N = the total number of items which might be disclosed by a sample company (332
for Cypriot and 514 for Greek companies).
173
6.4	 MEASUREMENT OF CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS
6.4.1	 Introduction
This section presents the empirical indicants of the corporate characteristics
investigated in the study and explains the rationale behind the measurements used.
Some corporate characteristics are verifiable facts (e.g. a company's listing status), but
others are subjective because they are not directly observable. In the case of those
that were not directly observable, they were inferred by observing some of their
presumed empirical indicants (proxies). The indicants were then specified
operationally in order to derive an appropriate technique to represent those
characteristics numerically, so that they could have been statistically analysed.
6.4.2	 Company Size
Several variables have been used as a proxy for company size including total
assets (e.g. Cerf, 1961), sales (e.g. Stagna, 1976) and market capitalisation (e.g.
Hossain et al., 1994). Although there is no overriding theoretical reason to prefer one
way of measurement over others (Cooke, 1991), Appendix D reveals that total assets
and sales have been the most popular measurements of company size. It must,
however, be noted that all measures mentioned above have potential problems. For
example, total assets and sales are capable of manipulation by management via
creative accounting techniques. A decision by management to exclude the
consolidation of a subsidiary on the grounds of dissimilar activities or lack of effective
control (and its inclusion using either the equity or the cost methods) can have a
fundamental impact on the total assets and sales figures of the group. On the other
hand, market—capitalisation is subject to short—term market—price fluctuations.
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In this study the size of Greek companies was measured by total assets (tangible and
intangible fixed assets plus current assets), net sales (sales less sales returns) and
market capitalisation. The size of Cypriot companies was measured by total assets
and net sales. Market capitalisation had not been used in the case of Cypriot
companies, because the Cypriot sample includes unlisted companies for which a
market valuation of their shares was not available. The primary motivation behind the
selection of these proxies is the fact that they have been used extensively in prior
research and will enable the researcher to compare his results with those of previous
studies. Furthermore, all the variables were easily determinable. Sales had been
measured by total group sales for the year, total assets by the total of the net book
value of fixed assets plus the book value of current assets, and market capitalisation
by the market value of equity shares at the end of the year under consideration. The
figures reported are in millions of Cyprus Pounds and Greek Drachmas.
6.4.3
	 Company Age
A company's age can be measured on different bases. For example a company's age
can be calculated as the number of years, half years or quarters since the date of its
incorporation, actual commencement of operations, or listing.
In the case of Cyprus, it was not possible to determine for all companies in the sample
the date of incorporation or the date of commencement of operations. This is because
there is no requirement for a company to disclose this information in its annual report.
Additionally, the listing date is not appropriate because the Cypriot sample includes
both listed and unlisted companies. Hence, since it was not possible to measure the
age of all Cypriot companies in the sample 39 , it was decided not to test for the
39 The age of all companies could have been determined by searching the file of each company at the
Registrar of Companies. This, however, would have been a very time consuming and costly exercise as a
special permission and an inspection fee is required. This was deemed to cause disproportionate delay
and expense in the research effort and was not undertaken.
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influence of company age on Cypriot corporate disclosure practices.
In the case of Greece, however, the date of incorporation was found in the ASE Annual
Factbook and the age of Greek companies was operationalised as the number of
years since the company's date of incorporation.
6.4.4	 Company Profitability
There are many different bases that can be used to measure a company's profitability.
Some of these express the company's profitability on an absolute basis (such as profit
e.g. Abu—Nassar and Rutherford, 1994) and some on a relative basis (such as profit
margin, e.g. Singhvi, 1967; and rate of return e.g. Raffournier, 1995). It was decided
to measure profitability on a relative, rather than an absolute basis, because the latter
is not considered to be a satisfactory measure of profitability for the purposes of this
study; US$100,000 profit for the biggest company is not the same as US$100,000
profit for the smallest. In an effort to examine both the operational efficiency of the
company as well as the efficiency of its financial achievement, profitability was
operationalised in two ways: as the ratio of a company's profit to its sales (profit
margin), and as the ratio of a company's profit to its capital employed [Return on
Capital Employed — (ROCE)].
In measuring a company's rate of return, total capital is of interest because the primary
objective is to assess corporate financial achievement regardless of how the company
is financed. The selection of total capital as the basis on which to assess rate of return
determined the relevant profit figure to be included in both the rate of return and the
profit margin ratios. Thus, earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) was used, because
there was a need to relate profit to all those entitled to that return (that is, all types of
shareholders, debenture holders and other interest—bearing loan capital providers).
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Relating EBIT to equity (as in Wallace et al., 1994) may not adequately capture rate of
return as this profit belongs to all capital providers and not only to equity shareholders.
Finally, book values, as opposed to market values, had been selected to measure
capital as: (1) most forms of debt in Cyprus and Greece are not traded and it would
have been inappropriate to measure total capital using a mixture of market and book
values; and (2), the existence of unlisted companies in the Cypriot sample rendered
the use of market value for equity inappropriate for that country.
6.4.5	 Company Liquidity
A company's liquidity position can be operationalised on the basis of information
derived from its cash flow statement or its balance sheet. If the latter is selected there
are two measures of liquidity that are normally used: the first is the company's quick
(acid test) ratio and the second is the company's current ratio. Their difference is that
the former excludes the value of stocks in measuring corporate liquidity.
Given that there is no requirement for Greek companies to publish a cash or a funds
flow statement and having in mind the desire to compare the results between the two
countries, it was decided to operationalise the company's liquidity position on the basis
of balance sheet information. A company's current, as opposed to its quick, ratio was
preferred for two reasons. First, it is the company's short term, as opposed to
immediate, liquidity that is of interest. Short term liquidity is normally measured by the
current ratio. Furthermore, since auditors in both countries are required to ensure that
stocks are valued at the lower of cost and net realisable value, it is not unrealistic to
assume that stocks do represent, on average, liquid assets which are easily
convertible to cash. Current ratio was measured as the ratio of a company's current
assets to its current liabilities at the end of the year under consideration.
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6.4.6
	 Industry Type
Although the CSE classifies the Cypriot listed non—financial companies into four
categories, the Cypriot unlisted companies are not classified by any institution or body.
On the other hand, in the case of Greece, the ASE classifies Greek listed companies
into twenty one categories. In order to reduce the number of industries in the samples,
it was decided to gather them into groups which have been found to influence
corporate disclosure in other countries (the manufacturing and conglomerate groups).
For example, Cooke (1991) found that Japanese manufacturing companies disclose
more extensively than non—manufacturing companies, while Wallace and Naser (1995)
reported that Hong Kong conglomerate companies disclose more comprehensive
information than non—conglomerate ones. Hence, it was decided to classify
companies into three groups: manufacturing, conglomerates and others.
The classification was made on the basis of a scrutiny of a company's CAR or CAFSs
and the determination of its principal economic activity, where this is defined as the
activity from which the company derives 80 per cent or more of its revenue.
Companies were firstly classified as "conglomerates" in case there was no single
industry from which they derived 80 per cent or more of their revenue. The remaining
were temporarily classified single—sector companies. Then, the single—sector
companies were classified as "manufacturing" in case their main economic activity
was either: (1) the use of labour and/or machinery to turn raw materials to finished
goods; or (2) the construction of buildings, roads, etc. The remaining single—sector
companies were classified as "others". The companies classified as "others" engaged
in tourism, services, shipping, transport, communication, retailing and wholesaling.
A problem arose because this variable was measured on a categorical (nominal) scale.
Given that OLS regression was used in the multivariate statistical analyses, dummy
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variables were required. Consequently, membership of an industry group was
represented by three dichotomous variables that received the value of one if the
company belonged to that group and zero if otherwise. Since these three variables
must sum to one, multicollinearity might be introduced if all three are incorporated in a
regression analysis. Hence, in the regression analyses undertaken in Chapters 7 and
8 (Sections 7.4 and 8.4) one of the dummy variables was omitted arbitrarily from the
regression procedures in order to avoid perfect colinearity.
6.4.7	 Listing Status
The Cypriot companies can be categorised into listed and unlisted, while the Greek
companies can be classified on the basis of their type of listing, that is whether a
company is listed on the main or the parallel market of the ASE.
Because the listing status variable was measured on a categorical (nominal) scale, a
dummy variable was needed. The variable was scored one if a Cypriot company was
listed and zero if unlisted. In the case of Greek companies, the variable was scored
one if the company was listed on the main market and zero if it was listed on the
parallel market.
6.4.8	 Auditor Type
A common corporate characteristic examined in previous studies is the size of a
company's audit firm. However, the determination of whether a Cypriot audit firm is
large or small is a difficult task. There is no information about the audit fees, total fees,
number of clients or any other reliable information on the basis of which to classify
Cypriot audit firms. However, given that: (1) the Big 5/non—Big 5 dichotomy has been
used extensively in prior research as a proxy for audit size and quality (e.g.
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Raffournier, 1995); (2) it is widely used and accepted in Cyprus as a proxy for audit
size and quality40 , it was reasonable to categorise Cypriot audit firms into large and
small on the basis of that dichotomy. In the case of Greece, however, the
hypothesised relationship required the classification of audit firms on the basis of firm
origin rather than of firm size. Thus, Greek audit firms were classified into SELE firms
and indigenous firms (comprising SOL SA and ex—SOL firms).
As in the case of listing status, auditor type was measured on a categorical (nominal)
scale and dummy variables were required. The variable was scored one if a Cypriot
company was audited by a Big 5 audit firm and zero if otherwise. In the case of
Greece, the auditor variable was scored one if the company was audited by a SELE
member and zero if otherwise.
40 As indicated by most of the practitioners and academics interviewed.
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6.5	 DATA QUALITY
6.5.1	 Introduction
The quality of data used in this disclosure study depends on the measuring
instruments used to extract it from the CAFSs. Sekaran (1992) proposes that two
main criteria for testing the goodness of measures are reliability and validity. Validity is
concerned with whether the right thing is being measured, whereas reliability is
concerned with the accuracy in measurement [that is, how well the concept under
investigation is being measured (Sekaran, 1992)]. Sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 consider
the reliability and validity of the measuring instruments used to score the Cypriot and
Greek CAFSs.
6.5.2	 Reliability of the Measuring Instruments
Sekaran (1992) points out that the reliability of the measuring instrument41 is
concerned with the precision of measurement and indicates the stability and
consistency with which the concept is being measured. Stability refers to the ability of
the measuring instrument to stably measure the concept of interest no matter when it
is measured, the testing condition and the state of the respondents themselves.
Consistency, on the other hand, is indicative of the homogeneity of the items in the
measure that tap the construct (that is, how the items hang well together as a set). In
the context of this study, reliability refers to the degree of precision in the disclosure
scores when the sample CAFSs are scored by different scorers.
The main threats to reliability of the index scores derive from the possibility of an
incorrect application of the scoring instrument and the existence of subjectivity in the
41 Marston and Shrives (1991) note that the issue of index reliability in disclosure studies is not a major
problem as in behavioural sciences because the subjects of investigation (the CAFSs) are constant over
time and an important obstacle to repetition is overcome.
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scoring procedure. Owusu—Ansah (1998) points out that in disclosure studies the
practice has been the use of correlation analysis in assessing the reliability of the
constructed measuring instruments. Following Owusu—Ansah (1998), the reliability of
the measuring instruments used in this study was measured by selecting randomly the
CAFSs of 15 Greek and 10 Cypriot companies (that were already scored by the
researcher) and asking another investigator 42 to score them.
TABLE 6.3:
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS ON THE
DISCLOSURE MEASURING INSTRUMENTS
I PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS I
CYPRUS GREECE
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
(n=10) (n=15)
ACTUAL SCORES
— Researcher 76.30 30.80 158.73 35.50
— Independent Investigator 76.10 31.67 158.07 35.75
MAXIMUM SCORES
— Researcher 88.50 30.95 179.47 40.35
— Independent Investigator 88.50 30.74 179.53 40.65
RELATIVE SCORES
— Researcher 85.12 5.58 88.58 2.31
— Independent Investigator 84.48 5.94 88.16 2.89
42 The investigator was Mr. Panicos Charalambous, a Chartered Certified Accountant with eight years
experience in public practice, as well as nine years experience in academia.
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Table 6.3 — continued
I PANEL B: CORRELATIONS I
ACTUAL SCORES MAXIMUM SCORES RELATIVE SCORES
Cyprus	 — Pearson test 0.999** 0.999** 0.917**
— Spearman test 0.997** 1.000** 0.867**
Greece	 — Pearson test 0.999** 0.999** 0.885**
— Spearman test 0.998** 0.998** 0.875**
** = correlation is significant at the 1 per cent level (2—tailed)
Several correlation tests were then performed on the independent investigator's and
the researcher's scores. The results, presented in Tables 8.4, indicate that the scores
are in substantial agreement. The means and standard deviations of the actual,
maximum and relative scores for both Cypriot and Greek companies are similar. The
Pearson correlation coefficients for the actual, maximum and relative scores of the
Cypriot companies are 0.999, 0.999 and 0.917, while the Spearman correlations are
0.997, 1.000 and 0.867 respectively. In the case of Greek companies, the Pearson
correlation coefficients for actual, maximum and relative scores are 0.999, 0.999 and
0.885 and the Spearman correlation coefficients 0.998, 0.998 and 0.875 respectively.
All the above correlations are significant at 1 per cent for two—tailed tests. Although it
is difficult to state at which correlation level the reliability of the measuring instrument is
considered to be satisfactory, Carmines and Zeller (1979) propose that as a general
rule correlations should not be below 0.80. Hence, the correlation levels reported in
Table 6.3 indicate substantial agreement in the disclosure scores and minimal
subjectivity in the scoring process. In addition, the reliability levels reported in the
study are higher than those reported in prior similar studies (e.g. Owusu—Ansah,
1998). Hence, it can be assumed that the measuring instruments are reliable.
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6.5.3	 Validity of the Measuring Instruments
Validity is concerned with whether the right thing is being measured. Sekaran (1992)
groups validity tests under three broad headings: construct validity, content validity
and criterion—related validity. Construct validity indicates whether the instrument taps
the concept of interest as theorised (Sekaran, 1992) and is assessed through
convergent and discriminant validity. The former is established when the scores
obtained by two different instruments measuring the same concept are highly
correlated and the latter is established when the scores of the variable of interest has a
low correlation with the score of another variable that is supposed to be unrelated to it
(Sekaran, 1992). Content validity, on the other hand, indicates whether the measure
adequately measures the concept of interest (Sekaran, 1992) and is usually
established when the items that are supposed to measure the concept are evaluated
by a group of expert judges to ensure that they do measure the concepts (Kidder and
Judd, 1986). Finally, criterion—related validity ". . . is at issue when the purpose is to
use an instrument to estimate some form of behaviour that is external to the measuring
instrument itself, the latter being referred to as the criterion" (Nunually, 1978, p.87;
cited in Owusu—Ansah, 1998). Owusu—Ansah (1998) notes that criterion—related
validity has been used extensively in psychology and education to analyse the validity
of certain types of tests and selection procedures but it has a rather limited use in
social sciences. This is because, in many cases, there are no criteria against which
the measure can be evaluated (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Thus, only construct and
content validity are relevant to this study.
The construct and content validity of the measuring instruments were assessed via a
three step process. First, the initial selection of mandatory information items and their
breakdown into sub—elements was made after reviewing the relevant disclosure
requirements and thoroughly inspecting the mandatory disclosure checklists of two
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audit firms in each country. The scoring instruments were then despatched to four
audit firms, requesting a review of the list to ensure that the items and their sub—
elements accurately capture the extent of mandatory disclosure. The comments of the
two responded firms were used to revise the scoring instruments 43, which were finally
discussed extensively with the thesis supervisors to conclude on their appropriateness
to measure what they purport to measure. It is, therefore, safe to assume that the
measuring instruments are valid for the purpose of measuring the extent of corporate
disclosure in Cyprus and Greece.
43 The disclosure checklists of KPMG and Ernst and Young in both Cyprus and Greece were used. The
scoring instruments designed were reviewed by Coopers and Lybrand (Cyprus), Price Waterhouse
(Cyprus), Coopers and Lybrand (Greece) and Deloitte and Touche (Greece). The kind assistance of Mr.
George Loizou, partner at Coopers and Lybrand (Cyprus), Mr. Christakis Santis, partner at Price
Waterhouse (Cyprus), Mr. Dino Michalatos, partner at Coopers and Lybrand (Greece) and Mrs. Dina
Karsas, principal manager at Deloitte and Touche (Greece) is gratefully acknowledged.
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6.6	 DATA ANALYSIS
6.6.1	 General
In trying to understand the influence of corporate characteristics on Cypriot and Greek
corporate disclosure, economic theory was used to specify a statistical model where
disclosure is a function of a number of explanatory variables and an error term. The
explanatory variables are the corporate characteristics that are assumed to influence
corporate disclosure (company size, profitability, listing status etc.). The error term
represents all those factors that affect disclosure and are not taken into account
explicitly (e.g. qualifications of a company's principal accounting officer, socio—cultural
variables etc.). The estimation of the parameters of the model and the testing of the
relevant economic theories were made using hypothesis testing.
In the hypothesis testing process, the sample results have been used to make
inferences about a wider hypothetical population of Cypriot public and Greek listed
companies in 1996. This wider hypothetical population comprises the disclosure
practices that could have occurred if the study could have been repeated under the
same conditions but where the unmeasured factors influencing the error term had
different values (for example, companies with the same corporate characteristics as
the sample companies which had their CAFSs prepared under the responsibility of a
different principal accounting officer"). It is to this hypothetical population that the
statistical inferences (standard errors, significant levels etc.) apply. The statistical
process was conducted using both bivariate and multivariate statistical analysis.
44 Cox and Wermuth (1996) point out that the empirical interpretation of the probability distribution is often
rather hypothetical. They note that "... the interpretation is that we imagine a population of values
produced by repeating the investigation under the same conditions; probability then refers to frequency in
that population, i.e. specifies what would happen in the long run. This motion and that of an underlying
parameter thus aim to capture aspects of the system under study that are free from the accidental
disturbances in the particular set of data under analysis" (p.13-14).
186
In addition to the above, Kish (1987) argues that a welcome and necessary use of
research data is to use the sample results beyond the originally designated target
population in order to make inferences about a wide variety of other inferential
populations which differ from the target in kind, time etc. Thus, with the appropriate
caution, an attempt has also been made to make theoretical (and not statistical)
inferences about Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure practices in general.
6.6.2	 Bivariate Statistical Analysis
6.6.2.1	 Introduction
Bivariate statistical methods examine the statistical relationship between two variables.
Siegel and CasteIlan (1988) note that although alternative and valid bivariate statistical
tests are available for a particular research hypothesis, it is necessary to employ some
rationale for choosing among them. In this study, the selection of a particular bivariate
statistical test to examine each hypothesised relationship was influenced by two
factors. First, the nature of the hypothesis under consideration influences the kind of
statistical test to use (that is, a test of difference or a test of association). Second, if
the assumptions of a parametric test are satisfied (that is, whether the variables have
been measured in at least an interval scale and the samples are drawn from
populations whose variances are homogeneous and whose distributions are normal),
then a relevant parametric test is preferred because it is more powerful (Siegel and
CasteIlan, 1988); otherwise a non—parametric test should be used. Nevertheless,
although the procedure mentioned above were followed in order to determine the
appropriateness of parametric or non—parametric tests, all hypotheses were tested
using both. The main reason for this strategy is the fact that the necessity of satisfying
certain conditions before a parametric test can be employed have been seriously
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questioned. For example, Lord (1953) suggests that parametric tests can also be
used with ordinal scale variables.
6.6.2.2 Selection of Bivariate Tests
Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4 require a test of association. Given that the variables are
measured on an interval scale, the parametric Pearson product — moment and the
non—parametric Spearman rank order correlation were used to assess the strength
and direction of association between the disclosure scores and the selected corporate
characteristics. The Pearson correlation assesses the linear correlation between each
pair of variables, while the Spearman correlation assesses their monotonic correlation.
Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 require a test of difference. Given that the variables tested
(disclosure scores) relate to unrelated samples and are measured in non—categorical
scale, the tests selected for Hypotheses 6 and 7 were the parametric t—test and the
non—parametric Wilcoxon—Mann—Whitney test for two unrelated samples. Hypothesis
5 was tested using the parametric ANOVA test and the non—parametric Kruskal— Wallis
one way analysis of variance by ranks test for three unrelated samples. The t—test
determined whether the means of the two groups (listed versus unlisted and Big 5
versus non—Big 5 audited companies) differ, by comparing their means with the
standard error of the difference in the means. In view of the fact that the method of
computing the standard error of the difference in means depends on whether the
variances of the two groups are equal or not, equality of variances was tested using
the Levene test. Depending on the results, the t—value for pooled or separate
variances was used. The Wilcoxon—Mann—Whitney test assessed the difference in
mean ranks between the unrelated samples, in order to determine whether they have
been drawn from the same population. It was preferred to the Kolmogorov—Smirnov
test because it is one of the most powerful of the non—parametric tests and evidence
seems to indicate that for large samples (more than 25) it is slightly more efficient
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(Siegel and CasteIlan, 1988). The parametric one way ANOVA and the non—
parametric Kruskal—Wallis tests were used to assess the means of the three industry
groups by comparing the between—groups estimated variance with the within—groups
estimated variance. Given that the assumption of equal variances is essential in an
ANOVA test (Gaito, 1980), the equality of variances of the three groups was tested
using the Levene test. In choosing among the non—parametric tests, the Kruskal-
Wallis was preferred to the extension of the median test, because it is more efficient as
it utilises more of the information in the observations; by converting scores into ranks,
rather than simply dichotomising them as above or below the median (Siegel and
CasteIlan, 1988). When the tests indicated that at least one of the groups was
different from at least one of the others, a multiple comparisons test was used to
determine where any differences lay. The Scheffe test was selected as it provides an
exact value for groups of unequal size and is more conservative, in the sense that the
probability of Type I error is less than the nominal significance level (Cramer, 1994).
However, the tests of association and difference outlined above have a main potential
drawback. Even though they may reveal a significant association or difference
between the variables, this does not necessarily imply causation. This is because of
the possibility that the statistical relationship between the variables is influenced by one
or more other interfering variables (for example, because of spurious correlation).
Similarly the absence of a significant association or difference does not signify that
there is no causal connection, because of the possibility that the relationship is
suppressed by the influence of one or more other interfering variables. This potential
problem was overcome when the relationship between corporate disclosure and the
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selected corporate characteristics was examined by a multivariate statistical
technique.45
6.6.3	 Multivariate Statistical Analysis
6.6.3.1	 Introduction
Bivariate statistical tests were used to analyse the data because it is common in
disclosure studies to commence the data exploration using those methods in order to
obtain a preliminary indication about the relationships between the variables under
investigation. However, multivariate methods were also used for two reasons. First,
some researchers opine that the use of bivariate analysis to study corporate
disclosure might be unsuitable, as disclosure is a phenomenon that depends on the
joint effect of many factors (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992). Hence, the use of
multivariate analysis constitutes a more appropriate method to assess the collective
influence of the selected corporate characteristics on corporate disclosure. Second,
multivariate analysis enables an examination of the relationship between corporate
disclosure (dependent variable) and each of the corporate characteristics (independent
variables), while simultaneously controlling for the effects of other independent
variables in the model. This helps avoid any spurious relationships between the
dependent and each of the independent variables that may be produced by a
confounding factor.
45 Although multiple regression does take account of some of the interfering variables (those that have
been measured), it does not take account of all possible interfering variables (those that have not been
measured). Hence, technically, the problem of interfering variables is only partially overcome. However,
the existence of other variables that may affect the dependent and independent variables is a general
problem encountered by all researchers. It was taken into account by: (1) the careful selection of the
potential explanatory variables; and (2), the careful interpretation of the results of the multivariate
statistical tests (especially as far as the ascription of causal connection between corporate disclosure and
some corporate characteristics is concerned). These issues are also discussed in Chapter 10 (limitations
of the study).
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To examine the statistical relationship between the corporate disclosure scores and the
selected corporate characteristics, a multiple regression model was developed for each
country. A model is defined as a representation of a set of relationships that aids in
understanding it, while its specification is the act of stating its propositions (Vogt,
1993). The regression model is specified as follows:
For Cypriot Companies:
= a + 11, assets, +112 sales, + /33 profit margini + fl4 ROCEi + 135 current ratiol + 116 conglomerate,+
117 manufacturing,+ 118 otheri + 119 listings+ hip audit, +
(possibly after logarithmic or other transformation of some of the variables)
	
(6.5)
where:
= disclosure score of the ith sample company
a = the intercept of Equation (6.5) to be estimated
111, /3 2, 11 3, 11 4, 5, g 6, 7, fi 8, /39 , 10= the coefficients of the explanatory variables (with the
possibility that some of these coefficients may turn out to be zero)
gi = random disturbance for the ith sample company.
For Greek Companies:
Y] = a + assets] + sales] + fl3 capitalisation] + age] + 115 profit margin] + 116 ROCE] + fl, current
ratioi + 118 conglomeratei + Amanufacturingi + /110 otheri + fill listingi + ig 12 auditi + gi
(possibly after logarithmic or other transformation of some of the variables) 	 (6.6)
where:
Vi = disclosure score of the jth sample company
a = the intercept of Equation (6.6) to be estimated
flz, 11 2, /1 3, /1 4, fl 5, /16, P, 8, /39, /310, 11 11, /312 the coefficients of the explanatory variables (with the
possibility that some of these coefficients may turn out to be zero)
ei = random disturbance for the jth sample company.
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The dependent variable is the relative disclosure score computed for each of the
sample companies. The intercept has been included in order to capture the average
effects (on corporate disclosure) of those variables excluded from the model, and is
assumed to be constant across all the sample companies. The independent variables
of the model are all those corporate attributes that have been identified as possible
explanatory variables of corporate disclosure. The disturbance term 46 represents the
net influence of those variables that may have an influence on corporate disclosure but
have not been measured statistically (e.g. socio—cultural factors).
Kennedy (1996) stresses that an appropriate methodology should be employed when
specifying an empirical model. Although the question as to which specification
methodology is superior is an unresolved issue, the specification methodology used in
this study is the Hendry's (or London School of Economics) approach to economic
modelling, which is known as "the general to simple" model building approach. It
begins with a model with several regressors and then testing is undertaken in order to
simplify this general specification and whittle the model down to contain only the
important variables. Then the model is subjected to several diagnostic tests and, if
needed, the model is respecified. Although this methodology has been developed to
deal mainly with time series data, its general principles equally apply to other contexts
(Ramanathan, 1995). It was preferred for two reasons. First, there is no theoretical or
other reason to suggest that a particular simple model is the correct one to explain the
variations in Cypriot corporate disclosure practices; hence, "testing up" has no
appealing preference in this case. Second, it has been used in similar disclosure
studies with satisfactory results (e.g. Owusu—Ansah, 1998).
46 Kennedy (1996) notes that the disturbance term is very important in econometrics. He points out that a
major distinction between economists and econometricians is the latter's concern with the disturbance
terms. This is because their nature determines the success of the econometric methods used to estimate
the parameters of a model.
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6.6.3.2	 Estimating the Parameters of the Regression Models
Although there are several methods to estimate the regression function, the
parameters of Equations (6.5) and (6.6) were estimated with the OLS procedure, This
estimation procedure was preferred for several reasons. First, its computational
procedure is fairly simple to understand and operate (Kennedy, 1996). Second, it has
been used in a wide range of economic relationship studies with satisfactory results
(Owusu—Ansah, 1998). Third, it is an essential component of most other econometric
techniques (Koutsoyiannis, 1977). Finally, under certain assumptions the OLS
procedure has some attractive statistical properties that have made it one of the most
powerful and popular regression estimating methods. Given the assumptions of the
classical linear regression model (CLRM), the least—squares estimators are the best
linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) of the true value of the parameters (Gujarati, 1995).
A
An estimator (13) is an unbiased estimator of the true (3), if the mean of its sampling
distribution is equal to (13) (that is, if we undertake repeated sampling an infinite
number of times, we would get the correct estimate on the average; Kennedy, 1996,
p.14). Also, the OLS estimators are a linear function of the observations on the
dependent variable. This property reduces the task of finding the efficient estimator to
mathematically manageable proportions since in many cases it is impossible to
determine which of all unbiased estimators has the smallest variance (Kennedy, 1996,
p.16). However, it is usually the case that whenever one unbiased estimator can be
found, a large number of other unbiased estimators exists. In this case, OLS gives the
linear unbiased estimator with the smallest variance. This is called the best linear
unbiased (or most efficient) estimator among all unbiased estimators.
However, in order for OLS estimators to have these desirable properties the regression
model must satisfy certain assumptions. First, the dependent variable must be a linear
function of a specific set of independent variables plus a disturbance (that is, the model
should be linear in parameters). Second, the expected value of the disturbances must
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be zero. Third, the disturbances must be spherical [that is, they must have uniform
variance (homoscedastic)] and must not be correlated with one another (have no
autocorrelation). Fourth, the observations on the independent variables must be
considered to be fixed in repeated sampling (that is, they must be non—stochastic)47.
Fifth, there must be no perfect linear relationship between the independent variables
(that is, there should be no perfect multicollinearity). A sixth assumption is usually
added that renders the CLRM a normal linear regression model. This is the
assumption that the disturbances are normally distributed. The addition of this
assumption makes an OLS estimate Minimum Variance Unbiased Estimator (MVUE),
in that it has minimum variance in the entire class of unbiased estimators, whether
linear or not. This property is desirable if one wants to carry out hypothesis testing and
draw influences about the true population values (Gujarati, 1995).
The second assumption required to be satisfied by the regression model (expected
value of disturbances should be zero) is more a matter of definition; for if the expected
value of the disturbance is not zero, then its value can be included in the constant
term. Thus, it is regarded as being satisfied. The problem of autocorrelation is not
considered to be a major threat to this study, because it is reasonable to assume that
the observations in the dependent variable are not ordered in a particular way.
Additionally, Gujarati (1995) states that autocorrelation is more common to time series
than cross—sectional data. Finally, the assumption that the regressors are distributed
independently of (or are uncorrelated with) the disturbances is often taken for granted
in the disclosure literature, as it is reasonable to assume that there is no two—way
influence among the disclosure scores and the explanatory variables. For the
remaining assumptions specific diagnostic tests were carried out on the regression
results.
47 In this study certain regressors (such as sales and assets) cannot be regarded as truly fixed, in the
sense that their values could have been different if this study was repeated under different conditions. In
such a case, Gujarati (1995) suggests that if we assume that the regressors, although random, are
distributed independently of (or at least are uncorrelated with) the disturbances, then for all practical
purposes we can continue to operate as if the regressors were non—stochastic.
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6.7	 SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the basic aspects of the research design and
methodology, with the exception of data analysis and interpretation which is
undertaken in the next two chapters. Particular emphasis has been placed on the
most important elements of data collection and measurement techniques. Data has
been collected by contacting all elements of the population by post. A combination of
follow up letters and telephone inquiries, as well as an analysis of the non—
respondents, led to the conclusion that the samples can be considered representative
of the targeted populations. Hence, by analysing the sample subjects, generalisations
to the population elements can be made. Adequate disclosure is measured using
Certs (1961) index methodology which is currently the most appropriate measurement
tool for disclosure studies. The selected corporate characteristics are measured by
operationalising their presumed indicants and assigning them suitable numerals to
facilitate their statistical analysis. In addition, appropriate tests have confirmed that the
measuring instruments used to measure the extent of corporate disclosure are valid
and reliable. Finally, an overview was given of the bivariate and multivariate techniques
that were used to analyse the financial disclose practices of the sample companies.
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CHAPTER 7
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE PRACTICES OF CYPRICT
COMPANIES: STATISTICAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS
7.1	 INTRODUCTION
The first three research questions, as posed in Chapter 1, were:
(1) What is the extent of mandatory information disclosure in the CAFSs of Cypriot
and Greek companies?
(2) Is there any association between the extent of mandatory disclosure by Cypriot
and Greek companies and each of a number of selected corporate
characteristics?
(3) Can the variations in the extent of corporate mandatory disclosure practices of
Cypriot and Greek companies be explained by the selected corporate
characteristics together?
Chapter 7 reports and discusses the statistical methods employed to address these
research questions relating to Cypriot companies. Research question one has been
addressed by measuring the extent of Cypriot corporate disclosure using the index
methodology. The testable hypotheses for research questions two and three have
been addressed using both bivariate and multivariate statistical methods.
196
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Section 7.2 reports and discusses the results of the statistical methods employed to
address research question one, that is, to examine the extensiveness of mandatory
information disclosure in the CAFSs of Cypriot companies. The extent of disclosure is
measured by a disclosure measuring instrument whose contents, development,
reliability and validity were discussed in Chapter 6. An attempt is also made to judge
the extensiveness of Cypriot corporate disclosure in the context of other mandatory
disclosure studies reported in the literature. In this respect, disclosure extensiveness
is not judged using a cut off disclosure score (above which disclosure is deemed to be
adequate and below which inadequate), but by comparing the disclosure scores of
Cypriot companies with the scores of other companies reported in previous mandatory
disclosure studies. However, this comparison should be treated with caution as the
comparisons are made with studies that: (1) examined companies operating in
different countries and, possibly, within different social, political, economic and
institutional environments; (2) have been carried out in different time periods; and (3),
are probably inconsistent with this study in terms of sample type, research method and
variables analysed. Nevertheless, this limitation and concern is inherent in any attempt
to compare the results of different disclosure studies. Such comparisons are
widespread in the literature when researchers evaluate the implications of their findings
(e.g. Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu—Ansah, 1998), or summarise the results of
previous studies (e.g. Marston and Shrives, 1995). Hence, provided such a
comparison is made with caution, it will give a useful insight into the Cypriot and Greek
corporate disclosure practices.
Table 7.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the relative disclosure scores and the
selected corporate characteristics of Cypriot companies. The table shows that the
range of the disclosure index varies from about 66 to 97 per cent with the mean
disclosure score being 84.7 per cent. The disclosure practices of the Cypriot sample
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TABLE 7.1:
CYPRUS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE RELATIVE DISCLOSURE
SCORES AND THE SELECTED CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS"
PANEL A: CONTINUOUS VARIABLES: UNTRANSFORMED DATA (n = 50)
VARIABLE CODE-NAME MEAN STD. DEVIATION MINIMUM MAXIMUM SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
Relative Score (%) RELAT 84.7 7.1 66.20 97.0 -0.4 -0.3
Assets (CYP m) ASSET 19.7 31.6 0.03 172.0 3.3 12.6
Sales (CYP m) SALES 9.7 20.8 0.01 124.5 4.0 19.2
Profit Margin (%) PRMAR -44.8 222.4 -1249.10 83.8 -4.4 19.8
Return on Capital
Employed (%) ROCE 1.2 7.9 -23.60 16.2 -1.2 1.9
Current Ratio
(times) CURRE 3.9 10.7 0.12 70.3 5.4 31.7
I PANEL B: CONTINUOUS VARIABLES: TRANSFORMED DATA (n = 50)
VARIABLE CODE-NAME MEAN STD. DEVIATION MINIMUM MAXIMUM SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
Natural Log of
Assets LGASS 1.8 1.9 -3.6 5.2 -0.8 0.7
Natural Log of
Sales LGSAL 0.5 2.2 -4.4 4.8 -0.5 -0.1
Natural Log of
Current Ratio LGCUR 0.3 1.2 -2.1 4.3 1.0 1.9
PANEL C: CATEGORICAL VARIABLES I
CATEGORY NUMBER OF
COMPANIES
PROPORTION OF
SAMPLE (%)
RELATIVE SCORES
MEAN STD. DEVIATION
INDUSTRY GROUP:
Conglomerates 7 14 93.1 2.9
Manufacturing 13 26 84.5 5.6
Others 30 60 82.8 7.0
All Companies 50 100 84.7 7.1
LISTING STATUS:
Listed 27 54 88.6 4.6
Unlisted 23 46 80.1 6.7
All Companies 50 100 84.7 7.1
AUDITOR TYPE:
Big 5 42 84 86.1 6.5
Non-Big 5 8 16 77.1 4.8
All Companies 50 100 84.7 7.1
48 All statistical tests and procedures reported in the thesis have been made using the statistical package
SPSS 10.1.
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companies, on the whole, appear to be extensive, as the minimum, maximum and
mean disclosure scores reported compare favourably with those reported in some prior
mandatory disclosure studies on both developed countries (e.g. Wallace et al., 1994)
and developing countries (e.g. Patton and Zelenka, 1997 and Owusu—Ansah, 1998).
For example, Wallace et al.'s (1994) study for Spanish companies reported (for the
relative disclosure scores) a minimum score of 29 per cent, a maximum score of 80
per cent and a mean disclosure score of 59.3 per cent. The corresponding scores
reported by Wallace and Naser (1995) for Hong Kong were 55 per cent, 87 per cent
and 73 per cent; by Patton and Zelenka (1997) for the Czech Republic were 34 per
cent, 80 per cent and 56 per cent; and by Owusu—Ansah (1998) for Zimbabwe were 63
per cent, 85 per cent and 74.4 per cent. Although this comparison should be treated
with caution (for the reasons stated earlier), it does indicate that Cypriot companies
disclose a reasonably high percentage of information items applicable to them.
The measures for skewness for some continuous variables suggest that their
distributions are skewed. Histograms of all continuous variables were inspected which
confirmed this suggestion. In order to reduce the skewness, the variables on assets,
sales and current ratio were transformed using the natural logarithmic conversion of
the original figures. Given that the standard methods of transformation (powers and
logs) apply to positive values, the data for profit margin and ROCE were kept in their
untransformed form. This is because they included some negative values and no
standard method of transformation could have given meaningful results. Because a
logarithmic transformation is monotonic, it changes the scale on which a variable is
measured (and hence can reduce the skewness of a data set), but does not change
the direction of the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable.
A visual inspection of the histograms after the transformations revealed that the
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skewness of the assets, sales and current ratio variables has been reduced." The
data for profit margin included three extreme negative values. The companies with
these scores had exceptionally negative profit margins because of a significant
downsizing in their operations that had resulted in insignificant sales for the year and
huge losses (due to fixed costs). When the negative values were removed from the
data set, the distribution of profit margin was not particularly skewed (skewness =
1.15). However, in view of the low number of observations it was decided to keep the
data for the three companies in the distribution.
One of the bivariate methods that was used to assess the strength of linear association
between the relative scores and the continuous independent variables was the
Pearson correlation (Section 7.3). As the Pearson correlation coefficient measures the
strength of the linear association between two variables, several scatterplots were
plotted in order to check the linearity of the relationships between each of the
continuous independent variables and the relative disclosure scores. The scatterplots
disclosed that the log transformations had not only reduced the skewness of assets,
sales and current ratio but had also made their relationships with the relative scores
more linear. This is evidenced by the fact that the transformations have made the
overall shape of the distribution of points more elliptical. The scatterplots also revealed
that the relationship of the relative scores with profit margin was not linear, while in
the case of relative scores with ROCE no clear relationship was evident (Figure 7.1).
As noted earlier the data sets for those variables included some negative values and
no method of transformation could have improved their skewness (or linearity). It was,
therefore, decided to keep the data for profit margin and ROCE in its original form.
49 A Shapiro—VVilks test showed that the data for the relative disclosure scores, log assets and log sales
conformed to a normal distribution. Test statistics and significance levels were: 0.969 and p=0.39 for the
relative scores, 0.948 and p=0.057 for log assets and 0.964 and p=0.280 for log sales.
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CYPRUS: SCATTERPLOTS OF RELATIVE SCORES WITH THE
CONTINUOUS EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
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7.3	 BIVARIATE STATISTICAL TESTS AND INTERPRETATION
7.3.1	 Introduction
Section 7.3 answers the second research question posed for Cypriot companies.
Specifically, it reports the results of the bivariate statistical methods employed to
investigate whether there is an association between the extent of disclosure by Cypriot
companies and each of a number of selected corporate characteristics. Section 7.3
also interprets the results in the context of the testable hypotheses in Chapter 5 for
research question two and compares the results of the study with some previous
disclosure studies.
7.3.2	 Company Size Hypothesis
The company size hypothesis states that:
HI:	 There is an association between a company's size and the extent of its
disclosure practice.
The appropriateness of a parametric test was evaluated by testing the normality and
homogeneity of variances assumptions. Normality was tested by running a regression
of the relative scores on each of log assets and log sales and inspecting the normal
p—p plots of the residuals. No significant departures from normality were found.
Additionally, a scatterplot of standardised residuals against the predicted values
revealed that the spread of the residuals does not change with an increase in the
predicted values, suggesting that the assumption of homogeneous variances is
reasonably safe. These findings suggest that a parametric test may be more
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appropriate. However, as pointed out earlier, the hypothesis was examined with both
the parametric Pearson and the non—parametric Spearman correlation tests.
The results of the correlation tests are reported in Table 7.2. The Pearson and
Spearman correlations are positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, suggesting
that the corporate disclosure practices of Cypriot companies are positively associated
with their size. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported and the results of the tests are
consistent with the propositions of disclosure, agency and political cost theories, that
large companies are more likely to disclose more extensive information. These results
are in agreement with previous findings reported in the literature such as Cerf (1961)
and Cooke (1989).
TABLE 7.2:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CYPRIOT CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AND SIZE
CORRELATIONS
PARAMETRIC TESTS NON—PARAMETRIC TESTS
Pearson
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Spearman
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Log Assets with
Relative Score 0.538* 0.000 0.604* 0.000
Log Sales with
Relative Score 0.432* 0.001 0.439* 0.001
* = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2—tailed).
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7.3.3 Company Profitability Hypothesis°
The company profitability hypothesis states that:
H3:	 There is an association between a company's profitability and the extent
of its disclosure practice.
Profitability was measured by ROCE and profit margin. A normal p—p plot and a
scatterplot of standardised residuals against the predicted values revealed that the
assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variances were reasonably safe for
ROCE. In the case of profit margin there was some evidence of heteroscedasticity.
Nevertheless, as in the case of company size, this hypothesis was examined with both
the Pearson and the Spearman correlation tests.
The results of both tests are reported in Table 7.3. The correlation coefficients are not
significant at the 5 per cent level and, thus, Hypothesis H3 is not supported. The result
suggests that profitability is not related to the corporate disclosure practices of
Cypriot companies. However, the presence of some outliers in the data set of profit
margin suggests that the actual relationship of relative scores with profit margin might
be different from the one reported because of the influence of those outliers. The
effect of the outliers was examined by removing them from the data set and re-
calculating the correlation coefficients. The correlations were still low and
insignificant. 51
 Hence, Hypothesis 3 is not supported and the result is not in line with
the predictions of agency, signalling and political cost theories, which can be used to
hypothesise either for a positive or a negative association between corporate
50 As explained in Chapter 6 there is no test of Hypothesis 2 for Cypriot companies because it was not
possible to measure the age of all Cypriot companies in the sample.
51 The Pearson correlation was 0.095 and p=0.527 while the Spearman correlation was 0.219 with
p=0.139.
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TABLE 7.3:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CYPRIOT CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AND PROFITABILITY
CORRELATIONS
PARAMETRIC TESTS NON—PARAMETRIC TESTS
Pearson_
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Spearman
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
ROCE with
Relative Score 0.255 0.074 0.269 0.059
Profit Margin with
Relative Score 0.070 0.628 0.249 0.082
profitability and disclosure. It should be noted that although the bivariate test reported
here revealed that ROCE is not significantly related to the extent of Cypriot corporate
disclosure, the multivariate analysis reported in Section 7.4.4 revealed that ROCE has
a significant positive influence. This conflicting result is discussed in Section 7.4.4.
The evidence reported in this section (that ROCE is not significantly related to the
extent of corporate disclosure) is not in line with the conclusions of Cerf (1961) and
Singhvi (1967), but is consistent with that of Wallace et al. (1994).
7.3.4	 Company Liquidity Hypothesis
The company liquidity hypothesis states that:
H4:	 There is an association between a company's liquidity and the extent of
its disclosure practice.
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Although a normal p—p plot showed that the assumption of normality was reasonably
safe, a scatterplot of standardised residuals against standardised predicted values
revealed a non—homogeneity in the variances. This result suggests that a non—
parametric test may be more appropriate. However, the hypothesis was also tested
using both the Pearson and the Spearman correlation tests.
Table 7.4 shows that both the Pearson and the Spearman correlation coefficients are
not significant. Hence, Hypothesis H4 is not supported and the result suggests that
there is no association between liquidity and disclosure. This result is not in line with
the predictions of either signalling theory, which hypothesises for a negative
relationship between liquidity and corporate disclosure, or with the capital need theory,
that hypothesises for a positive relationship. This result is not in line with that reported
by Wallace et al. (1994) but corroborates that of Belkaoui and Kahl (1978).
TABLE 7.4:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CYPRIOT CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AND LIQUIDITY
CORRELATIONS
PARAMETRIC TESTS NON—PARAMETRIC TESTS
Pearson_
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Spearman
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Log Current Ratio
with Relative Score -0.009 0.951 0.015 0.917
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7.3.5	 Industry—type Hypothesis
The industry—type hypothesis states that:
H5:	 The extent of a company's disclosure practice varies depending on the
industry to which it belongs (whether it is a manufacturing, conglomerate
or other).
The Shapiro—Wilks and the Levene's test confirmed that data sets of the three
industrial groups are drawn from the populations whose distributions are normal and
whose variances are equal. 52 Although this suggests that a parametric test might have
been more appropriate, the hypothesis was examined with both the parametric one
way ANOVA and the non—parametric Kruskal—Wallis tests.
The F statistic for the ANOVA test and the chi—square statistic for the Kruskal—Wallis
test are significant at the 1 per cent level. They suggest that there are significant
statistical differences in the mean disclosure practices of Cypriot companies in the
three industrial groups. Nevertheless, further analysis is necessary to localise the
differences among the group means. Kinnear and Gray (1996) argue that the question
of exactly how one should proceed to further analysis after the F test in ANOVA is not
a simple one. They suggest that different a priori and a posteriori tests can be
used to localise the differences. However, the use of any of these techniques
depends on whether the hypothesis being tested is directional or non—directional.
Given that Hypothesis 5 is non—directional, the a posteriori technique (Scheffe test)
was used. The Scheffe test was selected as it is more conservative, that is the
52 The Shapiro—Wilk statistic is 0.951 for conglomerates, 0.884 for manufacturing and 0.978 for others;
the respective significance levels are 0.742, 0.08 and 0.768. The Levene statistic is 2.4288 and
p=0.0990.
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TABLE 7.5:
RESULTS OF TESTS FOR EQUALITY OF MEANS OF CYPRIOT
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE PRACTICES BY INDUSTRY TYPE
	 A
I PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
	
1
Group Number of
Companies
Mean 'td.
Deviation
Std.
Error
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Conglomerates 7 93.1 2.89 1.09 90.4 95.8
Manufacturing 13 84.5 5.64 1.56 81.1 87.9
Others 30 82.8 6.99 1.28 80.2 85.4
Total 50 84.7 7.07 1.00 82.7 86.7
PANEL B: ONE WAY ANOVA TEST I
Source of
Variation
Sum of
Squares
Degrees of
Freedom
Mean
Squares
F
Statistic
Significance
(2—tailed)
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
_
599.961
1847.008
2446.969
2
47
49
299.980
39.298
7.633 0.001
I PANEL C: KRUSKAL—WALLIS TEST I
Group Number of
Companies
Mean Rank Chi—Square Degrees of
Freedom
Asymptotic
Significance
(2—tailed)
Conglomerates 7 44.21
Manufacturing 13 24.27
Others 30 21.67
Total 50 13.707 2 0.001
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probability of Type I error is less than the nominal significance level (Cramer, 1994).
The results, reported in Table 7.6, show that the mean scores of the conglomerate
group is significantly higher than that of the manufacturing and the other industrial
groups. Hence, there is evidence to support the proposition that industry —
specific factors, such as the complexity and nature of operations of the
conglomerate industry, usually lead companies in that industrial group to disclose
more detailed information. These results are consistent with those of Wallace and
Naser (1995), but not with those of Wallace (1987).
TABLE 7.6:
RESULTS OF SCHEFFE MULTIPLE COMPARISONS TEST
FOR THE CYPRIOT INDUSTRIAL GROUPS
First Group Second Group Mean Difference
Between Groups
Std.
Error
Significance
(2—tailed)
Conglomerates Manufacturing 8.5723* 2.939 0.020
Others 10.2767* 2.631 0.001
Manufacturing Conglomerates -8.5723* 2.939 0.020
Others 1.7044 2.082 0.717
Others Conglomerates -10.2767* 2.631 0.001
Manufacturing -1.7044 2.082 0.717
* = The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
7.3.6	 Listing Status Hypothesis
The listing status hypothesis states that:
H6(C): The extent of disclosure of a Cypriot listed company is greater than that of
an unlisted one.
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Although the Shapiro—Wilks and the Levene test confirmed the normality and
homogeneity of variances assumptione, both the parametric t and the non—
parametric Mann—Whitney U tests were used to examine this hypothesis.
Table 7.7 shows that the t statistic is significant, suggesting that the mean disclosure
indexes of listed companies is significantly higher than those of unlisted ones. This
result is also confirmed by the non—parametric Mann—Whitney U test. Hence,
Hypothesis H6(C) is supported and the result is consistent with the predictions of
agency, capital—need and disclosure costs theories, that listed companies will disclose
TABLE 7.7:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DISCLOSURE
PRACTICES OF CYPRIOT LISTED AND
UNLISTED COMPANIES
I PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS I
Group Number of
Companies
Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error of
Mean
Unlisted Companies
Listed Companies
23
27
80.1
88.6
6.73
4.64
1.40
0.89
PANEL B: T—TEST
Test t—value Degrees of
Freedom
Significance
(1—tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std.
Error of
Difference
Equality of Means -5.23 48 0.000 -8.459 1.617
53 The Shapiro—Wilks statistic is 0.9768 for the listed and 0.9776 for the unlisted group, with the
respective significance levels being 0.7766 and 0.8280. The Levene statistic is 2.7362 and p=0.1046.
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Table 7.7 — continued
I PANEL C: MANN—WHITNEY U TEST I
Group Number of
Companies
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks Z Statistic
Significance
(1—tailed)
Unlisted Companies
Listed Companies
23
27
16.17
33.44
372.00
903.00
-4.176 0.000
more extensively than unlisted companies (from among those information items that
are not unique only to listed companies). The results reported here are consistent with
those of Firth (1979) and Wallace et al. (1994), but not with those of Buzby (1972).
7.3.7	 Auditor—type Hypothesis
The auditor—type hypothesis states that:
H7(C): The extent of disclosure of a Cypriot Big 5 audited company is greater
than that of non—Big 5 audited one.
Even though the Levene test confirmed the homogeneity of variances assumption, the
Shapiro—Wilks test showed that the normality assumption cannot be maintained.54
This suggests that a non—parametric test might have been more appropriate.
However, the hypothesis was tested using both the parametric t and the non—
parametric Mann—Whitney tests.
64 The Shapiro—Wilks statistic is 0.9420 for the Big 5 audited and 0.7947 for the non—Big 5 audited
groups, with the respective significant levels being 0.0499 and 0.0325. The Levene statistic is
1.734 and p=0.194.
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Table 7.8 shows that, despite the non—normality of the data sets, the parametric and
the non—parametric tests give very similar results. The t—statistic is significant at the 1
per cent level, suggesting that the mean disclosure indexes of companies audited
by Big 5 firms is significantly higher than those audited by non—Big 5 firms. This
result is also confirmed by the non—parametric Mann—Whitney U test. Thus,
Hypothesis H7(C) is supported and the result lends support to the propositions derived
from the collateral aspect, agency and economic dependency theories, that companies
audited by Big 5 audit firms will disclose more extensively. The results are consistent
with those reported by Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) but not with those of Raffournier
(1995).
TABLE 7.8:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DISCLOSURE
PRACTICES OF CYPRIOT COMPANIES AUDITED BY BIG 5 AND
NON—BIG 5 AUDIT FIRMS
PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Group Number of
Companies
Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error of
Mean
Companies Audited
by Non—Big 5 Firms 8 77.13 4.81 1.70
Companies Audited
by Big 5 Firms 42 86.13 6.52 1.01
I PANEL B: T—TEST
Test t—value Degrees of
Freedom
Significance
(1—tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std.
Error of
Difference
Equality of Means -3.706 48 0.001 -9.000 2.4290
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Table 7.8 — continued
PANEL C: MANN—WHITNEY U TEST
Group Number of
Companies
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks Z Statistic
Significance
(1—tailed)
Companies Audited
by Non—Big 5 firms 8 10.00 80.00 -3.282 0.000
Companies Audited
by Big 5 Firms 42 28.45 1195.00
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7.4	 MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL TESTS AND INTERPRETATION
7.4.1	 Introduction
Section 7.4 answers the third research question posed for Cypriot companies.
Specifically, it reports the results of the multivariate statistical methods employed to
investigate whether the variations in the extent of corporate disclosure practices of
Cypriot companies can be explained by the selected corporate characteristics together.
This is done through the specification of a multivariate regression model that seeks to
explain the variations in the extensiveness of disclosure by the Cypriot sample
companies. Section 7.4 also interprets the results of the multivariate statistical tests
and evaluates the robustness of the regression model developed.
7.4.2
	 Correlations Between the Independent Variables
The parameters of the regression model developed in Section 7.4 were estimated
using the OLS procedure. In order, however, for OLS estimators to be best linear
unbiased estimators, certain assumptions must be satisfied. One of these
assumptions is that there must be no perfect linear relationship between the
independent variables (no multicollinearity). This assumption is examined in this
section.
A popular method for the detection of multicollinearity in regression analysis is the
existence of high pairwise correlations among the independent variables. A value of
about 0.80 (in absolute value) of one of the pairwise correlations indicates a potential
for a multicollinearity problem (Kennedy, 1996). In order to detect any multicollineary
problem, the Pearson product—moment correlation matrix between all pairs of the
independent variables was examined (Table 7.9). Although no pairwise correlation
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(among the independent variables) is higher than 0.80, Gujarati (1995) cautions that in
models involving more than two explanatory variables, the simple (zero—order)
correlation will not provide an infallible guide to the presence of multicollinearity. In
addition ". . . high zero—order correlations are a sufficient but not a necessary condition
for the existence of multicollinearity because it can exist, even though the zero order or
simple correlation are comparatively low (say less than 0,50)" (Gujarati, 1995, p.336).
For this reason, alternative techniques were used to investigate the severity of any
multicollinearity problem, (e.g. Variance Inflation Factor and Condition Index). The
results of those tests are reported in Sections 7.6.3 and 7.6.4.
7.4.3	 Predictor Selection Procedure
In a regression routine the number of potential equations increases with the number of
predictors. In order not to have to examine every possible regression equation, a
predictor selection procedure is usually followed. One procedure that has been used
extensively by previous researchers is the stepwise approach, where the independent
variables are added to (or taken away from) the equation one at a time, the order of
entry (or removal) being determined by statistical considerations (e.g. Cooke, 1989).
Wallace and Naser (1995) have cautioned that such statistical search strategies could
lead to an erroneous conclusion because they may exclude one or more variables with
offsetting effects. That is, where the two variables are positively (negatively) related
but their effects on the dependent variable have opposite (similar) signs. Instead, they
propose the hierarchical selection of variables based on the frequency with which they
have been found to be explanatory in previous studies. However, to be consistent with
the testing—down specification methodology followed in the study the main procedure
followed in this section is the backward stepwise regression. Under this method all
predictors are initially entered into the model and are then assessed for removal on the
basis of a specified criterion. As one variable is excluded, all other excluded variables
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are assessed for entry, again on the basis of a specified criterion. This procedure
continues until no more predictors are to be removed from, or entered into, the
equation. However, in order to determine whether the predictor selection procedure
had any impact on the selection of predictors, alternative procedures were also used.
7.4.4	 Results of Regression Procedures
A summary of the results of the backward stepwise regression is presented in Table
7.10. Initially (Model 1) all possible predictors are entered into the model. Then all
variables are assessed for removal if they are not significant at the 10 per cent level.
As one variable is removed, all excluded variables are assessed for entry if they are
significant at the 5 per cent level. The first variable to be excluded is one of the
company size measures used, log sales. Its removal increases the unstandardised B
coefficient of the other size variable (log assets) from 0.251 to 0.333 and has only a
minor impact on the unstandardised B coefficients of other variables. Additionally, its
removal has only a minor impact on R 2
 (decreasesfrom 0.659 to 0.658). This probably
indicates that the multiple correlation of log sales with log assets is high. The next
variables to be removed are profit margin and log current ratio, whose removal has
only a minor impact on R 2
 (decreases from 0.658 to 0.657). Similarly, their removal
does not result in a dramatic change in the unstandardised B coefficients of the
variables included in the model. In the final model (Model 8) the variables remaining
are ROCE, listing and conglomerates. This model has a fairly high explanatory power
as the adjusted R 2 indicates that almost 60 per cent of the variations in the Cypriot
corporate disclosure practices can be explained by three corporate characteristics (that
is, conglomerates, listing and ROCE 55). The coefficients of conglomerates and listing
55 Although adjusted R2 is the most popular method used to judge the adequacy of a regression model,
Gujarati (1995) cautions that its use is dangerous because some researchers play the game of
maximising adjusted R2 . He stresses that in regression analysis the objective of the researcher should not
be to obtain a high adjusted R2 per se, but to provide a logical or theoretical relevance of the explanatory
variables and draw statistical inferences about them. "If in this process he obtains a high adjusted R`,
well and good; on the other hand, if adjusted R 2 is low, it does not mean the model is necessarily bad"
(Gujarati, 1995, p.211).
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TABLE 7.10:
CYPRUS: RESULTS OF BACKWARD STEPWISE REGRESSION
(p values are for 2—tailed tests)
I PANEL A: MODEL SUMMARY' 
bc, d 
Model Variables R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error
of the
Estimate
Entered Removed
1 AUDIT
ROCE
LGCUR
OTHER
LIST!
PRMAR 0.812 0.659 0.582 4.5692 
CONGL
LGASS
LGSAL' f
2g LGSAL 0.811 0.658 0.592 4.5159
3h
4 '
PRMAR
LGCUR
0.811
0.811
0.658
0.657
0.601
0.609
4.4633
4.4162
6k
71
81
LGASS
OTHER
AUDIT
AUDITm
0.807
0.800
0.789
0.789
0.652
0.639
0.623
0.623
0.612
0.607
0.599
0.599
4.4005
4.4285
4.4772
4.4772
a. Dependent Variable: RELAT
b. Method: Enter
c. Method: Backward (Criterion: Probability of F—to—remove >=0.10).
d. Method: Stepwise (Criteria: Probability—of—F--to—enter < =0.05, Probability—of—F—to—remove >=0.10).
e. Independent Variables: (Constant), AUDIT, ROCE, LGCUR, OTHER, LIST', PRMAR, CONGL,
LGASS, LGSAL
f. All requested variables entered
g. Independent Variables: (Constant), AUDIT, ROCE, LGCUR, OTHER, LISTI, PRMAR, CONGL,
LGASS
h. Independent Variables: (Constant), AUDIT, ROCE, LGCUR, OTHER, LISTI, CONGL, LGASS
i. Independent Variables: (Constant), AUDIT, ROCE, OTHER, LISTI, CONGL, LGASS
j. Independent Variables: (Constant), AUDIT, ROCE, OTHER, LISTI, CONGL
k. Independent Variables: (Constant), AUDIT, ROCE, LISTI, CONGL
I. Independent Variables: (Constant), ROCE, LIST!, CONGL
m. Probability of —F—to remove = 0.10 limits reached
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Table 7.10 - continued
PANEL B: ANOVA I
Model Sum ofSquares
Degrees of
freedom
Mean
Square F Signific.
8	 Regression 1524.895 3 508.298 25.358 0.000
Residual 922.073 46 20.045
Total 2446.969 49
PANEL C: COEFFICIENTS I
Variables
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients t Signific
Collinearity
Statistics
B Std.Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 78.687 0.968 81.329 0.000
ROCE 0.183 0.083 0.204 2.211 0.032 0.964 1.038
LIST! 8.441 1.273 0.601 6.633 0.000" 0.997 1.003
CONGL 8.698 1.857 0.431 4.682 0.000 0.965 1.036
PANEL D: EXCLUDED VARIABLES I
Variables Beta In t Signific. Partial
Correlation
Collinearity Statistics
Toler. VIF MinimumTolerance
LGSAL 0.120 1.102 0.276 0.162 0.692 1.444 0.692
PRMAR -0.021 -0.195 0.846 -0.029 0.730 1.370 0.714
LGCUR -0.038 -0.412 0.682 -0.061 0.988 1.012 0.956
LGASS 0.144 1.282 0.206 0.188 0.640 1.563 0.640
OTHER -0.091 -0.862 0.393 -0.127 0.745 1.342 0.745
AUDIT 0.147 1.420 0.1631 0.207 0.749 1.334 0.749
I PANEL E: COLLINEARI7T DIAGNOSTICS
Mode Dimension Eigenvalue Condition	 Variance Proportions
Index
(Constant) ROCE LIST! CONGL
8 1 2.026 1.000 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.08
2 1.012 1.415 0.02 0.67 0.06 0.09
3 0.704 1.697 0.02 0.30 0.04 0.81
4 0.258 2.805 0.88 0.01 0.82 0.02
n Given that Hypotheses H6(C) and H7(C) (for the influence of listing status and auditor type on Cypriot
corporate disclosures respectively) are directional, the significant levels should be for an 1-tailed test. This
implies that the significant levels reported should be halved. If this is done the listing status variable is more
significant whilst the auditor type is still insignificant.
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are positive and highly significant, while that of ROCE is significant at the 3.2 per cent
level. When the regression was run using the forward stepwise regression approach
the results were identical. The listing variable explained 35 per cent of the variation in
the corporate disclosure practices of Cypriot companies. The next variable entered
into the regression was conglomerates (which increased adjusted R 2 to 0.565) and the
last variable entered was ROCE (raising adjusted R 2
 to 0.599). The results suggest
that Cypriot companies which are listed on the CSE, are classified as conglomerates or
are more profitable, disclose significantly more extensive mandatory information than
other companies.
The finding that Cypriot listed companies disclose more extensively than unlisted ones
supports a priori speculation, and corroborates with the results from previous research
(e.g. Wallace et al., 1994). It provides empirical evidence to support the arguments
stemming from agency, capital need and disclosure costs theories, which suggest that
listed companies may disclose more extensively than unlisted ones. The finding that
Cypriot conglomerate companies disclose more extensive information than companies
in other industry types is consistent with the results of Wallace and Naser (1995).
Also, it provides empirical evidence to support the argument that companies operating
in more than one business category will have more information to disclose, and will
actually disclose it, than those which do not. Finally, the result that Cypriot companies
with higher ROCE tend to provide more extensive information in their CAFSs is
consistent with the conclusions of Singhvi (1967). This result also lends support to the
predictions of agency, signalling and political cost theories that more profitable
companies are more likely to disclose more extensively than less profitable ones.
It is interesting to note that although the bivariate analysis revealed that ROCE is not
significantly related to the extent of Cypriot corporate disclosure (Section 7.3.3), the
multivariate analysis revealed otherwise. Hence, despite the absence of a significant
association there is still a connection between the two variables. This suggests that in
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the bivariate test their relationship might have been suppressed by the influence of one
or more other variables. In order to examine for this possibility, several scatterplots of
the relative disclosure scores with ROCE were inspected, setting markers by different
qualitative variables and fitting lines for each sub—group. The scatterplot of ROCE
with relative scores (setting markers by listing and fitting two lines for each of the listed
and unlisted groups) shows that the relationship between ROCE and disclosure scores
is influenced by a company's listing status (Figure 7.2). The partial correlation
between ROCE and relative scores, while controlling for the influence of listing, is
0.3553 and is significant at the 5 per cent level (p =0.012). This indicates that in the
calculation of the zero order correlation coefficient a significant relationship between
the ROCE and relative scores has been suppressed by the influence of listing. This
means that when both listed and unlisted companies are considered together (and
without differentiating between the two groups), their disclosure scores do not
associate significantly with their ROCE. However, when each of the listed and listed
groups are considered independently, their disclosure scores do associate significantly
with their ROCE.
In order to examine whether alternative selection procedures would have an effect on
the conclusions of the backward stepwise and the stepwise procedures, several
alternative regression models were run. For example, alternative combinations of
variables were examined, dropping in each case some of the highly—correlated
variables. The results of those regressions were similar to those of the backward
stepwise and the stepwise procedure. Finally, in order to assess the impact of the
three data sets with the extreme negative profit margin observations (referred in
Section 7.3.3) the regressions were re—run excluding the extreme observations. The
results were similar to the regression with all fifty observations and, as such, they are
not reported in the study.
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7.5	 ASSESSING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE REGRESSION MODEL
7.5.1	 Economic a priori Criteria
Koutsoyiannis (1977) states that three different criteria can be used to assess the
robustness of a model's estimates: economic, statistical and econometric criteria. The
economic a priori criteria assess a model's robustness on the principles of economic
theory and the prior assumptions underlying the hypothesised relationships between
the dependent and the independent variables. The use of economic theory to assess
a model's estimates is also of crucial importance if one wishes to ascribe causal
connection between the dependent and the independent variables. This is because
regression analysis does not necessarily imply causation. Kendall and Stuart (1961,
p.279) caution that ". . . a statistical relationship, however strong and however
suggestive, can never establish causal connection: our ideas of causation must come
from outside statistics, ultimately from some theory or other". In this context, Gujarati
(1995) stresses that to ascribe causality, one must appeal to a priori or theoretical
considerations.
On the basis of economic criteria, the model developed for Cypriot companies is
consistent with the predictions relating to listing status, industry type and ROCE. If
listing on the CSE implies more shareholders and higher agency costs, then listed
companies may disclose more extensive information in their annual reports in an
attempt to reduce those costs. Similarly a listed company, being under more detailed
scrutinisation by investors and analysts than an unlisted one, may disclose more
extensively in an attempt to avoid attacks and criticisms for non—disclosure that are
more likely to be brought to light by the detailed scrutinisation process. The results are
also consistent with the capital need theory, in that listed companies, which are
dependent on the market for their capital needs, may disclose more extensively in
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order to lower their systematic risk and decrease their cost of capital. The result that
conglomerates companies provide more detailed information than companies in other
industry groups is consistent with the industry—specific factors proposition, that the
complexity and nature of operations in specific industries (such as conglomerates)
makes the disclosure of more detailed information by those companies essential, if that
information is to be useful for decision making.
The positive effect of profitability on corporate disclosure is consistent with agency
theory, which can be used to predict that managers of profitable companies will
disclose more extensive information (than managers of less profitable companies) in
order to show and explain to shareholders that they are acting in their best interests
and justify their compensation packages. It is also in line with signalling theory which
predicts that more profitable companies may be encouraged to disclose more
extensively because failure to signal good news may be interpreted as bad news.
Finally the positive effect of profitability on corporate disclosure is consistent with the
political cost theory, which argues that more profitable companies may disclose more
information in order to justify the level of their profits and counter potential government
actions.
On the other hand, even though the bivariate analyses have shown that the effect of
company size on corporate disclosure is significantly positive, the multivariate analysis
did not find this influence to be significant. This is probably because the variables
included in the model (listing and profitability) have captured most of the effect of the
influences that are also captured by company size. For example, in the development
of the research hypotheses, company size has been used as a proxy for disclosure,
agency and political costs. These costs, however, have also been represented by the
listing status and profitability variables. It may, therefore, be possible that listing status
and profitability have captured most of the effect of those costs and have rendered the
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additional explanatory power of the size variable insignificant. 56 In order to remove the
effect of the variables included in the final model (listing status, profitability and
industry—type variables) the partial correlation coefficient of log assets and log sales
with relative scores (controlling for the effects of listing, ROCE and conglomerates)
was calculated: the correlation coefficient of relative scores with both log asset and log
sales becomes insignificant (though remains positive57).
The insignificance of liquidity, although inconsistent with the prediction of signalling
and capital need theories, is in line with the findings of most empirical research (e.g.
Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978). In the case of auditor type, although its influence on
corporate disclosure is significantly positive when bivariate tests are used, this
influence disappears when the effect of auditor type on corporate disclosure is
examined simultaneously with other variables. This may be due to the possibility that
the influence of auditor type has been captured by the listing status variable included in
the model (all listed companies were audited by Big 5 auditors).
7.5.2	 Statistical Criteria
Koutsoyiannis (1977) notes that the most commonly used statistical criteria to evaluate
the reliability of the estimates of a model's parameters are: (1) the standard error of
the estimate of the regression line; and (2) the adjusted R 2 of the model. The
standard error of the estimate of the regression line measures the spread of the points
about the regression line and is often used as a measure of the "goodness of fit" of the
estimated regression line. The adjusted R 2 gives an estimate of how much of the
56 Ball and Foster (1982) note that as size has been used as a proxy for many influences, its meaning
cannot be clearly stated.
57 The correlation coefficient of relative scores with log assets was 0.1877 with the p value being 0.206;
the respective values for log sales were 0.1621 and 0.276.
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variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. In the
case of the model for the Cypriot companies the standard error of the estimate of the
regression line (4.48) is relatively low when compared to those reported in other
studies. 58 This indicates that the disclosure of Cypriot companies is more predictable
than those reported in some other studies. Additionally, the adjusted R 2 of the model
for Cypriot Companies is almost 60 per cent indicating that the model has a reasonably
high explanatory power, similar to that reported in some other studies.58
In an attempt to determine whether the explanatory power of the model can be
improved, other variables found to be explanatory of corporate disclosure in other
countries were incorporated in the model (e.g. gearing ratio and dividend ratio).
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the model could not be increased. This
suggests that there might be other variables, such as ownership dispersion and
ethnicity of management, that influence the disclosure practices of Cypriot companies.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to test for the effects of those variables due to the
lack of relevant data.
7.5.3	 Econometric Criteria
Econometric criteria seek to ascertain whether the assumptions of the estimation
technique employed are satisfied by the estimated model. As the OLS method has
been used, the robustness of the developed model can be assessed by testing the
validity of the OLS assumptions.
55 For example, Khasharmeh's (1995) study of the disclosure practices of Jordanian companies reported
a standard error of 5.888 while Cooke's (1989) study of the disclosure practices of Swedish companies
reported a standard error of 7.300.
59 For example, the adjusted R2 reported by Khasharmeh (1995) and Cooke (1989) were 22.07 and 62.93
respectively.
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The first assumption to be tested is the absence of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity
exists when there is a high linear relationship between the independent variables. In
the presence of multicollinearity between two or more independent variables, it is
difficult (if not impossible) to determine their separate effects on the dependent
variable (Vogt, 1993). Gujarati (1995) points out that if the sole purpose of regression
analysis is prediction, then multicollinearity is not a serious problem. If, however, the
purpose of regression analysis is not only prediction but also hypothesis testing then
multicollinearity will be a problem. This is because multicollinearity leads to large
standard errors of the estimators and the population values of the coefficients cannot
be estimated precisely. However, Learner (1983, p.300-1) stresses that ". . . that
many of our explanatory variables are highly collinear is a fact of life". Hence, the
issue is not whether multicollinearity exists or not, but the extent to which its presence
is likely to cause major problems in hypothesis testing. Although an evaluation on the
basis of a correlation matrix has indicated that the potential for multicollinearity is not
severe (Section 7.6), two alternative approaches have also been used. The first was
the use of the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The VIF is a widely used method of
detecting the presence of multicollinearity. It shows how the variance of an estimator
is inflated by the presence of multicollinearity and the higher the VIF the higher the
extent of collinearity. Gujarati (1995) suggests that if the VIF of a variable exceeds 10,
that variable is highly collinear. It can be seen from the collinearity statistics of Table
7.11 that the VIFs of all variables included in the model are less than 10. Hence, in the
developed model for Cypriot companies there is no severe multicollinearity problem.
Another method for detecting the presence of multicollinearity is the Condition Index
(CI). Kennedy (1996) suggests that a CI greater than 30 indicates strong collinearity.
Table 7.11 shows that the Cl's of all dimensions are below 30. It can, therefore, be
concluded that in the case of the Cypriot model multicollinearity is not a major problem.
The second assumption of OLS to be tested is that of homoscedasticity.
Homoscedasticity exists when the disturbances of the model are spherical (they have
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2uniform variance). In the absence of homoscedasticity (and the presence of
heteroscedasticity) internal estimation and hypothesis testing using the OLS estimators
can no longer be trusted (Kennedy, 1996). This assumption was examined using a
graphical method as suggested by Gujarati (1995). A visual inspection of the
scatterplot of standardised residuals against standardised predicted values (Figure
7.3) shows that the spread of the residuals doPs not change with the predicted values,
suggesting the absence of heteroscedasticity.
FIGURE 7.3:
CYPRIOT MODEL: SCATTERPLOT OF STANDARDISED RESIDUALS
AGAINST STANDARDISED PREDICTED VALUES
a)
m
al
>
a)
.15
3
X x x
-o 2. X
112
CL
73
a)U)
f..'
a3
-0E
ai
.....
-I	 .
0
X
X xxx
x x
X	 x
X
X
x	 x
x<	 X	 x	 x )Z( 	x
X
x
x
X
X
C
o
.(7)
U)
f.12
o)
a)cr
-1
-2
x
X x
X x
x x
x
x x
X
X x xx x X
X
Ac
-3	 -2	 -.1	 o	 1
Regression Standardised Residual
The third assumption to be tested is that of normality in the distribution of the
disturbances of the regression model. Without this assumption we can still use the
OLS procedure for point estimation (that is, estimate the sample regression function).
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However, Gujarati (1995) points out that if our interest is not just point estimation but
also hypothesis testing (that is, use of the sample regression function to draw
inferences about the true population regression function) then we need to specify the
probability distribution of the disturbances. With the normality assumption one can use
the usual test procedures (the t and F tests) to test various statistical hypotheses
regardless of the sample size (Gujarati, 1995). Kinnear and Gray (1996) point out that
this assumption is fulfilled if the distribution of standardised residuals is normal. A
normal p—p plot of standardised residuals (Figure 7.4) suggests that the disturbances
are fairly normally distributed as the data points cluster around the diagonal line.
Additionally, a Kolmogorov—Smirnov test for normality reveals that the standardised
residuals have no significant departure from normality (z statistic is 0.581 and
p=0.889).
FIGURE 7.4:
CYPRIOT MODEL: NORMAL P—P PLOT OF THE STANDARDISED
RESIDUALS
Observed Cumulative Probability
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The last assumption to be examined is that of linearity in the parameters of the model.
If the dependent variable is not a linear function of the set of independent variables
and the disturbance term, then the standard OLS procedure cannot be used and must
be revised to handle a non—linear functional form (Kennedy, 1996). Kinnear and Gray
(1996) propose that a scatterplot of standardised residuals against standardised
predicted values can provide useful information not only about the homogeneity of
variance but about linearity as well. The scatterplot of standardised residuals against
standardised predicted values (Figure 7.3) shows no discernible patterns, thereby
confirming the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity.
Additionally, Gujarati (1995) points out that a model's residuals can also be examined,
especially in cross—sectional data, to detect model specification errors, such as
omission of an important variable or incorrect functional form. In case of such errors a
plot of the residuals will exhibit distinct patterns. The absence of any noticeable
patterns in the plot of the residuals (Figure 7.3) indicates that there are no major
specification errors.
7.5.4	 Testing for Interaction Effects
An interaction between two predictor variables means that the effect of one of them on
the dependent variable depends on the level of the other. Gujarati (1995) stresses the
importance of testing for interactions between the predictor variables, because an
omission of a significant interaction term incorrectly will lead to a specification bias. In
order to investigate the possibility of interactions between the predictor variables,
several scatterplots of the relative scores with each independent variable were plotted,
setting markers by different qualitative variables and fitting straight lines for each sub-
group. A peculiar relationship is shown by one of the scatterplots. Figure 7.5 shows
that the relationship between the corporate disclosure scores and the current ratios of
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CYPRUS: SCATTERPLOT OF CURRENT RATIO WITH
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(fitting different regression lines for the listed and unlisted groups)
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the sample companies is affected by their listing status. This is evidenced by the fact
that in the case of listed companies (marked with a cross) their disclosure scores are
positively related with current ratios, as the fitted regression line is upward sloping;
whilst in the case of unlisted companies (marked with a dot) their disclosure scores
are negatively related with current ratio, as the fitted regression line is downwards
sloping.
It was decided to test for the effect of this interaction. Retherford and Choe (1993)
propose that when we do not know the precise mathematical form of the interaction,
we must choose as simple a form as possible. They state that the usual way of
specifying an interaction between I and E is to add a multiplicative (I times E) term to
the model. Thus, a new variable (log current ratio times listing) was created and
another regression was run using the backward stepwise procedure used in the
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original model. The new model had a greater explanatory power (adjusted R 2 = 0.654)
than the original model. Furthermore, in addition to the variables included in the
original model (conglomerates, listing and ROCE), it also incorporated log current ratio
and the interaction of log current ratio with listing (Table 7.11). The result suggests
that the relationship of a company's disclosure with its current ratio depends on
whether the company is listed or not. The disclosure scores of unlisted companies are
negatively related to their current ratio as the coefficient of log current ratio (-2.540) is
significant. In contrast, the disclosure scores of listed companies are positively related
to their current ratio, as the coefficient of the interaction log current ratio times listing
TABLE 7.11:
CYPRUS: RESULTS OF BACKWARD STEPWISE REGRESSION
INCLUDING THE INTERACTION EFFECT
(p values are for 2-tailed tests)
MODEL SUMMARY
Variables R R Square Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error
of the
Estimate
ROCE
LISTI
LGCUR
CONGL
LGCUR.LISTI
0.830 0.690 0.654 4.1545
I COEFFICIENTS I
Variables Unstandardised
Coefficient Standardised
Coefficient
t Signific. Collinearity
Statistics
B Std Beta Tolerance VIF
Error
(Constant) 79.407 0.933 85.153 0.000
CONGL 8.114 1.745 0.402 4.649 0.000 0.941 1.063
LGCURxLISTI 3.324 1.095 0.493 3.037 0.004 0.268 3.737
LISTI 7.528 1.218 0.536 6.178 0.000 0.936 1.068
LGCUR -2.540 0.905 -0.443 -2.805 0.007 0.283 3.532
ROCE 0.237 0.079 0.264 2.994 0.005 0.906 1.104
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(3.324) is significant, making the coefficient of log current ratio for listed companies
equal to -2.540 + 3.324 = 0.784. It was decided to investigate whether the interaction
might have been caused by the peculiarities of the sample. A scatterplot of current
ratio against relative scores indicated that the data set for current ratio included two
companies whose current ratios were 70.30:1 and 28.90:1. The first was a property
company that had an abnormally high amount of work in progress reported in its
current assets due to uncompleted contracts (its work in progress was eight times
higher than its sales). The second was a holding company which had an abnormal
amount of cash and debtors (almost five times its sales). The data for these two
companies were removed and a new regression was run to re—examine for the effect
of the interaction. The new model excluded the log current variable as well as the
interaction effect. The variables entered into the model were those of the original
model (conglomerates, listing and ROCE). Furthermore, the model had similar
explanatory power to the original model and the coefficients of the included variables
were similar. The above procedure confirmed that it was the presence of the two
outliers that made the interaction effect significant. Given the abnormality in the
liquidity position of those two companies it was decided not to include the interaction
effect in the final model.
The above procedure has pinpointed that the investigation of interaction effects is a
very important issue in disclosure studies involving the use of multivariate statistical
methods. This is because a failure to investigate and test for such interactions, runs
the danger of omitting a significant interaction term incorrectly, thereby leading to a
specification bias.
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7.6	 SUMMARY
This chapter answered the first, second and third research questions posed for Cypriot
companies. Section 7.2 presented and discussed the descriptive statistics of the
Cypriot relative corporate disclosure scores which aimed to measure disclosure
extensiveness by Cypriot companies. The disclosure practices of the Cypriot sample
companies, on the whole, appear to be extensive, as the minimum, maximum and
mean disclosure scores reported compare favourably with those reported in previous
mandatory disclosure studies. Section 7.3 presented and interpreted the results of the
various bivariate and multivariate statistical tests performed on the second and third
research questions posed for Cypriot companies. The results of the various bivariate
statistical tests performed provided evidence that there is a significant association
between the extent of disclosure by Cypriot companies and company size, industry
type, listing status and auditor type. A multivariate regression model was specified that
sought to investigate whether the variations in the extent of disclosure practices by the
Cypriot sample companies could be explained by the selected corporate
characteristics together. The bottom—up specification methodology has been used,
starting with a general specification and testing it down for simplification. The
parameters of the regression model were estimated using the OLS procedure which,
under certain conditions, has some attractive statistical properties. The robustness of
the regression model was assessed using economic, statistical and econometric
criteria. It was found that the model was reasonably well specified and that there were
no serious violations of the OLS assumptions. Based on the regression model
reported in this chapter, which has an adjusted R 2 of 60 per cent and a standard error
of the estimate of 4.48, the fitted equation of the disclosure index for Cypriot
companies is:
A
Yi = 78.687 + 0.183 ROCE,+ 8.698 Conglomerate, + 8.441 Listing,
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where:
A
Yi = the estimate of the true disclosure score that the ith sample company will earn
under the 1996 disclosure regulatory regime in Cyprus.
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that the variations in the extent of corporate
mandatory disclosure practices of Cypriot companies is explained by the intercept and
a company's profitability, industry type and listing. A detailed discussion and
comparison of these results with those found for Greek companies is provided in
Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 8
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE PRACTICES OF GREEK
COMPANIES: STATISTICAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS
8.1	 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 8 answers the first, second and third research questions posed for Greek
companies. It reports and discusses the statistical methods employed to address
research question one and the testable hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 for
research questions two and three. The statistical tests and procedures employed in
this chapter are essentially the same as those used for Cypriot companies in Chapter
7. As the selection of those tests has already been justified, only the results of the
tests and their interpretations are reported here.
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8.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Section 8.2 reports and discusses the results of the statistical methods employed to
address research question one, that is, to examine the extensiveness of mandatory
information disclosure in the CAFSs of Greek companies. The extent of disclosure by
the Greek sample companies is measured by a disclosure measuring instrument
whose contents, development, reliability and validity were discussed in Chapter 6. As
in the case of Cypriot companies (Chapter 7), an attempt is also made to judge the
extensiveness of Greek corporate disclosure in the context of other mandatory
disclosure studies. This is done by comparing the disclosure scores of the Greek
sample companies with the disclosure scores of other companies reported in previous
mandatory disclosures studies.
Table 8.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the relative disclosure scores and the
selected corporate characteristics of Greek companies. The range of disclosure index
varies from about 83 to 93 per cent with the mean disclosure index being 88.8 per
cent. The disclosure practices of the Greek sample companies, on the whole, appear
to be extensive, as the minimum, maximum and mean disclosure scores reported
compare very favourably with those reported in Chapter 7 for Cypriot companies as
well as to those reported in some prior studies on both developed and developing
countries (e.g. Wallace et al., 1994, Wallace and Naser, 1995, Patton and Zelenka,
1997 and Owusu—Ansah, 1998). It is noticeable that the standard deviation of the
index is very small when compared to that found for Cypriot companies (2.3% versus
7.1%). This indicates that the variability in the disclosure practices of Greek
companies is less than those of Cypriot companies. This is probably because of the
stringent disclosure regulations in Greece. Greek law sets out the disclosure
requirements in a great extent of detail and effectively acts as a disclosure checklist
which companies have to go through. In contrast, in Cyprus the main source of
disclosure requirements are the IASs, which do not have the backing of the Cypriot
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Companies Act 1951 and, in many cases, it is the accountant who determines the
extent of detail to be disclosed about a particular item.
TABLE 8.1:
GREECE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE RELATIVE DISCLOSURE
SCORES AND THE SELECTED CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS
PANEL A: CONTINUOUS VARIABLES: UNTRANSFORMED DATA (n = 74) I
VARIABLE CODE-NAME MEAN STD. DEVIATION MINIMUM MAXIMUM SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
Relative Score (%) RELAT 88.8 2.3 83.3 92.8 -0.2 -0.6
Age (years) AGE 36.2 25.0 4 116 1.2 1.1
Assets (GRD m) ASSET 22,248 30,910 627 147,527 2.5 5.8
Capitalisation
(GRD m) CAP1T 21,519 55,526 696 432,008 6.0 42.1
Sales (GRD m) SALES 21,460 32,148 14.9 143,191 2.5 5.8
Profit Margin (%) PRMAR 9.6 32.7 -231.5 58.5 -5.8 41.4
Return on Capital
Employed CYO
ROCE 16.2 13.5 -17.2 53.0 0.3 0.6
Current Ratio
(times) CURRE 2.2 2.4 0.5 17.7 4.4 24.9
I PANEL B: CONTINUOUS VARIABLES: TRANSFORMED DATA (n = 74) I
VARIABLE CODE-NAME MEAN STD. DEVIATION MINIMUM MAXIMUM SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
Natural Log of
Age LGAGE 3.3 0.8 1.4 4.8 -0.5 -0.1
Natural Log of
Assets LGASS 9.3 1.2 6.4 11.9 0.2 -0.3
Natural Log of
Capitalisation LGCAP 9.0 1.2 6.6 13.0 0.8 1.0
Natural Log of
Sales LGSAL 9.1 1.6 2.7 11.9 -1.2 3.2
Natural Log of
Current Ratio LGCUR 0.5 0.7 -0.7 2.9 1.0 1.7
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Table 8.1 — continued
I PANEL C: CATEGORICAL VARIABLES I
C ATEGORY NUMBER OFCOMPANIES
PROPORTION OF
SAMPLE (%)
RELATIVE SCORES
MEAN STD. DEVIATION
INDUSTRY GROUP:
Conglomerates 14 19 90.4 1.9
Manufacturing 31 42 89.4 2.0
Others 29 39
All Companies 74 100 87.4 2.0
LISTING STATUS:
Main Market 62 84 89.2 2.1
Parallel Market 12 16 86.8 2.0
All Companies 74 100 88.8 2.3
AUDITOR TYPE:
SELE firms 22 30 88.8 2.6
Non—SELE firms 52 70 88.8 2.1
All Companies 74 100 88.8 2.3
The measures for skewness for some continuous variables (e.g. sales and assets)
suggest that their distributions are skewed. In order to check the skewness of the
distributions the histograms for all continuous variables were inspected, which
confirmed that the variables on assets, sales, capitalisation, current ratio, age, profit
margin and ROCE were skewed. To reduce the effects of skewness, the variables
without negative values (all continuous explanatory variables except profit margin and
ROCE) were transformed using the natural logarithmic conversion of the original
figures. A visual inspection of the histograms after the transformations revealed that
the skewness of all variables have been reduced.° The data for profit margin
included one extreme negative value corresponding to a company with virtually no
operations during the year. When this value was removed the skewness of the
distribution improved substantially (skewness = 1.65). In view of the low number of
observations it was decided to keep the data of the extreme observation in the
distribution. Furthermore, the data sets for profit margin and ROCE were kept in their
60 A Kolnnogorov—Smirnov test showed that the data for the relative disclosure scores, ROCE, log age, log
asset and log capitalisation conformed to a normal distribution.
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untransformed form as they included negative values and no standard method of
transformation could have given meaningful results.
Several scatterplots were inspected in order to check the linearity of the data
sets for the continuous variables. With the exception of profit margin, all scatterplots
revealed that the relationship of the continuoJs explanatory variables with the relative
scores did not exhibit significant patterns of non—linearity (Figure 8.1). The scatterplot
of profit margin indicates a pattern of non—linearity. This implies that in measuring the
association between profit margin and the corporate disclosure scores the Pearson
correlation (which measures the strength of linear association between two variables)
may not be an appropriate test to use. This is discussed in detail in Section 8.3.4.
FIGURE 8.1:
GREECE: SCATTERPLOTS OF RELATIVE SCORES WITH THE
CONTINUOUS EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
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8.3	 BIVARIATE STATISTICAL TESTS AND INTERPRETATION
8.3.1	 Introduction
Section 8.3 answers the second research question posed for Greek companies.
Specifically, it reports the results of the bivariate statistical methods employed to
investigate whether there is an association between the extent of disclosure by Greek
companies and each of a number of selected corporate characteristics. Section 8.3
also interprets the results in the context of the testable hypotheses in Chapter 5 for
research question two and compares the results of the study with some previous
disclosure studies.
8.3.2	 Company Size Hypothesis
The company size hypothesis states that:
Hl:	 There is an association between a company's size and the extent of its
disclosure practice.
The appropriateness of the Pearson correlation test was examined by running a
regression of the relative scores on each of the company size measures. The
residuals were examined for normality and homoscedasticity by inspecting the normal
p—p plots of the residuals and the scatterplots of standardised residuals against
standardised predicted values. It was found that the assumptions of normality and
homoscedasticity were reasonably safe, suggesting that a parametric test would have
been more appropriate. Nonetheless, both the Pearson and the Spearman tests were
used to examine this hypothesis.
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The results reported in Table 8.2 reveal a very interesting relationship. All correlation
coefficients are negative, suggesting that in Greece company size is negatively
associated with corporate disclosure practices. Nevertheless, the only significant
relationship is revealed when company size is measured by log market capitalisation.
This finding is not in line with the results from other studies (e.g. Cerf, 1961 and
Cooke, 1991) and provides evidence to support the argument stemming from political
cost theory, that large companies may reduce the likelihood of political action by
disclosing less information so as to avoid the increased attention that comprehensive
disclosure may draw to them. A detailed discussion of this result is undertaken in
Chapter 9.
TABLE 8.2:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GREEK CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AND SIZE
CORRELATIONS
PARAMETRIC TESTS NON—PARAMETRIC TESTS
Pearson_
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Spearman
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Log Assets with
Relative Score -0.161 0.171 -0.175 0.136
Log Sales with
Relative Score -0.096 0.417 -0.136 0.248
Log Capitalisation
with Relative Score -0.290* 0.012 -0.294* 0.011
* = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2—tailed).
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8.3.3	 Company Age Hypothesis
The company age hypothesis states that:
H2:	 There is an association between a company's age and the extent of its
disclosure practice.
Although the normal p—p plot and the scatterplot of standardised residuals against
standardised predicted values showed that the normality and homogeneity
assumptions were safe, both the Pearson and the Spearman correlation tests were
used to examine this hypothesis.
The results, reported in Table 8.3, show that company age is not significantly related to
the extent of Greek corporate disclosure. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. The
results do not support the proposition that younger companies are less likely to
disclose more information in their annual reports because this may harm their
competitive position. This result is not in line with that of Owusu—Ansah (1998) but
corroborates that of Henderson (1969).
TABLE 8.3:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GREEK CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AND AGE
CORRELATIONS
PARAMETRIC TESTS NON—PARAMETRIC TESTS
Pearson_
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Spearman
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Log Age with
Relative Score 0.206 0.078 0.172 0.143
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8.3.4	 Company Profitability Hypothesis
The company profitability hypothesis states that:
H3:	 There is an association between a company's profitability and the extent
of its disclosure practice.
A visual inspection of the p—p plots and the scatterplots indicate that although in the
case of ROCE with relative scores both parametric and non—parametric tests can be
used, in the case of profit margin with relative scores a non—parametric test is more
appropriate. However, both parametric and non—parametric tests have been used to
measure the association between the disclosure indexes and ROCE and profit margin.
Table 8.4 reports the results of both the Pearson and Spearman correlation tests,
which reveal that there is an association between a Greek company's profitability and
the extent of its disclosure practice. The signs of both coefficients reveal another
TABLE, 8.4:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GREEK CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AND PROFITABILITY
CORRELATIONS
PARAMETRIC TESTS NON—PARAMETRIC TESTS
Pearson_
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Spearman
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
ROCE with
Relative Score -0.297* 0.01 -0.250* 0.032
Profit Margin with
Relative Score -0.074 0.532 -0.272* 0.019
* = correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2—tailed).
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interesting relationship. The extent of disclosure by Greek companies is negatively
related to their profitability. The negative correlations are all significant at the 5 per
cent level with the exception of the Pearson correlation and when profitability is
measured by profit margin. However, given that the relationship between profit margin
and relative scores is not linear (Figure 8.1) and the fact that a non—parametric test
has been found to be more appropriate, the results of the Spearman test seem to be
more relevant. Hence, it can be concluded that there is a significant negative
association between the extent of disclosure by Greek companies and their
profitability. The result is consistent with the argument derived from political cost
theory, that companies with large declared profits may be more politically sensitive and
may disclose less details in order to avoid government or public attacks. Additionally,
this finding lends support to the result reported in Section 8.3.2 between corporate size
and disclosure. The result is also consistent with the argument derived from signalling
theory that information disclosure can be used as a mechanism for explaining bad
news. A detailed discussion of those findings is presented in Chapter 9. The result
reported here corroborates that of Wallace and Naser (1995), but is not in line with that
of Singhvi (1967) and Abu—Nassar and Rutherford (1994).
8.3.5	 Company Liquidity Hypothesis
The company liquidity hypothesis states that:
H4:	 There is an association between a company's liquidity and the extent of its
disclosure practice.
Although a visual inspection of the p—p plot and the scatterplot indicates that a
parametric test is more appropriate, the hypothesis was examined by both the Pearson
and the Spearman correlation tests.
250
Table 8.5 suggests that there is no association between corporate liquidity and
disclosure. This result is not in line with that reported by Wallace et al. (1994) but is
consistent with that of Belkaoui and Kahl (1978). Furthermore, the result is not in line
either with signalling theory, which predicts that liquidity and disclosure are negatively
related, or with capital need theory, which predicts that this relationship in positive.
TABLE 8.5:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GREEK CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AND LIQUIDITY
CORRELATIONS
PARAMETRIC TEST NON—PARAMETRIC TESTS
Pearson_
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Spearman
Correlation
Significance
(2—tailed)
Log Current Ratio
with Relative Score -0.008 0.947 0.022 0.855
8.3.6	 Industry—type Hypothesis
The industry—type hypothesis states that:
H5:	 The extent of a company's disclosure practice varies depending on the
industry to which it belongs (whether it is a manufacturer, conglomerate
or other).
The Shapiro—Wilks and the Levene test confirmed that the data sets for the three
industrial groups are drawn from populations whose distributions are normal and
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whose variances are equal. 61 Although this suggests that a parametric test of
difference may be more appropriate, the hypothesis was examined using both the
parametric one way ANOVA and the non—parametric Kruskal—Wallis tests.
The results, reported in Table 8.6, indicate there are significant differences in the
mean disclosure practices of the Greek sample companies in the three industrial
groups. The F statistic for the ANOVA test and the Chi—square statistic for the
Kruskal—Wallis test are significant at the 1 per cent level. An a posteriori Scheffê test
TABLE 8.6:
RESULTS OF TESTS FOR EQUALITY OF MEANS OF GREEK
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE PRACTICES BY INDUSTRY TYPE
I PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS I
Group Number of
Companies
Mean Std.
Devia
tion
Std.
Error
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Manufacturing 31 89.4 1.95 0.35 88.7 90.2
Conglomerates 14 90.4 1.89 0.50 89.3 91.4
Others 29 87.4 1.99 0.37 86.7 88.2
Total 74 88.8 2.26 0.26 88.3 89.4
I PANEL B: ONE WAY ANOVA TEST I
Source of
Variation
Sum of
Squares
Degrees of
Freedom
Mean
Squares
F
Statistic
Significance
(2—tailed)
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
99.952
271.297
371.250
2
71
73
49.976
3.821
13.079 0.000
61 The Shapiro—Wilks statistic is 0.932 for conglomerates, 0.966 for manufacturing and 0.962 for others;
the respective significance levels are 0.326, 0.424 and 0.372. The Levene statistic is 0.105 and p =
0.900.
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Table 8.6 — continued
PANEL C: KRUSKAL—WALLIS TEST I
Group Number of
Companies
Mean Rank Chi—Square Degrees of
Freedom
Asymptotic
Significance
(2—tailed)
Manufacturing 31 42.95
Conglomerates 14 52.07
Others 29 24.64
Total 74 18.794 2 0.000
was undertaken in order to determine which group has significantly different disclosure
practices. The results of the Scheff6 test, shown in Table 8.7, indicate that the extent
of disclosure by companies in the others group is significantly lower than that of the
manufacturing and the conglomerate groups.
TABLE 8.7:
RESULTS OF SCHEFFE MULTIPLE COMPARISONS TEST
FOR THE GREEK INDUSTRIAL GROUPS
First Group Second Group Mean Difference
Between Groups
Std.
Error
Significance
(2—tailed)
Manufacturing Conglomerates -0.9116 0.629 0.356
Others 1.9997* 0.505 0.001
Conglomerates Manufacturing 0.9116 0.629 0.356
Others 2.9113* 0.636 0.000
Others Manufacturing -1.9997* 0.505 0.001
Conglomerates -2.9113* 0.636 0.000
* = The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Hence, the Scheff6 test provides evidence that companies which are not
conglomerates or manufacturing disclose significantly less information. This
corroborates with prior empirical evidence reported by Wallace and Naser (1995) and
Cooke (1991). It is also in line with the proposition that industry specific factors may
make companies in different industries disclose differently.
8.3.7	 Listing Status Hypothesis
The listing status hypothesis states that:
H6(G): The extent of disclosure of a Greek main—market listed company is
greater than that of a parallel—market listed one.
The normality in the distribution of the data sets of the two groups was confirmed by
the Shapiro—Wilks and the Kolmogorov—Smirnov tests. Additionally, the Levene's test
confirmed that the variances of the two groups are equal. 62 Nevertheless, the
hypothesis was examined with both the parametric t and the non—parametric Mann—
Whitney tests.
The statistics of the t and the Mann—Whitney U tests are significant at the 1 per cent
level and provide evidence that Greek main market listed companies disclose more
extensively than parallel market listed companies. The result corroborates that of
Singhvi and Desai (1971) and is line with the prediction derived from agency theory,
that Greek main market listed companies may disclose more extensively than parallel
market listed companies in an attempt to reduce their agency costs.
62 The Shapiro—Wilks statistic for the parallel—market group is 0.944 and the significance is 0.513. The
Kolmogorov—Smirnov statistic for the main—market group is 0.090 and the significance > 0.200. The
Levene statistic is 0.233 and the significance is 0.631.
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TABLE 8.8:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DISCLOSURE
PRACTICES OF GREEK MAIN—MARKET AND PARALLEL—MARKET
LISTED COMPANIES
PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Group Number of
Companies
Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error of
Mean
Parallel—market
Listed Companies 12 86.77 2.02 0.5843
Main—market
Listed Companies 62 89.23 2.09 0.2649
I PANEL B: T—TEST I
Test t—value Degrees of
Freedom
Significance
(1—tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std.
Error of
Difference
Equality of Means -3.757 72 0.000 -2.4601 0.6548
PANEL C: MANN—WHITNEY U TEST
Group Number of
Companies
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks Z statistic
Significance
(1—tailed)
Parallel—market
Listed Companies 12 19.29 231.50 -3.204 0.001
Main—market
Listed Companies 62 41.02 2543.50
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8.3.8	 Auditor—type Hypothesis
The auditor—type hypothesis states that:
H7(G): There is an association between a Greek company's auditor type and the
extent of its disclosure practice.
Although the Kolmogorov—Smirnov, Shapiro—Wilks and Levene tests confirmed the
normality and homogeneity of variances assumptions, the hypothesis was examined
using both the t and the Mann—Whitney tests.63
TABLE 8.9:
RESULTS OF TESTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DISCLOSURE
PRACTICES OF GREEK COMPANIES AUDITED BY SELE AND NON—SELE
MEMBER AUDIT FIRMS
PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS I
Group Number of
Companies
Mean Std.
Deviation
Std.
Error of Mean
Companies Audited
by Non—SELE
Members 52 88.84 2.14 0.2963
Companies Audited
by SELE Members 22 88.82 2.57 0.5474
63 The Kolmogorov—Smirnov statistic for the non—SELE group is 0.089 and the significance > 0.200. The
Shapiro—Wilks statistic for the SELE group is 0.963 and the significance 0.544 The Levene statistic is
0.366 and the significance 0.547.
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Table 8.9 — continued
PANEL B: T—TEST
Test t—value Degrees of
Freedom
Significance
(2—tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std.
Error of
Difference
Equality of Means 0.034 72 0.973 0.002 0.5775
I PANEL C: MANN—WHITNEY U TEST I
Group Number of
Companies
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
Z statistic Significance
(2—tailed)
Companies Audited
by Non—SELE
Members 52 37.41 1,945.50 -0.053 0.958
Companies Audited
by SELL Members 22 37.70 829.50
Table 8.9 shows that the statistics of the t and the Mann—Whitney tests are not
significant, indicating that the extent of disclosure by Greek companies audited by
SELE member firms is not significantly different from that of companies audited by
non—SELE member firms. Thus, Hypothesis H7(G) is not supported and the result is
not in line with the prediction of the theory of association that local audit firms which
are internationally — affiliated are more likely (than local firms without such affiliation) to
have a positive influence on the disclosure levels of their client companies. This result
is consistent with that reported by Wallace et al. (1994).
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8.4	 MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL TESTS AND INTERPRETATION
8.4.1	 Introduction
Section 8.4 answers the third research question posed for Greek companies.
Specifically, it reports the results of the multivariate statistical methods employed to
investigate whether the variations in the extent of corporate disclosure practices of
Greek companies can be explained by the selected corporate characteristics together.
This is done through the specification of a multivariate regression model that seeks to
explain the extensiveness of disclosure by the Greek sample companies. Section 8.4
also interprets the results of the multivariate statistical tests and evaluates the
robustness of the regression model developed.
8.4.2	 Correlations Between the Independent Variables
The correlation matrix presented in Table 8.10 indicates that the correlations between
the proxies used to measure company size are high (0.836 between log capitalisation
and log assets and 0.891 between log sales and log assets). Hence, multicollinearity
may be a problem if all three size variables are entered into the same regression
model. For this reason alternative techniques were used to investigate and control for
the potential for multicollinearity. The results are reported in Section 8.5.3.
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8.4.3	 Results of Regression Procedures
A summary of the results of the backward stepwise regression are presented in Table
8.11. Initially (Model 1) all possible predictors were entered into the model. The first
variable to be excluded is log age. The fact that its removal has no impact on neither
R2
 nor the unstandardised B coefficients of the variables remaining in the model,
indicates that its multiple correlation with the other explanatory variables is very high.
The next variables to be removed are audit, profit margin and log current. R2
decreases from 0.449 to 0.444 whilst the unstandardised B coefficients of the
variables remaining in the model do not change significantly. In the sixth model, when
log assets is removed from the model, the unstandardised B coefficient of the other
size variable (log capitalisation) changes from -0.836 to -1.364 and becomes
significant (significance changes from 0.321 to 0.026). Nevertheless, adjusted R2
increases only from 0.385 to 0.386. This reflects the high collinearity between those
two size variables. When the third size variable (log sales) is removed from the model
(Model 8) log capitalisation becomes highly significant (0.005) whilst the
unstandardised B coefficients of the variables remaining in the model do not change
significantly. In the final model (Model 10) the variables remaining in the model are
listing, others and log capitalisation. Those three variables explain 39.3 per cent of
the variance in the Greek corporate disclosure practices. When the regression was
run using the forward stepwise procedure the results were identical. The variable
others explains 23.7 per cent of the variation in the corporate disclosure of Greek
companies. When variable listing was entered into the regression adjusted R 2
 rose to
0.313. The last variable entered into the regression was log capitalisation which
raised adjusted R2
 to 0.393. The results suggest that Greek companies that are listed
on the main market of the ASE, are small (in terms of their market capitalisation) or
are classified as conglomerates or manufacturers, significantly disclose more
extensive mandatory information than other companies.
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TABLE 8.11:
GREECE: RESULTS OF BACKWARD STEPWISE REGRESSION
(p values are for 2-tailed tests)
PANEL A: MODEL SUMMAR? b' d
Model
Variables
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error
of the
Estimate
Entered Removed
1 AUDIT
ROCE
CONGL
LGCUR
LIST!
PRMAR 0.670 0.449 0.351 1.8172
OTHER
LGASS
LGAGE
LGCAP
LGSALe' f
2g LGAGE 0.670 0.449 0.361 1.8027
3 h AUDIT 0.669 0.448 0.370 1.7895
PRMAR 0.668 0.447 0.379 1.7776
5j LGCUR 0.666 0.444 0.385 1.7690
6k LGASS 0.661 0.437 0.386 1.7667
7 1 ROCE 0.659 0.434 0.392 1.7578
r LGSAL 0.656 0.431 0.398 1.7498
n9" CONGL 0.647 0.393 1.7568
10" CONGL° 0.647 0.418 0.393 1.7568
a. Dependent Variable: RELAT
b. Method: Enter
c. Method: Backward (Criterion of F-to-remove >=0.10)
d. Method: Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter< =0.05, Probability-of-F-to-remove>=0.10)
e. Independent Variables: (Constant), AUDIT, ROCE, CONGL, LGCUR, LISTI, PRMAR, OTHER,
LGASS, LGAGE, LGCAP, LGSAL
f. All requested variables entered
g. Independent Variables: (Constant), AUDIT, ROCE, CONGL, LGCUR, LIST!, PRMAR, OTHER,
LGASS, LGCAP, LGSAL
h. Independent Variables: (Constant), ROCE, CONGL, LGCUR, USTI, PRMAR, OTHER,
LGASS, LGCAP, LGSAL
i. Independent Variables: (Constant), ROCE, CONGL, LGCUR, USTI, OTHER, LGASS,
LGCAP, LGSAL
j. Independent Variables: (Constant), ROCE, CONGL, LIST!, OTHER, LGASS, LGCAP, LGSAL
k. Independent Variables: (Constant), ROCE, CONGL, LISTI, OTHER LGCAP, LGSAL
1. Independent Variables: (Constant), CONGL, LIST!, OTHER LGCAP, LGSAL
m. Independent Variables: (Constant), CONGL, LISTI, OTHER, LGCAP
n. Independent Variables: (Constant), LIST!, OTHER, LGCAP
o. Probability of-F-to remove = 0.10 limits reached
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Table 8.11- continued
PANEL B: ANOVA
Model Sum ofSquares
Degrees of
Freedom
Mean
Square F Signific.
10	 Regression 155.201 3 51.734 16.762 0.000
Residual 216.048 70 3.086
Total 371.250 73
PANEL C: COEFFICIENTS
Variables
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients t Signific
Collinearity
Statistics
B Std.Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 92.687 1.551 59.763 0.000
LISTI 2.046 0.576 0.337 3.552 0.001" 0.925 1.081
OTHER -1.805 0.434 -0.393 -4.160 0.000 0.930 1.076
LGCAP -0.542 0.168 -0.296 -3.215 0.002 0.981 1.020
PANEL D: EXCLUDED VARIABLES
Variables Beta In t Signific. Partial
Correlation
Collinearity Statistics
Toler. VIF MinimumTolerance
LGAGE 0.028 0.274 0.785 0.033 0.832 1.202 0.777
AUDIT 0.050 0.521 0.604" 0.063 0.911 1.098 0.911
PRMAR 0.006 0.060 0.952 0.007 0.938 1.066 0.907
LGCUR -0.095 -1.027 0.308 -0.123 0.972 1.029 0.903
LGASS 0.070 0.412 0.682 0.050 0.288 3.471 0.288
ROCE -0.031 -0.302 0.764 -0.036 0.784 1.275 0.784
LGSAL 0.117 0.884 0.380 0.106 0.472 2.117 0.468
CONGL 0.126 1.250 0.215 0.149 0.810 1.235 0.793
PANEL E: COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS
Mode Dimension Eigenvalue Condition
Index
Variance Proportions
(Constant) LISTI OTHER LGCAP
10 1 3.321 1.000 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00
2 0.575 2.402 0.00 0.04 0.80 0.00
3 9,489E-02 5.915 0.03 0.95 0.18 0.04
4 9,144E-03 19.056 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.96
p Given that Hypotheses H6(G) (for the influence of listing status on Greek corporate disclosure) is directional, the
significance level should be for an l-tailed test. This implies that the significance level should be halved. If this is
done the listing status variable is more significant.
262
The finding that Greek companies which are classified as others disclose significantly
less information (and that conglomerate and manufacturing companies disclose
significantly more information) is consistent with the industry specific factors
proposition and corroborates those reported by Cooke (1991) and Wallace and Naser
(1995). Additionally, the finding that Greek main market listed companies disclose
significantly more information than parallel market listed companies is consistent with
the prediction of agency theory and is in line with the results of Singhvi and Desai
(1971). The result that Greek larger companies disclose less extensive information
than smaller companies is in contrast to the results reported in most single country
disclosure studies (e.g. Cooke, 1991). However, it can be explained by theoretical,
environmental, empirical and other considerations (a detailed discussion is presented
in Chapter 9).
Following Cooke (1989) the potential for multicollinearity was also controlled by
running three different regression routines, with each routine incorporating only one of
the three size variables. The regression routine with log capitalisation produced
identical results with those of the backward stepwise regression model (reported in
Panels B — E of Table 8.11). On the other hand, the models that used log assets and
log sales (as proxies for company size) had less explanatory powers (adjusted R 2 35.6
and 31.3 per cent respectively). All these regression routines revealed a negative
association between company size and Greek corporate disclosure.
Alternative predictor selection procedures were also employed, such as forward
selection, but their results were similar to those of the reduced and full regression
models using the backward stepwise and the forward stepwise procedures. The
results of all those regression routines are, therefore, not reported in the thesis.
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8.5	 ASSESSING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE REGRESSION MODEL
8.5.1	 Economic a priori Criteria
On the basis of economic criteria the model developed for Greek companies is
consistent with the predictions of the industry—specific factors proposition and agency
and political cost theories. The finding that Greek conglomerate and manufacturing
companies disclose significantly more information than companies belonging in the
others industrial group is consisted with the industry specific factors proposition; that
is, that industry specific factors (such as the complexity and nature of operations of
certain industries) can make companies within those industries disclose more
extensive information. This result corroborates those reported by Cooke (1991) and
Wallace and Naser (1995), who reported that Japanese manufacturing and Hong
Kong conglomerate companies disclose more extensively than companies in other
industry groups.
The finding that Greek main market listed companies disclose significantly more
information than parallel market listed companies is consistent with the prediction of
agency theory. If we assume that main market listed companies are more likely to
have a greater number of shareholders (and hence have greater agency problems),
then we can expect them to disclose more extensively than parallel market listed
companies, in an attempt to reduce their agency costs. This result is in line with that
of Singhvi and Desai (1971), who found that U.S. main market listed companies
disclose more extensively than companies whose shares are listed on the OTC
market.
On the other hand, the finding that Greek larger companies disclose less extensive
information than smaller companies contradicts the empirical evidence provided by
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most single country disclosure studies, where large companies have been found to
disclose significantly more information than smaller ones. This finding, however, is in
line with the argument derived from political cost theory: if large companies are
considered to be more politically sensitive than smaller ones, they may disclose less
information in an attempt to avoid the increased attention caused by increased
disclosure and, hence, reduce the likelihood of political action. A detailed discussion
of this result is provided in Chapter 9.
The multivariate analysis also revealed that auditor type, profitability, liquidity and age,
do not have any significant relationship with the extent of Greek corporate disclosure.
The insignificance of the auditor type variable may be attributed to the distinctive
nature of Greek market for audit services. This market has recently been liberalised
and there is evidence that the indigenous auditors have retained the majority of audit
assignments, with SOL SA being the largest audit firm (Caramanis, 1997). Thus,
although it is usually suggested that the big international firms, being larger and better
known than local firms, exert more influence over the disclosure policies of their
clients, this relationship does not seem to exist in Greece. One reason may be that
the local affiliates of the big international firms, having been admitted to the register of
qualified auditors in the last couple of years, are not perceived to offer a better quality
of service than indigenous auditors. As a result, the clients of the big international
firms are not more likely to accede to advice regarding the quality of their CAFSs than
the clients of the indigenous auditors.
In the case of profitability, although the bivariate tests showed that it is negatively
related to the extent of Greek corporate disclosure, the multivariate OLS model
revealed no significant relationship. This may be due to minor multicollinearity effects
between profitability and the variables included in the model. In order to investigate
for this possibility the partial correlation of ROCE with relative scores, while controlling
for the effects of log capitalisation and listing, was computed. The correlation
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becomes insignificant (p=0.448), indicating that most of the influence of profitability
has been captured by the other variables included in the model.
Finally, company age and liquidity have not been found to be significant in either the
bivariate or multivariate analyses. This finding is consistent with the results of most
prior empirical research that examined these variables (e.g. Wallace and Naser, 1995)
and may indicate that company liquidity and age are not very important explanatory
variables of corporate disclosure in many countries.
8.5.2	 Statistical Criteria
The standard error of the estimate of the regression line (1.76) is very low, when
compared to the standard errors of regression lines reported in other studies
(e.g. Kasharhmeh, 1995; Cooke, 1989). It is also lower than the standard error of the
regression line reported in Chapter 7 for Cypriot companies (4.48). This indicates that
the disclosure of Greek companies is more predictable than the disclosure of Cypriot
companies and companies examined in some other studies. Additionally, the adjusted
R2
 of the Greek model, although not being among the highest reported in the
literature, it has a reasonable explanatory power and it compares favourably to those
reported in some other studies on developing countries (e.g. Kasharhmeh, 1995).
In an attempt to determine whether the explanatory power of the model can be
improved, other variables found to be explanatory of corporate disclosure in other
countries were incorporated in the model (e.g. gearing ratio and dividend ratio).
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the model could not be increased. This
suggests that there might be other variables, such as ownership dispersion and
ethnicity of management, that may influence the disclosure practices of Greek
companies. Unfortunately, it was not possible to test for the effects of those variables
due to the lack of relevant data.
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8.5.3	 Econometric Criteria
In addition to the correlation matrix method, the potential for multicollinearity was also
evaluated with the use of VIF and Cl. Table 8.11 reveals that the VIF of all variables
included in the regression model is less than 10, while their condition indexes are less
than 30. Hence, based on Gujarati (1995) and Kennedy (1996), it can be concluded
that multicollinearity is not a major problem as the VIF and Cl values of all variables
are within acceptable limits.
Homoscedasticity was tested by a visual inspection of the scatterplot of standardised
residuals against standardised predicted values (Figure 8.2). The scatterplot shows
that the spread of the residuals does not change with the predicted values, suggesting
the absence of heteroscedasticity.
FIGURE 8.2:
GREEK MODEL: SCATTERPLOT OF STANDARDISED
RESIDUALS AGAINST STANDARDISED PREDICTED VALUES
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The normality of the disturbances was examined using different methods. Figure 8.3
presents a normal p—p plot of the standardised residuals of the reduced regression
model. The p—p plot shows that the disturbances are fairly normally distributed as the
data points cluster around the diagonal line. Additionally, a Kolmogorov—Smirnov test
for normality reveals that the standardised residuals have no significant departure
from normality (Z statistic is 0.592 and p=0.875).
Apart from the homoscedasticity test, the scatterplot of standardised residuals against
standardised predicted values (Figure 8.2) was also used to examine the assumption
of linearity and check for the omission of important variables and incorrect functional
form. The scatterplot shows no patterns, confirming that the assumption of linearity is
reasonably safe and that there are no major specification errors.
FIGURE 8.3:
GREEK MODEL: NORMAL P—P PLOT OF THE
STANDARDISED RESIDUALS
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Finally, in order to investigate the possibility of interaction effects between the predictor
variables, several scatterplots of the relative scores with each independent variable
were plotted, setting markers by different qualitative variables and fitting straight lines
for each sub—group. No peculiar relationships were found, indicating the absence of
interaction effects.
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8.6	 SUMMARY
This chapter answered the first, second and third research questions posed for Greek
companies. Section 8.2 presented and discussed the descriptive statistics of the
Greek relative corporate disclosure scores which aimed to measure disclosure
extensiveness by Greek companies. The disclosure practices of the Greek sample
companies, on the whole, appear to be extensive, as the minimum, maximum and
mean disclosure scores reported compare favourably with those reported in previous
mandatory disclosure studies. Section 8.3 presented and interpreted the results of the
various bivariate and multivariate statistical tests performed on the second and third
research questions posed for Greek companies. The results of the various bivariate
statistical tests performed provided evidence that there is a significant association
between the extent of disclosure by Greek companies and company size, profitability,
listing status and industry type. A multivariate regression model was specified that
sought to investigate whether the variations in the extent of disclosure practices by the
Greek sample companies could be explained by the selected corporate characteristics
together. As in the case of Cyprus, the bottom—up specification methodology and the
OLS regression procedure have been used. Several diagnostic tests confirmed that
the model was reasonably well specified and that there were no serious violations of
the OLS assumptions. Based on the regression model reported in this chapter, which
has an adjusted R2 of 39.3 per cent and a standard error of the estimate of 1.76, the
fitted equation of the disclosure index for Greek companies is:
A
Y.; = 92.687 - 0.542 Log Capitalisation./ - 1.805 Other 2.046 Listing)
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where:
A
Yi = the estimate of the true disclosure score that the jth sample company will
earn under the 1996 disclosure regulatory regime in Greece.
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that the variations in the extent of corporate
mandatory disclosure practices of Greek companies is explained by the intercept and a
company's size, industry type and listing status. A detailed discussion and comparison
of these results with those found for Cypriot companies is provided in Chapter 9.
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PART IV
CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER 9
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CYPRIOT AND
GREEK CORPORATE DISCLOSURE PRACTICES
9.1	 INTRODUCTION
The fourth research question posed in Chapter 1 was: what are the similarities of, and
differences between, the relationships between corporate characteristics and corporate
mandatory disclosure found for Cypriot companies and those found for Greek
companies? Chapter 9 answers the fourth research question by undertaking
qualitative and quantitative comparisons between the results obtained for research
questions 1, 2 and 3. However, before the comparative analysis is made and in order
to assist in the interpretation of the empirical results, Section 9.2 summarises the main
differences between the Cypriot and Greek accounting environments found in Chapter
2.
It should be noted that the comparison between the Cypriot and Greek corporate
disclosure practices is made using an indirect approach. As noted in Chapter 4, a
direct comparison between the corporate disclosure practices in different countries can
be made using a direct approach (that is, using a common disclosure index) when all
of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the countries concerned are comparable in
terms of their socio—economic development; (2) the perceptions of the objectives of
financial statements and the order of importance of disclosure items are broadly the
same in both countries; and (3), the countries compared have the same disclosure
minima. Since in the case of Cyprus and Greece these conditions are not satisfied the
comparison is made using a separate index for each country (that is, effectively
carrying out two single country disclosure investigations and making an indirect
comparison of the results).
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9.2	 COMPARISON OF ACCOUNTING ENVIRONMENTS
9.2.1	 Internal Accounting Environments
The British, as the last colonial rulers of Cyprus, introduced important socio—economic
reforms in the island. Nonetheless, Cypriot accounting has (since then) tended to
respond to its internal environmental stimuli. The common law legal system, along
with the political turbulence of the post—independence years, contributed to the
development of a flexible accounting system which has tended to be adaptable to
individual company circumstances. The two main economic phases of the post—
independence years have also been influential. The first was the 1960 — 1974 period,
which was marked by political unrest and moderate economic development. During
this period socio—economic development was not a high priority and the role of
accounting was mainly that of a bookkeeping system. Then came the period from 1974
to the present, which was marked by a recovery from the 1974 catastrophe and an
unprecedented economic boom. During this period accounting has revealed a
capacity for responses to a wide variety of users' needs for sophisticated information
and has extended into management consultancy and business services. Another
characteristic of Cypriot accounting is that it has developed as an independent
discipline. The main factors that contributed to this have been the existence of broad
legal rules, the lack of a comprehensive conceptual framework of accounting and the
fact that the government tended not to intervene in accounting matters. All of the
above factors enabled Cypriot accountants to develop a self—constructed and self—
regulated framework which has been flexible enough to reflect the needs and priorities
of the business and socio—economic environment. In this respect, the Cypriot
accounting system is more similar to the Anglo—Saxon rather than the Franco—German
accounting system.
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In contrast, accounting in Greece has followed a uniform development pattern and the
government has, usually, been using it as an instrument of government policy. There
has traditionally been a preference for extensive statutory control. Legal stipulations
provide in great detail the accounting rules and regulations and the form and content of
financial statements. The exercise of professional judgement has, traditionally, been
restricted and the accountant's main task has been to interpret the law. These
characteristics have mainly been the product of specific environmental factors. For
example, being under Ottoman occupation from 1453 to 1830, Greece was left out of
the mainstream of the Western world's main socio—economic achievements. Upon
independence a decision was taken to adopt the French legal, commercial and
accounting systems. As a result, the accounting system adopted was based on the
French accounting values, which was (and is) characterised by more statutory control
and uniformity than a typical Anglo—Saxon accounting system (e.g. Cyprus).
Additionally, since independence Greece has gone through a series of national and
civil wars that brought it to its knees. It is plausible that given the political and social
unrest throughout the last two centuries, the government did not have either the time
or the will to undertake a radical change of the transplanted accounting system. Also,
the consequential economic underdevelopment of the country did not necessitate a
sophisticated accounting system and accounting was mainly equated with
bookkeeping. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Greek accounting, which
differentiates it from most other European and American accounting systems, is the
fact that it has been highly politicised. This can mainly be attributed to the traditional
"party politics phenomenon" which has resulted in frequent changes of the short and
long—term socio—economic objectives and policies, depending on the priorities of the
dominating political party. There is also a tendency for Greek people to mistrust
accounting as a means of generating misleading information for tax evasion and
pricing policies. It is possible, however, that as the Greek politico—economic system
becomes more integrated with the other European systems, the Greek accounting
environment will undergo some changes.
275
9.2.2	 External Accounting Environments
One of the major external environmental factors on Cypriot accounting has been the
IASs. Although not backed by statute, the IASs are generally accepted as
formalisation of existing good practice and are believed to be followed by the majority
of Cypriot companies. Another critical external environmental factor has been the
presence and growth of the international accounting firms, which have acted as
catalysts in the development of an independent accounting profession and significantly
influenced the development of a respectable level of professional accounting
education. At the beginning of the new millennium, Cyprus is facing a new challenge
that is expected to have an important impact on local policies and practices: EU entry.
Though not radical, the impact of the forthcoming adoption of the relevant EU
Directives is expected to have an important impact on local accounting and disclosure
practices. It is expected that it will introduce greater legal and governmental influence
over financial accounting and reporting.
In the case of Greece, however, the EU has already been a very influential external
environmental factor. Through its Directives, the EU brought important changes to the
Greek accounting system that had existed for 160 years, resulting in a move towards
more substance and fairness in accounting. Pressures from the EU have also led to
the abolition of the quasi—governmental structure of the established accounting body
and the liberalisation of the Greek accounting profession. In contrast to Cyprus, the
influence of the IASs and the international accounting firms on Greek accounting have
not been very significant. For example, many IASs (such as those dealing with leasing
and deferred tax) are still in conflict with Greek accounting regulations.
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9.2.3	 Regulatory Frameworks for Accounting
As already noted the regulatory framework for financial accounting and reporting in
Cyprus is characterised by broad rules laid down by statute, which are complemented
by the IASs and the CSE's regulations. Furthermore, the Cypriot accounting system is
influenced by the British accounting traditions. For example, the Cypriot Companies
Act is a copy of the UK 1948 Act and the accounting profession is modelled on the
ACCA and the ICAEW. Commenting on the impact of such transplantation on the
development of accounting in many ex—British colonies, Briston (1978, p.108)
contributes to an understanding of the development of Cypriot accounting:
Once a reporting system and a nucleus of an accounting profession
have been established in this way, it becomes very difficult to
modify the system.... Furthermore, the British system tends to be
extended because, after independence, the small nucleus of
qualified accountants will often create a monopolistic and elitist
professional body which is virtually a carbon copy of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants.
The Cypriot accounting profession has flourished within an unregulated environment,
whilst accounting education is heavily influenced by the British professional
qualifications as the majority of accounting students are studying for the ACCA and the
ICAEW qualifications. The CSE, which has been established in 1996, is at a
developing stage. Furthermore, the regulatory system of the CSE is marked by the
absence of a formal financial reporting watchdog which acts, and is seen to act, to
ensure that accounting and reporting regulations are complied with.
Greek accounting, on the other hand, is influenced by French accounting traditions.
There is strict prescription of accounting rules, with company and tax laws setting out
in detail the valuation and measurement rules to be followed and the form and content
of financial statements. Another characteristic of Greek accounting is the influence of
financial statements by tax rules.	 Even though the incorporation of EU Directives in
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Greek law has enabled company law to regain, to some extent, influence on
accounting matters from tax law, Greek financial statements continue to a great extent
to be tax oriented. Other important differences between the Cypriot and Greek
regulatory frameworks of accounting is that in Greece an independent accountancy
professional body was established only in 1992 and that accounting education has
been relatively underdeveloped. For example, for many years accounting was
considered a second—class course at Greek universities. Nevertheless, this situation
is gradually changing. With the introduction of degree—level courses in universities,
the availability of the local SOE qualification and the introduction of ACCA training,
accounting education in Greece has a lot of scope for development. In contrast to
Cyprus, however, the Greek stock market has been making significant strides and
experiencing remarkable growth rates. The recent modernisation and
internationalisation, the relaxation of exchange controls and the arrival of foreign
investors are expected to increase the pressure for improvement in corporate reporting
and disclosure practices. Nevertheless, as in the case of Cyprus, there is no formal
financial reporting watchdog which systematically inquires into annual accounts of
Greek companies to ensure conformity with regulations.
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9.3	 COMPARISON OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE PRACTICES
9.3.1	 Summary of Empirical Results
Tables 9.1 — 9.3 summarise the results of the empirical analyses carried out in
Chapters 7 and 8. Table 9.1 reports the main descriptive statistics for the relative
disclosure scores. The table shows that the mean disclosure scores of the 50 Cypriot
and the 74 Greek sample companies are 84.7 and 88.8 per cent respectively. The
range of the disclosure indexes for Cypriot companies varies from 66.2 to 97.0 per
cent, while that for Greek companies ranges from 83.3 to 92.8 per cent. Respectively,
the standard deviations are 7.1 and 2.3 per cent for Cypriot and Greek companies.
TABLE 9.1
SUMMARISED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE DISCLOSURE SCORES
DISCLOSURE SCORES CYPRUS GREECE
Mean 84.7 88.8
Maximum 97.0 92.8
Minimum 66.2 83.3
Std. Deviation 7.1 2.3
Number of Observations 50 74
The above statistics signify that the disclosure practices of the sample companies in
both countries, on the whole, appear to be extensive when compared to the corporate
disclosure practices reported in other mandatory disclosure studies (e.g. Wallace et
al., 1994 and Patton and Zelenka, 1997). The mean disclosure scores indicate that,
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on average, the disclosure of Greek companies is higher than those of Cypriot
companies in terms of the items expected to be disclosed in each country.
Furthermore, the standard deviations indicate that the variability in the disclosure
practices of Greek companies is less than those of Cypriot companies.
Nevertheless, the above comparison should be treated with caution as the disclosure
regulatory frameworks in the two countries are different, and separate disclosure
measuring instruments have been used. It may, therefore, be possible that the
comparison of the mean disclosure scores is biased in favour of the country with the
more stringent disclosure regulations (Greece). The stringent disclosure regulations in
Greece may also explain the low standard deviation of the index for Greek companies.
This is because in Greece the law sets out the corporate disclosure requirements in a
great extent of detail and, effectively, acts as a detailed disclosure checklist which
companies have to go through. Additionally, since what a company must disclose is
dictated by law, any departure from disclosure regulations is liable to legal action. This
is likely to reduce the possibility of the reporting accountant exercising his/her own
judgement about the items to be disclosed (even though judgement needs to be
exercised in deciding the extent of detail with which mandatory items are to be
disclosed). In contrast, in Cyprus the main source of disclosure requirements is the
IASs which do not have the backing of the law. Thus, the reporting accountant has
more flexibility to determine the extent of detail to be disclosed about a particular item.
It may, therefore, be the case that the greater variability in the disclosure scores of
Cypriot companies is a result of this liberal nature of the local disclosure regulations.
Table 9.2 presents a summary of the explanatory power of the selected corporate
characteristics as revealed by the regression analyses." It can been seen that the
64 Bivariate tests were carried out as it is common in disclosure studies to commence the data exploration
using theses methods. However, in this section the results of the bivariate tests are not compared as it
has been cautioned in the literature that the use of bivariate analysis to study the effect of corporate
disclosure might be unsuitable since disclosure depends on the joint effect of many factors (Adhikari and
Tondkar, 1992).
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TABLE 9.2
EXPLANATORY POWER OF CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS
AS REPORTED BY THE MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL TESTS
CORPORATE
CHARACTERISTIC
HYPOTHESISED
DIRECTION OF EFFECT ON
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
CYPRUS GREECE
H 1 — Company Size Unknown 0 s( ( - )
H2- Company Age Unknown N/A 0
H3 - Company Profitability Unknown V(±) 0
114 - Company Liquidity Unknown 0 0
H5 - Industry—type Unknown V(+)1 /(_) 2
H6 - Listing Status — Positive for Cypriot listed
companies
—Positive for Greek main—
market listed companies
V ( + )
N/A
N/A
V(+)
H7 - Auditor—type — Positive for Cypriot Big 5
audited companies
— Unknown for Greek
companies
0
N/A
N/A
0
= Significant positive relationship
= Significant negative relationship
= Significant positive relationship with Cypriot conglomerate companies
= Significant negative relationship with Greek other companies
= No significant relationship
N/A	 = Not applicable
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results of the empirical analyses of Cypriot companies are in line with the results of
most previous studies (e.g. Wallace et al., 1994, Wallace and Naser, 1995). Cypriot
companies which are more profitable, are classified as conglomerates or whose
shares are listed on the CSE, tend to disclose significantly more extensive mandatory
information in their CAFSs. In the case of Greece, the results of the empirical
analyses corroborate those found for Cypriot companies as far as listing status and
industry type are concerned. Greek companies which are listed on the main market of
the ASE or are classified as conglomerates or manufacturing, tend to disclose
significantly more extensive mandatory information than other companies. However,
an interesting relationship between company size and Greek corporate disclosure has
been revealed: larger Greek companies tend to disclose significantly less information
than smaller ones.
Table 9.3 presents a summary of the Cypriot and Greek regression models. The table
indicates that the regression line of the Greek model has a lower standard error than
the regression line of the Cypriot model (1.77 versus 4.48), indicating that the
disclosure of Greek companies is more predictable than those of Cypriot companies.
Additionally, the table indicates that the fitted model for Cypriot companies has a
higher explanatory power (adjusted R 2 = 60 per cent) than the fitted model for Greek
companies (adjusted R 2 = 39 per cent). The lower adjusted R2 in the case of the
Greek model reflects, to some extent, the smaller variation in the disclosure practices
of the Greek companies. This is consistent with the fact that the variance of the Greek
disclosure indexes is smaller than that of the Cypriot indexes. Nevertheless, as
previously noted, this comparison should be treated with caution as the disclosure
regulatory frameworks in the two countries are different and separate disclosure
measuring instruments have been used.
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TABLE 9.3
SUMMARISED REGRESSION MODELS
PANEL A: VARIABLES I
VARIABLE COEFFICIENTS
CYPRIOT MODEL GREEK MODEL
Intercept 78.68 92.68
Log Capitalisation N/A -1.25
ROCE 0.18 NI
Conglomerates 8.70 NI
Others NI -1.81
Listing 8.44 2.0
I PANEL B: STATISTICS I
STATISTIC CYPRIOT MODEL GREEK MODEL
Adjusted R Square 0.60 0.39
Std Error of the Estimate 4.48 1.76
F statistic 25.36 16.76
Significance of F statistic 0.0000 0.0000
Number of Observations 50 74
Residual Degrees of Freedom 46 70
KEY
N/A = Not applicable
NI	 = Not included in the model
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9.3.2	 Deriving a "Minimal Model"
In addition to the indirect comparison between the Cypriot and Greek corporate
disclosure practices presented in the previous section, a more direct comparison was
attempted. This was made by fitting two models (one for each country) with similar
explanatory variables in an attempt to find a "minimal model". A "minimal model" is
defined as one which satisfies the following criteria: (1) it comprises the highest
number of significant explanatory variables; (2) these explanatory variables are also
included in the fitted models for both Cyprus and Greece; and (3), the model has an
explanatory power (adjusted R2) which is not materially different from that of the
original models developed in Chapters 7 and 8. Such a minimal model can enable a
more direct comparison to be made, because any similarities or differences (between
the impact of specific corporate characteristics on national corporate disclosure
practices) can emerge more clearly.
Different combinations of similar independent variables were fitted into a regression
model for each country. The variables were chosen on the basis of their inclusion in
the initial fitted models and their level of significance. The most significant results are
presented in Table 9.4. It is noticeable that the results of the above models are not
significantly different from those reported in Chapters 7 and 8. The table indicates that
the impact of listing and industry type on the disclosure practices of Cypriot and Greek
companies is similar. Listing is included in all eight models and its coefficient is, in an
cases, significantly positive. In the case of industry—type the impact, although not
identical, is similar. When both conglomerate and other variables are included in the
models (Model 1), the conglomerate variable is significantly positive for Cypriot
companies and other variable is significantly negative for Greek companies. When the
conglomerate variable is excluded from the models (Model 3), the coefficient of the
other variable is significantly negative for both Cypriot and Greek companies.
Additionally, when the other variable is excluded from the models (Model 4), the
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coefficient of the conglomerate variable is significantly positive for both Cypriot and
Greek companies. On the other hand, the impact of company size on the extent of
Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure is clearly different. In the case of Greece, the
coefficient of log assets is significantly negative in all four models. In the case of
Cyprus, log assets is significantly positive in the case of Models 3 and 4. In the case
of Models 1 and 2, the impact of log assets is not significant because of the existence
of other more influential variables in the model (listing and conglomerates).
TABLE 9.4
SUMMARY OF DIFFERENT REGRESSION MODELS WITH SIMILAR
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
Cyprus Greece Cyprus Greece Cyprus Greece Cyprus Greece
Variables Entered:
•	 Listing V V V V V V V V
•	 Log Assets V V V V V V V V
.Conglomerate V V V V V V
'Other V V V V V V
•	 ROCE V V
Adjusted 122 0.599 0.373 0.587 0.373 0.518 0.356 0.592 0.284
Std Error of the
Estimate 4.4776 1.7858 4.5423 1.7853 5.063 1.8095 4.5132 1.9077
F 15.610 9.682 18.399 11.870 16.485 14.461 24.711 10.669
F Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unstandardised
Coefficients:
•	 Listing 7.707 2.007 7.240 2.168 6.944 2.100 7.155 2.671
•	 Log Assets 0.488 -0.377 0.738 -0.419 1.010 -0.436 0.801 -0.428
•Conglomerate 7.444 1.011 7.562 0.986 8.155 1.735
•Other -0.934 4.504 -0.997 -1.579 -3.303 -1.898
•	 ROCE 0.137 -1.6E-02
Significance:
•	 Listing 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
•	 Log Assets 0.271 0.046 0.079 0.023 0.030 0.019 0.049 0.029
•Conglomerate 0.001 0.085 0.001 0.092 0.000 0.003
•	 Other 0.545 0.003 0.524 0.002 0.040 0.000
•	 ROCE 0.136 0.331
KEY
= Variables entered in the model
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The conclusion emerging from the above analysis is clear. In both Cyprus and Greece
listed companies and companies classified as conglomerates tend to disclose more
extensive mandatory information than unlisted and non—conglomerate companies. On
the other hand, while larger Cypriot companies tend to disclose more extensive
mandatory information than Cypriot smaller companies, their Greek counterparts tend
to disclose less extensive information than Greek smaller companies.
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9.4	 DISCUSSION OF MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS
9.4.1
	
Listing Status and Corporate Disclosure
In spite of the environmental differences between Cyprus and Greece there is some
evidence that the influence of listing status on Cypriot and Greek corporate mandatory
disclosure is similar. The empirical evidence presented in this study suggests that
Cypriot listed and Greek main market listed companies tend to disclose more
extensive mandatory information than Cypriot unlisted and Greek parallel market listed
companies.
These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of agency theory. If
listing on the CSE or the main market of the ASE implies more shareholders and more
potential conflicts between managers (as agents) and capital providers (as principals),
this can lead to higher agency costs which decrease the value of the company to the
detriment of both groups. A plausible explanation can be that managers of Cypriot
listed and Greek main market listed companies try to reduce their agency costs by
disclosing more information in their CAFSs, in order to assure their shareholders and
the market in general, that they are not exploiting their fiduciary positions for personal
gains.
Additionally, the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the extent
of disclosure in Cypriot CAFSs and the independent variable listing status is consistent
with the theoretical predictions of capital need and disclosure costs theories. A
plausible explanation is that Cypriot managers may try to reduce the cost of capital of
their companies through the disclosure of more information. If Cypriot listed
companies are more dependent on the stock market for their capital needs than
Cypriot unlisted companies, then they are likely to disclose more extensive
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information because they possibly have more to gain by such disclosure. This is
because more information is likely to reduce investors' uncertainty and their required
rates of return, with a consequential reduction in the company's cost of capital and an
increase in its market value. Similarly, it is probable that the more extensive
mandatory information provided by Cypriot listed companies (compared to Cypriot
unlisted companies) is attributed to the lower costs associated with such disclosure.
This is because a listed company would have already gathered and published such
information in its prospectus (required by the CSE when a company applies for listing),
and the marginal direct and indirect costs of such disclosure are likely to be minimal.
9.4.2	 Industry Type and Corporate Disclosure
As in the case of listing status, the empirical evidence suggests that in spite of the
environmental differences between Cyprus and Greece, the influence of industry—type
on national corporate disclosure practices is, on average, similar. There is evidence
that Cypriot conglomerate and Greek conglomerate/ manufacturing companies tend to
disclose relatively more information in their CAFSs than Cypriot non—manufacturing
and Greek non—conglomerate/manufacturing companies. This is consistent with the
theoretical prediction (derived from the industry — specific factors proposition) that the
extent of disclosure in CAFSs is likely to differ across different industries.
A plausible explanation for this evidence may be that the activities of Cypriot
conglomerate and Greek conglomerate/manufacturing companies are more complex
and generate more reportable events than Cypriot non—conglomerate and Greek non-
conglomerate/manufacturing companies. Additionally, Cypriot conglomerate and
Greek conglomerate/manufacturing companies may provide more extensive
information than other companies, because the scope of their operations subsumes
the operations of the other companies. Thus, it can be claimed that on the basis of
the empirical evidence reported in this study, in spite of the environmental differences
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between Cyprus and Greece the effect of industry—type on the national corporate
disclosure practices is similar.
9.4.3	 Company Size and Corporate Disclosure
In contrast to the above similarities, there is evidence that the influence of company
size on the mandatory disclosure practices of Cypriot and Greek companies is
different. In the case of Cyprus, the results of the bivariate analyses indicate that
company size associates positively with the extent of mandatory information disclosed,
while the multivariate analyses suggest that the relationship, although positive, is
insignificant. In the case of Greece, however, both the bivariate and the multivariate
analyses reveal that company size has a negative effect on the extent of mandatory
information disclosed. Although this result is inconsistent with those of most previous
studies (e.g. Cerf, 1961 and Cooke, 1991), it can be explained by theoretical,
environmental, empirical and other considerations.
Firstly, the above result can be explained by political cost theory. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) suggested that larger companies are subject to more government
and public scrutiny than smaller companies. Zimmerman (1983) used effective
corporate tax rates as a proxy for political costs and demonstrated that large U.S.
companies are less likely to circumvent their tax liabilities and more likely to pay more
taxes. Zimmerman calls this a political cost of being a large company. In this context,
some disclosure researchers have extended the political cost argument to corporate
disclosure. However, there is some controversy about how political costs may affect
corporate disclosure. Some disclosure researchers argue that another political cost of
being a large company is increased corporate disclosure. They propose that larger
companies, being more politically sensitive, will disclose more extensive information in
order to reduce the likelihood of political action either from the government or from a
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particular pressure group (e.g. Inchausti, 1997). However, some other disclosure
researchers have an exactly opposite view. They contend that politically sensitive
companies will disclose less information in an attempt to avoid the increased attention
that comprehensive disclosure may draw to them (Wallace, 1987; Wallace et al.,
1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995). Although most empirical evidence supports the
argument that larger companies tend to disclose more information in an attempt to
reduce their political costs (e.g. Inchausti, 1997), the findings of this study lend
support to the latter theoretical argument that the threat of political action may (in
some countries) make larger companies disclose less extensively.
Secondly, the negative influence of company size on the mandatory disclosure
practices of Greek companies can be attributed to, and explained by, the distinctive
accounting environment in Greece. Chapter 2 has illustrated that Greek companies
operate within an environment which is different from that found in other countries in
which a positive relationship between company size and corporate disclosure has
been reported [for example the U.S. (Cerf, 1961) and Canada (Belkaoui and Kahl,
1978)]. Indeed, the empirical evidence (summarised in Appendix D of the study)
shows that most countries in which a positive association between company size and
corporate disclosure has been reported, follow the Anglo—Saxon model of accounting
(e.g. the US, UK and Canada). Quite distinctive from such Anglo—Saxon accounting
environments, the Greek accounting environment is characterised by a strong
influence of party politics, that has rendered accounting an instrument of public policy
aiming to enforce the decisions of the party in power. Ballas (1998) notes that in
Greece there is extensive state intervention in accounting matters and a propensity to
regulate even minute details of business activity because social actors call upon the
government to intervene whenever they disagree. Bourantas et al. (1990) suggest
that in Greece matters are continuously debated in long parliamentary discussions
which end up, most of the time, in legislation. In the rest of the developed world, these
matters would be considered as managerial prerogatives or tasks. Papas (1993)
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opines that in Greece people tend to mistrust accounting and regard it as a means of
generating misleading information for tax evasion purposes and pricing policies.
Papas (1993, p.77) also notes that in Greece:
Accountants do not feel obliged to disclose any reliable
information beyond that required by law or custom. They are loyal
to members of the family that owns or controls the business and
serve its interests. They often use the occasional anti—
business bias of the general public to justify the withholding
of sensitive data. [Emphasis added].
It may, therefore, be possible that the disclosure practices of large companies in such
a highly politicised environment are different from those of companies operating in
more flexible and laissez—faire environments. In line with the argument derived from
political theory earlier, large Greek companies may fear that in such an environment
extensive disclosure may attract greater public or government attention, leading to a
detailed scrutinisation of their operational and financial affairs. The increased visibility
may lead to greater exposure to political attacks in the form of pressure for greater
regulation such as price controls, higher corporate taxes and the threat of
nationalisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consequently, it is likely that in such a
highly politicised environment, large Greek companies may try to reduce the likelihood
of political action through the disclosure of less information in the general purpose
CAFSs.
Thirdly, some support for the negative influence of company size on the extent of
mandatory information disclosed by large Greek companies can also be provided by
empirical evidence reported in this as well as in other studies. This is because the
results of the bivariate statistical tests reported in Section 8.3.4 show that company
profitability (which , like company size, can also be used as a proxy for political costs)
has also been found to have some negative (though weak) influence on Greek
mandatory disclosure practices. Some researchers have cautioned the use of
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company size as a proxy for political costs and argued that in certain cases a better
proxy may be a company's profitability (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). It can be
claimed that the reported negative influence of company size on Greek mandatory
disclosure practices is consistent with the reported (weak) negative influence of
company profitability on Greek mandatory corporate disclosure. In other words, Greek
companies which are politically sensitive, either because of their size or of their profits,
tend to disclose less mandatory information in an attempt to decrease their political
costs. It is interesting to note that a similar result has been reported by Craig and
Diga (1998) who presented evidence that politically sensitive companies (banks and
utilities) in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand had the
lowest levels of mandatory information disclosure. Similar evidence has also been
reported by Kim and Limpaphayom (1998), who found a negative relation between
firm size and effective tax rates (which are also used as a proxy for political costs) in
Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand.
Finally, another plausible explanation for the reported negative relationship between
company size and Greek mandatory disclosure may be that Greek large companies
disclose fewer details in their statutory annual reports but: (1) use alternative channels
for communicating the undisclosed mandatory information to specific user groups, for
example through special reports to the tax authorities, lenders, employees,
shareholders etc.; or (2), given that mandatory and voluntary disclosures are
sometimes used as substitutes (Dye, 1985; Wallace and Naser, 1995), it is possible
that some Greek large companies may avoid disclosing extensive mandatory
information but, instead, disclose extensively information which is entirely voluntary.
For example, a Greek company may avoid giving a breakdown and details of
employee remuneration (mandatory information) but may provide details about
employee productivity, performance, fringe benefits, remuneration policy etc.
(voluntary information). Indeed, the researcher noticed that in their 1996 CARs some
large Greek companies disclosed detailed information about voluntary items (e.g.
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Goodies S.A.) or have prepared a separate report which was attached to the CAR and
included voluntary information on specific areas (e.g. Titan S.A.). It is possible that
not taking into account information items that are entirely voluntary has caused the
results on the size variables to be inconsistent with prior results. For this reason, it
would be very interesting if future researchers investigate the disclosure of voluntary
information in Greece and examine the relationship of company size with the voluntary
disclosure practices of Greek companies.
It should be emphasised that although both corporate size and listing status are often
found to associate positively with corporate disclosure (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999), this
is not so in the case of the Greek sample companies. Although the Greek main
market listed companies have been found to disclose more extensively (than parallel—
market listed companies), Greek large companies have been found to disclose less
extensively (than smaller companies). It is also noticeable that the Greek main market
listed companies included in the sample (non—financial companies), are not
significantly bigger (in terms of size) than the parallel market listed companies. 65 It
must also be noted that, in contrast to most previous studies, the listing status variable
in Greece does not capture the effect of being listed or unlisted, but the effect of being
listed on one of the two markets of the ASE.
To summarise, it can be claimed that the reported negative influence of company size
on Greek mandatory disclosure can be explained by theoretical, environmental,
empirical and other considerations. For example this relationship can be attributed to
the distinctive nature of the highly politicised Greek accounting environment and can
be explained by political cost theory. The implication is that political cost theory,
whose predictions have extensively been tested in empirical studies in the U.S., does
not necessarily represent a set of propositions that are applicable in all accounting
65 A t—test was carried out on the mean company sizes (log cap) of the two listing groups. The t—statistic
was -1.586 with the p value being 0.118.
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environments. Hence, it is possible that different predictions about the disclosure of
corporate information may be derived from political cost theory (and possibly other
theories of corporate disclosure) depending on the environment within which the
theory is examined. Thus, whilst in some countries the existence of political costs may
induce large companies to disclose more extensive information, in other countries with
specific environmental and regulatory characteristics, the existence of such costs may
make large companies disclose less extensively. A similar caution has been made by
Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) who found a negative relation between firm size and
effective tax rates (which are also used as a proxy for political costs) in Hong Kong,
Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. Their results also contradict the common
prediction for a positive relation put forth by the political cost hypothesis and is in stark
contrast to the majority of other U.S. findings such as Zimmerman (1983).
Finally, it must be pointed out that the reported relationship between company size
and the extent of Greek corporate disclosure is sensitive to the choice of company
size as a proxy for political costs. Some researchers have argued that the actual
reason why size is important could vary from one country to another and size could act
as a proxy for the complexity of company operations in one country and for political
costs in another (Craig and Diga, 1998). As using company size as a proxy for
political costs has been questioned in the literature, it is possible that a better proxy for
political costs may not give identical results. Alternatively, it may be the case that
large Greek companies disclosed less extensive mandatory information but more
extensive voluntary information, either in their annual reports or through other
communication mediums.
9.4.4	 Company Profitability and Corporate Disclosure
The empirical evidence reported in Chapters 7 and 8 suggests that the influence of
corporate profitability on the extent of information disclosed by Cypriot and Greek
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companies is different. While Cypriot more profitable companies tend to disclose
more information, there is evidence that profitability has no (or a very weak negative)
influence on Greek corporate disclosure. This result lends support to Lang and
Lundholms' (1993, p.250) proposition that "the results from the theoretical and
empirical research suggest disclosure could be increasing, constant, or even
decreasing in correspondence with firm performance".
The reported positive association between profitability and Cypriot corporate
disclosure is in line with most previous empirical research (e.g. Singhvi, 1967; Abu-
Nassar and Rutherford, 1994). The reported positive association is also consistent
with the prediction of agency theory, that managers of profitable companies will want
to disclose extensive information in order to show and explain to shareholders that
they are acting in their best interests and to justify their (the managers') compensation
packages. Additionally, the result for Cypriot companies lends support to the
prediction of signalling theory, that more profitable companies may be encouraged to
disclose more adequate information to the market because failure to signal good news
may be interpreted as bad news. Finally, the positive association between corporate
profitability and Cypriot corporate disclosure is in line with the prediction of political
cost theory, that very profitable companies may disclose more information in order to
justify the level of their reported profits and counter political government intrusions.
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9.5	 SUMMARY
This chapter answered the fourth research question. Section 9.2 summarised and
compared the background information about the Cypriot and Greek accounting
environments provided in Chapter 2. The comparison showed that in spite of their
similarities in terms of ethnicity, language and religion, Cyprus and Greece have
important differences in terms of their accounting environments and corporate
disclosure practices. Due to historical, political, economic and other reasons, Cyprus
follows the Anglo—Saxon accounting model while Greece follows the Franco-German
accounting traditions. Furthermore, the adopted accounting system in each country
has evolved to reflect its respective local environmental characteristics. Section 9.3
summarised and compared the evidence produced by the empirical investigation of
the mandatory disclosure practices of the Cypriot and Greek sample companies that
was undertaken in Chapters 7 and 8. Although an indirect comparison of the results
was made, a more direct comparison was also attempted by trying to derive a
"minimal model". The comparisons confirmed that there are some similarities in terms
of the influence of listing status and industry type on the mandatory disclosure
practices of Cypriot and Greek companies. Nevertheless, the comparison also
confirmed an interesting difference as far as the influence of company size on Cypriot
and Greek corporate disclosure is concerned. Although company size has not been
found to have any significant influence on the extent of mandatory information
disclosed by Cypriot companies, the empirical evidence has shown that in Greece
company size has a negative influence on mandatory corporate disclosure. This
finding is in contrast to the results of most previous disclosure studies which indicated
that in most countries company size is positively associated with corporate disclosure.
This result can be explained by theoretical, environmental, empirical and other
considerations.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
10.1	 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents the main
conclusions of the study and discusses the related policy implications. The first
section also points out some broader issues relating to Cypriot and Greek accounting
which were noticed during the course of this investigation and may deserve some
attention by policy makers in the two countries. The second section discusses the
limitations of the study and the third section identifies and recommends some areas of
further research on the topic.
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10.2 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
10.2.1 Research Objectives
The main objectives of this study were:
(1) To investigate empirically the extensiveness of the Cypriot and Greek corporate
mandatory disclosure practices.
(2) To examine the relationship between each of a number of specific corporate
characteristics and the Cypriot and Greek corporate mandatory disclosure
practices.
(3) To assess whether the variations in the extensiveness of Cypriot and Greek
corporate mandatory disclosure practices can be explained by the selected
corporate characteristics together.
(4) To make appropriate comparisons between the ways in which corporate
characteristics influence Cypriot corporate mandatory disclosure practices and
the ways in which they influence Greek corporate mandatory disclosure
practices.
In order to throw light on Cypriot and Greek accounting, background information about
the respective accounting environments was presented in Chapter 2. The background
information provided, together with a synthesis of the theoretical framework for
corporate disclosure that was undertaken in Chapter 3 and a literature review
presented in Chapter 4, enabled the generation of testable hypotheses in Chapter 5.
The hypotheses were statistically tested in Chapters 7 and 8. The results of the
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statistical analyses undertaken were summarised and compared in Chapter 9. These
results are used in this chapter as a basis on which to formulate appropriate policy
recommendations.
10.2.2 Main Conclusions
The empirical analyses of the Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure practices have
led to four main conclusions.
First, on the basis of the statistical results for research question one, it can be
concluded that the mandatory disclosure practices of the Cypriot and Greek sample
companies, on the whole, appear to be extensive. Applicable information items
disclosed ranged from 66.2 to 97 per cent for Cypriot companies and 83.3 to 92.8 per
cent for Greek companies. Respectively, the mean disclosure scores were 84.7 and
88.8 per cent for Cypriot and Greek companies. These percentages compare
favourably with those reported in some prior mandatory disclosure studies (e.g.
Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Patton and Zelenka, 1997).
Second, on the basis of the statistical results for research questions two and three, the
second main conclusion of the study is that Cypriot public companies which are more
profitable, are classified as conglomerates, or whose shares are listed on the CSE,
tend to disclose significantly more extensive mandatory information in their 1996
CAFSs.
Third, on the basis of the statistical results for research questions two and three, the
third main conclusion of the study is that Greek listed companies which are smaller,
are classified as conglomerates or manufacturing, or whose shares are listed on the
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main market of the ASE, tend to disclose more extensive mandatory information in
their 1996 CAFSs.
Finally, on the basis of the comparative analyses undertaken in Chapter 9, it can be
concluded that although the influence of listing status and industry type on Cypriot and
Greek corporate mandatory disclosure is similar, the influence of company size is
different. In contrast to Cyprus and evidence reported in previous studies, company
size has a negative influence on the extent of Greek corporate mandatory disclosure.
This difference can be explained by theoretical, environmental, empirical and other
considerations.
10.2.3 Policy Implications
The conclusions presented above have at least three important implications for the
regulation of Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure, the use of corporate information
by interested users of CAFSs and the use of political cost theory to make predictions
about corporate financial disclosure. The approach followed in presenting these
implications is to point out the general policy implication arising out of the conclusions
of the study and, then, offer practical recommendations for its implementation.
The first implication relates to the statistical results of the analyses made for research
question one and arises out of the first main conclusion of the study. Although the
Cypriot and Greek corporate mandatory disclosure practices, on the whole, have been
found to be extensive, improvements in mandatory disclosure can still be made. This
is because there is evidence that some companies do not provide sufficiently extensive
mandatory information required under the respective regulatory regimes. For example,
the minimum disclosure scores were 66.20 per cent for Cypriot companies and 83.3
per cent for Greek companies. It is also noticeable that no company in either Cyprus
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or Greece disclosed all sub-elements of mandatory information that could have been
disclosed (maximum relative disclosure scores were 97 per cent for Cypriot companies
and 92.8 per cent for Greek companies). Improvements in corporate mandatory
disclosure can be achieved by several measures. For example, policy makers can
consider introducing better disclosure monitoring mechanisms in order to ensure
stricter compliance with mandatory minima. One measure can be the setting up of a
financial reporting watchdog, that will formally undertake detailed reviews of corporate
disclosure practices and be empowered to take remedial action in case of non-
compliance with disclosure requirements. Another measure that can be taken is the
introduction of educational policies to raise the awareness of companies (that tend to
disclose less extensively) about their disclosure responsibilities. For example,
policymakers can consider the circulation of technical notes clarifying disclosure
regulations and/or making recommendations about the extent of information to be
disclosed. Finally, policymakers can consider organising seminars on a regular basis,
to update practitioners on newly introduced disclosure regulations and to clarify the
provisions of existing regulations on corporate accounting and reporting.
The second implication relates to the statistical results of the analyses made for
research questions two and three and arises out of the second and third main
conclusions of the study. Corporate stakeholders who rely on CAFSs to get useful
information to assist them in their decision making should be wary of Cypriot
companies which are less profitable, are classified as non—conglomerates or are not
listed on the CSE; and Greek companies which are larger, are classified as others or
are listed on the parallel market of the ASE. This is because these companies have
been found to disclose significantly less extensive mandatory information. The users
of the CAFSs of such companies are likely to find out that the CAFSs do not include all
information details that could or should have been disclosed. In such a case, and if
they are interested to get more extensive information about particular aspects of
corporate performance or financial position, they may have to rely on other sources of
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information. These sources can be internal (from within the company) or external
(outside the company). For example, users may have to rely on internal sources such
as voluntary information disclosed in CARs or other specialised voluntary reports (such
as employee reports, environmental reports etc.). Alternatively, users can rely on
external sources such as financial newspapers, government reports, stockbrokers'
research reports, stock exchange statistics etc.
The third implication relates to the results of the comparative analyses undertaken for
research question four and arises out of the fourth main conclusion of the study. It is
possible that different predictions about the disclosure of corporate information may be
derived from political cost theory, depending on the environment within which the
theory is examined. Although it is usually claimed that politically sensitive companies
may disclose more extensively in order to reduce their political costs, the opposite may
be true in the case of countries with specific environmental characteristics (similar to
those existing in Greece in 1996): politically sensitive companies may disclose less
extensively. If company size can be used as a proxy for political costs of Greek
companies, it could be suggested that politically sensitive companies operating within a
highly politicised accounting environment (similar to that existing in Greece in 1996),
could be expected to disclose less extensive mandatory information. It can also be
argued that political cost theory may not necessarily represent a set of propositions
that can be used to derive similar predictions about the disclosure of corporate
information in all accounting environments. As Watts and Zimmerman (1986) put it,
there exist no perfect accounting theories because "theories are simplification of reality
and the world is complex and changing" (Watts and Zimmermann, 1986, p.10).
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10.2.4 Broader Issues Arising Out of this Study
This study was empirical in nature. However, during the process of gathering
background information about the Cypriot and Greek accounting environments, several
policies and/or practices were noted which, in the opinion of the researcher, deserve
some attention by accounting regulators and researchers. It should be made clear,
however, that these issues do not arise out of the statistical analyses made.
For example, in the process of analysing the Cypriot regulatory framework for
accounting it was noted that Cypriot company law is out of date and has not kept
abreast of the rapid development of the Cyprus economy. Additionally, in the process
of gathering background information about the Cypriot accounting profession and
education, it was noted that although Cyprus has a developed and respected
accounting profession, there are virtually no rules and regulations about the training
and education of accountants and the issue of practising certificates. Finally, it was
noticed that the over—emphasis on professional accounting training at the expense of
academic accountancy education has resulted in research on accounting in Cyprus
being poor.
The above issues deserve some attention by accounting regulators and researchers in
Cyprus. For example, it is the opinion of the researcher that the attempt to modernise
Cypriot company law and regulate the Cypriot accounting profession should proceed
without any further delay. In this respect, Cyprus can draw on the experiences of other
countries that have modernised their accounting systems and harmonised them with
EU regulations and practice (e.g. Poland). Additionally, accounting professionals and
academics, possibly in co—operation with the government and other accounting
regulators, can proceed with the establishment of a broad—based national committee
to advance accounting education. The degree programmes in accounting offered in
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the University and the private colleges could be developed to reflect local realities, and
accounting research could be encouraged and supported financially by both the
corporate sector and the government.
In the process of gathering background information about the Greek accounting
environment, some other broader issues arose. For example, it was noticed that in
many cases the local accounting practices are heavily influenced by tax rules.
Additionally, specialised transactions such as leasing and deferred tax are not reflected
in Greek financial statements. The effect of such practices is to make Greek CAFSs
inconsistent with financial statements prepared under the IASs. Another characteristic
of Greek accounting which deserves some attention is the fact that some companies
do not make the notes to the accounts easily accessible to users other than existing
shareholders. This is because these companies do not include the notes to the
accounts in their CAFSs but, instead, file them with the Ministry of Finance and
interested users have to visit the Ministry to obtain a copy.
It is the opinion of the researcher that the above issues need some attention by
accounting regulators in Greece. For example, the current tax influence of certain
accounting practices could be mitigated through, for example, the introduction of one
set of accounting and disclosure rules for tax reporting purposes, and another set of
rules for reporting to other stakeholder groups. Additionally, accounting regulators can
consider the non—comparability of Greek CAFSs with those of other European
countries and, in case it is desirable, introduce rules to remedy this situation (e.g.
introduce lease and deferred tax accounting). Finally, accounting regulators can
amend the annual reporting requirements in order to make the notes to the accounts of
all listed companies easily accessible to prospective investors, the public at large and
other interested users; for example by requiring the publication of the notes to the
accounts in the set of CAFSs released to prospective investors.
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10.3	 LIMITATIONS
10.3.1 General
There are several limitations of this study that should be taken into account in
considering the conclusions and policy implications outlined in the previous section.
Some of the limitations relate to the kind of research design employed and are inherent
in any study following a similar approach. Other limitations have, effectively, been
forced on the investigator (for example due to missing data). Finally, some of the
limitations arise out of decisions made by the researcher in the process of this
investigation and could have been avoided had an alternative decision been taken.
These limitations have been grouped into three categories and are discussed below.
10.3.2 Limitations Relating to the Research Design
The first limitation relates to the operational definition of disclosure extensiveness
used. The definition has been based on the extent of detail disclosed and assumes
that the more disclosure the better. Hence, as in the case of Wallace (1987) and
Owusu—Ansah (1998), this study suffers from "the more disclosure the better"
syndrome and ignores the information—overload problem. Although there is no
empirical evidence to support the existence of the information—overload problem in
emerging economies (Owusu—Ansah, 1998), it should be cautioned that giving a sheer
volume of all required disclosures may overwhelm users' ability to comprehend all
information and focus on the most important items. Additionally, the definition used
ignores the possibility of incorrect or immaterial information given. Nevertheless, this
problem is faced by all researchers and it is usually ignored, since the possibility of
misinformation in annual reports is a problem that it is not logically feasible to
investigate (Wallace and Naser, 1995).
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The second limitation relates to the subjectivity inherent in the scoring process (that is,
confirming whether a particular information item was, in fact, relevant to a company).
In spite of the different safeguards employed to avoid subjectivity in scoring the CAFSs
of the sample companies, the problem may not be completely eradicated. A more safe
method to confirm item applicability is to go directly into a company and, by searching
the records and interviewing the company's officers, decide whether an information
item is relevant or not. However, this is usually not feasible especially in studies where
very detailed disclosure measuring instruments are used.
The third limitation relates to the fact that the results of this study have, in certain
cases, been compared to the results of previous studies. For example, the study
compared the ways in which some corporate characteristics influence Cypriot and
Greek corporate disclosure practices and the ways in which they influence corporate
disclosure practices in other countries (as reported in previous studies). This was
done in order to evaluate whether the results of the study corroborate with prior
empirical evidence. However, any conclusions drawn should be eva(uated with caution
because the studies compared examined companies operating in different countries
and, possibly, within different socio—economic environments. Additionally, the studies
have been carried out in different time periods and are probably inconsistent with this
study in terms of sample type and research method. Nevertheless, such comparisons
are widespread in the literature and this limitation and concern is inherent in any
attempt to compare the results of different disclosure studies.
The fourth limitation is associated with the ascription of causal connection between
corporate disclosure and some corporate characteristics. Based on the definition of
causality adopted in this study, an attempt has been made using regression analysis
and economic theory to establish a cause—effect relationship between corporate
disclosure and a number of corporate characteristics. However, the term causality is
one of the most troublesome concepts in statistics and highly respected researchers
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disagree about what constitutes a cause (Vogt, 1993). Furthermore Kennedy (1996)
stresses that by using the dictionary definition of causality, it becomes impossible to
statistically test for it. It is important to clarify that the term causality, as used in this
study, is used to refer to multiple causation. This implies that: (1) any of the several
causes (corporate characteristics) can produce the same effect (disclosure); and (2),
no one of the causes will necessarily produce the effect; but several of them in
combination make it more likely. Therefore, the term causation used does not imply
that whenever the cause (corporate characteristics) happens, the effect (corporate
disclosure) always does too (simple causation).
Another problem relates to the fact that in undertaking different statistical analyses it
was assumed that the relationships between corporate disclosure and the selected
corporate attributes is linear. Ramanathan (1995) has cautioned that this may be an
unrealistic constraint on a model. However, several approaches were used to
investigate and cater for any non—linear relationships (e.g. transformation of data sets
and investigation for interaction effects) that enabled the researcher to conclude that
the assumption of linearity is reasonably safe.
Finally, there is the issue of the external validity of the study and the extent to which
the findings of this investigation are relevant to subjects and settings beyond those in
the present study. Although the conclusions presented in Section 10.2.2 above are
based on the analysis of the CAFSs of 50 Cypriot and 74 Greek sample companies,
the results can be generalised for all Cypriot public and Greek listed companies which
prepared and published CAFSs in 1996 that could have been used as a meaningful
basis for informed decision making. This generalisation can be made as the sampling
procedures outlined in Section 6.2 of Chapter 6, show that it is reasonable to assume
that the Cypriot and Greek samples are representative of the target populations.
However, generalisation to other settings or to other groups has to be done on other,
non statistical bases (Robson, 1993). For example, generalisability of the findings to
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the post-1996 disclosure practices of the Cypriot public and Greek companies, should
be made with caution; especially in view of the dynamic nature of the Cypriot and
Greek accounting environments in the late 1990s (for example the EU harmonisation
moves in Cyprus and the integration of the Greek economy into the EMU).
10.3.3 Forced Limitations
The first forced limitation relates to the fact that the comparative analysis between the
Cypriot and Greek corporate disclosure practices has been carried out using an
indirect approach (that is, by developing a separate index for each country, carrying
out two single country disclosure investigations and making an indirect investigation of
the results). Nevertheless, this approach was effectively forced on the researcher as
the conditions required to use a direct approach were not satisfied. The countries
compared do not have the same disclosure minima, have certain socio—economic
differences, and there is no empirical evidence about the perceptions of the objectives
of financial statements and the order of importance of disclosure items.
The second forced limitation relates to the selection of the particular corporate
characteristics that have been examined as potential explanatory variables of
corporate disclosure. The corporate characteristics selected have been those capable
of being measured easily and believed to be influential by the researcher and the
practitioners and academics interviewed. The relationships between corporate
disclosure and the selected corporate characteristics were then expressed in the form
of research hypotheses to facilitate their statistical analysis. However, there might
have been other potential hypotheses that could have been derived from the
theoretical framework (such as the existence of share compensation plans for directors
and the existence of audit committees) that would have been very interesting to
examine, but the lack of relevant information made these impossible to consider.
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The measurement of corporate characteristics is not without its limitations. Given that
some of the corporate characteristics cannot be measured directly, it was decided to
infer them by specifying appropriate operational definitions (for example, company size
in Greece was defined on the basis of market capitalisation, net sales and total
assets). However, it is possible that an alternative definition and measurement (for
example, measuring company size on the basis of the total number of shareholders or
the total number of employees) could have had an impact on the selection of
explanatory variables included in the regression model and, thus, could have resulted
in different conclusions. Nevertheless, in most cases, it was the absence of data that
prevented the measurement of a particular characteristic using an alternative
approach.
10.3.4 Study—specific Limitations
The first study—specific limitation is associated with the form of the corporate
communication medium examined. This study focuses on the CAFSs of Cypriot and
Greek non—financial companies. Companies, however, use other media through which
they communicate information (such as prospectuses, press reports, press releases
and interim reports). Information disclosed through such disclosure media were left out
of the empirical investigation. Additionally, the study focuses on information disclosed
by non—financial companies and its conclusions may not necessarily be applicable to
financial companies such as banks and insurance companies.
Another limitation relates to the time horizon of the study. The extent of Cypriot and
Greek corporate disclosure has been examined in this study cross—sectionally.
However, the accounting environments in both Cyprus and Greece are undergoing
important changes (such as the EU harmonisation exercise in Cyprus and the gradual
integration of the Greek economy with other EU economies). Hence, although 1996
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was a convenient and suitable year to use in a comparative analysis of the Cypriot and
Greek corporate disclosure practices, it is still possible that the relative influence of the
selected explanatory variables have changed in view of the dynamic nature of the
Cypriot and Greek accounting environments. Nevertheless, the study does give a
point in time comparison and provides a starting point for future longitudinal research
endeavours.
Thirdly, the definition and measurement of extensive disclosure is not without its
drawbacks. The definition of disclosure extensiveness used in this study has been
based on the extent of compliance with a set of legal and other institutional
requirements. Although this enabled a convenient operationalisation and
measurement of the term extensiveness, it should be admitted that there are
alternative measurement techniques. For example, disclosure extensiveness could
have been evaluated by asking a group of financial analysts to evaluate the CAFSs
and their ratings could have been used as the measure for disclosure extensiveness.
Similarly, disclosure extensiveness was measured by the extent to which companies
disclose mandatory information items. Although this definition captures and element of
voluntary disclosure as well (in the sense that the extent of detail with which mandatory
information is disclosed is up to the discretion of management), it ignores items that
are entirely voluntary. Thus, it may be possible that some of the companies that have
been found to disclose less extensive mandatory information than others may, in fact,
be offering more extensive disclosure about the items that are entirely voluntary.
Perhaps an investigation of voluntary disclosure would result in different conclusions
from those reported in this study.
Finally, the selection of information items included in the scoring instruments have
been based on the disclosure minima in the respective countries, which are believed to
represent what the average user of CAFSs requires in order to take informed
310
decisions. Instead, a questionnaire survey could have been used to identify the stated
information needs of all (or particular) groups of users and the scoring instruments
could have been designed accordingly. Similarly, it has been assumed that each item
is equally important to the average user of CAFSs but in practice some information
items may be more important to decision makers than others. Hence, weighted
disclosure scores might have given different results.
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10.4	 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Future work might extend this type of research by examining information disclosed
through other communication media (such as interim reports) or information disclosed
by other types of companies (such as banks and other financial institutions). Future
research might also examine the disclosure of information by Cypriot and Greek
companies longitudinally. This may give a useful insight on how disclosure practices
change in the Cypriot and Greek accounting environments.
There are also other approaches that can be used to make a comparison of cross—
national corporate disclosure practices. For example, if the relevant conditions are
satisfied one can make a direct comparison of common mandatory disclosure items.
In such a case a researcher can develop a multiple regression model and use as a
potential explanatory variable a company's country of origin. This can reveal whether
corporate disclosure levels are influenced by a company's country of origin and
whether Cypriot or Greek companies provide the highest levels of disclosure.
Alternatively, one may investigate common voluntary disclosure items and
disaggregate the disclosure indexes into categories (or even individual items) of
information. Another cross—national comparative disclosure research endeavour could
be to adopt a multi—country approach, where more than two countries would be
examined. In such a case, researchers should be careful to use a representative
sample of companies from each country in order to be able to separate the effect of
country of origin on corporate disclosure practices. Another development of this type
of research could be to study other aspects of disclosure quality, such as readability
of information disclosed. This would give a more complete picture of national
corporate disclosure practices. Of particular interest would also be a voluntary
disclosure study, especially in the case of Greek companies where the result for
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company size is in contrast to most previous studies. Such a study should enrich our
understanding of Greek corporate financial disclosure.
In measuring corporate disclosure, it would be interesting to use alternative
measurement techniques. For example, questionnaires can be used to elicit the
opinion of specific user groups (such as financial analysts) about the importance of
different information items and assign weights accordingly. Additionally, given that
data availability limited the researcher's ability to study some factors that have been
found to be important in other disclosure studies (such as ownership structure), the
effects of such factors could be examined as additional information becomes available.
In analysing the data, alternative approaches can be employed. For example, in cases
where some of the OLS assumptions are not satisfied (e.g. the residuals are not
normally distributed) robust regression can be used (such as the least absolute
deviations squares). Additionally, a researcher can employ alternative methods of
transformation when dealing with non—linear relationships (such as rank regression) or
attempt to model the relationships between corporate disclosure and corporate
attributes using non—linear models (such as exponential regression).
Finally, given that the effect of company size on the mandatory disclosure practices of
Greek companies has been found to be in contrast to previous research findings, it
would be interesting to investigate this relationship during a later period to see if this
relationship was not time specific. Similarly, it would be interesting to examine whether
the impact of company size on corporate mandatory disclosure practices is not
country specific. For this reason, a similar study on countries with environmental
characteristics similar to those of Greece (strong influence of party politics, extensive
state intervention in accounting matters, negative attitude of people towards
accounting) would be a welcoming initiative.
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10.5	 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study empirically investigated the 1996 financial disclosure practices of Cypriot
and Greek companies. The main findings of the study are:
(1) The 1996 mandatory disclosure practices of Cypriot public and Greek listed
companies, on the whole, appear to be extensive.
(2) Cypriot public companies which are profitable, are classified as conglomerates
or whose shares are listed on the CSE tend to disclose significantly more
extensive mandatory information in their 1996 CAFSs.
(3) Greek listed companies which are smaller, are classified as conglomerates or
manufacturing, or whose shares are listed on the main market of the ASE tend
to disclose significantly more extensive mandatory information in their 1996
CAFSs.
(4) Although the influence of listing status and industry type on Cypriot and Greek
mandatory disclosure practices is similar, the influence of company size is
different. In contrast to Cyprus and most evidence reported in previous studies,
company size has a negative influence on the extent of Greek corporate
mandatory disclosure. This difference can be explained by theoretical,
environmental, empirical and other considerations.
Despite its limitations, it is claimed that this study constitutes a significant addition to
the corporate disclosure literature. Nevertheless, the study concludes by indicating
that corporate financial disclosure has still a long list of unexplored research topics; or
in Socrates' words: we, still, "know nothing except the fact of our ignorance" (469 — 399
BC; cited in Bartlett and Kaplan, 1992).
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PART V
APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX A
CYPRUS vs GREECE:
COMPARISON OF THE 1996 MAIN ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
N° PRACTICE
	
CYPRUS
	
GREECE
1 Organisation of Bookkeeping At the discretion of the directors. The	 chart of accounts outlines the
names, content and interrelationships
among the accounts to be kept.
2 Preparation of Annual Financial
Statements
•	 - Profit and Loss
- Balance Sheet
- Cash flow Statement
- Notes to the accounts
•	 IAS 5 specifies the information to be
presented but no specific formats are
required.
•	 - Income Statement
- Balance Sheet
- Table of Appropriation of Profits
- Prosartima (Notes to the accounts)
•	 The	 General	 Accounting	 Plan
specifies	 in	 detail	 the	 form	 and
content of the financial statements.
3 Basic Accounting Model Used Historic Cost Accounting modified by
subjective revaluations.
Historic Cost Accounting modified by
tax/legally induced revaluations.
4 Fundamental Accounting
Assumptions and Policies
(Principles) followed
Going	 Concern,	 Consistency,
Accruals,	 Prudence,	 Substance over
Form, Materiality.
•	 Prudence,	 Consistency,	 Historic
Cost, Accruals, Matching, Revenue
Recognition,	 Adequate	 Disclosure,
Periodicity,	 Going	 Concern,
Materiality, Objectivity.
•	 Prudence must prevail	 in case of
conflict.
5 Property, Plant & Equipment Valued at purchase price/production
cost subject to subjective revaluations/
impairment according to IAS 16.
Valued	 at purchase price/production
cost subject to revaluations (according
to	 special	 legislation)	 or permanent
devaluations.
6 Depreciation •	 Depreciable	 amount	 should	 be
allocated on a systematic basis over
the useful life of the asset.
•	 Useful	 life,	 residual	 values	 and
depreciation	 methods	 are
subjectively	 determined	 by	 the
directors,
•	 Depreciation	 should	 be	 based	 on
estimated economic life. 	 Rates may
be estimated by management but
maximum rates are prescribed by
law.
•	 Accelerated	 depreciation	 may	 be
provided under various laws.
7 Government Grants •	 Grants should be matched with the
related costs which they intend to
compensate.
•	 Capital	 grants	 should	 either	 be
deducted from the carrying amount
of the asset or separately disclosed as
deferred income.
Capital grants should be credited to a
deferred	 account and taken to the
Income Statement in proportion to the
depreciation of the asset concerned.
8 Capitalisation of Borrowing Costs Should be written off to the P & L
account	 unless	 they	 are	 directly
attributable	 to	 the	 acquisition,
construction	 or	 production	 of	 a
qualifying asset in which case they
should be capitalised as part of the cost
of the asset.
May be written off to the Income
Statement or capitalised and amortised
over 5 years.
9 Intangible Fixed Assets •	 No requirement.
•	 E50 which became a standard in
1997 is not applicable to accounting
periods ending in 1996.
•	 Valued at historic cost and amortised
over the period of their productive
use.
•	 Revaluation is not allowed. 
Purchased goodwill	 is either written
off immediately	 or	 capitalised	 and
amortised over 5 years.
10 Goodwill Purchased	 goodwill	 must	 be
capitalised and amortised over a period
not exceeding	 five	 years	 unless	 a
longer period, not exceeding twenty
years, can be justified.
11 Research & Development •	 Research costs should be recognised
as an expense in the year incurred,
•	 Development	 costs	 should	 be
recognised as an asset if certain strict
criteria	 are	 met;	 otherwise,	 they
should be written off,
•	 Research and development costs can
either be written off immediately or
capitalised	 and	 amortised	 over	 5
years.
•	 No	 definition	 of what constitutes
research and development is offered
by accounting law except in the case
of mineral extraction resources.
12 Incorporation Expenses No	 specific	 provisions	 but	 usually
written	 off	 immediately	 to
undistributable reserves.
Either	 written
	 off	 immediately	 or
capitalised and amortised over 5 years.
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APPENDIX A — continued
• PRACTICE
	
CYPRUS
	
GREECE
13 Leases •	 Lessees should recognise a finance
lease as an asset and show the lease
obligations as a liability,
•	 Lessors should derecognise assets on
finance leases and set up a receivable
equal to the net investment in the
lease.
•	 Rentals on operating leases should be
recorded	 as	 income
	 payable	 and
income receivable by the lessee and
the lessor respectively.
•	 Lessee records rentals as operating
expenses and an appropriate value is
recorded in both assets and liabilities
in the memo accounts.
•	 Lessor	 depreciates	 the	 asset	 and
takes	 income
	 to	 the	 Income
Statement.	 The value of the asset is
recorded in the memo accounts as
property in the hands of third parties.
14 Stocks •	 Valued at the lower of cost and net
realisable value.
•	 Acceptable	 methods	 to	 determine
cost are FIFO, Weighted Average
and LIFO.
•	 Valued at the lower of cost and
market (replacement) price.
•	 Acceptable	 methods	 to	 determine
cost	 are	 FIFO,	 LIFO,	 Average,
Individual and Base Stock.
15 Construction Contracts •	 When outcome can be estimated
reliably contract revenue and costs
should be recognised by reference to
the stage of completion.
•	 An	 expected	 loss	 should	 be
recognised immediately.
•	 Not specifically addressed.
•	 Usually the percentage of completion
method is followed.
16 Receivables •	 Revenue is recognised when realised.
•	 Receivables are stated at the lower of
cost or net realisable value,
•	 Provisions	 are	 subjectively
determined based on the prudence
concept.
•	 Usually shown at their stated value
reduced	 by	 provisions	 to	 cover
specific losses.
•	 Usually the provisions charged are
the maximum allowed against tax
and are not prudently determined.
17 Investments •	 Current asset investments should be
carried either at market value or the
lower of cost and market value.
	 If
the latter method is used the carrying
amount should be determined either
on a portfolio or on an individual
basis,
•	 Long term asset investments should
be carried either at cost or revalued
amounts or, in the case of marketable
securities, at the lower of cost and
market	 value	 determined	 on	 a
portfolio basis.
•	 Valuation
	 differences
	 should	 be
taken to the P & L account or to the
owners' equity subject to the rules of
IAS 25.
•	 Investments	 in	 corporations	 are
valued at the lower of cost, market
value	 or	 the
	 value	 in	 previous
financial statements determined on a
portfolio basis.
•	 Investments	 in	 unincorporated
enterprises are valued at the lower of
cost and market value determined on
an individual basis.
•	 Any differences arising should be
taken to the Income Statement.
18 Liabilities •	 Current	 liabilities	 are	 those
obligations payable within one year
and are stated at their repayment
values,
•	 Long	 term	 liabilities	 are	 usually
stated at their maturity value,
•	 Current liabilities are shown at their
face or repayment value.
•	 Long term liabilities are shown at
their maturity value reduced by the
amount of unrealised interest which
appears	 in	 the	 contra	 liability
account.
19 Provisions
(including pension costs)
•	 Provisions	 for	 identified	 liabilities
should
	 be	 made	 based	 on	 the
probability of crystallisation.
•	 Provisions	 for	 bad	 debts	 are
subjectively determined based on the
prudence concept.
•	 Provisions	 for pensions and other
retirement benefits are made during
the service life of the employee in
accordance	 with	 the	 accruals
concept.
•	 In theory companies should make
adequate provisions for bad debts,
employees severance pay etc.
•	 In practice, provision for bad debts is
calculated at a percentage of sales as
stipulated by tax law.
•	 Provision for severance pay is not
usually made because it is not tax
deductible.
•	 Provisions	 are	 not	 defined
	 as
liabilities or reserves but accountants
consider them as "special	 purpose
reserves".
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20 Taxation •	 Tax	 is	 shown	 as	 an	 expense
including over/under adjustments for
the tax charge of previous years.
•	 Deferred tax should be provided for
using the deferral or liability method,
on all timing differences. 	 The tax
expense may exclude the tax effects
of certain timing differences when
there is reasonable evidence that they
will	 not	 reverse	 for	 some
considerable period ahead.
•	 Tax is shown as an appropriation of
profit	 and	 may	 also	 include
additional taxes assessed by the tax
authorities for prior years.
•	 Deferred	 tax	 is	 not	 reflected
	 in
financial statements.
21 Contingencies and Other
Commitments
•	 Contingent gains should be disclosed
if it is probable that the gain will be
realised,
•	 Contingent	 losses	 should	 be
recognised	 if it	 is	 probable,	 and
disclosed in the notes if possible, that
they will be incurred.
They are usually recorded in the memo
accounts	 which	 do	 not
	 interchange
with the regular accounts.
22 Reserves •	 If	 share	 capital	 is	 issued	 at	 a
premium the surplus is credited to a
share premium account,
•	 Only realised profits are credited to
the P & L account.
•	 Reserves	 are	 classified	 as	 either
revaluation,	 P	 &	 L,	 capital
redemption and other reserves.
•	 A legal reserve of one—third of share
capital	 should	 be	 created	 via	 the
annual appropriation of at least 5%
of annual profits.
•	 General	 reserves	 can	 be	 formed
freely	 but	 their distribution
	 needs
AGM	 approval.	 130th	 legal	 and
general reserves are taxable.
•	 "Hidden"	 (tax	 free)	 reserves	 are
usually	 provided	 through
undervaluation	 of	 assets	 and
overprovision of liabilities	 because
of the influence of tax requirements.
23 Capital •	 Called—up	 share	 capital	 must	 be
disclosed as the aggregate amount of
the calls made, whether or not they
have been paid.
•	 Own shares may be purchased under
specific circumstances.
•	 Called—up share capital not paid is
shown as a debtor.
•	 Capital is shown at par value with
share	 premium	 disclosed	 in	 a
separate equity account.
•	 Own shares may be purchased under
exceptional	 cases	 and	 are	 usually
extinguished.
•	 If any shares are outstanding at year
end there are shown as a current
asset and an off—setting reserve is set
up out of current year's profits.
24 Foreign Currency Translation •	 The	 general	 rule	 for	 individual
company transactions is that they are
recorded using the rate at the date of
the transaction.	 Monetary items are
reported at the balance sheet date
using	 the	 closing	 rate	 and	 non—
monetary items using the historic
rate.	 Exchange	 differences
	 are
normally recorded to the P & L
account.
•	 The financial statements of a foreign
operation	 that	 is	 integral	 to	 the
operations of the reporting enterprise
should	 be	 translated	 using	 the
individual company rules,
•	 The financial statements of foreign
entities should be translated using
the closing rate for monetary and
non—monetary assets and liabilities
and historic rates for income and
expenses.	 All exchange differences
should be classified as equity.
•	 The	 general	 rule	 for	 individual
company transactions is that each
asset, liability, revenue or expense is
translated using the transaction rate.
Monetary assets	 and	 liabilities
	 are
translated using the closing rate.
•	 The general rule for the translation of
the financial statements of foreign
subsidiaries is that they should be
translated using the historic rate for
non—monetary items, the closing rate
for monetary items and the average
rate for the profit and loss items.
Exchange differences are normally
taken to the Income Statement.
318
APPENDIX A — continued
ACCOUNTING PRACTICE
	
CYPRUS
	
GREECE
25 Revenues and Expenses •	 Income and expenses are classified
as	 ordinary	 or	 extraordinary.	 If
ordinary	 items	 are	 of such	 size,
nature	 or	 incidence	 that	 their
separate disclosure is necessary then
it should be made.
•	 In	 the	 case	 of	 discontinued
operations the revenue and the profit
or loss from ordinary activities of the
operation should be disclosed.
•	 Revenues and expenses are classified
as ordinary or extraordinary.
•	 Overstatement	 of	 expenses	 is
common	 practice,	 with	 provisions
and
	 depreciation	 being	 the	 most
frequently overstated	 items,
	 giving
rise to hidden reserves.
26 Appropriations Net profit is appropriated to dividends
and transfer to reserves. 	 The balance
is retained as the P & L reserve,
Net profit is appropriated to dividends,
legal	 reserves,	 income	 taxes	 and
directors' fees. The balance is retained
as an optional reserve.
27 Earnings per Share •	 No requirement.
•	 E52 became a standard in 1997.
No requirement.
28 Memo Accounts No requirement. They	 are	 a	 separate	 category	 of
accounts	 that	 operate	 dually	 in	 an
autonomous accounting system.
29 Definition of a Subsidiary The definition of a subsidiary is based
on control rather than ownership.
As in the case of Cyprus.
30 Basic Consolidation Methods •	 A business combination which is an
acquisition should be accounted for
by use the of the purchase method
of accounting and one which is a
unification	 of	 interests
	 by	 the
pooling of interests method.
•	 Positive differences arising under the
purchase	 method	 should	 be
capitalised and written off over 5 (or
maximum)	 20	 years.	 Negative
differences are either eliminated by
reducing	 proportionately
	 the	 fair
values of non—monetary assets or
treated	 as	 negative	 goodwill	 and
recognised as	 income over 5	 (or
maximum) 20 years.
•	 Differences	 arising	 under	 the
pooling of interests method should
be adjusted against equity.
•	 All business combinations should be
accounted	 for
	 using	 acquisition
accounting.
•	 Positive differences on consolidation
should
	 either	 be	 written
	 off
immediately	 or	 capitalised	 and
amortised over a period of 5 years.
•	 Negative differences may be shown
as a reserve and transferred partly or
wholly to the Income Statement if
they correspond to a realised profit or
to an expectation of unfavourable
future results.
31 Equity Accounting •	 The equity method of accounting
should
	 be	 used	 for	 an	 associate
company.
•	 For jointly controlled operations the
assets controlled, liabilities incurred,
income earned and expenses incurred
should be reported.
•	 Jointly controlled entities should be
accounted	 for	 using	 the	 equity
method	 or	 the	 proportional
consolidation method.
•	 Equity accounting should be used for
participating	 interests	 in	 associated
companies.
•	 Proportional	 consolidation	 is	 not
allowed.
32 Segmental Information A reporting entity should report for
each	 reported	 industry	 and
geographical segment the sales, results,
assets employed and basis of inter—
segmental pricing.
No requirement.
33 Financial Instruments •	 Financial	 instruments	 should	 be
presented as liabilities or as equity in
accordance with the substance of the
item concerned.
•	 Interests, dividends, losses and gains
of a financial	 liability	 should	 be
reported as expense_or income.
•	 Information	 about	 credit	 risk
exposure and about interest rate risk
exposure should be reported for each
class	 of	 financial
	 assets	 and
liabilities.
No requirement.
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34 Cash Flow Statement A Cash Flow Statement should be
prepared and presented as an integral
part of the financial statements.
No requirement.
35 Changing Prices •	 Disclosure	 of	 a	 depreciation
adjustment, cost of sales adjustment,
monetary items adjustment and the
effect	 of	 borrowing	 on	 equity
interests should be made when such
adjustments have been taken into
account.
No requirement.
•	 The overall effect on results of the
above adjustments are encouraged.
36 Distributions •	 No mention of distributable profits in
company law.
•	 Table	 A	 simply	 states	 that	 no
dividend shall be paid out otherwise
than out of profits.
•	 Current	 UK	 practice	 is	 normally
followed	 where	 distributions	 can
only be paid out of accumulated
realised	 profits	 after	 taking	 into
account accumulated realised losses.
•	 A minimum amount equal to 5% of
annual profits must be transferred to
a statutory reserve until it reaches
1/3	 of	 share	 capital.	 This	 is
undistributable but can be used to
offset a deficit.
•	 Of the remaining profits, a minimum
dividend of at least 6% of the paid
up capital or 35% of annual profits
(whichever is greater) must be paid.
This can be waived by a majority
vote representing 95% of the paid up
capital taken at an AGM.
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APPENDIX B
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE MEASURING INSTRUMENT
FOR CYPRUS
1.
SUMMARY OF MARK ALLOCATIOIV
MARKS
GENERAL DISCLOSURES
1.1	 General Presentation
	 14
1.2	 Accounting Policies	 29
1.3	 Changes in Accounting Policy	 7
1.4	 Fundamental Errors	 8
1.5	 Other items	 1
1.6	 Business Combinations During the Period 	 6
1.7	 Acquisitions	 3
1.8	 Uniting of Interests 	 4
1.9	 Consolidated Financial Statements 	 8
1.10 Foreign Currency	 4 84
2. BALANCE SHEET
2.1	 Current Assets	 18
2.2	 Long—term Assets	 45
2.3	 Current Liabilities	 14
2.4	 Long—term Liabilities 	 12
2.5	 Shareholders' Equity 	 8
2.6	 Surplus and Reserves	 3 100
3. INCOME STATEMENT
3.1	 Revenue
	 7
3.2	 Cost of Sales	 2
3.3	 Other Items	 32 41
4. CASH FLOW STATEMENT 15
C/F 240
66 The measuring instrument is mainly based on information items required to be disclosed by the IASs
applicable as at 31 December 1996 (IAS 1-32). This is because the IASs tend to demand more detailed
disclosure than the Cypriot Companies Act 1951. In case an information item is required to be disclosed
under either the IASs or the Act, the most comprehensive requirement is selected. Part 6 of the
measuring instrument includes those information items which are more comprehensively required to be
disclosed under the Act. The measuring instrument has been validated by the international accounting
firms of Coopers & Lybrand (Cyprus) and Price Waterhouse (Cyprus).
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5.
6.
B/F
OTHER DISCLOSURES
5.1	 Contingencies
5.2	 Commitments
5.3	 Government Assistance
5.4	 Income Taxes
5.5	 Interest Capitalised
5.6	 Leases
5.7	 Retirement Benefits
5.8	 Related Party Transactions
5.9	 Segmental Information
5.10 Subsequent Events
5.11	 Discontinued Operations
5.12 Goodwill
5.13 Hyperinflationary Economies
ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURES REQUIRED BY
THE CYPRIOT COMPANIES ACT 1951 —
CHAPTER 113
6.1	 Signatures
6.2	 Income Statement
6.3	 Balance Sheet
6.4	 Group Financial Statements
3
1
4
6
1
6
10
4
7
2
4
6
4
1
6
18
9
240
21
37
34
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CORPORATE DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
COMPANY NAME' 	
RESEARCH CODE: 	
DISCLOSURE SCORE:
(1) ACTUAL: 	
(2) MAXIMUM: 	
(3) RELATIVE' 	
STRUCTURE RELATED VARIABLES:
(1)	 COMPANY SIZE:
(i) Total Sales: 	
(ii) Total Assets: 	
(2)	 COMPANY AGE:
Number of Years Since Date of Incorporation: 
	
PERFORMANCE RELATED VARIABLES:
(1)	 PROFITABILITY:
(i) Profit Margin: 	
(ii) Rate of Return: 	
(2)	 LIQUIDITY:
Current Ratio: 	
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MARKET RELATED VARIABLES:
(1)	 INDUSTRY TYPE:
(i) Manufacturing: 	
(ii) Conglomerate: 	
(iii) Other: 	
(2)	 LISTING STATUS:
(i) Listed: 	
(ii) Unlisted: 	
(3)	 AUDITOR TYPE:
(i) Big 5. 	
(ii) Non—Big 5: 	
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APPENDIX B — continued
PART 1 — GENERAL DISCLOSURES
1.1	 GENERAL PRESENTATION
YES NO N/A
1.1.1	 General 
1.1.1.1 Name of the enterprise	 0	 0	 0	 1
1.1.1.2 Country of incorporation	 0	 0	 0	 2
1.1.1.3 Balance sheet date	 0	 0	 0	 3
1.1.1.4 Period covered by the financial statements
	 0	 0	 0	 4
1.1.1.5 Brief description of the nature of its activities
	 0	 0	 0	 5
1.1.1.6 The legal form of the enterprise (IAS 5, Par. 7)
	 0	 0	 0	 6
1.1.2 Reporting Currency
1.1.2.1 Reporting currency
1.1.2.2 Reasons why reporting currency is not the
currency of the country of domicile
1.1.2.3 Reasons for change in reporting currency
(IAS 5, Par. 7 and IAS 21, Par. 43)
1.1.3 Classification, Aggregation and Offsetting
Explanations of classification, aggregation and offsetting
of items if necessary to make their meanings clear (IAS
5, Par. 8)
O 0 0 7
O 0 0 8
O 0 0 9
O 0 0 10
1.1.4 Corresponding Figures
Corresponding figures for preceding period (IAS 5, Par.
9)	 0	 0 0 11
1.1.5 Fundamental Accounting Assumptions
1.1.5.1 Departures	 from fundamental accounting
assumptions (going concern, consistency,
accruals)	 0	 0	 0	 12
1.1.5.2 Reasons for departures	 0	 0	 0	 13
1.1.5.3 Different accounting bases
(IAS 1, Par. 3)	 0	 0	 0	 14
1.2	 ACCOUNTING POLICIES
1.2.1	 General
1.2.1.1 Significant accounting policies
1.2.1.2 Overall valuation policy
(IAS 1, Par. 8)
1.2.2 Change in Accounting Estimate
Nature and amount of material change in accounting
estimate or impracticality of quantifying the amount (IAS
8, Par. 3) O 0 0 17
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YES NO N/A
1.2.3 Property Plant and Equipment
1.2.3.1 Accounting policies adopted for each class of
property, plant and equipment
	
0	 0	 0	 18
1.2.3.2 Depreciation methods and rates, or useful
lives	 0	 0	 0	 19
1.2.3.3 Restoration costs [IAS 4, Par. 15; IAS 16, Par. 16
(a), (b) and (d); IAS 16, Par. 67 (c)]
	
0	 0	 0	 20
1.2.3.4 Effect of changes in estimated useful lives of
depreciable assets (IAS 4, Par. 8)
	 0	 0	 0	 21
1.2.3.5 Effect and reason for changing depreciation
methods (IAS 4, Par.12)
	 0	 0	 0	 22
1.2.4 Investments
1.2.4.1 Accounting policy for investments
	 0	 0	 0	 23
1.2.4.2 Determination of carrying amounts
	 0	 0	 0	 24
1.2.4.3 Treatment of changes in market value of
current assets	 0	 0	 0 25
1.2.4.4 Treatment of revaluation surpluses on sale
of revalued investments [IAS 25, Par. 49 (a)] 	 0	 0	 0	 26
1.2.5 Subsidiaries and Associates
1.2.5.1 Method used to account for subsidiaries [IAS 27,
Par. 29 (a) & (b); IAS 27, Par. 30; IAS 27, Par. 32
(c)]	 O	 0 0 27
1.2.5.2 Method used to account for associates [IAS 28,
Par. 14; IAS 28, Par. 27 (b)]	 0	 0	 0	 28
1.2.6 Inventories
Accounting policies for measuring inventories (stock and
work—in—progress), including cost—formula used [IAS 2,
Par. 34 (a)]
1.2.7 Goodwill and Intangible Assets
Accounting treatment for goodwill, negative goodwill and
intangible assets [IAS 4, Par. 14; 15; IAS 5, Par. 12; IAS
22, Par. 72 (a)]
1.2.8 Retirement Benefits
1.2.8.1 Accounting	 treatment for retirement benefit
costs
1.2.8.2 Description of actuarial valuation method
[IAS 5, Par. 10 (c); IAS 19, Par. 51 (b)]
1.2.9 Tax
Accounting method for tax—effect accounting (IAS12,
Par. 1)
O 0 0 29
O 0 0 30
O 00 31
O 0 0 32
O 0 0 33
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1.2.10 Borrowin g Costs
Accounting policy for borrowing costs
[IAS 23, Par. 9; IAS 23, Par. 29 (a)]
1.2.11 Research and Development
Accounting policy for research and development costs
[IAS 9, Par. 30 (a)]
1.2.12 Revenue Recognition
Accounting policy for revenue recognition [IAS 18, Par.
35 (a)]
1.2.13 Construction Contracts
1.2.13.1 Accounting policy for recognition of revenue
from long—term construction contracts
1.2.13.2 Methods of determination of revenue and
stages of completion [IAS 11, Par. 39 (b) &
(c)]
1.2.14 Finance Leases
Accounting basis used by lessor to recognise income on
finance leases [IAS 17, Par. 53)]
1.2.15 Government Grants
Accounting policy for government grants and method of
presentation [IAS 20, Par. 39 (a)]
YES NO N/A
O 0 0 34
O 0 0 35
O 0 0 36
O 0 0 37
O 0 0 38
O 0 0 39
O 0 0 40
1.2.16 Financial Instruments
Accounting policy for recognition, measurement and
hedge accounting of financial instruments (IAS 32, Par.
49 (b); IAS 32, Par. 93)	 0	 0	 0	 41
1.2.17 Discontinuance of Operations
Accounting policy used to measure gains or losses on
discontinuance of operations [IAS 8, Par. 20 (e)]
1.2.18 Changing Prices
Methods adopted, and nature of indices used, to reflect
the effects of changing prices (IAS 15, Par. 23)
1.3	 CHANGES IN ACCOUNTING POLICY
1.3.1 Benchmark Treatment — Adjust Opening Retained
Earnings
1.3.1.1 Reasons for material changes (IAS 8, Par. 53
(a); IAS 19, Par. 50)
O 0 0 42
O 0 0 43
O 0 0 44
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1.3.1.2 Effect of changes in accounting policies relating
on the current period and each period
presented
(IAS 8, Par. 53 (b); IAS 8, Par. 54)
1.3.1.3 Effect of changes in accounting policies relating
to periods prior to those included in the
comparative information [IAS 8, Par. 53 (c)]
1.3.1.4 Restatement of comparative information or
disclosure of impracticability of restatement [IAS
8, Par. 53 (d)]
1.3.2 Allowed Alternative Treatment— Include in Current 
Year's Income Statement
1.3.2.1 Reasons for material changes [IAS 8, Par. 57
(a)]
1.3.2.2 Amount of adjustment recognised in net
profit or loss in the current period [IAS 8, Par.
57 (b)]
1.3.2.3 Amount of adjustment for each period for which
pro forma information is presented and for
periods prior to those included in the financial
statements. If impracticable to do so, this fact is
disclosed [IAS 8, Par. 57 (c)]
1.4	 FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS
1,4.1 Benchmark Treatment — Adjust Opening Retained
Earnings
1.4.1.1 Nature of fundamental errors [IAS 8, Par. 37 (a)]
1.4.1.2 Amount of the correction for current period and for
each prior period presented [IAS 8, Par. 37 (b)]
1.4.1.3 Amount of the correction for periods prior to
those included in the comparative information
[IAS 8, Par. 37 (c)]
1.4.1.4 Restatement of comparative information or
disclosure of the impracticability of restatement
[IAS 8, Par. 37 (d); IAS 8, Par. 381
1.4.2 Allowed Alternative Treatment — Include in Current
Year's Income Statement
1.4.2.1 Nature of the fundamental error [IAS 58, Par. 40
(a)]
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 45
0 0 0 46
0 0 0 47
0 0 0 48
0 0 0 49
0 0 0 50
0 0 0 51
0 0 0 52
0 0 0 53
0 0 0 54
0 0 0 55
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YES NO N/A
1.4.2.2 Amount of the correction recognised in net profit
or loss for current period [IAS 8, Par. 40 (b)] 	 0	 0	 0	 56
1.4.2.3 Amount of the correction in each period for
which pro forma information is presented	 0	 0	 0	 57
1.4.2.4 Amount of the correction for periods prior to
those included in the pro forma information or
disclosure of the impracticability of presenting
pro forma information [lAS 8, Par. 40 (c)]
1.5	 OTHER ITEMS
Security given in respect of liabilities (that is, carrying
amount of inventory and PPE pledged) [IAS 2, Par. 34
(f); IAS 5, Par. 10 (b); IAS 16, Par. 67 (b)]
1.6
	 BUSINESS COMBINATIONS DURING THE PERIOD
1.6.1	 Names and descriptions of combining enterprises
[IAS 22, Par. 70 (a)]
1.6.2	 Method of accounting [IAS 22, Par. 70 (b)]
1.6.3	 Effective date for accounting purposes [IAS 22, Par. 70
(c)]
1.6.4 Any operations resulting from business combinations
which the enterprise has decided to dispose of [IAS 22,
Par. 70 (d)]
O 0 0 58
O 0 0 59
O 0 0 60
O 0 0 61
O 0 0 62
O 0 0 63
1.6.5
	 Nature and amount of provisions for restructuring and
other plant closure expenses related to an acquisition
[IAS 22, Par. 71 (c)] 	 0	 0	 0	 64
1.6.6	 Information about business combinations effected after
the balance sheet date or the fact that it is impracticable
to disclose such information (IAS 22, Par. 76) 	 O	 0	 0	 65
1.7	 ACQUISITIONS
1.7.1
	 Percentage of voting shares acquired [IAS 22, Par. 71
(a)]	 0	 0 0 66
1.7.2	 Cost of acquisition and description of purchase
consideration paid or contingently payable [IAS 22, Par.
71 (b)]	 O	 0	 0 67
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1.7.3 If fair values of the assets and liabilities or the purchase
consideration is only determinable on a provisional basis,
state this fact and the reasons and any subsequent
adjustments (LAS 22, Par. 73)
1.8
	
UNITING OF INTERESTS
1.8.1	 Description and number of shares issued [IAS 22, Par.
74 (a)]
1.8.2	 Percentage of each	 enterprise's voting shares
exchanged
[IAS 22, Par. 74 (a)]
1.8.3	 Amounts of assets and liabilities contributed by each
enterprise [IAS 22, Par. 74 (b)]
1.8.4	 Sales revenue, other operating revenues, extraordinary
items and the net profit or loss of each enterprise prior to
the date of the combination that are included in net profit
or loss of the combined enterprise [IAS 22, Par. 74 (c)]
1.9	 CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1.9.1 Reasons why consolidated financial statements have not
been presented and basis on which subsidiaries are
accounted for (IAS 27, Par. 8)
1.9.2 Name and registered office of its parent that publishes
consolidated financial statements (IAS 27, Par. 8)
1.9.3 Listing of all significant subsidiaries, including name,
country of incorporation, ownership interest, and voting
interest (if different) [IAS 27, Par. 32 (a)]
1.9.4 Reasons for not consolidating a subsidiary and the basis
on which such subsidiary is accounted for DAS 27, Par.
32 (b) (i)]
1.9.5 Nature of relationship between parent and subsidiary if
parent does not own, directly or indirectly, more than 50%
of the voting power [IAS 27, Par. 32 (b) (ii)]
1.9.6 Name of an enterprise in which more than 50% of the
voting power is owned, directly or indirectly, but which,
because of the absence of control, is not a subsidiary
[IAS 27, Par. 32 (b) (iii)]
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 68
0 0 0 69
0 0 0 70
0 0 0 71
0 0 0 72
0 0 0 73
0 0 0 74
0 0 0 75
0 0 0 76
0 0 0 77
0 0 0 78
330
APPENDIX B — continued
1.9.7 Effect of the acquisition and disposal of subsidiaries on
the financial position at the reporting date, results for the
reporting period and on the corresponding amounts for
the preceding period [IAS 27, Par. 32 (b) (iv)]
1.9.8 Disclose whether uniform accounting principles have
been used. If not that fact should be disclosed together
with he proportions of the items to which the different
accounting policies have been applied (IAS 27, Par. 21)
1.10 FOREIGN CURRENCY
1.10.1 General
1.10.1.1 Net exchange differences classified as a
separate component of equity and reconciliation
of such amounts at beginning and end of the
period [IAS 21, Par. 17; IAS 21 Par. 19; IAS 21,
Par. 42 (b)]
1.10.1.2 Nature and reason of change in classification of
a foreign operation DAS 21, Par. 44 (a) & (b)]
1.10.1.3 Impact of change in classification of a foreign
operation on shareholders' equity [IAS 21, Par.
44 (c)]
1.10.2 Allowed Alternative Treatment
Amount of exchange differences arising during the period
included in the carrying amount of an asset under the
allowed alternative treatment PAS 21, Par. 21; IAS 21,
Par. 42 (c)]
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 79
0 0 0 80
0 0 0 81
0 0 0 82
0 0 0 83
0 0 0 84
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PART 2— BALANCE SHEET
YES NO N/A
2.1	 CURRENT ASSETS67
2.1.1	 General
Total amount of current assets (IAS 13, Par. 19)
	 0	 0	 0	 85
2.1.2 Cash and Bank Balances
Cash subject to short—term restrictions [IAS 5, Par. 13 (a);
IAS 13, Par. 13 (a)]
2.1.3 Marketable Securities
2.1.3.1 Marketable securities other than long—term
investments [IAS 5, Par. 13 (b); IAS 13, Par. 13
(b)]
2.1.3.2 Market value of marketable securities if different
from carrying amount [IAS 5, Par. 13 (b); IAS 25,
Par. 49 (c)]
2.1.4 Receivables and Prepaid Expenses
2.1.4.1 Trade receivables due from:
(i) Directors
(ii) Intercompany
(iii) Associates
(iv) Other
(IAS 5, Par. 12 (b); IAS 5, Par. 13 (c); IAS 2,
Par. 22)
2.1.4.2 Amount of receivables and prepaid expenses
expected to be realised within one year of
balance sheet date [IAS 13, Par. 43 (c)]
2.1.4.3 Gross amount due from customers for
construction contract work—in—progress [IAS 11,
Par. 42 (a)]
O 0 0 86
O 0 0 87
O 0 0 88
O 00 89
000 90
000 91
O 0 0 92
O 0 0 93
O 0 0 94
2.1.4.4 Advance payments on purchase of current assets
[IAS 13, Par. 13 (e)] 	 0	 0	 0	 95
2.1.4.5 Prepaid expenses expected to be used up
within one year [IAS 5, Par. 13 (c); IAS 13, Par.
13 (f)]	 O	 0	 0	 96
67 IAS 13 Presentation of Current Assets and Current Liabilities", paragraphs 13 to 21, apply to those
enterprises which present a balance sheet with a distinction between current and non—current assets.
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2.1.5 Inventories
2.1.5.1 Inventories DAS 5, Par. 13 (d); IAS 13, Par. 13
(d)]
2.1.5.2 Carrying amount of inventories in total and by
appropriate classifications [IAS 2, Par. 34 (b)]
2.1.5.3 Amount of inventories carried at net realisable
value [IAS 2, Par. 34 (c)]
2.1.5.4 Amount and circumstances related to reversals of
write—downs of inventories recognised as income
in the period [IAS 2, Par. 34 (b) and (e)]
Allowed Alternative Treatment
2.1.5.5 When the cost of inventories is determined using
LIFO, disclose the difference between LIFO
carrying amount of inventories and the lower of
current cost and net realisable value DAS 2, Par.
36 (a) & (b)]
2.1.5.6 Deduction of ptogress payments anti
advances from related construction work in
progress (IAS 13, Par. 21)
2.2	 LONG—TERM ASSETS
2.2.1 Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE)
2.2.1.1 Analysis between
(i) Land and buildings
(ii) Plant and equipment
(iii) Other categories
(iv) Separate disclosure should be made of lease
holds and of assets being acquired on
installment purchase plans
[IAS 5, Par. 11 (a), (b), & (c)]
2.2.1.2 For each class of PPE, gross carrying amount for
each category if different bases are used [IAS 16,
Par. 66 (a)]
2.2.1.3 For each class of PPE, gross carrying
amount and accumulated depreciation at
beginning and end of period [IAS 5, Par. 11
(d);IAS 16, Par. 66 (d)]
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 97
0 0 0 98
0 0 0 99
0 0 0 1 00
0 0 0 10 1
0 0 0 102
0 0 0 103
0 0 0 104
0 0 0 105
0 0 0 106
0 0 0 107
0 0 0 108
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2.2.1.4 For each class of PPE, reconciliation of carrying
amount at	 beginning and end of period	 [IAS 16,
YES NO N/A
Par. 66 (e)] 0 0 0 109
2.2.1.5 Whether future cash flows have been discounted
in determining recoverable amounts [IAS 16, Par. 0 0 0 110
67 (a)]
2.2.1.6	 Existence and amounts of restrictions on title and
assets	 pledged	 as security
[IAS 16, Par. 67 (b); IAS 2, Par. 34 (f); IAS 5, Par.
10 (a)] 0 0 0 111
2.2.1.7 Expenditures on assets under construction
[IAS 16, Par. 67 (d)] 0 0 0 112
2.2.1.8 Costs	 incurred	 and	 recognised
	 profits less
recognised
	 losses	 to	 date,	 on	 long—term
construction	 contracts	 in	 progress	 at	 balance
sheet date [IAS 11, Par. 40 (a)]
0 0 0 113
Allowed Alternative Treatment
2.2.1.9 When PPE are stated at revalued amounts under
the allowed alternative treatment:
(i)	 Revaluation basis 0 0 0 114
(ii) Effective date of revaluation 0 0 0 115
(iii) Involvement of independent valuers
(iv) Nature of indices used to determine
replacement cost
(v)	 Hypothetical carrying amounts (as if carried at
cost less depreciation) for each class
(vi) Revaluation surplus, movement for period and
any	 restrictions
	 on	 its	 distribution	 to
shareholders
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
116
117
118
(IAS 16, Par. 70) 0 0 0 119
Other Lonct-Term Assets
0 0 0 120
2.2.2.1 Method and period of depreciation of long—term
assets other than PPE (IAS 5, Par. 12)
2.2.2.2 Unusual write—offs during the period of long—term
assets other than PPE (IAS 5, Par. 12) 0 0 0 121
2.2.2.3 Long term
	 receivables broken down
	 between
accounts and notes receivable, receivables from
directors,	 intercompany receivables,
	 receivables
from associates and other receivables
	 [IAS 5,
Par. 12 (b)] 0 0 0 122
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2.2.2.4 Amortisation methods, useful lives or amortisation
rates, reconciliation of the carrying amount of
development costs recognised as an asset at the
beginning and the end of the period [IAS 9, Par.
30 (c), (d) & (e)]
2.2.2.5 Patents, trademarks, and similar assets
[IAS 5, Par. 12 (d)]
2.2.2.6 Expenditure carried forward eg deferred taxes,
preliminary expenses [IAS 5, Par. 12 (e)]
2.2.3 Other Long—Term Investments
2.2.3.1 Investments analysed into:
(i) Subsidiaries (if not consolidated)
(ii) Associates
(iii) Other
[IAS 5, Par 12 (a)]
2.2.3.2 Fair value of investment properties if accounted
for as long—term investments and not carried at
fair value
[IAS 25, Par. 28 (b); IAS 25, Par. 49 (d)]
2.2.3.3 Significant restrictions on realisability of
investments or remittance of income and
proceeds of disposal
[IAS 25, Par. 49 (e)]
2.2.3.4 Frequency, basis of revaluations, date of latest
revaluation of long—term investments, and if
external valuer is used [IAS 25, Par. 49 (f)]
2.2.3.5 For enterprises the main business of which is the
holding of investments, analysis of the portfolio
[IAS 25, Par. 49 (h)]
2.2.3.6 Investment enterprises: summary of movements
in value of their investments for period (IAS 25,
Par. 45)
2.2.4 Investments in Associates
2.2.4.1 Listing and description of significant associates,
proportion of ownership interest and, if different,
proportion of voting power held [IAS 28, Par. 27
(a)]
2.2.4.2 The method used to account for such associates
[lAS 28, Par. 27 (b)]
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 123
0 0 0 124
0 0 0 125
0 0 0 126
0 0 0 127
0 0 0 128
0 0 0 129
0 0 0 130
0 0 0 131
0 0 0 132
0 0 0 133
0 0 0 134
0 0 0 135
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2.2.4.3 Investments in associates accounted for using
the equity method (IAS 28, Par. 28)
2.2.5 Joint Ventures
2.2.5.1 Listing and description of interests in significant
joint ventures, proportion of ownership interest,
aggregate amounts of items related to the
interests in joint ventures (that is, current assets,
long—term assets, current liabilities, long—term
liabilities, income and expenses)
(IAS 31, Par. 47)
2.2.5.2 Aggregate amount of contingencies related to
interests in joint ventures [IAS 31, Par. 45 (a), (b)
& (c)]
2.2.5.3 Aggregate amount of commitments in respect of
interests in joint ventures [(AS 31, Par. 46 (a) &
(b)]
2.2.6 Financial Instruments
2.2.6.1 For each class of financial asset, financial
liability and equity instrument: extent and nature
and significant terms and conditions that may
affect timing, amount, and certainty of cash flow
[IAS 32, Par. 47 (a)]
2.2.6.2 The accounting polices and methods adopted,
including the criteria for recognition and the basis
of measurement applied [IAS32, Par. 47 (b)]
2.2.6.3 For each class of financial asset: exposure to
interest rate risk including contractual repricing or
maturity dates, and effective interest rates (IAS
32, Par. 56)
2.2.6.4 For each class of financial asset: exposure
to credit risk including maximum credit exposure
at balance sheet date and significant
concentrations of credit risk
(IAS 32, Par. 67)
2.2.6.5 For each class of financial asset and
financial liability: information about fair value (IAS
32, Par. 77)
2.2.6.6 Carrying amount and fair value of financial assets
carried at an amount in excess of their fair value
[IAS 32, Par. 88 (a)]
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 136
0 0 0 137
0 0 0 138
0 0 0 139
0 0 0 140
0 0 0 141
0 0 0 142
0 0 0 143
0 0 0 144
0 0 0 145
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2.2.6.7 Reasons for not reducing the carrying amount of
financial assets carried at an amount in excess of
their fair value
[IAS 32, Par. 90 (b)]
2.2.6.8 Description	 of	 anticipated	 transactions,
hedging instruments and amount and the
expected timing of recognition of deferred or
unrecognised gain or loss as income or expense
(IAS 32, Par. 91)
2.2.6.9 Separate classification of component parts of
financial instruments as equity or liability (IAS 32,
Par. 23)
2.3	 CURRENT LIABILITIES
2.3.1	 Total amount of current liabilities (IAS 13, Par. 19)
2.3.2	 Bank loans and overdrafts [IAS 13, Par. 15 (a)]
2.3.3	 Other loans [IAS 13, Par. 15 (a)]
2.3.4	 Current portions of long—term liabilities except in case of
long—term debt to be refinanced; state amount and terms
[IAS 5, Par. 15 (b); IAS 13, Par. 15 (b); AS 13, Par. 16;
IAS 13, Par. 18]
2.3.5 Payables:
2.3.5.1 Trade
2.3.5.2 To directors
2.3.5.3 Intercompany
2.3.5.4 To associates
2.3.5.5 Taxes on income
2.3.5.6 Dividends Payable
2.3.5.7 Other
[IAS 5, Par. 15 (c); IAS 13, Par. 15 (c), (d) & (e)]
2 .3.6 Gross amount due to customers for construction contract
work as a liability [IAS 11, Par. 42 (d)]
2.3.7 Dividends proposed or declared after balance sheet date
but before the date of approval of the financial statements
(IAS 10, Par. 31)
YES NO N/A
O 0 0 146
O 0 0 147
O 0 0 148
O 0 0 149
O 0 0 150
O 0 0 151
O 0 0 152
O 0 0 153
O 0 0 154
O 0 0 155
O 0 0 156
O 0 0 157
O 0 0 158
O 0 0 159
O 0 0 160
O 0 0 161
2.3.8 Deferred revenues and advances from customers
[IAS 5, Par. 16; IAS 11, Par. 40 (b); IAS 13, Par. 15 (f)]
	 0	 0	 0	 162
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YES NO N/A
2.4	 LONG—TERM LIABILITIES
2.4.1	 Secured loans excluding the portion repayable within one
year
[IAS 5, Par. 14 (a)]
2.4.2	 Unsecured loans excluding portion repayable within one
year
[IAS 5, Par. 14 (b)]
2.4.3	 Intercompany loans excluding portion repayable within one
year
[IAS 5, Par. 14 (c)]
O 0 0 163
O 0 0 164
O 0 0 165
	
2.4.4	 Loans from associates excluding the portion repayable
within one year [IAS 5, Par. 14 (d)]
	 0	 0	 0
	
166
	
2.4.5	 Unamortised premium or discount (IAS 5, Par. 14)
	 0	 0	 0 167
	
2.4.6	 Summary of interest rates, repayment terms, covenants,
subordinations, conversion features (IAS 5, Par. 14)
	 0	 0	 0	 168
	
2.4.7	 Other Significant liabilities and provisions
	 0	 0	 0	 169
	
2.4.8	 Security given in respect of liabilities [IAS 5, Par. 10 (b)]
	 0	 0	 0	 170
	
2.4.9	 Liabilities which contain an option to convert to shares
(IAS 32, Par.23)	 0	 0	 0 171
2.4.10 Preferred shares which in substance, are liabilities
(IAS 32, Par. 18)
	 0	 0	 0 172
2.4.11 Nature of a financial instrument where balance sheet
presentation differs from the legal form (IAS 32, Par.50)
	 0	 0	 0	 173
2.4.12 Minority interests — separately from liabilities and
shareholders' equity (IAS 27, Par. 26)
	 0	 0	 0	 174
2.5	 SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
For each class of capital:
2.5.1 Number or amount of shares authorised, issued and
outstanding	 0	 0	 0 175
2.5.2 Capital not yet paid in
	 0	 0	 0	 176
2.5.3 Par or legal value per share
	 0	 0	 0	 177
2.5.4 Movement in share capital accounts during the
period	 0	 0 0 178
2.5.5 Rights, preferences, restrictions on dividends
and repayment of capital
	 0	 0	 0 179
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YES NO N/A
2.5.6 Cumulative preferred dividends in arrears 0 0 0 180
2.5.7 Required shares 0 0 0 181
2.5.8 Terms and amounts of shares reserved under
options and sales contracts [IAS 5, Par. 17 (a)] 0 0 0 182
SURPLUS AND RESERVES
Movement for the period and restrictions on distribution
for:
2.6.1	 Revaluation surplus 0 0 0 183
2.6.2 Reserves 0 0 0 184
2.6.3 Retained earnings
[IAS 5, Par. 17 (b); IAS 16, Par. 70 (f); IAS 25, Par. 49 (g)] 0 0 0 185
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PART 3 — INCOME STATEMENT
YES NO N/A
3.1	 REVENUE
3.1.1	 Sale of goods and rendering of services:
3.1.1.1 Accounting policy for the recognition of revenue 	 0	 0	 0	 186
3.1.1.2 Methods adopted to determine the stages of
completion of transactions involving the rendering
of services
[IAS 5, Par. 18 (a)]	 0	 0	 0	 187
3.1.2	 Construction contract revenue [IAS 11, Par. 39 (a)] 	 0	 0	 0	 188
3. /.3	 Other operating revenues [IAS 5, Par. 18 (a)]
	 0	 0	 0	 189
3.1.4	 Amount of each significant category of revenue
[IAS 18, Par. 35 (b)]	 0	 0	 0	 190
3.1.5 Revenue from exchanges of goods or services rendered
included in each significant category of revenue [lAS 18,
Par. 35 (c)]
	 0	 0	 0 191
3. /.6	 Reversals of write—downs of inventories recognised as
income [IAS 2, Par. 34 (d)]
	 0	 0	 0 192
3.2	 COST OF SALES
3.2.1 Cost of inventories expensed during period or operating
costs applicable to revenues, expensed during period,
classified by their nature (IAS 2, Par. 37 (a); IAS 2, Par.
38; IAS 2, Par. 37 (b); IAS 2, Par. 39)	 0	 0	 0	 193
3.2.2	 Significant write—downs of inventories
(IAS 2, Par. 40; IAS 8, Par. 16)
	 0	 0	 0	 194
3.3
	 OTHER ITEMS
3.3.1	 Interest income [IAS 5, Par. 18 (c)]
	 0	 0	 0	 195
3.3.2	 Income from investments:
3.3.2.1 Interest, royalties, dividends, rentals on long—term
and current investments
	 0	 0	 0 196
3.3.2.2 Profits/losses on disposal 	 0	 0	 0	 197
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3.3.2.3 Changes in value (for example, unrealised
gains/losses), and other than temporary
declines in carrying value of long—term
investments, reductions to market value and
reversals of such reductions DAS 5, Par. 18 (d);
IAS 18, Par. 35 (d); IAS 25, Par. 41; IAS 25, Par.
49 (b)]
33.3 Share of profits/losses of associates accounted for under
equity method and, separately, share of any
extraordinary or prior period items (IAS 28, Par. 28)
	
3.3.4	 Depreciation [IAS 4, Par. 15 (c); IAS 5, Par. 18 (b)]
3.3.5	 Effect of change in depreciation rates (IAS 4, Par. 8)
3.3.6 Unusual write—offs of long—term assets
[IAS 5, Par. 12; IAS 16, Par. 66 (e); IAS 22, Par. 72 (d)]
3.3.7 Research and development costs expensed in the period
[IAS 9, Par. 30 (b)]
	
3.3.8	 Retirement benefit plan expense (or income) [IAS 19,
Par. 22 (b); IAS 19, Par. 51 (b)]
	
3.3.9	 Interest expense [IAS 5, Par. 18 (e)]
3.3.10 Exchange differences included in the net profit or loss
[IAS 21, Par. 42 (a)]
3.3.11 Impact of change in classification of a significant foreign
operation on net profit or loss for each prior period
presented
[IAS 21, Par. 44 (d)]
3.3.12 Profit or loss from ordinary activities [IAS 8, Par. 10 (a)]
3.3.13 Nature and amount of items resulting from ordinary
business, the size, nature or incidence of which is
relevant to explain performance (IAS 8, Par. 16)
3.3.14 Taxes:
3.3.14.1 Taxes on income
(IAS 5, Par. 18 (f); IAS 12, Par. 22; IAS 12,
Par. 38)
3.3.14.2 Tax expense related to income from ordinary
activities [IAS 12, Par. 41; IAS 21, Par. 49 (a)]
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 198
0 0 0 199
0 0 0 200
0 0 0 201
0 0 0 202
0 0 0 203
0 0 0 204
0 0 0 205
0 0 0 206
0 0 0 207
0 0 0 208
0 0 0 209
0 0 0 210
0 0 0 211
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YES NO N/A
3.3.14.3 Tax saving recognised as a benefit in the
period of the loss [IAS 12, Par. 48 (a)] 	 0	 0	 0 212
3.3.14.4 Tax saving included in net income that had not
been accounted for in the period of the loss
[IAS 12, Par. 48 (b)]
3.3.14.5 Tax	 expense	 related
	 to	 extraordinary
items,	 to corrections of fundamental errors
and to changes in accounting policies
[IAS 12, Par. 41; IAS 12, Par. 49 (b)]
3.3.14.6 Tax effects related to revaluation of assets in
excess of historical cost or previous revaluation
[IAS 12, Par. 49 (c)]
3.3.15 Discontinuance of Operations
3.3.15.1 Gain or loss on discontinuance of operations
[IAS 8, Par. 20 (e)]
O 0 0 213
O 0 0 214
O 0 0 215
O 0 0 216
3.3.15.2 Revenue and profit or loss from the ordinary
activities of discontinued operation for the
period, together with corresponding amounts
for each prior period presented
((AS S, Par. 20 Mj	 0 0 0 217
3.3.16 Minority 'interest 'in 'income of group 	 0	 0	 0	 218
3.3.17 Extraordinary Items 
3.3.17.1 Extraordinary charges [IAS 5, Par. 18 (g)]
	 0	 0	 0	 219
3.3.17.2 Extraordinary credits [IAS 5, Par. 18 (h)]
	 0	 0	 0	 220
3.3.17.3 Nature and amount of each extraordinary item
(IAS 8, Par. 10 (b); IAS 8, Par. 11)
	 0	 0	 0	 221
3.3.17.4 Tax expense related to extraordinary items
[IAS 12, Par. 41; IAS 12, Par. 49 (b)]
	 0	 0	 0 222
3.3.18 Gain or loss on net monetary position resulting from
restatement of financial statements in the currency of a
hyperinflationary economy (IAS 29, Par. 9)
	 0	 0	 0 223
3.3.19 Interest, dividends, losses, and gains relating to financial
	
instruments classified as a financial liability (IAS 32, Par.
	 0	 0	 0	 224
32)
	
3.3.20 Significant intercompany transactions [IAS 5, Par. 18 (i)]
	 0	 0	 0	 225
3.3.21 Net profit or loss (IAS 5, Par. 18 (j); IAS 8, Par. 7)
	 0	 0	 0	 226
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PART 4— CASH FLOW STATEMENT
YES NO N/A
4.1	 Cash flows classified by operating, investing and financing
activities (IAS 7, Par. 10) 	 0	 0	 0	 227
4.2	 Major classes of gross cash receipts and gross cash
payments when direct method is used (IAS 7, Par. 18)
	 0	 0	 0 228
4.3 Major classes of gross cash receipts and gross cash
payments from investing and financing activities (except
those cash flows that are properly reported on a net basis)
(IAS 7, Par. 21) 	 0	 0	 0 229
	4.4	 Cash flows from extraordinary items (IAS 7, Par. 29)
	 0	 0	 0 230
	4.5	 Cash flows from interest and dividends received (IAS 7,
Par. 31)	 0	 0	 0 231
	
4.6	 Cash flows from taxes on income (IAS 7, Par. 35)
	 0	 0	 0 232
4.7	 Cash flows from acquisitions and from disposals of
subsidiaries or other business units, presented separately
and classified as investing activities (IAS 7, Par. 39)
	 0	 0	 0	 233
4.8	 For acquisition and disposals of subsidiaries or other
business units during the period:
4.8.1 Total purchase or disposal consideration [IAS 7,
Par. 40 (a)]	 O	 0	 0 234
4.8.2 Portion of purchase or disposal consideration
discharged in cash and cash equivalents [IAS 7,
Par. 40 (b)]
	 0	 0	 0 235
4.8.3 Cash and cash equivalents in subsidiary or business
unit acquired or disposed of [IAS 7, Par. 40 (c)]
	 0	 0	 0 236
4.8.4 Non—cash assets and liabilities of subsidiary, or
business unit, acquired or disposed of, summarised
by each major category [IAS 7, Par. 40 (d)]
4.9 Non—cash investing and financing transactions excluded
from cash and cash equivalents and disclosed elsewhere
in the financial statements (IAS 7, Par. 43)
O 0 0 237
O 0 0 238
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4.10 Components of cash and cash equivalents and
reconciliation of amount with equivalent items reported in
balance sheet
(IAS 7, Par. 45)
4.11	 Cash and cash equivalent balances not available for use
by the group (IAS 7, Par. 48)
4.12	 The effect of changes in exchanges rates on cash and
cash equivalents (IAS 7, Par. 28)
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 239
0 0 0 240
0 0 0 241
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PART 5— OTHER DISCLOSURES
5.1	 CONTINGENCIES
5.1.1	 Accruals for probable contingent losses
[IAS 10, Par. 8; IAS 13, Par. 15 (g)]
5.1.2 Nature, uncertain factors and estimated financial effect of
contingent liabilities/losses unless possibility of loss is
remote [IAS 5, Par. 10 (d); IAS 10, Par. 9; IAS 10, Par.
22; IAS 12, Par. 50; IAS 20, Par. 39 (c)]
5.1.3 Nature, uncertain factors and estimated financial effect of
probable contingent assets/gains [IAS 5, Par. 10 (d); IAS
10, Par. 16; IAS 10, Par. 22; IAS 12, Par. 50]
5.2	 COMMITMENTS
Amounts committed for future capital expenditure,
including the acquisition of P, P & E DAS 5, Par. 10
(e);.IAS 16, Par. 67(e)]
5.3
	 GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
5.3.1 Forms of government assistance received, and nature and
extent of government grants recognised [IAS 20, Par. 39
(b)]
	
5.3.2	 Nature and extent of government grants recognised
5V,Z 20, Pay . '3,3 i b)3
5.3.3
	 Unfulfilled conditions and other contingencies attaching to
government assistance that has been recognised
(IAS 20, Par. 39 (c))
5.3.4 Nature and extent of government grants received as
compensation for expenses or losses already incurred or
as immediate financial support with no future related costs
[IAS 20, Par. 20; IAS 20, Par. 39 (b)]
5.4	 INCOME TAXES
5.4.1	 Deferred taxes (IAS 5, Par. 12 (e); IAS 12, Par. 42)
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 242
0 0 0 243
0 0 0 244
0 0 0 245
0 0 0 246
0 0 0 247
0 0 0 248
0 0 0 249
0 0 0 250
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YES NO N/A
5.4.2	 Amount of current and cumulative timing differences not
accounted for (IAS 12, Par. 18) 	 0	 0	 0 251
5.4.3	 Taxes relating to an item included in shareholders' equity
(IAS 12, Par. 39)
	 0	 0	 0 252
5.4.5 Explanation of relationship between tax expense and
accounting income if not explained by tax rates effective in
the country of the reporting enterprise [IAS 12, Par. 49
(d)]	 0	 0	 0 253
5.4.6	 Contingencies related to taxes on income (IAS 12, Par.
50)	 0 0 0 254
5.5	 INTEREST CAPITALISED
Amount of borrowing costs capitalised during the period
and capitalisation rate used [IAS 23, Par. 29 (b) & (c)]
	 0	 0	 0	 255
5.6	 LEASES
5.6.1	 For lessees:
5.6.1.1 Assets held under finance leases and related
liabilities divided between current and long—term
portion
(IAS 17, Par. 21) 0 0 0 256
5.6.1.2 Amounts and timing of future minimum lease
payments beyond one year (IAS 17, Par. 24)
	 0	 0	 0 257
5.6.1.3 Significant financing restrictions, renewal or
purchase options, contingent rentals and other
contingencies
(IAS 17, Par. 26)	 0	 0	 0 258
5.6.2	 For lessors: 
5.6.2.1 Gross investment in finance leases, related
unearned income, unguaranteed residual values
of assets, and basis used for allocating income
(IAS 17, Par. 28; IAS 17, Par. 51; IAS 7, Par. 53)
	 0	 0	 0	 259
5.6.2.2 For each major class of assets when a significant
part of the lessor's business involves operating
leases: cost and accumulated depreciation that are
subject of operating leases (IAS 17, Par. 44; IAS
17, Par. 54)	 0	 0	 0 260
5.6.2.3 Leaseholds and assets being acquired on
installment purchase plans (IAS 5, Par. 11)
	 0	 0	 0	 261
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5.7	 RETIREMENT BENEFITS
51.1	 Provisions for pensions (IAS 19, Par. 51)
5.7.2	 Description of retirement benefit plans, employee groups
covered
DAS 19, Par. 22 (a); IAS 19, Par. 51 (a)]
5.7.3	 Significant matters related to retirement benefits that
affect comparability [IAS 19, Par. 22 (c)]
5.7.4 Actuarial details
5.7.4.1 Funding of retirement benefit plans
5.7.4.2 Actuarial present value of promised retirement
benefits
5.7.4.3 Fair value of plan assets (if plan is funded)
[IAS 19, Par. 51 (c), (e) & (f)]
5.7.5 Amount of liability or asset and funding approach adopted
if amounts funded are different from amounts recognised
as income or expense since inception of plan [IAS 19,
Par. 51 (g)]
5.7.6	 Principal actuarial assumptions and changes in those
assumptions
[IAS 19, Par. 51 (h)]
5.7.7	 Date of most recent actuarial valuation and frequency of
valuations [IAS 19, Par. 51 (i)]
5.7.8	 Other significant matters related to retirement benefits
iii,S143, Pas. 51 0)
5.8	 RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
5.8.1 Nature of related party relationships, types and elements
of related party transactions (IAS 5, Par. 18 (i); IAS 24
Par. 22)
5.8.2	 Separate disclosure of significant related party
transactions
(IAS 24, Par. 24)
5.8.3	 Related party relationships, where control exists even if no
related party transactions exist (IAS 24, Par. 20)
5.8.4	 Exemptions from related party disclosures (IAS 24, Par.
4)
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 262
0 0 0 263
00 Q264
0 0 0 265
0 0 0 266
0 0 0 267
0 0 0 268
0 0 0 269
0 0 0 270
0 0 0 271
0 0 0 272
0 0 0 273
0 0 0 274
0 0 0 275
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YES NO N/A
5.9	 SEGMENTAL INFORMATION
	
5.9.1	 Sales or other operating revenues, distinguishing between
revenue from customers outside the enterprise and
revenue from other segments [lAS 14, Par. 16 (a)]	 0	 0	 0	 276
	
5.9.2	 Segment result [IAS 14, Par. 16 (b)] 	 0	 0	 0	 277
5.9.3 Segment assets employed, expressed either in money
amounts or as percentages of the consolidated totals [IAS
14, Par. 16 (c)]	 0	 0	 0	 278
5.9.4	 Basis of intersegment pricing [IAS 14, Par. 16 (d)] 	 0	 0	 0	 279
5.9.5	 Description, reasons for changes, and effect of changes in
accounting practices and changes in identification of
segments
(IAS 14, Par. 24)	 0	 0	 0	 280
5.9.6	 Activities of each reported industry sequent and the
composition of each reported geographical area (IAS 14,
Par. 9)	 0	 0	 0 281
5.9.7	 Reconciliation of sum of information on individual
sequence and aggregate information (IAS 14, Par. 9)	 0	 0	 0	 282
SAS SUISEWENT EVENTS
5.10.1 Nature and estimated financial effects of material post-
taVante sheet e\sents that do not affect the condition of
assets or liabilities as at the balance sheet date (IAS 10,
Par. 28; IAS 10, Par. 33; IAS 22, Par. 76) 	 0	 0	 0	 283
5.10.2 Information on operations discontinued after the balance
sheet date (IAS 8, Par. 20) 	 0	 0	 0	 284
5.11 DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS
5.11.1 Nature of the discontinued operation [IAS 8, Par. 20 (a)] 	 0	 0	 0	 285
5.11.2 Industry and geographical segments in which it is reported
[IAS 8, Par. 20 (b)]	 0	 0	 0	 286
5.11.3 Effective date of discontinuance for accounting purposes
[IAS 8, Par. 20 (c)]	 0	 0	 0	 287
5.11.4 Manner of discontinuance (sale or abandonment)
[IAS 8, Par. 20 (d)]	 0	 0	 0	 288
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YES NO N/A
5.12 GOODWILL
5.12.1 Goodwill (positive and negative) [IAS 5, Par. 12 ( c)]	 0	 0	 0	 289
5.12.2 Method selected to translate goodwill (and fair value
adjustments) arising on acquisition of a foreign entity (IAS
21, Par. 45)
	 0	 0	 0	 290
5.12.3 Period of amortisation [IAS 22, Par. 72 (a)]
	 0	 0	 0	 291
5.12.4 Justification when amortisation period exceeds five years
(IAS 22, Par. 72 (b))
	 0	 0	 0	 292
5.12.5 Basis and reason for using an amortisation basis other
than straight—line [IAS 22, Par. 72 (c)]
	 0	 0	 0	 293
512.6 Reconciliation of amount at beginning and end of period
[IAS 22, Par. 72 (d)]
	 0	 0	 0	 294
5.13 HYPERINFLATIONARY ECONOMIES
5.13.1 Identity, level of price index at balance sheet date and
index movement during current and previous reporting
period
(IAS 29, Par. 34)
	 0	 0	 0	 295
5.13.2 Restatement of financial statements in a measuring unit
current at the balance sheet date [IAS 29, Par. 39 (a)]
	 0	 0	 0	 296
5.13.3 Valuation basis: historical or current cost approach
[IAS 29, Par. 39 (b)]
	 0	 0	 0	 297
5.13.4 Identity, level of price index at balance sheet date and
movement during current and previous reporting period
[IAS 29, Par. 39 (c)]
	 0	 0	 0	 298
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PART 6 — ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURES REQUIRED BY THE
COMPANIES ACT 1951 — CHAPTER 113
YES NO N/A
6.1	 SIGNATURES
The Balance Sheet is signed by two directors or, if there
is only one director, then by that one director (S149a)
6.2	 INCOME STATEMENT
6.2.A Emluments, pensions and compensation paid to directors
and past directors (not applicable to consolidated financial
statements if holding company publishes a separate
income statement) (S188)
	
6.2.2	 Auditors' remuneration (including expenses) if not fixed in
general meeting [8 Sch 13; S153 (7)1
	
6.2.3
	 Amounts respectively set aside for redemption of share
capita) and icons 18 Sch 12 (1) (d))
6.2.4	 Transfers or proposed transfers to or from reserves
[8 Sch 12, (1) (e)]
6.2.5 Transfers to or from provisions other than provisions for
depreciation, renewals or diminution in value of assets and
for losses of subsidiary companies [8 Sch 12 (1) (f)]
6.2.6	 Dividends paid or proposed stating whether shown gross
or net
[8 Sch 12, (1) (h)]
6.3	 BALANCE SHEET
6.3.1	 Share capital on which interest has been paid out of
capital and rate of interest (8 Sch 2 (b); S63)
6.3.2	 Earliest date of redemption on redeemable preference
shares
[8 Sch 2 (a); S57 (3)]
6.3.3	 Capital Reserves
6.3.3.1 Capital reserves shown separately from revenue
reserves
(8 Sch 4 (1); 8 Sch 6)
0 0 0 299
0 0 0 300
0 0 0 301
0 0 0 302
0 0 0 303
0 0 0 304
0 0 0 305
0 0 0 306
0 0 0 307
0 0 0 308
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6.3.3.2 Capital redemption reserve shown separately
[S57 (i)]
6.3.3.3 Share premium account shown separately
(8 Sch 2 (c), S55)
6.3.4	 Particulars of redeemed debentures which can be
reissued
6.3.5	 Trade investments quoted and unquoted:
6.3.5.1 Quoted investments:
(i) Subdivided between those quoted on a
recognised Stock Exchange [8 Sch 3]
(ii) Show the market value if different from
balance sheet value and the Stock Exchange
value if lower
6.3.5.2 Unquoted investments: When held as current
assets it is not necessary to show gross cost or
valuation and amount written off, but any
deficiency in value should be provided for
6.3.6 Loans to employees to enable them to purchase fully paid
shares in the company or its holding company [8 Sch 8
(1) (c); S53 (1)]
6.3.7 Loans to directors or officers of the company (made by the
company or a subsidiary, or a third party on the
security/guarantee of the company/any subsidiary) unless
made in the ordinary course of business or of E2000 or
under to employees [S189 (1), (2)]
	
6.3.8	 Nominal amount and book value of debentures held by a
nominee a trustee of the company (8 Sch 10)
	
6.3.9	 Preliminary expenses not written off [8 Sch 3 (a)]
6.3.10 Share/debenture issue expenses not written off [8 Sch
(b)]
6.3.11 Share/debentures commission not written off [8 Sch 3 (c)]
6.3.12 Discount on issue of debentures not written off [8 Sch 3
(d)]
6.3.13 Discount on issue of shares not written off [8 Sch 3 (e)]
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 309
0 0 0 310
000 311
0 0 0 312
0 0 0 313
0 0 0 314
0 0 0 315
0 0 0 316
0 0 0 317
0 0 0 318
0 0 0 319
0 0 0 320
0 0 0 321
0 0 0 322
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YES NO N/A
6.3.14 Disclosure by the directors whether in their opinion the
realisable value of current assets in the ordinary course of
business is less than their balance sheet value [8 Sch 11
(7)]
6.4	 GROUP FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
6.4.1 If the financial years of subsidiaries are not co—terminous
with that of the holding company, then reasons and the
date at which the last preceding financial statements were
closed must be disclosed in an annexure to the
consolidated financial statements or in the directors' report
(8 Sch 15 (6); 8 Sch 22)
6.4.2 Aggregate of auditors' remuneration of all companies
where it has not been fixed by general meeting, should be
shown in the consolidated profit and loss account [S146
(2)]
6.4.3	 Information to be shown in relation to subsidiaries not
included in the consolidated financial statements:
6.4.3.1 Particulars of shareholdings and indebtedness
shown separately in the consolidated financial
statements as in the financial statements of a
holding company
[8 Sch 21, 8 Sch 15 (2)]
6.4.3.2 Notes of holdings of such subsidiaries of the
shares and debentures of their holding companies
[8 Sch 15 (3)]
6.4.3.3 Particulars of the holding companies' proportion of
revenue profits or losses [8 Sch 15 (4) (b) (c); 8
Sch 15 (5)]
6.4.3.4 Qualifications in audit reports on financial
statements of subsidiaries or notes on financial
statements which would properly have been the
subject of a qualification, if they affect the holding
company and are not covered by its financial
statements [8 Sch 15 (4)]
6.4.3.5 If the information required under (iii), (iv) and
(v) above cannot be obtained a statement to that
effect [8 Sch 15 (4)]
Note: The information required under (iii), (iv) and (v)
above may be omitted if Registrar of Companies
permission is obtained and disclosed [8 Sch 15 (4)]
0 0 0 323
0 0 0 324
0 0 0 325
0 0 0 326
0 0 0 327
0 0 0 328
0 0 0 329
0 0 0 330
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6.4.4 Non—publication of the holding company's profit and loss
account:
6.4.4.1 A holding company need not publish a separate
profit and loss account, if it publishes a
consolidated profit and loss account complying
with statutory requirements and showing how
much of the consolidated profit or loss for the
financial year is "dealt with" in the accounts of the
company
[S143 (5)]
6.4.4.2 In such case the consolidated profit and loss
account must show particulars of directors'
emoluments [S143 (5)]
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 331
0 0 0 332
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE MEASURING INSTRUMENT
FOR GREECE
1, 
SUMMARY OF MARK ALLOCATION"
MARKS
1. MAIN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1.1. General Presentation 7
1.2. Balance Sheet Disclosures 128
1.3. Income Statement Disclosures 29
1.4. Appropriation Disclosures 17 181
2. PROSARTIMA (NOTES)
2.1.	 Preparation and Layout of Financial Statements:
Departures from the Requirements of Law
2190/1920 in Order to Show a True Picture 16
2.2.	 Valuation of Assets 41
2.3.	 Fixed Assets and Formation Expenses 32
2.4.	 Participations 16
2.5.	 Inventories 6
2.6.	 Share Capital 18
2.7.	 Provisions and Liabilities 19
2.8.	 Transitory Accounts 12
2.9.	 Memorandum Accounts 9
2.10. Guarantees and Assets Placed as Security 13
2.11. Fees, Advances and Loans to Directors 8
2.12. Income Statement 39 229
3. ADDITIONAL PROSARTIMA (NOTES) FOR GROUPS
3.1. Companies Included in the Group Accounts 34
3.2. Assets 5
3.3.	 Liabilities and Provisions 15
3.4. Results 18
3.5. Departures from the Law 15
3.6. Other Disclosures 17 104
514
68 Balance Sheet, Income Statement and Appropriation disclosures are based on the compulsory formats of
the Greek General Accounting Plan. If a company does not exceed at least 2 of the following 3 criteria, it can
prepare a "Condensed Balance Sheet" and a "Condensed Prosartima" (see article 42a, S6; article 43a, S2):
(a) Balance Sheet total, GDR 500m; (b) Revenue, GDR 'I bn; (c) Average number of employees, 50.
Furthermore, the numbering method of the Plan has been maintained for this section of the scoring
instrument. The measuring instrument has been validated by the international accounting firms of Coopers &
Lybrand (Greece) and Deloitte & Touche (Greece).
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CORPORATE DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
COMPANY NAME. 	
RESEARCH CODE: 	
DISCLOSURE SCORE:
(1) ACTUAL: 	
(2) MAXIMUM: 	
(3) RELATIVE: 	
STRUCTURE RELATED VARIABLES:
(1)	 COMPANY SIZE:
(I)
	
Total Sales: 	
(ii) Total Assets: 	
(iii) Market Capitalisation. 	
(2)	 OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION:
Number of Shareholders: 	
(3)	 COMPANY AGE:
Number of Years Since Date of Incorporation: 	
PERFORMANCE RELATED VARIABLES:
(1)	 PROFITABILITY:
(i) Profit Margin: 	
(ii) Rate of Return: 	
(2)	 LIQUIDITY:
Current Ratio: 	
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MARKET RELATED VARIABLES:
(1)	 INDUSTRY TYPE:
(i) Manufacturing* 	
(ii) Conglomerate: 	
(iii) Other: 	
(2)	 LISTING STATUS:
(i) Main Market Listing: 
	
(ii) Parallel Market Listing. 	
(3)	 AUDITOR TYPE:
(i) SELE member: 	
(ii) Non SELE member: 	
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N/A
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0 10
0 11
0 12
0 13
0 14
0 15
0 16
0 17
0 18
0 19
0 20
0 21
0 22
0 23
0 24
0 25
0 26
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PART 1 — MAIN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1.1
1.2
GENERAL PRESENTATION
1.1.1	 Name of company
1.1.2	 Country of incorporation
1.1.3	 Balance sheet date
1.1.4	 Period covered by financial statements
1.1.5	 Nature of activities
1.1.6	 Corresponding figures
1.1.7	 Adoption of compulsory presentation formats
BALANCE SHEET DISCLOSURES
ASSETS
A	 Unpaid called—up capital
B	 Formation Expenses
1 Formation expenses
2 Exchange differences on loans for the purchase
of fixed assets
3 Construction—period interest on loans
4 Other
r	 Fixed Assets
I	 Intangible assets
1 R&D costs
2 Concessions, patents, rights
3 Goodwill
4 Payments on account
5 Other
6 Goodwill on acquisition of subsidiaries
YES
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NO
00
00
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
II Tangible assets
1 Land
Less: Provision for diminution
2 Mines, quarries, farms
3 Buildings, structures
4 Plant and machinery
5 Means of transport
6 Furniture and fixtures
7 Assets under contruction and advances
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37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
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Ill Investments and long—term receivables
1 Equity participation in related and affiliated
companies
2 Equity participation in other companies
Less: Capital unpaid
Provisions for devaluation
3 Long—term claims on affiliated companies
4 Long—term claims on other related companies
5 Long—term notes receivables
Less: Deferred interest
6 Investments held as fixed assets
7 Other long—term receivables
A	 Current Assets
I Stocks
1 Goods for resale
2 Finished and semi—finished goods by—products,
wastes
3 Work in progress
4 Raw materials, supplies, consumables
5 Advances for purchase of stock
ll Receivables
1 Trade debtors
Less: Provision (general)
2 Notes receivable:
- Portofolio
(Less: Notes discounted
Notes transferred)
At banks for collection
At banks pledged
Less: Deferred interest
- Promissory notes
3 Notes receivables overdue
- Cheques receivables (postdated)
- Cheques overdue (redundant)
4 Share capital receivable
5 Receivables from affiliated companies
6 Receivables from other related companies
7 Receivables from members of management
8 Blocked deposits
9 Maturing portion of long—term receivables
10 Doubtful accounts receivables
Less: Provisions
11 Sundry debtors
12 Prepayments
YES NO N/A
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
00 0
000
000
000
0 00
0 00
0 00
000
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
III Securities
1 Shares 0 0 0
2 Bonds 0 0 0
63
64
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YES NO N/A
3 Other securities 0 0 0 65
4 Own shares 0 0 0 66
Less: Capital unpaid 0 0 0 67
Provisions for write down 0 0 0 68
IV Cash in hand and at banks
1 Cash 0 0 0 69
2 Matured bonds coupons 0 0 0 70
3 Demand and time deposits 0 0 0 71
E Transitory asset accounts
1 Deferred charges 0 0 0 72
2 Revenue receivable 0 0 0 73
3 Other 0 0 0 74
Memorandum Asset Accounts
1	 Third parties' assets 0 0 0 75
2 Guarantees and collateral 0 0 0 76
3 Claims from bilateral agreements 0 0 0 77
4 Other 0 0 0 78
LIABILITIES
A Owners' Equity
I	 Subscribed capital
1	 Capital paid up 0 0 0 79
2 Capital unpaid 0 0 0 80
3 Amortized capital 0 0 0 81
II	 Share premium account 0 0 0 82
III	 Revaluation differences, investment grants
1	 Revaluation differences from participating
interests and securities 0 0 0 83
2 Revaluation differences from other assets 0 0 0 84
3 Investment grants 0 0 0 85
IV Reserves
1	 Legal reserves 0 0 0 86
2 Reserves provided for by the articles of
association
0 0 0 87
3 Special—purpose reserves 0 0 0 88
4 Extraordinary reserves 0 0 0 89
5 Tax—exempt reserves 0 0 0 90
6 Reserves for own shares 0 0 0 91
Less: Goodwill on acquisition of subsidiaries 0 0 0 92
Depreciation of goodwill 0 0 0 93
V Profit or loss carried forward
1	 Profit carried forward 0 0 0 94
2 Loss carried forward 0 0 0 95
3 Prior years' loss 0 0 0 96
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O 0 0 98
O 0 0 99
O 0 0 loo
O 0 0 101
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YES NO NIA
VI Funds for capital increase
1 Owners' deposits
2 Dividends for capital increase
3 Reserves for capital increase
VII Exchange differences arising from the translation
of foreign subsidiaries
VIII Discount on acquisition of subsidiaries
Proportion in undistributed profits of affiliated
companies	 0 0 0 102
Minority interests 	 0	 0	 0	 103
Consolidation differences 	 0	 0	 0 104
B Provisions for Liabilities and Charges
1 Provisions for staff termination indemnities costs 	 0	 0	 0	 105
2 Other provisions	 0	 0	 0 106
r	 Liabilities
I Long—term liabilities
1 Bonds	 0 0 0 107
2 Bank loans	 0	 0 0 108
3 Post—savings loans	 0	 0	 0 109
4 Long—term liabilities to affiliated companies 	 0	 0	 0	 110
5 Long—term liabilities to other related companies 	 0	 0	 0	 111
6 Bank long—term loans on accounts receivable	 0	 0	 0 112
7 Notes payable of long—term maturity 	 0	 0	 0 113
Less: Deferred interest	 0	 0	 0 114
8 Other	 0	 0 0 115
II Short—term liabilities
1 Trade creditors	 0	 0	 0 116
2 Notes payable and promissory notes
	 0	 0	 0 117
Cheques payable	 0	 0 0 118
Less: Deferred interest
	 0	 0	 0 119
3 Short—term bank loans	 0	 0 0 120
4 Customers' advances	 0	 0 0 121
5 Tax and duties payable	 0	 0	 0 122
6 Social security contributions	 0	 0	 0 123
7 Long—term liabilities payable in the following
year	 0 0 0 124
8 Liabilities to affiliated companies	 0	 0	 0	 125
9 Liabilities to other related companies	 0	 0	 0	 126
10 Dividends payable	 O	 0	 0 127
11 Sundry creditors	 O	 0	 0 128
A	 Transitory Liability Accounts
1 Deferred income	 O	 0 0 129
2 Expenses payable	 O	 0 0 130
3 Other	 O 0 0 131
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Memorandum Liability Accounts
1 Beneficiaries of third parties' assets
2 Beneficiaries of guarantees
3 Commitments from bilateral agreements
4 Other
1.3 INCOME STATEMENT DISCLOSURES
I	 Operating income
Annual turnover (sales)
Deduct: Cost of sales
Gross operating profit (loss)
Other operating income
Standard cost variances
Total
Deduct:
1 Administrative expenses
2 R&D expenses
3 Selling expenses (and distribution)
4 Operating production overhead expenses not
included in costing of products
5 Standard cost variances
Partial operating income
Add:
1 - Income from equity participations:
Profit from participations in affiliated companies
2 Income from securities
3 Profit from the sale of participating interests
and securities
4 Interest income and other income
Deduct:
1 Value adjustments for equity participations and
securities
2 Expenses and losses from equity participations
and securities
3 Interest expenses and other charges
Total operating income
Add:
Extraordinary income
1 Extraordinary and non—operating revenue
2 Extraordinary profits
3 Prior years' revenue
4 Reversal of prior years' provisions
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 132
0 0 0 133
0 0 0 134
0 0 0 135
0 0 0 136
0 0 0 137
0 0 0 138
0 0 0 139
0 0 0 140
0 0 0 141
0 0 0 142
0 0 0 143
000 144
0 0 0 145
0 0 0 146
0 0 0 147
0 0 0 148
0 0 0 149
0 0 0 150
0 0 0 151
0 0 0 152
0 0 0 153
0 0 0 154
0 0 0 155
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Deduct:
1 Extraordinary and non—operating expenses
2 Extraordinary losses
3 Prior years' expenses
4 Provisions for extraordinary charges (including
provision for bad debts)
Total operating and extraordinary income
Deduct: Annual depreciation expense
Depreciation included in production cost
Depreciation of goodwill on acquisition of subsidiary
Exchange differences arising from the translation of
subsidiaries' accounts
Net income (profit or loss) before tax
Minority Interests
1.4 APPROPRIATION DISCLOSURES
Net income	 0
(+) or (-): Previous year's income/losses	 0
(+) or (-): Tax credit (charge) on prior years' taxable income 	 0
(+) or (-): Reserves for distribution	 0
Less: Income tax
Other taxes not included in operating costs
Profits for distribution or loss carried forward
Profits are distributed as follows:
1 Legal reserve
2 First dividend
3 Additional dividend
4 Reserves provided for by the articles of association
5 Special and extraordinary reserves
6 - Tax—exempt reserves
- Tax—free income reserves
- Special tax income reserves
- Reserves — income from construction companies
7 Emoluments of directors
8 Profit carried forward
0 0 156
0 0 157
0 0 158
0 0 159
0 0 160
0 0 161
0 0 162
0 0 163
0 0 164
0 0 165
0 0 166
0 0 167
0 0 168
0 0 169
0 0 170
0 0 171
0 0 172
0 0 173
0 0 174
0 0 175
0 0 176
0 0 177
0 0 178
0 0 179
0 0 180
0 0 181
YES NO N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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2.1.1	 Article 42a, S3 
Departures from presentation rules in order to
show with "absolute clarity" the true picture:
2.1.1.1 Description
2.1.1.2 Reason for departure
2.1.1.3 Impact on net worth
2.1.1.4 Impact on financial and cash position
2.1.1.5 Impact on profit/loss
2.1.2 Article 420, SI 
Departures from layout rules and format of the
financial statements:
2.1.2.1 Description
2.1.2.3 Reason for departure
2.1.3 Article 420, S2
Recording of account items in a particular account
rather than in other accounts which would have been
equally suitable:
2.1.3.1 Description
2.1.3.2 Analysis
2.1.4 Article 420, S3 
Adaptations in the layout and titles of accounts
denoted by arabic numerals where the special nature
of the business so requires:
2.1.4.1 Description
2.1.4.2 Explanation
2.1.5 Article 420, S4
Combination of account items denoted by arabic
numerals due to immateriality or in order to ensure
greater clarity:
2.1.5.1 Description
2.1.5.2 Explanation
APPENDIX C — continued
PART 2— PROSARTIMA (NOTES)
2.1 PREPARATION AND LAYOUT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS:
DEPARTURES FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF LAW 21 90/1 920
IN ORDER TO SHOW A TRUE PICTURE
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 182
0 0 0 183
0 0 0 184
0 0 0 185
0 0 0 186
0 0 0 187
0 0 0 188
0 0 0 189
0 0 0 190
0 0 0 191
0 0 0 192
0 0 0 193
0 0 0 194
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YES NO N/A
2.1.6 Article 426, S5
Reclassification of prior year amounts to make them
comparable with current year amounts:
2.1.6.1	 Description 0 0 0 195
2.1.6.2 Explanation 0 0 0 196
2.1.7 Article 430, S2
When financial statements are also presented in
ECUs disclose the exchange rate between ECU and
GRD. 0 0 0 197
VALUATION OF ASSETS
2.2.1 Article 43a, Sl.a
Methods of valuation, calculation of depreciation
and provisions for devaluations:
2.2.1.1	 Fixed assets
(i)	 Valuation method 0 0 0 198
(ii)	 Revaluation 0 0 0 199
(iii) Depreciation method 0 0 0 200
(iv) Explanation of provisions for
devaluations 0 0 0 201
2.2.1.2 Participations and securities in Societe
Anonymes
(i)	 Valuation method 0 0 0 202
(ii) Explanation of provisions for
devaluations 0 0 0 203
2.2.1.3 Participations and securities in other legal
entities
(i)	 Valuation method 0 0 0 204
(ii) Explanation of provisions for
devaluations 0 0 0 205
2.2.1.4 Government bonds
(i)	 Valuation method 0 0 0 206
(ii)	 Explanation of provisions for
devaluations 0 0 0 207
2.2.1.5 Stocks
(i)	 Valuation method 0 0 0 208
(ii) Explanation of provisions for
devaluations 0 0 0 209
2.2.1.6 Work in progress
(i)	 Valuation method 0 0 0 210
(ii) Explanation of provisions for
devaluations 0 0 0 211
2.2.1.7 Stock for own use 0 0 0 212
2.2.1.8 Scraps and by—products
(i)	 Valuation method 0 0 0 213
(ii) Explanation of provisions for
devaluations 0 0 0 214
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YES NO N/A
2.2.1.9 Stock valuation methods eg FIFO, LIFO
etc
(i) Valuation method
(iii) Explanation of provisions for
devaluations
2.2.2 Article 43a, 51.a
Basis of converting assets from foreign currency and
treatment of related exchange differences:
2.2.2.1 Amounts
2.2.2.2 Basis of translation
2.2.2.3 Accounting treatment of exchange
differences
2.2.3 Article 43, S2
Departures from normal valuation methods and
principles:
O 00 215
O 0 0 216
2.2.3.1 Description	 0	 0	 0 220
2.2.3.2 Reasons for departure 	 0	 0	 0 221
2.2.3.3 Impact on net wealth 	 0
O 0 0 
222
 2.2.3.4 Impact on cash and financial position	 223
2.2.3.5 Impact on profit/loss	 0	 0	 0 224
2.2.4	 Article 43, 57.13
Changes in the method of calculation of the
cost or construction cost of stocks or other current
assets:
2.2.4.1 Description
2.2.4.2 Reasons for the change
2.2.4.3 Impact on profit/loss
2.2.5 Article 43, 57.v
Any material difference between the valuation
and the market value of stocks or any other class of
current assets:
2.2.5.1 Stocks
(i) Total difference
(ii) Analysis by category
2.2.5.2 Receivables
(i) Total difference
(ii) Analysis by category
2.2.5.3 Securities
(i) Total difference
(ii) Analysis by category
2.2.5.4 Cash
(i) Total difference
(ii) Analysis by category
O 0 0 225
O 0 0 226
O 0 0 227
O 0 0 228
O 0 0 229
O 0 0 230
O 0 0 231
O 0 0 232
O 0 0 233
O 00  234
O 0 0 235
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2.2.6 Article 43 S9
YES NO N/A
Fixed asset revaluations as a result of any special
law:
2.2.6.1	 Description 0 0 0 236
2.2.6.2 Reference to the special law 0 0 0 237
2.2.6.3 Analysis of revaluation account 0 0 0 238
FIXED ASSETS AND FORMATION EXPENSES
2.3.1 Article 42 S8
Movement	 of each class	 of fixed assets
	 and
capitalised/ formation expenses:
2.3.1.1
	
Purchase cost or construction cost brought
forward 0 0 0 239
2.3.1.2 Additions and improvements during the year 0 0 0 240
2.3.1.3 Revaluations 0 0 0 241
2.3.1.4 Decreases and other transfers during the
year 0 0 0 242
2.3.1.5 Cost as at the year end 0 0 0 243
2.3.1.6 Accumulated depreciation brought forward 0 0 0 244
2.3.1.7 Annual charge for depreciation 0 0 0 245
2.3.1.8 Corrections of prior periods depreciation
charges 0 0 0 246
2.3.1.9	 Other transfers 0 0 0 247
2.3.1.10 Accumulated depreciation as at the year
end 0 00 248
2.3.1.11 Net book value as at the year end 0 0 0 249
2.3.2 Article 42, S5.6
Additional depreciation	 based on special tax law
(in the form of development incentives):
2.3.2.1	 Analysis 0 0 0 250
2.3.2.2 Reference to the relevant tax law 0 0 0 251
2.3.3 Article 43, S5.E
Provisions for decrease in the value of a tangible
fixed asset:
2.3.3.1	 Description 0 0 0 252
2.3.3.2 Amount 0 0 0 253
2.3.4 Article 43, S3.E
Analysis and explanation of formation expenses for
the year:
2.3.4.1
	
Explanations 0 0 0 254
2.3.4.2 Analysis by type 0 0 0 255
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2.3.5	 Article 43, Sly
YES NO N/A
Amounts and accounting treatment of exchange rate
differences arising on loans or other credits incurred
solely for the acquisition of fixed assets:
2.3.5.1	 Total amount 000 256
2.3.5.2 Analysis 0 00 257
2.3.5.3 Accounting treatment 000 258
2.3.6	 Article 43, S4.a 8, 6
Analysis and explanation of intangible assets:
2.3.6.1 Research and development
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 259
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 260
(iii)	 Explanation 0 0 0 261
2.3.6.2 Patents and trademarks
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 262
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 263
(iii)	 Explanation 0 0 0 264
2.3.6.3 Goodwill
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 265
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 266
(iii)	 Explanation 0 0 0 267
2.3.6.4 Other intangible assets
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 268
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 269
(iii)	 Explanation 0 0 0 270
PARTICIPATIONS
2.4.1	 Article 43a, S1.6
For each investment in the capital of another legal
entity that exceeds 10% of the investee's share
capital:
2.4.1.1	 Name 0 0 0 271
2.4.1.2 Headquarters 0 0 0 272
2.4.1.3 Share capital 0 0 0 273
2.4.1.4	 Participating interest 0 0 0 274
2.4.1.5 Acquisition cost 0 0 0 275
2.4.1.6 Result for latest period 0 0 0 276
2.4.2	 Article 43a, S1. f3
For each investment in the capital of another business
in which the company has an unlimited liability:
2.4.2.1 Name 0 0 0 277
2.4.2.2 Headquarters 0 0 0 278
2.4.2.3 Share capital 0 0 0 279
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YES NO N/A
O 0 0 280
O 0 0 281
O 0 0 282
O 0 0 283
2.4.2.4 Participating interest
2.4.2.5 Acquisition
2.4.2.6 Result for latest period
2.4.2.7 Nature of liability
2.4.3 Article 43a, S1.1E 
Consolidated financial statements in which the
company's financial statements are/will be included:
2.4.3.1 Name of reporting entity	 0	 0	 0 284
2.4.3.2 Headquarters	 0	 0	 0 285
2.4.3.3 Place where the financial statements are 	 0	 0	 0 286
made available
2.5 INVENTORIES
2.5.1 Article 43a, Stu]
Departures from the valuation principles of article 43
made for tax saving purposes:
2.5.1.1 Description
2.5.1.2 Impact on profit/loss
2.5.1.3 Explanations relating to any resulting material
future tax liabilities
2.5.2 Article 43a, S1.1 
Differences relating to decreases in the value of
working capital items:
2.5.2.1 Amount	 0	 0	 0 290
2.5.2.2 Reasons for differences	 0	 0	 0 291
2.5.2.3 Related tax treatment	 0	 0	 0 292
2.6 SHARE CAPITAL
2.6.1 Article 43a, S1.8
For each class of share capital:
2.6.1.1 Number of shares 	 0	 0	 0 293
2.6.1.2 Nominal value of shares
2.6.2 Article 43a, S1.v
For increases of share capital during the year:
2.6.2.1 Number of shares issued
2.6.2.2 Nominal value of shares issued
2.6.2.3 Issue price
O 0 0 294
O 00 295
000 296
0 00 297
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2.6.3	 Article 43a, Sit & 42E, Si 0
YES NO N/A
For issues of instruments with special rights:
2.6.3.1	 Preferred shares
(i)	 Number of shares 0 0 0 298
(ii)	 Nature of special rights 0 0 0 299
2.6.3.2	 Convertible debentures:
(i)	 Number of debentures 0 0 0 300
(ii)	 Nature of special rights 0 0 0 301
2.6.3.3	 Life—interest shares
(i)	 Number of shares 0 0 0 302
(ii)	 Nature of special rights 0 0 0 303
2.6.3.4	 Incorporation titles
(I) Number of titles 0 0 0 304
(ii)	 Nature of special rights 0 0 0 305
2.6.4	 Article 43a, StiaT
For purchase of own shares during the period:
2.6.4.1	 Reasons for purchase 0 0 0 306
2.6.4.2 Number of shares 0 0 0 307
2.6.4.3 Percentage of capital they represent 0 0 0 308
2.6.4.4 Nominal value of shares 0 0 0 309
2.6.4.5 Consideration for the shares 0 0 0 310
PROVISIONS AND LIABILITIES
2.7.1	 Article 42E, S14.5
Analysis of other provisions accouht (if material)
2.7.1.1	 Total amount 0 0 0 311
2.7.1.2 Analysis by type 0 0 0 312
2.7.1.3	 Description 0 0 0 313
2.7.2	 Article 43a, S1.4
Financial commitments and probable liabilities not
disclosed under memorandum accounts:
2.7.2.1	 Financial commitments 0 0 0 314
2.7.2.2 Guarantees 0 0 0 315
2.7.2.3 Other legal commitments 0 0 0 316
2.7.2.4 Other commercial commitments 0 0 0 317
2.7.2.5 Obligations for the payment of special
monthly fees 0 0 0 318
2.7.2.6 Economic commitments to affiliated
companies 0 0 0 319
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2.8
2.7.3	 Article 43a, S1. IS
Taxes payable or probable in respect of the current
and past periods not disclosed under liabilities and
provisions:
2.7.3.1	 Description 0 0 0 320
2.7.3.2 Explanation 0 0 0 321
2.7.3.3 Analysis 0 0 0 322
2.7.3.4 State for which period the tax liability has
been agreed with the tax authorities and for
which it hasn't 0 0 0 323
2.7.4	 Article 43a, StaT
Liabilities due after more than 5 years:
2.7.4.1 Total amount 0 0 0 324
2.7.4.2 Analysis on an item by item basis 0 0 0 325
2.7.4.3 Description 0 0 0 326
2.7.5	 Article 43a, StaT
Liabilities secured with real estate guarantees:
2.7.5.1 Amounts 0 0 0 327
2.7.5.2 Description 0 0 0 328
2.7.5.3 Nature and extent of security given 0 0 0 329
TRANSITORY ACCOUNTS
2.8.1	 Article 42E, S12
Analysis of
2.8.1.1	 Prepaid expenses:
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 330
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 331
(iii)	 Description 0 0 0 332
2.8.1.2 Accrued Income:
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 333
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 334
(iii)	 Description 0 0 0 335
2.8.1.3 Deferred Income:
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 336
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 337
(iii)	 Description 0 0 0 338
2.8.1.4 Accrued Expenses:
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 339
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 340
(iii)	 Description 0 0 0 341
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2.9	 MEMORANDUM ACCOUNTS
2.9.1	 Article 42E, S11
0 0 0 342
Analysis of:
2.9.1.1	 Third parties' assets
(i)	 Total amount
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 343
(iii)	 Description 0 00 344
2.9.1.2 Mutually binding contracts
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 345
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 346
(iii)	 Description 0 0 0 347
2.9.1.3 Guarantees and assets placed as security if
not covered by disclosures in Note 10:
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 348
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 349
(iii)	 Description 0 0 0 350
2.10	 GUARANTEES AND ASSETS PLACED AS SECURITY
Article 42E S9
Analysis of:
2.10.1 Guarantees given by the company:
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 351
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 352
(iii)	 Description 0 0 0 353
(iv) Nature and extent of security given
(v)	 Disclose separately amounts relating to
affiliated companies
0
0
0
0
0
0
354
355
2.10.2 Real estate securities pledged by the
company:
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 356
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 357
(iii)	 Description 0 0 0 358
(iv) Nature and extent of security given
(v)	 Disclose separately amounts relating to
affiliated companies
0
0
0
0
0
0
359
360
2.10.3 Real estate securities given to the company:
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 361
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 362
(iii)	 Description 0 0 0 363
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2.11 FEES, ADVANCES AND LOANS TO DIRECTORS
2.11.1 Article 43a, Stiv
Fees payable to:
2.11.1.1 Directors
2.11.1.2 Other members of the management
team
2.11.2 Article 43a, Stiv
Liabilities created in respect of assistance to retiring:
2.11.2.1 Directors O 0 0 366
2.11.2.2 Other members of the management team
	 0	 0	 0 367
NOTE: The above can be waived if it gives information
about the idemity and remuneration of
directors or managers.
2.11.3 Article 43a, S1.16
2.11.3.1 Advances to:
(i) Directors
(ii) Other members of the management
team
2.11.3.2 Loans to:
(i) Directors
(ii) Other members of the management
team
2.12 INCOME STATEMENT
2.12.1 Article 43a, Stri
Analysis of sales by:
2.12.1.1 Activity
2.12.1.2 Geographical area
2.12.1.3 In case of non—disclosure refer to the
Minister's decision exempting the company
from disclosing this information
2.12.2 Article 43a, S1.8
The average number of employees by category and
their related costs:
2.12.2.1 Average number
2.12.2.2 Analysis by category
2.12.2.3 Analysis of costs for each category
(i) Salaries
(ii) Social security contributions
(iii) Other forms of assistance
O 0 0 372
O 0 0 373
O 0 0 374
O 0 0 375
O 0 0 376
O 0 0 377
O 0 0 378
O 0 0 379
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2.12.3 Article 42E, S1533
Amounts and nature of exceptional and extraordinary
expenses and income:
2.12.3.1	 Exceptional and extraordinary expenses
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 380
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 381
(iii)	 Nature 0 0 0 382
(iv) Effect on tax charge of current year 0 0 0 383
2.12.3.2 Exceptional and extraordinary revenue
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 384
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 385
(iii)	 Nature 0 0 0 386
(iv) Effect on tax charge of current year 0 0 0 387
2.12.3.3 Exceptional and extraordinary losses
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 388
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 389
(iii)	 Nature 0 0 0 390
(iv) Effect on tax charge of current year 0 0 0 391
2.12.3.4 Exceptional and extraordinary profits
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 392
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 393
(iii)	 Nature 0 0 0 394
(iv) Effect on tax charge of current year 0 0 0 395
2.12.3.5 Income related to prior periods
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 396
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 397
(iii)	 Nature 0 0 0 398
(iv) Effect on tax charge of current year 0 0 0 399
2.12.3.6 Expenses relating to previous periods
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 400
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 401
(iii)	 Nature 0 0 0 402
(iv) Effect on tax charge of current year 0 0 0 403
2.12.3.7 Reversal from prior years' provisions
(i)	 Total amount 0 0 0 404
(ii)	 Analysis 0 0 0 405
(iii)	 Nature 0 0 0 406
(iv) Effect on tax charge of current year 0 0 0 407
2.12.4 Article 43a, Stu<
Any other information aiming at a more complete
understanding of the financial statements:
2.12.4.1	 Nature 0 0 0 408
2.12.4.2 Effect on financial statements 0 0 0 409
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2.12.5 Article42a, S5
Financial statements signed by the Chairman (or
Deputy Chairman), the Managing Director (or a
Director appointed for that purpose) and the Chief
Accountant 0 0 0 410
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PART 3— ADDITIONAL PROSARTIMA FOR GROUPS
3.1 COMPANIES INCLUDED IN THE GROUP ACCOUNTS
YES NO N/A
3.1.1 Article 107, S18
Information about companies included in the
consolidated accounts using the full consolidation
method:
3.1.1.1 Name	 0	 0	 0 411
3.1.1.2 Headquarters	 0	 0	 0 412
3.1.1.3 Participating interest of the parent company	 0	 0	 0	 413
3.1.1.4 Participating interest of other companies (or
of persons acting on their behalf) included in
the consolidation	 0	 0	 0 414
3.1.1.5 Reasons for consolidation
	 0	 0	 0 415
3.1.2 Article 107, S15
Information about companies included in the
consolidated accounts using the equity method:
3.1.2.1 Name	 0	 0	 0 416
3.1.2.2 Headquarters	 0	 0	 0 417
3.1.2.3 Participating interest of the parent company	 0	 0	 0	 418
3.1.2.4 Participating interest of other companies
included in the consolidation 	 0	 0	 0 419
3.1.2.5 Cost of participation	 0	 0	 0	 420
3.1.2.6 Share in net assets	 0	 0	 0 421
3.1.3 Article 107, Sly & 97 
Information about companies excluded from
consolidation or not equity accounted for, on the
basis of immateriality:
3.1.3.1 Name
3.1.3.2 Headquarters
3.1.3.3 Participating interest of parent company
3.1.3.4 Participating interest of other companies
included in the consolidation
3.1.4 Article 107, Sly & 98 
Information about companies excluded from
consolidation on the basis of dissimilar activities:
3.1.4.1 Name	 0	 0 0 426
3.1.4.2 Headquarters	
00	
0  427
3.1.4.3 Participating interest of the parent company
	
	 0	 428
3.1.4.4 Participating interest of other companies
included in the consolidation	 0	 0	 0 429
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3.1.5 Article 107, Sit
Information about those companies in which the
companies included and excluded from
consolidation, own directly or indirectly more than
10% of their share capital (this information can be
waived on the basis of immateriality; information
required under (d) and (e) can be waived under
special circumstances):
3.1.5.1 Name
3.1.5.2 Headquarters
3.1.5.3 Participating interest
3.1.5.4 Total amount of share capital
3.1.5.5 Profit or loss for latest financial year
3.1.6 Article 104, S7
The year end of all companies included in the group
accounts:
3.1.6.1 The actual year end
3.1.6.2 If the year end is not coterminous with those
of the group balance sheet:
(i) Explain reason
(ii) Disclose (if not taken into account when
preparing the consolidated accounts) the
important events from year end to date
of consolidated balance sheet relating to:
- Net wealth
- Cash and financial position
- Profit/loss for period
3.1.7 Article 104 S9
If there has been a change in the composition of the
group during the period then relevant information,
aiming in making the financial statements
comparable, should be disclosed:
3.1.7.1 Name of company
3.1.7.2 Nature of operations
3.1.7.3 Description of impact on:
(i) Net wealth
(ii) Cash and financial position
(iii) Profit/loss for period
3.2 ASSETS
3.2.1 Article 107, S1a
Valuation of assets included in the consolidation:
3.2.1.1 Methods of revaluation
3.2.1.2 Method of calculating depreciation and
provisions
YES NO N/A
0 0 0 430
0 0 0 431
0 0 0 324  3
0 0 0 434
0 0 0 435
0 0 0 436
000 437
000 438
000 439
0 0 0 aao
0 0 0 441
00 Q442
0 0 0 443
0 00 444
0 0 0 445
0 0 0 446
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3.2.2 Article 105, S3 
Normally assets and liabilities valued using
different methods from those used for the assets
and liabilities of the group must be revalued using the
latter methods. In exceptional cases, where their
inclusion using the original methods will not show the
"true picture" of the group, a departure from the
normal rule is allowed provided it is:
3.2.2.1 Described
3.2.2.2 Justified
3.3	 LIABILITIES AND PROVISIONS
3.3.1 Article 107, Si 07
3.3.1.1 Liabilities falling due after more than 5 years:
(i) Total amount
(ii) Analysis
3.3.1.2 If any of the above is covered with real—estate
security also disclose:
(i) Type of security
(ii) Nature of security
(iii) Amount
3.3.2 Article 107, SI<
Liabilities undertaken but not included in the balance
sheet:
3.3.2.1 Total amount
3.3.2.2 Analysis
3.3.2.3 Description
3.3.2.4 Disclose separately
(i) Pensions due
00 Amounts due to affiliated companies
3.3.3 Article 107, Sim
Probable taxes due and taxes relating to previous
years not accrued:
3.3.3.1 Description of contingency
3.3.3.2 Estimate of financial effect
3.3.3.3 Tax audit certification details
3.3.4 Article 104, S7 
Significant post balance sheet events:
3.3.4.1 Nature
3.3.4.2 Amounts involved
APPENDIX C — continued
YES NO N/A
3.2.1.3 Method of translating assets denominated in
foreign currency	 0	 0	 0 447
0 0 0 448
0 0 0 449
0 0 0 450
0 0 0 451
0 00 452
0 00 453
0 00 454
0 0 0 455
0 0 0 456
0 0 0 457
0 0 0 458
0 0 0 459
0 0 0 460
0 0 0 461
0 0 0 462
0 0 0 463
0 0 0 464
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YES NO N/A
3.4	 RESULTS
3.4.1 Article 107, S1 ri
Group turnover analysed by distinguishable:
3.4.1.1 Activity
3.4.1.2 Geographical area
3.4.2 Article 107, S10
Group average number of employees and related
costs:
3.4.2.1 Average number
3.4.2.2 Analysis by category
3.4.2.3 Staff costs (if not separately disclosed on the
face of the Income Statement)
3.4.3 Article 105 S5
In case the values of some assets have been
amended solely for tax purposes (eg accelerated
depreciation, special provisions, etc) these should be
included in the consolidation before those
amendments. They can, however, be included at
their amended values if the company discloses:
O 0 0 465
O 0 0 466
3.4.3.1 The amount
	
O00 470
3.4.3.2 The purpose 000 471
3.4.3.3 The justification 000 472
3.4.4 Article 107, S1113
Fees and other remuneration paid to the directors or
managers of the parent company, in respect of
duties undertaken for any group company:
3.4.4.1 Fees
(i) Total amount
	 0	 0	 0 473
(ii) Analysis by category	 0	 0	 0 474
3.4.4.2 Obligations undertaken in respect of pensions
to retiring members
(i) Total amount
(ii) Analysis by category
3.4.5 Article 107, Shy
Advances and loans to directors and managers of the
parent company, either by the parent or any of its
subsidiaries, should be analysed by category as
follows:
O 0 0 475
O 0 0 476
3.4.5.1 Amounts involved 	 0	 0	 0 477
3.4.5.2 Analysis by category 	 0	 0	 0 478
3.4.5.3 Interest rate	 0	 0	 0 479
3.4.5.4 Terms	 0	 0 0 480
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YES NO N/A
0 0 0 481
0 0 0 482
3.4.5.5 Amounts repaid
3.4.5.6 Any other guarantees undertaken on behalf of
the above persons
3.5 DEPARTURES FROM THE LAW
3.5.1 Article 100, S5
Any departures from articles 101 to 107 (S1 and
S2) in order to show with "absolute clarity" the true
picture:
3.5.1.1 Description
3.5.1.2 Explanation
3.5.1.3 Effect on net wealth
3.5.1.4 Effect on cash and financial position
3.5.1.5 Effect on profit/loss
3.5.2 Article 104, S4
3.5.2.1 Departures from article 104 (53y) relating to
the cancellation of intercompany
profits/losses are allowed only when they
were entered into in the normal course of
business and their cancellation involves
disproportionate expense.	 In this case
disclose:
(i) Description
(ii) Effect on net wealth
(iii) Effect on cash and financial position
(iv) Effect on group results
3.5.2.2 Departures from article 104 (S3) relating to the
cancellation of intercompany balances,
revenues, costs, profits and losses are
allowed if they involve immaterial amounts. In
this case disclose:
(i) Description
(ii) Effect on net wealth
(iii) Effect on cash and financial position
(iv) Effect on group results
3.5.3 Article 107, Sly
Other information required by special provisions of the
law deemed necessary to enhance the understanding
of the financial statements of the companies
consolidated or equity accounted for:
3.5.3.1 Nature
3.5.3.2 Effect on financial statements
0 0 0 483
484
0 0 0 485
0 0 0 486
0 0 0 487
0 0 0 488
0 0 0 489
0 0 0 490
0 0 0 491
0 0 0 492
0 0 0 493
0 0 0 494
0 0 0 495
0 0 0 496
0 0 0 497
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3.6 OTHER DISCLOSURES
3.6.1 Article 103 S4
Differences on consolidation:
3.6.1.1 Comment on the difference arising from each
participation
3.6.1.2 Comment on the treatment of each difference
3.6.1.3 Movement
(i) Original difference
(ii) Accumulated amounts written off at the
start of the period
(iii) Changes during the year
(iv) Balance at year end
3.6.2 Article 103, S4 and S2
Information about any fair value adjustments made to
the consideration given and the net assets acquired
as at the date of the acquisition:
3.6.2.1 Amounts
3.6.2.2 Analysis
3.6.2.3 Description
3.6.3 Article 104, S2 
The consolidation methods can only be changed in
exceptional cases subject to adequate disclosure of
3.6.3.1 Reason for the change
3.6.3.2 Impact on net worth
3.6.3.3 Impact on cash and financial position
3.6.3.4 Impact on group results
3.6.4 Article 106, S2
If the difference between the accounting value of an
investment in a related company and the value of the
group participation in its share capital is not disclosed
on the face of the balance sheet, then disclose:
3.6.4.1 The amount of the difference
3.6.4.2 In case the participation has been revalued
by virtue of article 43 this should also be
disclosed
3.6.5 Article 106, S3
In case the assets or liabilities of a related company
have been revalued using methods different from
those used in the consolidation and these valuations
have not been amended this should be disclosed
0 0 0 498
0 0 0 4,39
0 0 0 500
0 0 0 501
0 0 0 502
0 0 0 503
0 00 504
0 00 505
0 00 506
0 0 0 507
0 0 0 508
0 0 0 509
0 0 0 510
0 0 0 511
0 0 0 512
0 0 0 513
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YES NO N/A
3.6.6 Article 109
Group financial statements signed by one or more
directors as well as by the officer responsible for their
preparation	 0	 0 0 514
381
r ..
r u44
-4
+
P .->: w st ,4
a	 azg
. x
z
t
...0
E
CO,
t..
4C7
E:.
,....
w
o
gcc
>.
.. w 0 ,-_-,0 ..! .7 Pi
.., 2 k.7 0
4,,n1:Ca.
v) g E
L	 m a
0	 ..2
i
t g	 4
,,,
w =PZ
X
Z °
‘ \ X X X
tt
... ,
k m
,,, ,k
, tt.i
.7
..t F.
R'.. 2
+
.
w c,
CI [..1
E-. •S 41
;.7 0 cn0 f•-n •G
X
Lta
0
cn
47 =03
X
z 8
t'
W7
CY 0
4.1 +
\
I-.	 Zta 4. 0
gt.: PA. <
..E ..t cl)
Z C .7
( ( If
0
u7
.7 >.
g s a
it c, =`'' 2
,....,....,...
(—
..4
cn
4- X
P
w
cncr)
<
s. ,.. X 4- ..3. (- X 4- 4- 4- 72.
lal U Ia. t.I.-. rz p <
.: Q L4',
Q...) 47,
U z
"r 41 ..4
U
CC0 R*
g
`CC
---G
F-."
"I
U
.0.7...
I
a .
iii
=
0.
--,
—
..1
:g
2 )
i7i
i-4'
,..
,,
'"'"
I
03
cc7
,
'
-..
i
g6
—
;'S
10
i7)
Di
,
.
/—
c.:1
,,3
a]
—as
nsr--
—
Re
ai
FT'.
7.,
=
.
iz
M 0'.c4,,
rz...
"' 0
.S.
= 'A
i' uua
2 x
E... Z7--;
..2 c,cr,
ct 7. .-_,
..	 g
RI0.
=
c
g
00
3'
.1 .....
....
u =
r...
..,
cr
.7.,
b'
'a
3
1I
1
rs...t0 '..
w Z3 w0.. r..• Ka. .4
Y.
go
1
a
P.
i
N.
a
M
1
.<
	  M
1
a
:40
1
a
CO°
1
a
I
I
a
I
=
,.'E
1
V
i
,. n‘5
i
t
.^
>.'
t	 g.
m	 5< 2
n
n
i
I
a.
ic
0C.) cn
a
2
i
Z
,
,..)
w- z
u 14
.z c)L...)
g 
cn
$
3
L4
o
u
x
a
UJCD
Z
0
Z.	
1-
N rn .:s. ,c, co o
^ =
N ,.,
-
382
P-4
4,, tA3
P. LI
kd
4-
P ^3P
• . i....41? cn 0 cnZ < F <
x
_
x
..
5
..1:1
,.„.
,41
R0
i.M 0 t..)
cc, et 0 ,-4.
0 4t .1 0 X :0 X
a ,:l
iq	 c4cs. a al E0 4 d .
et:3=4
-
ce .
'ict 1
x
.,8
1 k:t., cD
,,,,'
Z0 t4;
..
< .I-.
 600 LaF 0
.
F •—nGO =
LI cy
al tcl
X X X
4—q..)F < ucCO F cnt.: 0 co)
0 I. <
X X
t‘it..1u:
0:1
z ..,
z 0
‘ ‘
`a.
,..4
a 0
wa +
f-	 z
La •k 0t P.
< .,4 tit
X C.: ..3
a
0
1.3
..:	 )...
't 0	 a
t .-4 in 0
A. A• n Z
..t Z t...
4—
'..
C/3
L.3
-a
a
th
x x x x ,..
P
1.1
cn
x
4c
\
‘.. X ss `... 1 X X
tu u k. s.
Z '', q '
$ a a
C.,ZZ4
z 4:	 a
0
e t
F:0.
o
,,
>. p,
0 C"
1- ._
„--,,,
&7.,
,
c.)38
;
_
0.
..
8u
.
a.
00c..)
a
a
g.
,..0 z
= —
os
...
..
z
E
El
a
z
lf •7‘
= 0,
77.:
..
7.
I
w
.E.
6:
-
.:
o
,
.
1
c,-,-
t
0
al
0 ,D
.4L0 c„, T.24a. 0, PC
t ;:t .:
II c;' 71`2 E
a I .< >
2..
-.52
T.
12
E
7f;
>
r. 0 -
Zra 3
5 >'a 2 c,
E
>
E
I2
F:',
re
g
2
IT.'
r.
1
0
Z
3
Fn
a
..:
E
i>
>.
a
aZ
aC.)
z
0 o o
z z
o o
=
o oz z0 o0 -,
a2
1
R
a
...,0 =z r.,,
..t ..,
0 0
0.
x
a
i; i 0
P
2
4 0F. z
5 <
c,,--
cz,
-_
—
.—.
-
....
,
—'
00
—.
c,.
'—'
7,-
(sl
r..
e,
CI
Tr
t".
,
r.r1
383
e01
+ E
P a
w
. 2
.+C 4
55
o
o
410
4"
w a
z"
a ..t
0
0Z 0
GrJ 40 4
'5n }
a
o
z
s,
= 0
5 e'
E ,I.
x
>.
...1
k.C
Q.
+
—Cl,.. 
V 2 roz_
.„,..
Z	 U.Iw 6	 a
x
F
< :.•0
+	 i..
k-: 6- cc rx
wi i..4 . >.•
x x
+
a ,.,
te. cc 0 r.4
z 0. i- a
. '3< . 3<
+
rg w w0 0 ..t F
Cg	 1-' 3
i- [-. < 0..
‘4 ,4	 2QZ Z ....kJ
1 1 X 1 X X
F Cl,C
tiH+tLai col
r p<
F t+ M
Gal	 tr•Z 0 +t
g% XM.
1 X 1
Cal
F Z
w 0Z C.)
4
wuT=0..
C4 I.. 1..
z 4: v.
0	
Ec,
,.,
Nt ...
,....,
__
-
.U
.0
.
:: "... •
.
ill
z...
p
*I
-a
.in
.0
0.
"..:. .
I
•.
=in
..7...
,
.
g1
.GO
0.,
,0 •
-‘L'.2
L..in
.4 a
ere
ifJ r,
- =2r.a
210 .S
r...".
&'
—8
=
-a
-
7.-...
,..
4,
2
.5.73
°2
z
2--
.L. ,75 0.
7.;
,scr‘
17,
1
.--.
0,0.
-.
,
§
0
,...,
.-,
1
1
g
—,
cr.
.11
;
e
g
Lt. .4
is, -0 LAD. ,
4 ?,
f.:,
.9
6'
2
al
a
2
a,
.
a
2
a
.
51
a0
a
Z,
,z
1
2
.,1
..
. g.0--.-,.
.,.
.am
<2
g'It
..
g2
g‘
%
-0
g
2
fn 's
zp
a
O'
tii
i
2
1'2,0
'1
z
I
>
a.
,....ac
k.
0
u
.=
a4
<
Q
u
uSZi_,.
.z 0
c13
a .
0
Li
z N
tal
0
z
0
z
0
Ne
0
zto g 2
'6 o1,7
1;
to
L
- r4 ol .0 ko ,,, CO C9 . C,1 en v
384
Ns.
4
a al
tul
cawl
‹Z
C,..)
Zt
„, z
o w o
D.. 1:4 ill
VI
Cr, n
0 1!XI0 —
Z il) C
Z
CP t;
t
0 •etSr. SY
+
t/3
F—n
ig u,
il]
ca.
Of.
k4 C.,IL x
..- V3
0 .1 47
4 5
.
...E
cd ...
m o
3 ‘4 	'‹z0
C).,C
dr:e.
zC
t CI,I—• Z
67
Cu {..
2 ce
0 0
c? CI.
-azfaaut.5
.J cci-
•-0:2
(..)
EiCcng.az
Zi7.1-
CD5,f:n -aua
cCO.
r=,
..!
• . . .
F• r,:.•
ig
,,:,
Z.	
-`5.
L'i	
‘* Q6. 4
.
, ..._
a.
0,
:a.
co,
,
.......
a
cks
'5
,
'
.....
2.•
cii
.,
.4
-cra
at
E .
a Z..
,
a.
E.
cl)
...
coa
...
ar,
as
....
P 7,1M 0
..:-..s.
g 1
2 x
.5
g
0 c,,
x =
•-•
•-:
,::1 c..) kJ
E. g 4..
. . ..,
'
a
co
t.'
M6
c
i
t
i
>.Lc
1
,...)
id Z
c.“4
- Z 0
..• :4
.2 3
u. en
,. -1
Lc'. Lti
Z N
Z
385
m
t 61
(.)
1
4 g
..L2,;,.
LI 8
2 'A g
x
nCr.,	 ..:	 ...
o 2 cg
o .,, 4
z u, c z
x
z
g g
o a
r... a
x %. s.
+
PGt cn
2 ti
x .4
w .
",.
..,0 ,..
k3c.:
.. x
..-.,,,r n w
5 F.)
.. E.
,„. s. ... x x x , x
.k
U Cr.
:1 '"'	 •
,,t z 0
— 0 4
6 rz O.
z 20 0 — ,
.4 z
,.. „ z
2 1...1
.... s. s. 4—
u
P 0
u.1	 cn
0 ''' II
= :i cn
g
0 kJ
•-n
<
X X sl. X X
[4.1 U1.-• rz:
4
R :=1
c4 tU
1	
.7.	 k
inn N"'"
61
"t
R.'
0.
:::.
.4.
;
..o•
a,
-V
g
U
<
-.
°3
x
t
>.' a
0%
..?( 7:::,
C- 3
g 1
171o.
c:r
4
z
.
t.,0,
.7.
§-
--,
0
-be
8
U
`i
,-.•
0
-.
8
U
__,
en
c,.
..
7'...
o
-.
8
u
<
<
.-
R g"
x =
42;
.a.,
75
.c
ed
g
<
2
.;
i3 .7„,g 0,
g--
..
V;
=A
ero.
0I
.
--•
..n-ng
-,....,
fi
,
.,,,,
;7,
crcrz,
130
It.	 •
z
r4.1 t"; 44
I. Q a,
1
,,1 E.,
— 2
6- g
%2<
,,;...?
To
v,,.._.
< ->
2
g
2
r.
-g
as2
"4
•a0
>
..'t4's74. . ,, 2 E6-. =
tr,,,1 7:2'MA >
<-2 4s
!..it''
„ n,. , 2. V0— . .
to.? 15po es >
<2 01
V.
c
0
>
L'.0
Vs
32
g'
ti
12
al15
i
e•0I2
0
a,i
<
L,
1
>
a.,Lc
0C.)
<
2
Ow
2
z
ow[LI
3
0Z
0
m
0Z
0
<
<7
a.
<
.k
—1
z 7
< L0
m 0 cy.
cal
ES5
r.I
„c
0
•-n
0 vz,
.-
r-
--,
co
.--,
oCA 174 ri"
rn
e..
V/
ni ,eV •.0CI ,IN 00r.
386
0.)
t th 'n
	
CA *a*	 6) °	 C/10
	
"0 0	 V/ Li' 	 cn 0
	
c o	 ta.	 >, —	 a, cn
a u 
0.
a	 'Fs' ml	 u, >,>. 7,
..	 u,.a 	 a c
	
-r1) C.)	 C 't	 c =>,	 c ct
	
a) dj	 —.	 a)
• 
.E	 a
	0 •'::	 t	 'a I-	 4) taS<at 7:
	
...0 aj
	ct	 c rd>	 '-- cct
	
E E	 ca,> .....z.,. ...	 ca >
	.0 bp	 'IS	 '-'' 0	 ..,. 'EU,0- E a a
	
2..	 a bi)
-0	 crl
	
a x	 7.:	 to t:41	 to aco
	
ccs ,..,	 ed	 4)	 a . c	 a .7,
-_,- 72	 • ...4/2 fi) >U,	 }...
• Z 0cn a)	 cn	 04
	
tn •,..'	 ..0 0	 0	 '0
	
=	 '''' mt7)0 10 ,— O.	 ,	 co3 .z	 t13 '''''rO ou,,o7- 4ts to 4,/, tE E
	 :43 ca. a 0°)
 R. 0" co,Z = = 0 0
... ...6- 0 a) t4
	
. , , ocs cL" a) , 03
	
L) s, >, te, 1., ra,)
	
a) "0 a)	 0 W) 1-• ...6' 	 vs MS = a: ss.. ••nn
	
" 
0) 04	 " t 73 0 n
	 3	 2 3	 2
	
= . a, - , ._, a) -	 t.)tn 0 
-0 a ,.., 1.. 0 00 y E-r., z, -0 E5 -0 kE TA
	
-^ ..a c3 — ...E a)
...C" .9':Pt' =CI" 0- Lt
	
. t,) 3 '`„.' `.) ,4ei --.„ lc "2	 46 ,-, 0,p tI) t.., Cta 5 p, 0 , 17.	 0
	
"0 6) Z ''' = '6. .: 03	 0 ...-. • •-• 0 L.; cncs
•.;.-, ..... — •— .4n1 ,	 X eL:4) 0ad J.. • 5..
	
4 ) Xi ts.1: . .) t E .- C a)	 tcs al S' ta' ttt .:z,	 t--n ';.5 ra
	
co . cc: co 0 a) 0 0 t,3	 Z
ew E.'	 t"...	 X> ,3 oha> a	 0	 — -a a	 a) on	 ta:ii'.:„ e E 1),.. 2,	 u , 2 Ix
	
,.. > VI	 vl •-• .... ,... p, .> 0 > > 0
	
2 ni.." 0 VI
tc0	 a) "0 a) ct '" db
,,,, .N 0 a) 7) ,f, , mstan
	
0) I-- ctI n''' E cla to	
....E. Z0 . Z7'1 ...0"' %...0$ . 7)
=,...Cn >Cti t 8 6,1)
0	 cr) < • -,
	
s-. t.7) 'A v] es u. 1... s...	 co, 00	 VI t1,00 4.) '0 0 0 -o	 "e5	 72	 —
	
o . . = a) 0 0 0	 CY 0 a) C. 0 a)
	 0
c-. 0 0 a . .
,.... - , •-	 ,.... ,..,.. ,... z 0 .0	 0. w
	
-g 0 co .- .E3. a)a.) 0 *-',- =
	
0 00)0)a) a..)	 40-4 ,.., E 5 a)
	
t 0. rj • — cat r r r
	 t..1('4 5 sa,c1* 5 5 E	 i:-.', 
	
0E,.,t4E000	 F,- F- = .vg 14 0	 Z GO Z 	 o.cl. 0 tp_ 1- „, 0. 0. 0.
	
C 	 E E ' E . E. -	 :.1
.t.D,t4 8 ,a) . oh -80. c.,	 0 s..6.; P. R. aa .- cL. — a a a &I re") Z.
 G 71 Z
	
>	 H II II II II II
	
ri) < C:4 0 < v) v) v)	 Gr.Z
..	 111111111111
	
c4	
›: E.-: c5H	 II	 II	 II	 H	 II	 II	 II	 t::4
;4	
cel
	 0 = a? co ¢ cia
s..., r-, X 4-- --), p
	
— rsi e•-, ,tr til n0 r-- 00	
.<	 Z ilj Z tli In. iii-,
387
APPENDIX E
CYPRIOT AND GREEK SAMPLE COMPANIES
	I
CYPRIOT COMPANIES
1. Agros Development Co "Proodos"
2. Amathus Navigation Co Ltd
3. Astarti Development Co Ltd
4. Avacom Computer Services Ltd
5. C.C.C. Holdings & Investment Ltd
6. C.C.C. Tourist Enterprises Ltd
7. Claridge Investments Ltd
8. Covotsos Enterprises Ltd
9. Cyprus Airways Ltd
10. Cyprus Forest Industries Ltd
11. Cyprus Sulphur and Copper Ltd
12. Cyprus Trading Corporation Ltd
13. Dome Investments Ltd
14. Drousia Heights Hotel Co Ltd
15. Edisson Electrical Contractors Suppliers Ltd
16. Efremico Stockbrokers Ltd
17. Ekto Ltd
18. Elma Properties and Investments Ltd
19. Emetkal Aluminium Ltd
20. Empal Aluminium (Nicosia) Ltd
21. Euroinvestment & Finance Ltd
22. EXE- Excellent Managed Fund Ltd
23. F.W. Woolworth & Co (Cyprus) Ltd
24. Gypsum and Plasterboard Company Ltd
25. Hellenic Mining Co Ltd
26. K & G Complex Ltd
27. Keo Ltd
28. Kermia Ltd
29. Lanitis Bros Ltd
30. Ledra Palace Hotels Ltd
31. Lemeco Si!vex Industries Ltd
32. Leptos Calypso Hotels Ltd
33. Loel Ltd
34. Lordos Hotels (Holdings)Ltd
35. Metohiko Pharmakio SEK-Lefkosias Ltd
36. Nicosia Buses Ltd
37. Olympus Wineries Ltd
38. Pancyprian Company of Bakers Ltd
39. Pancyprian Finance Corporation Ltd
40. People's Coffee Grinding Co Ltd
41. Pexek Ltd
42. Philoktimatiki Ltd
43. Sigma Radio IV Ltd
44. The Cyprus Cement Company Ltd
45. The Cyprus Phassouri Plantations Co Ltd
46_ The Cyprus P -pes Industries Ltd
47_ The Cyprus Tourism Development Company Ltd
48 Vass liko Cement Works Ltd
49. Venus Rock Estates Ltd
50_ Zako Ltd
APPENDIX E - continued
GREEK COMPANIES
1. A. Kalpinis N. Simos Steel Service Center
2. A.B. Vassilopoulos S.A.
3. A.G. Petzetakis S.A.
4. AEGEK S.A.
5. Alcar Trans Corn & Tour S.A.
6. Alcatel Cable Hellas S.A.
7. Allatini Industrial and Commercial Co S.A.
8. ALTE Technical Co S.A.
9. Aluminum of Greece S.A.
10. Alysida S.A.
11. Athens Medical Center S.A.
12. Athens Medical Clinic of Palaio Faliro S.A.
13. Athinea S.A.
14. Attica Enterprises S.A.
15. Balkan Exports S.A.
16. C.A. Papaellinas Group S.A.
17. Chipita International S.A.
18. Delta Dairy S.A.
19. Demetriades Fabrics S.A.
20. Elve Endymaton S.A.
21. Erlikon S.A.
22. Esha S.A.
23. Eskimo S.A.
24. Etem Light Metals Industry S.A.
25. Flexopack S.A.
26. G. Klaoudatos S.A.
27. Gnomon Construction Co S.A.
28. Goodys S.A.
29. H. Bernoubi and Son S.A.
30. Halyps Cement Co S.A.
31. Hellas Can Packaging Manufacturers S.A.
32. Hellenic Bottling Co S.A.
33. Hellenic Cables S.A.
34. Heracles General Cement Co S.A.
35. Hermes S.A.
36. Hippotour S.A.
37. Inform P. Lykos S.A.
38. Intracom S.A.
39. Intrasoft S.A.
40. Jacobs Suchard Pavlides S.A.
41. K. Doudos S.A.
42. Klonatex I.C.S.T. & T.C.A. S.A.
43. Kreka S.A.
44. Lavipharm S.A.
45. Macedonian Plastics S.A.
46. Macedonian Spinning Mills S.A.
47. Marine Co of Lesvos S.A.
48. Metalloplastiki Agriniou S.A.
49. Mytilineoas Holdings S.A.
50. Naoussa Spinning Mills S.A.
51. Nikas S.A.
52. Nirefs S.A.
389
53. Oinerga S.A.
54. P.D. Papoutsanis S.A.
55. Papastratos Cigarette Manufacturing Co S.A.
56. Pipeworks L. Tsirakian Profils S.A.
57. Radio A. Korasides Commercial Enterprises S.A.
58. Remek Pharmaceutical Cosmetics S.A.
59. S.P. Tasoglou S.A.
60. Selonda Aquaculture S.A.
61. Shelman S.A.
62. Sportsman S.A.
63. St. Georges Mills S.A.
64. Strintzis Lines S.A.
65. Technical Olympics S.A.
66. Technodomi M Traylos S.A.
67. Themeliodomi S.A.
68. Titan Cement Co
69. Viokarpet S.A.
70. Vioter S.A.
71. VIS Container Manufacturing Co S.A.
72. Xylemporia S.A.
73. Yalco S.D Constandinou & Son S.A.
74. Zampas S.A.
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